Session Forty-Nine, The Domain of the Inherent Dignity of the Human Being
Session Forty-Nine
The Domain of the Inherent Dignity of the Human Being — Conclusion — Examining Three Doubts — The First Doubt and Its Response — The Second Doubt and Its Response — The Third Doubt and Its Response — The General Conclusion of the Discussion
June 2, 2025
Conclusion of the Discussion on the Domain
This is the final session of this discussion, and we still have many topics that, if not necessary, are at least worthy of being addressed—such as the applications of this principle and examining the instances of its violation or those apparently conflicting with it throughout jurisprudence. This is because these discussions require more space and more extensive research to examine and answer them one by one, case by case. However, in a general manner, what was necessary has been said.
Up to this point, we have proven that inherent dignity is established for the human being; the scope of inherent dignity also comprises those six matters, without reducing some of them to others. That is, these six advantages are specific to the human being, and by virtue of them, we can say that God has honored and valued the human being; this exists for all human beings. Each of these advantages or dignities is also the source of a right or rights for the human being qua human being; we mentioned these rights in the previous session and stated that within this scope, any ruling that is incompatible with these rights is, in our view, unacceptable. However, within the scope outside of these rights, the differences and distinctions—whether justifiable or not, and whether accepted or not—do not damage our discussion. We do not wish to say that all the differences that exist among human beings, between Muslims and disbelievers, and between men and women are correct and that whatever the popular opinion (mashhūr) has said is correct; that must be examined in its proper place.
Examining Three Doubts
Within this scope, we want to see if there is any objection; whether there is any point or doubt that destabilizes this domain and this claim. Since time is short, I shall mention three doubts that are precisely connected to this domain—meaning they are somehow connected to some of the rights arising from the six dignities—to see whether they can be answered or not.
The First Doubt
The first doubt is that these very rights are sometimes ignored by some rulings; that is, some of those rights are violated by certain rulings that almost everyone has accepted. For instance, in the case of a native-born apostate (murtadd fitrī), there is no opportunity for investigation, research, questioning, study, and reconsideration. When native apostasy occurs, his ruling is execution, and even if he repents, it is not accepted; they say he must be killed. The most that is said is that his repentance is accepted by God, but it has no effect on his worldly ruling. Therefore, this violates the first right, which arose from the intellect; we stated that the right to investigate, research, question, and study is established for the human being; however, some of these rights are violated within this very scope. Thus, it becomes clear that this dignity is not inherent. This right that you say is established for the human being qua human being is ignored in the case of the native-born apostate.
Response
The response is that there is a debate regarding the permissibility or impermissibility of granting an opportunity to the native-born apostate for questioning, research, or investigation. It is not the case that everyone is in agreement regarding the impermissibility. In some parallel cases, they have considered this opportunity to be established for some individuals; for example, regarding some persons whose blood is considered permissible (mahdūr al-dam), such as rebels (bughāt), some have upheld this opportunity and believe that during this period, their security must be provided. Now, what barrier is there to opening the door of this investigation regarding the native-born apostate as well, by observing this principle? What objection does this have? Even if some have claimed consensus (ijmāʿ) on it. We can reconsider it with attention to what we said previously. Fundamentally, disbelief (kufr) is defined as denial arising from obstinacy and hostility (juḥūd and ʿanād); meaning someone who denies out of stubbornness and enmity, and such individuals are few. The majority of people are not as such. Therefore, with attention to the fact that disbelief carries such a meaning, and some jurists have explicitly stated this—such as Shahid al-Thani and Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini, who upheld a middle ground between disbelief and Islam—we can say that not every native-born apostate carries such a ruling. That is, if a person’s apostasy arises from doubt, skepticism, and questions, why should we deem him condemned to execution and not grant him an opportunity for investigation? Consider this especially in today’s conditions where many Muslims’ children are faced with this problem; can one truly put everyone to the sword? A story has been narrated and cited in some writings concerning the dialogue between Shahid al-Sadr and the late Ayatollah al-Khoei; Shahid al-Sadr stated regarding the repentance of a native-born apostate that if we see his doubts have forced him into apostasy, we must accept his repentance. Ayatollah al-Khoei did not accept this. Shahid al-Sadr raised the point that truly, in Iraq today, many Muslim youths have turned to Marxism and become communists; if we make this popular view the standard and the government is also Islamic, must we execute all of them?
Therefore, what obstacle is there, with attention to this noted point, that we do not consider a Muslim youth who grew up in an Islamic family environment but is now afflicted with doubt, or whom bad propaganda has led to exit Islam, to be included in this ruling?
In addition, the ruling of execution for apostasy carried a political aspect, which I pointed to here previously; meaning that the reason they did not grant an opportunity for repentance was because this act was a political action and carried a specific aspect. The late Ayatollah Ardebili also stated this on an occasion, and others have also said that this is a political ruling, rather than merely a punishment for individual opposition and one person’s exit from Islam. The hypocrites’ practice had become to become Muslim in the morning and turn back from Islam in the evening; a movement had started, and therefore, they wanted to confront that movement, and to confront that movement, they did not grant an opportunity for repentance; because the same thing would happen again.
The Second Doubt
The second doubt is that, assuming these rights cannot be violated in part regarding human beings from this perspective, there is nevertheless difference within the scope of these very rights; meaning, even if we accept differences outside the scope of these six rights and say that inherent dignity is not present there so as to be afflicted with these obstacles (although regarding those differences too, we must be answerable to some of the differences or discriminations according to some, but that does not relate to our discussion). The doubt and question is that there is difference within the scope of these very six rights. The difference is that it appears some human beings are more valuable than others. This is because there is a difference between a Muslim and a disbeliever regarding the impermissibility of humiliation, harm, harassment, and insult, and this is incompatible with the right arising from human emotions. Ultimately, what do you do with these differences? For example, if a Muslim falsely accuses a disbeliever of unchastity (qadhf), the prescribed punishment (hadd) is not executed upon him; but if he falsely accuses another Muslim, the prescribed punishment is executed. This itself is a difference; false accusation is a type of humiliation and insult, yet its punishment for one person is the prescribed punishment and for another it is not. If the human being qua human being enjoys this right, then why is it so? Or, for example, regarding blood money (diyyah), there is a difference between a disbeliever and a Muslim, or even the blood money of a woman and the blood money of a man. Or, for example, regarding the right to life, blood money, and retaliation (qiṣāṣ). Therefore, it becomes clear that these rights are not established for the human being qua human being.
Response
This doubt is also answerable; regarding these rights, we have a minimum (floor) and a maximum (ceiling). The origin of these rights is established for all human beings; the impermissibility of harm, injustice, humiliation, and insult has a minimum. For example, regarding the false accusation of a disbeliever, although the prescribed punishment is not established, it nevertheless carries discretionary punishment (taʿzīr); this itself shows that the Muslim had no right to perform this act. If a Muslim falsely accuses a disbeliever, he is subjected to discretionary punishment; discretionary punishment is a penalty and punishment determined by the ruler. This indicates that this act is a crime, a sign of its impermissibility; meaning the Muslim had no right to falsely accuse the disbeliever. Yes, the Muslim also has no right to falsely accuse another Muslim; however, if he falsely accuses a Muslim, his punishment is heavier; if he falsely accuses a disbeliever, his punishment is lighter and milder. This has no impact on the origin of that right; no one has the right to perform this act, whether Muslim or disbeliever. That we see differences in terms of the effects of these actions, whether in the positive or negative aspects, is in fact a privilege for the Muslim, rather than a deprivation for the disbeliever. This is a highly important point; for example, no one has the right to kill another or cause bodily harm; no one has the right to falsely accuse another, or deprive him of the right to think and ponder, or compel and force him into an affair, even if it is sacred and religious. Consider also the case of retaliation and blood money; there too, we say that if a Muslim kills a disbeliever, he must pay blood money, but his blood money is less; a female disbeliever a certain amount and a male disbeliever a certain amount. From this, it is clear that no one has the right to perform this act; this is the very right that the disbeliever possesses; meaning his life is respected. All matters related to them have been respected and recognized: their ownership, their marriage, the contracts they have, and their transactions. Therefore, the fact that some human beings are more valuable than others in the aspect of these rights is not a violation of our statement. This is because these rights exist for everyone in part, in the aspect of the certain minimums and floors. However, this does not conflict with granting advantages and privileges to Muslims in some of these rights, and the existence of certain advantages for Muslims is not considered a violation of our claim, just as we also mentioned this as one of the central points in our general response to the traditions.
The Third Doubt
The third doubt is that, assuming these rights are established for all human beings—meaning disbelievers also benefit from them—this is not exclusive to human beings, and animals also enjoy such rights. Therefore, inherent dignity no longer has any meaning. One must also provide food and water to animals, and show kindness to animals; one must not harm and abuse animals either; animals also possess the right to life, the right to eat grass and drink water, and the right to hunt other animals. Therefore, just as the human being benefits from these rights, animals also benefit from them. This indicates that these dignities are not inherent. The claim was that inherent dignity is established for the human being by virtue of these six matters; the meaning of inherent dignity was that these are advantages granted by God to the human being qua human being and not granted to non-humans, and by virtue of these advantages, he also possesses specific rights. However, we see that these exist in the case of animals as well.
Response
The response is that out of these six dignities, five are certainly not present in animals. Intellect, free will and choice, innate nature, the best creation (aḥsan taqwīm), and human emotions are certainly not present in animals. Yes, the animal shares some commonalities with the human being regarding the right arising from human emotions, but there is a vast difference between them. That one must provide water and food to an animal, not overload it, and not lash it—none of these is comparable to what is established for the human being. Our statement that the human being must not be oppressed differs greatly from the impermissibility of oppressing an animal. As I mentioned in the previous session, humiliation, insult, and violation of honor have no meaning regarding animals; but they carry meaning regarding the human being. Therefore, how can you say these rights are shared between the human being and animals? Yes, food and water are shared; but so many differences exist between the human being and animals.
As for the power to subjugate creatures, we stated that the right arising from this advantage is benefiting from natural resources, and that he can utilize them individually or collectively; this is established for the human being. The animal also has the right to eat food, consume grass, and breathe in this world, but the issue of subjugation, combination, and employing other creatures has no meaning regarding it. It is surprising that these rights arising from the six dignities are compared to the rights established for animals. Even if some rights are established for animals, its result is not the negation of inherent dignity. It is fundamentally an incorrect comparison (qiyās maʿa al-fāriq) and they have no connection to one another. Therefore, this doubt is also rejected in our view.
General Conclusion of the Discussion
After extensive examinations, we can say that we have a principle called the Principle of Dignity (qāʿidat al-karāmah), but not according to the popular conception of this principle, which aligns with the view of the lax/assimilationists (tafrīṭīs); these people say that everything introduced under the name of human rights is established hand-in-hand (ṭābiq al-naʿl bi-l-naʿl) for the Muslim, the disbeliever, the man, and the woman; however, this scope is definitely unacceptable in our view, because the dignities based on which certain rights are proven are not all inherent dignity. In addition, the very nature of their dignities may be different; we subscribe to the existence of these six dignities (now, you might say these dignities are not six but two, and they reduce to one another, but this is not very important; because they carried different aspects, we separated them from one another) and we say that these six dignities are followed by these rights, and in these rights, there is no difference between a Muslim and a disbeliever. These doubts that were directed at the six rights have also been resolved.
At any rate, the result and fruit of this principle must manifest itself regarding any matter that conflicts with these six rights. Since this principle is derived from the verses, traditions, and intellect, if a ruling is found somewhere that is contrary to these rights, it must be reconsidered. However, it must be noted that these rights are not absolute, but rather restricted by the boundary of public interest, the right of the public and society, and the non-transgression of the rights of society and individuals. That is, if limitations are created within these very rights, they arise from observing public interests and the interests of society. Now, if we can fit a ruling within this framework, there is no problem; if it cannot be placed within this framework, a measure must be devised and it must be re-evaluated. Those severe and intense rulings mentioned for disbelievers mostly carry the aspect of penalty; a portion is also outside this scope. However, even within those where a specific penalty and punishment is mentioned, the right of oppression and transgression beyond that designated measure and its extension to other affairs does not exist.
Question:
Professor: A group of the opponents of inherent dignity feel aversion (istīḥāsh) toward this term, not because of the term itself, but rather because of its consequences, effects, and the claims raised under the guise of this term.