Ayatullah Sayyid Mujtaba Nur Mufidi in an Interview with Harim-e Imam Journal: The People’s Vote Is the Prerequisite, and the Leader’s Endorsement Is the Absence of Obstacle

To begin with, please explain: what is the general concept of endorsement (tanfidh) in jurisprudence?

Endorsement (tanfidh) has been used in two senses in jurisprudence:

The first is granting validity to an act that is not valid in itself, or if it is valid, its validity is subject to annulment and rejection. Examples of this include the owner’s endorsement of an unauthorized contract (aqd al-fuduli), the heirs’ endorsement of a bequest exceeding one-third of the estate, and the like.

The second sense is executing or implementing a ruling or something that already possesses validity, such as the execution of a judge’s ruling. Endorsement in this sense is used in the chapters of prayer (salah), judgment (qada), and bequest (wasiyyah). For example, endorsement in the chapter of bequest according to this second meaning refers to the necessity of executing a qualified will upon the executor.

In any case, these two meanings have different consequences and implications, and paying attention to them is highly important in this context because, for this very reason, there is a disagreement regarding the meaning of the Leader’s endorsement of the presidential decree, and certain debates have resulted from it.

The most important difference between these two meanings in terms of their consequences is that endorsement in the first sense is at the discretion of the person holding the right or the owner—meaning they can either endorse it or reject it, and there is no obligation involved. In contrast, endorsement in the second sense is an obligatory duty and is considered a responsibility; the person cannot reject it, but rather, it is performed solely to realize a valid matter and implement it.

Sometimes, to express this difference in some cases, the expressions “ceremonial or symbolic endorsement” and “non-ceremonial endorsement” are used. Regardless of the extent to which this terminology is correct and precise, it must be noted that if it is said that endorsement in the second sense is ceremonial or symbolic, the meaning is not that its presence and absence are identical; rather, the meaning is that the person does not possess the power to reject it, and thus, through its endorsement, that ruling or matter is implemented, its effects are realized, and it is a source of responsibility.

For example, if a judge wishes to express an opinion on the ruling of another judge, without entering into the core of the case (because he deemed the judge who issued the ruling to be qualified), if he endorses his ruling, it means he makes the execution of its effects necessary, even if he disagrees with his ruling.

Paying attention to this point is important because sometimes the expressions “ceremonial” and “symbolic” cause confusion, and it is assumed to mean that it is ineffective and useless, whereas this is not the case. In any case, if we wish to summarize the difference between these two meanings in a single sentence, we can say that the difference between them is the difference between a right (haqq) and a duty (taklif). Endorsement in the first sense is a right, and therefore its holder can either accept that act or reject it; but endorsement in the second sense is a duty, and therefore they must act in accordance with it, and opposition to it is not permissible.

In light of what has been discussed, how do you view the jurisprudential standing of endorsement (tanfidh) in the presidency?

Regarding the jurisprudential standing, I must state that according to the theory of the Guardianship of the Jurist (Wilayat al-Faqih), the legitimacy (mashru’iyyah) of the various institutions of government is acquired through the approval of the ruling jurist and the qualified mujtahid, and the connection and link of these institutions with him. The reason for this connection and attribution is not to be discussed here, but must be examined in its proper place.

However, according to this foundation, the three branches of power must be attributed to the ruling jurist so that they acquire Sharia validity. For this very reason, you see that the head of the judiciary is appointed directly by the Islamic ruler, and the Islamic Consultative Assembly (Parliament) acquires this validity through the vetting of candidates by the Guardian Council, whose members are directly or indirectly appointed by the Leader. Regarding the presidency, the same applies; meaning that the connection, link, and attribution to the ruling jurist must be achieved in some way. Therefore, according to the theory of Wilayat al-Faqih, this is a necessity.

So, up to this point, there is agreement and no dispute (of course, within the framework of the followers of the theory of Wilayat al-Faqih). What is a subject of disagreement and discussion is the nature of this connection and how validation and approval are projected—and most importantly, how it is reconciled with the people’s vote; meaning, how must legitimacy be granted from the side of the Leader and the ruling jurist on one hand, while on the other, the people must vote for the president. This is in itself an important subject that requires discussion, but setting aside this aspect, the core necessity of the president’s approval by the Leader is not doubted. Both those who view endorsement in the first sense and those who view it in the second sense accept this.

However, the first group apparently believes that the path to the presidency’s legitimacy is restricted to the Leader’s endorsement of the people’s vote, while the second group does not restrict the path to endorsement, believing that this is achieved through other paths prior to the endorsement. To explain, the granting of legitimacy can occur through the country’s constitution, which was put to a popular vote and within which the general structure of the political system is delineated, and was approved and signed by the ruling jurist. This is because in this structure, the nature of electing the president, members of parliament, and the head of the judiciary is explained, and the mere fact that this structure is approved by the Leader means that all of these institutions have acquired their Sharia validity.

Or, for example, when the Guardian Council, whose members are appointed by the Leader, vets and approves the qualifications of the presidential candidates, this in fact means granting legitimacy to whoever the people vote for. Therefore, according to the view of the second group—who view endorsement as the implementation of the presidency—endorsement no longer possesses a legitimizing function, and there is no necessity for endorsement in this sense, because prior to it, this objective has been achieved. Consequently, in their view, endorsement does not mean validation, but rather implementation.

Thus, the disagreement lies in this direction. Therefore, in the view of the first group, endorsement is a right and is among the discretionary authorities of the Leader, who can, after the verification of qualifications and the people’s vote, re-evaluate and proceed to either approve or reject the presidency. However, in the view of the second group, because endorsement means implementation, it is among the duties and obligations of the Leader, from which he cannot abstain.

According to this view, the Leader’s endorsement is identical to the president’s signing of parliamentary bills, which merely has the role of implementing them. For this reason, it is considered the duty of the president, and he cannot refuse to sign them, but through his signature, the laws reach the execution stage; meaning he actually communicates these laws to the relevant organs for execution.

The remaining point is: under this second assumption, what necessity remains for the endorsement, and fundamentally, what was the intention of the framers of the constitution in including the Leader’s endorsement? This is a question for which an answer must be found.

What is the perspective of Imam Khomeini in this regard?

From the endorsement decrees of Imam Khomeini (may his soul be sanctified) regarding the presidents, it is inferred that he apparently believed in endorsement in the sense of validation and granting legitimacy. In the text of the endorsement decree of the first president, the Imam writes:

“Since the legitimacy of that election (of the president) must be by the appointment of the qualified jurist, I hereby, by virtue of this decree, endorse the vote and appoint him to this position.”

In the decree of the second president, it is also stated:

“Since its legitimacy must be by the appointment of the guardian of the affair (wali al-amr), I hereby endorse the vote of the noble nation and appoint him to the position of the presidency of the Islamic Republic of Iran.”

The expression “Since the legitimacy of the president’s election must be by the appointment of the qualified jurist” indicates that through the endorsement of the ruling jurist, the president acquires Sharia validity and legitimacy.

An important point that must be considered is that many of those who believe in endorsement in the sense of granting legitimacy speak of it or analyze the issue of endorsement in such a manner as if the people’s vote has no validity or value, and is raised merely for formal harmony with the conventions of the world, whereas in the view of the Imam, it is not so. While believing in the legitimizing role of the endorsement, he considered the people’s vote to have a real effect, rather than being a mere formality.

My understanding of the sum of the Imam’s words is that, in his view, the appointment of the president by the ruling jurist has a specific mechanism and is different from the appointment of the head of the judiciary. In the case of the head of the judiciary, the sufficient cause (tamm al-illah) for the appointment is the ruling jurist himself; but in the case of the president, it is a partial cause (juz’ al-illah)—meaning he can only appoint someone who, in addition to possessing the necessary qualifications for this position, also enjoys the vote of the nation.

If we consider the endorsement to be among the discretionary authorities of the Leader, which he can reject if he wishes, what then becomes of the people’s vote?

What can currently be said in response to your question is that if we consider the endorsement to be among the discretionary authorities of the Leader and say that through the endorsement, the office of the presidency acquires legitimacy, this does not mean negating the people’s vote and ignoring it. In our view, according to the constitution, the people’s vote is in fact equivalent to providing the prerequisite (muqtadi) for the Leader’s endorsement.

If there is no vote of the people, no prerequisite exists for the endorsement. The Leader’s endorsement also means that no obstacle (mani’) exists to the effect of this vote. Of course, the necessary qualifications of the individual who wishes to be exposed to the people’s vote are also among the requirements.

Therefore, in general, the gathering of the people and the endorsement of the Leader together cause the Sharia validity of the presidency, and consequently, if there is no vote of the people or if there is no endorsement and signature of the ruling jurist, the presidency possesses no validity.

Thus, if we consider the endorsement to be in the sense of validation, it does not mean that the people’s vote is ineffective. Here, as mentioned, two errors have occurred. The first group, who only sought the Sharia validity of the presidency through attribution to the ruling jurist—and that too solely through the endorsement—deemed the people’s vote to be completely valueless and empty. The second group, in order to resolve the problem of the people’s vote becoming ineffective under the mentioned assumption, found no choice but to say that the endorsement is merely an obligatory duty and means implementation rather than validation. Conversely, according to our solution, the endorsement means validation and granting legitimacy, and concurrently, the people’s vote is no longer valueless.

Therefore, according to this analysis, the people’s vote without the endorsement of the ruling jurist is equivalent to a situation where the prerequisite (muqtadi) for the presidency has been provided but has encountered an obstacle (mani’), and therefore they cannot assume the administration of affairs. Just as the decree of the jurist for someone who has not been elected by the people is equivalent to saying that the obstacle has been removed from before something for which the prerequisite has not been provided. Therefore, neither of the two extreme assumptions is acceptable