4. Fame: Clarification of the Point of Contention – Second Point – Third Point

Summary of the Previous Session

We stated that the fourth matter among those that generate conjecture (ẓann) and for which we must determine whether there is evidence for its validity is fame (shuhra). However, to clarify the point of contention, we mentioned that certain matters need to be addressed: When we discuss whether fame is authoritative (ḥujja) or not, we are examining whether it is considered among the specific conjectures (ẓunūn khāṣṣa). Is it like a definitive consensus (ijmā‘ muḥaṣṣal), a reported consensus (ijmā‘ manqūl), or the apparent meanings (ẓawāhir)? So far, we have discussed the authoritativeness of apparent meanings, the authority of lexicographers’ statements, and the authority of reported consensus. The fourth matter is fame. The first point we mentioned to clarify the point of contention is that we are discussing the authoritativeness of fame in fatwas (shuhra fatwā’iyya). Fame in fatwas refers to a fatwa that has become widespread among jurists without its basis being known. This differs from practical fame (shuhra ‘amaliyya), which refers to a fatwa supported by a report or narration that may be weak, but the fact that many jurists rely on it compensates for the weakness of its chain of transmission. Thus, the first point was that the fame in question here is fame in fatwas.

Second Point

The second point is that if we do not accept the authoritativeness of consensus, there is no room left for discussing the authoritativeness of fame. The discussion of the authoritativeness of fame follows and is dependent on the authoritativeness of consensus. If someone does not accept the authoritativeness of consensus, there is no place for discussing the authoritativeness of fame. This is a point some have made, and it appears to be correct. Therefore, the discussion of fame is raised in the context of and as a derivative of the discussion of consensus. Question: Professor: This is regarding the multiplicity and number. Here, it does not reach the level of consensus, regardless of the basis on which we accept it. For example, someone who uses the term “consensus” even if agreement has not been fully achieved would never use the term “fame” to express their intent. Hence, these are distinct from one another.

Third Point

If we are discussing the authoritativeness of fame in fatwas, we do not mean fame that leads to certainty or confidence (wuthūq). Someone might claim that fame in fatwas is authoritative because it generates certainty and confidence. If certainty and confidence are brought into the discussion, it is no longer about the validity or authoritativeness of fame itself but about the validity of certainty and confidence. For example, we say that certainty (yaqīn) is authoritative, and knowledge (qaṭ‘) is authoritative. Whenever certainty is achieved for a person by any means, it is authoritative, and its authoritativeness is inherent, not derived. If someone gains certainty about a legal ruling through fame in fatwas, the basis for its validity and authoritativeness is the achievement of certainty, and fame as fame has no intrinsic significance. Thus, when we discuss the authoritativeness of fame, we are actually discussing its conventional (ta‘abbudiyya) authoritativeness. We want to determine whether fame, as fame, is conventionally authoritative—without considering whether it leads to certainty or not—and whether there is evidence for its validity. Therefore, if someone claims that fame is authoritative because it leads to certainty, this is outside the scope of the contention. We will later mention that one of the opinions regarding the authoritativeness of fame distinguishes between the fame of early jurists (qudamā’) and that of later jurists (muta’akhkhirīn). However, some say that we gain certainty and confidence in a legal ruling from the fame of early jurists, which is a different discussion. Thus, the subject of the discussion and contention here is the conventional authoritativeness of fame in fatwas, without considering the attainment of certainty or confidence. We want to see whether fame, as fame, can be proven to be authoritative and whether there is evidence for its validity. Therefore, narrational fame (shuhra riwā’iyya) and practical fame (shuhra ‘amaliyya) are outside the scope of this contention. Fame that leads to certainty, confidence, or knowledge of a legal ruling is also outside the scope of this discussion.

Opinions

The opinions regarding the authoritativeness of fame vary. There are at least three opinions on this matter:

1. The absolute authoritativeness of fame, whether among later jurists or others. However, this opinion has few proponents.
2. The absolute lack of authoritativeness of fame, whether among early or later jurists.
3. A distinction between the fame of early jurists and that of later jurists, meaning that the fame of early jurists is authoritative, while that of later jurists is not. Each of these opinions has its own evidence, which we must examine. Question: Professor: Early jurists (qudamā’) refer to jurists up to the time of Shaykh Tusi.

Evidence for the First Opinion

The evidence for the opinion that fame is absolutely authoritative consists of several arguments.

First Evidence: The Reasoning in the Verse of Naba’

The first evidence is the reasoning provided in the context of the Verse of Naba’ (Quran 49:6): “If a wicked person comes to you with news, ascertain [its truth], lest you harm a people out of ignorance.” The verse provides a rationale for the necessity of verifying the report of a transgressor (fāsiq), stating, “lest you harm a people out of ignorance.” It means you should not act on the report of a transgressor but should verify and investigate it. Why? So that you do not act ignorantly toward a people, which would lead to regret. The argument here is that, based on this rationale, any action that causes harm to a people out of ignorance must be avoided. However, if an action does not entail harming a people out of ignorance, there is no issue with it. Acting on something that leads to such a consequence is impermissible, but if an action does not have this outcome, acting on it is permissible. The report of a transgressor certainly causes trouble and leads to harming a people out of ignorance, but fame does not. When a large group of jurists issue a fatwa, there is no harm out of ignorance. Thus, it is not prohibited; you only need to ensure that harm out of ignorance does not occur, and acting on fame clearly avoids this issue.

Examination of the First Evidence

This evidence is problematic both in its major premise (kubrā) and minor premise (ṣughrā). Objection to the Major Premise: The major premise is “lest you harm a people out of ignorance,” which is the stated reason for the necessity of verifying a transgressor’s report. Does this major premise explicitly or implicitly permit acting on fame? The explicit meaning (manṭūq) of “lest you harm a people out of ignorance” is that we must refrain from any action or matter that causes harm out of ignorance. But can we also infer that anything not causing harm out of ignorance is permissible? Can we take the implied meaning (mafḥūm) of this reasoning? This is the first point. Does it mean that if something does not cause harm out of ignorance, it is not prohibited and has no other issues? If a person acts ignorantly, makes a decision, or behaves in a way that causes trouble for a people, they must avoid it—this is clear. But are the things to be avoided limited to this alone? No, there may be other matters that must also be avoided for different reasons. Thus, fame may be prohibited for a reason other than causing harm out of ignorance. Therefore, we have an issue with the major premise: “lest you harm a people out of ignorance” does not indicate the permissibility, legitimacy, or validity of something that does not cause harm out of ignorance. Objection to the Minor Premise: It is stated that “lest you harm a people out of ignorance” is the reason for the necessity of investigating a transgressor’s report. As soon as a transgressor brings news, do not act on it; investigate it. Why? To avoid acting ignorantly toward a people, only to later discover it was incorrect. This reasoning has been used for fame, but we must consider what this “ignorance” contrasts with. Is it ignorance as opposed to knowledge, or does it mean folly (safāha)? There are two possibilities regarding ignorance:

• First Possibility: “Lest you harm a people out of ignorance” means “lest you harm a people out of folly,” i.e., acting foolishly.
• Second Possibility: Ignorance means lack of knowledge, i.e., acting unknowingly. Thus, ignorance could contrast with wisdom (ḥikma), meaning folly, or with knowledge (‘ilm), meaning lack of knowledge. If ignorance contrasts with knowledge, the question is whether acting on fame constitutes acting out of ignorance or knowledge. If someone acts on fame, taking a widely accepted fatwa as the criterion, this is clearly not acting based on knowledge. Acting based on knowledge means acting on certainty or knowledge, and fame, by our assumption, does not produce certainty or knowledge. Thus, this possibility is not acceptable. If ignorance means foolish behavior as opposed to wisdom or expediency, it does not apply to fame, as acting on fame is not considered foolish. Suppose it is widely accepted among jurists that a certain act is obligatory. The meaning of obligation is that neglecting it risks divine punishment in the hereafter. If an act is obligatory and a person neglects it, they may be held accountable for abandoning an obligation. Is there a risk of divine punishment here or not? Acting on fame to avoid the risk of punishment is certainly not a foolish act. Therefore, the Verse of Naba’ and its reasoning cannot prove the authoritativeness of fame. Perhaps because this is evident, many scholars of legal theory (uṣūlīyūn) have not cited this evidence.

Second Evidence: The Implication of the Evidence for the Authoritativeness of a Single Report

The second evidence is the implication (faḥwā) of the evidence for the authoritativeness of a single report (khabar wāḥid). We have evidence from which we derive the authoritativeness of a single report; how does this relate to fame? The authoritativeness of fame is derived through analogy by priority (qiyās awlawiyya) and the favorable implication (mafḥūm muwāfiq). Hence, the term “implication” (faḥwā) is used. The implication of the evidence for the authoritativeness of a single report refers to the priority-based implication we derive from it. The second evidence has two formulations, one of which was presented by Muḥaqqiq Khurāsānī in Kifāyat al-Uṣūl, though he himself objected to it.

First Formulation

The basis for the authoritativeness of a single report is conjecture (ẓann). We consider a single report from a trustworthy narrator authoritative because it generates conjecture about its content. This basis applies even more strongly to fame. When a single trustworthy narrator says, “Imam Sadiq (peace be upon him) said such-and-such,” and this creates conjecture about a legal ruling, then when dozens of jurists or the majority of jurists issue a fatwa, it creates conjecture about a legal ruling even more strongly. This is the first formulation presented by Muḥaqqiq Khurāsānī.

Examination of the First Formulation

Muḥaqqiq Khurāsānī objected to this evidence, stating:

• First: There is no evidence that the basis for the authoritativeness of a single report is the attainment of conjecture. The practice of rational people (binā’ ‘uqalā’), which is the most important evidence for the authoritativeness of a single report, is not based on attaining趟 attaining conjecture.
• Second: If the basis for the authoritativeness of a single report were conjecture, then in cases where conjecture is not attained, it should not be authoritative. Yet, in some cases, reports that do not generate conjecture are still considered authoritative. Both objections, the first and the second, are valid in our view. Thus, the first formulation of the second evidence, which relies on the implication of the evidence for the authoritativeness of a single report, is flawed due to these two objections.

Second Formulation

A single report is authoritative because it serves as a means to reality (ṭarīq ilā al-wāqi‘), and since fame in fatwas has a stronger connection to reality, it is authoritative by priority. This is again a matter of implication (faḥwā). The second formulation is based on the idea that the basis for the authoritativeness of a single report is its connection to reality. If we say a single report is authoritative because it is a means to reality, then fame, by priority, has a stronger connection to reality.

Examination of the Second Formulation

Is this acceptable? Is the basis for the authoritativeness of a single report its connection to reality? Do rational people act on a single report because they consider it a means to reality? Is this the basis for its authoritativeness? If we accept that the basis for the authoritativeness of a single report is its connection to reality, then we can rely on the implication of the evidence for the authoritativeness of a single report. However, this is debatable, as there are cases where rational people act on a single report without considering it a means to reality.

Discussion for the Next Session

In addition to these two pieces of evidence, several other arguments have been presented, which we must examine to determine whether fame in fatwas is authoritative.