Introduction – Fundamental Questions – Questions One, Two, and Three

Introduction

The discussion of human dignity has gained significant importance in recent decades, with an ever-widening circle of scholars addressing it. Regardless of whether we consider it a jurisprudential rule, a right, the source of a right, or even a ruling, the reason for its prominence lies in its inclusion in certain laws, declarations, and international covenants. Today, I will provide an introduction and, God willing, a brief overview of the topics we will cover in the future.

Following the events in the Western world known as the Renaissance, which brought about extensive cultural and scientific transformations, the concept of dignity was sporadically addressed. Ultimately, in the mid-twentieth century, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights established the inherent dignity of humans as the foundation of human rights. I do not claim that this term or concept was absent from our religious or scholarly texts prior to this; indeed, references to human dignity have appeared in various contexts within theology, mysticism, and philosophy. However, the notion of inherent human dignity as the basis for a set of rights was formalized in this declaration. The concept is explicitly mentioned in several parts of the declaration. For instance, the preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states:

“Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice, and peace in the world, and whereas the peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter reaffirmed their faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and in the equal rights of men and women and have determined to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom, …”

It then proceeds to enumerate certain rights. Thus, in the preamble of this declaration, drafted and adopted in the mid-twentieth century, the inherent dignity of humans is explicitly emphasized and made the basis for numerous rights. For example, Article 1 states: “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.” Similarly, Article 2 reflects the concept and implications of inherent human dignity: “Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty.”

When inherent dignity is invoked, distinctions based on belief, faith, religion, race, color, sect, or gender lose significance, and humans are granted equal rights without discrimination, as the declaration puts it. This is a significant issue. In many Abrahamic religions, particularly in Islamic law, Shiite tradition, and Shiite jurisprudence, there are numerous rulings that, at first glance, appear incompatible with the content and spirit of this declaration. Comparing the provisions of the declaration with certain Islamic rulings reveals clear differences in rights among individuals based on religion or sect. For instance, the rights enjoyed by a Muslim are not necessarily extended to a non-Muslim. Certain rulings or privileges are established for Muslims but not for non-Muslims. For example, in the matter of marriage, jurists have explicitly stated that a Muslim man may initially marry a dhimmi (non-Muslim under Islamic protection) woman, but the reverse is not permissible; a non-Muslim man cannot marry a Muslim woman. Regarding blood money (diyah), there is a difference between that of a Muslim and a non-Muslim. This difference is also evident in retribution (qisas); if a Muslim kills a non-Muslim, they are not subject to retribution for the act and must only pay blood money to the rightful claimant, but the reverse is not true. This is the prevailing view in our jurisprudential texts. While some differences have emerged and certain laws have been substituted, I will not delve into those discussions here, but these differences exist. In matters of wills, inheritance, and various jurisprudential chapters—from ritual purity to punishments and blood money—wherever Islam is stipulated as a condition, it naturally imposes restrictions on non-Muslims. This pertains to matters of belief, religion, and sect.

There are also differences based on gender between men and women, traceable across various jurisprudential chapters. In matters such as testimony, inheritance, and blood money, there are many instances that, on the surface, appear incompatible with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The declaration’s foundation, which establishes equal rights for humans as humans—regardless of race, color, religion, or belief—is inherent human dignity. As noted, the preamble and certain articles, a couple of which I read, explicitly refer to equality and grant these rights to all humans across various dimensions.

Since the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted and accepted by countries, approximately 70 to 80 years have passed. During this time, various countries, including Islamic ones, have grappled with this issue, which has become a significant matter for them. Consequently, for decades, the topic of dignity has been a subject of discussion and extensive debate among Islamic scholars. The prominence of dignity in recent decades stems from the conditions that have emerged in the modern world. As I mentioned, this does not mean the concept was absent in the past, but the idea that inherent dignity serves as the basis for a set of rights for humans as humans has gained more traction in recent decades, as evidenced by the numerous writings, articles, and books on the subject.

Regarding the topic of dignity, particularly inherent dignity, various approaches have emerged. Many jurists and jurisprudential scholars have outright rejected inherent dignity, denying its existence for humans altogether. Surprisingly, some argue that inherent dignity is not a matter of dispute, considering it an indisputable and certain principle, but the debate lies in whether this inherent dignity affects the restriction or expansion of rights. Some have fully embraced it, while others have accepted it to some extent.

Fundamental Questions

In any case, this discussion requires addressing several fundamental questions:

Question One

The primary issue is whether humans possess inherent dignity. Views on this matter vary. There may be little disagreement regarding acquired dignity, which is generally accepted. However, regarding inherent dignity, there is debate about whether humans possess it at all. This is the first question. Some outright deny it, others accept it but do not commit to its implications, and some view it as a primary rule that can be qualified or restricted by a more significant reason—this perspective differs from the first. Others fully accept inherent dignity, arguing that it takes precedence over all primary jurisprudential rulings, akin to the principles of “no harm” (lā ḍarar) and “no hardship” (lā ḥaraj). Just as these principles override primary rulings (with some disagreement on how the “no harm” principle takes precedence over other generalities and primary rulings), they argue that inherent dignity similarly takes precedence. This view faces significant challenges: if we accept the primacy of inherent dignity as a rule over all primary jurisprudential rulings, we must reconsider or justify many Islamic rulings. Accepting this approach leaves no room for qualification, requiring a reevaluation of all the differences in rights and rulings between Muslims and non-Muslims, men and women, as found in the texts of Islamic law. We must either amend these rulings or provide justifications for these differences in a way that aligns with the principle of inherent human dignity. There are also secondary views within these three main perspectives that need thorough examination.

Thus, the first step is to determine what inherent human dignity means, whether it can be proven, and whether there is evidence for such dignity from religious sources and the four primary sources of Islamic law. This is a crucial question.

Question Two

Another important question is, if we accept that humans possess inherent dignity, does this dignity influence the derivation of Islamic rulings? By influence, we mean whether inherent dignity leads to the establishment or negation of a right for humans or establishes a specific ruling for them.

Question Three

The third question, which arises if the answer to the second question is affirmative, concerns the manner of influence. Someone might argue that inherent dignity exists and affects the derivation of Islamic rulings, but its impact is not absolute, only partial. Thus, the manner in which inherent dignity influences the derivation of Islamic rulings is a significant issue, leading to various perspectives. At this stage, those who accept the principle of inherent dignity and its influence on deriving Islamic rulings may argue that it is accepted as a primary rule, like the generalities found in the Quran and Sunnah, which may be qualified. Generalities often yield primary rules, such as the permissibility or obligation of a sale, but these can be overridden by specific evidence in certain conditions. This is one form of influence. Another form is accepting a complete influence, where inherent dignity is established in humans and has a comprehensive impact on Islamic rulings.

Thus, we face three fundamental questions regarding inherent human dignity, which must be addressed step by step.

In summary, this topic has gained particular significance in recent decades, becoming a subject of debate and challenge among Islamic scholars, including Shiite scholars. From one perspective, it concerns its impact on the realm of Islamic jurisprudence, encompassing both rights and certain obligations, not limited to rights alone. Its effects, which have been discussed, pertain to both obligations and rights. This topic has also been independently addressed in the field of law. I mention law alongside jurisprudence due to the distinction that has been drawn between these two disciplines, necessitating the examination of certain issues from a legal perspective. For instance, we now have the concept of citizenship rights, which differs from human rights, though they overlap in some cases, with a relationship of partial generality and specificity. Ultimately, we need to explore whether, from the perspective of citizenship rights, humans as humans—whether Muslim or non-Muslim, man or woman—possess certain rights. These are matters we must discuss here.

Question:

Professor:

This is part of the responses some provide. They argue that a non-Muslim man cannot marry a Muslim woman … Inherent dignity means that belief and faith have no bearing on matters related to marriage, freedoms, and so forth. I read Article 2: “Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, particularly in terms of race, color, religion, language, political or other opinion…”

In any case, this topic has become a matter of contention and debate, escalating beyond ordinary discussions to intense disputes. Some claim there is a jurisprudential rule called the rule of human dignity, while others argue that accepting this rule would dismantle the foundations of Islamic jurisprudence, accusing it of surrendering to global pressures that seek to align everyone with their agenda. Conversely, others assert that, based on Quranic verses, narrations, reason, and the practice of rational people, the existence of a rule of dignity is easily provable. On this basis, they call for a complete reevaluation of rulings that may appear discriminatory, stating that any ruling or right conflicting with this rule must be set aside, just as the “no harm” and “no hardship” principles negate harmful rulings. They argue that this rule negates discriminatory rulings or those that deny a person’s rights due to their belief, religion, or sect, as such rulings are incompatible with inherent dignity. However, those who reject it as a rule argue that no such jurisprudential rule exists; they may acknowledge that humans have inherent dignity but deny it as a formal rule. Some outright deny inherent dignity and defend all existing rulings, while others take a middle path.

Thus, what I am presenting is a general overview of the discussion. First, we must determine what dignity means and identify its types. We need to reach a common understanding of the concept and meaning of dignity and its categories. Then, we must precisely clarify the point of contention—what exactly we are debating and where the disagreement lies. Next, we must examine the foundations of inherent dignity—whether we can derive a basis for it from Islamic law. Certain foundations have been proposed, which we must evaluate for accuracy. After that, we should address the evidence for this rule—what are the claimed proofs? If we accept this rule, we must define its scope. Finally, after establishing the rule, its scope, and its foundations, we must examine the objections and doubts raised against it. Like other rules, we should also discuss its applications and review some instances of its implementation.