The Meaning of Dignity (Karāmah) – Opinions of Lexicographers – Views of the Author of Muqāyīs and the Author of Mufardāt and Their Implications – Conclusion

Summary of the Previous Session

In the previous session, we presented an introduction that covered two main points: first, why this topic has become significant and somewhat challenging today, and second, the fundamental questions that this course aims to address.

The Meaning of Dignity (Karāmah)

The first matter we need to address is the meaning and concept of dignity (karāmah).

Opinions of Lexicographers

1. In Persian dictionaries such as Dehkhoda, several meanings are listed for karāmah, including nobility, honor, humanity, status, rank, degree, position, prestige, freedom from baseness, purity, benevolence, generosity, magnanimity, respect, reputation, value, and greatness. The Dehkhoda Dictionary compiles various meanings from other dictionaries, particularly for words of Arabic origin, and includes their common usages, as is typical for lexicographical works. When we examine Arabic dictionaries, many of these meanings appear, with each dictionary emphasizing certain aspects. Dehkhoda aggregates these meanings and adds some synonymous or related terms.
2. In some other Persian dictionaries, karāmah is also defined as intelligence. For instance, the Moin Dictionary lists karāmah as meaning generosity, greatness, and intelligence, alongside some meanings found in Dehkhoda. These examples illustrate the range of meanings attributed to karāmah, their interrelatedness, and their potential common essence, as many of these terms can be used interchangeably. In Arabic dictionaries, from the oldest to more recent ones, some of these meanings are mentioned, though not as extensively. I will provide references without quoting the texts to save time:

           Al-‘Ayn defines karāmah as nobility (sharāfah).

3. Lisān al-‘Arab notes that karīm (the adjective derived from karāmah) is a comprehensive term for anything praiseworthy. A person with qualities worthy of praise is called karīm.
4. Al-Jawhari in Ṣiḥāḥ al-Lughah defines karāmah as derived from karam (generosity, nobility), the opposite of baseness (danā’ah) and lowliness. Some dictionaries define it by its opposite, such as baseness or meanness.
5. Ibn Athīr in Al-Nihāyah describes karīm as a comprehensive term encompassing all forms of goodness, nobility, and virtue.
6. Al-Muḥīṭ fī al-Lughah defines karāmah as purity, something that is pure and commendable.
7. Ṭurayḥī in Majma‘ al-Baḥrayn states: “The Arabs only use karam to denote abundant virtues, and a person is not called karīm until these virtues are manifested in them.”

Question:

Professor: The root of karāmah is karam. Karam, with the pattern of fa‘l, has various derivatives, including the active participle (ism fā‘il) and the passive participle (ism maf‘ūl), each with its own meaning.

        8. Miṣbāḥ al-Lughah states: “Karam al-shay’ karaman means it became noble and honorable, so it is karīm, with the plural forms kirām and karamā’, and the feminine form karīmah, with plurals karīmāt and karā’im. The most precious and best of wealth is called karā’im al-amwāl. Akramtuhu ikrāman means I honored him, and the passive participle is mukram. The term karam is also applied to generosity (saḥā), and karamtuhu takrīman, with the noun form takrima. Additionally, karam refers to grapes.” It has many derivatives with varied meanings, but here, for example, karam is applied to generosity.

         9. Al-Taḥqīq fī Kalimāt al-Qur’ān states: “The core meaning of the root is that which opposes degradation (hawān), just as honor (‘izzah) opposes humiliation (dhillah) and greatness (kibr) opposes smallness (ṣighar).” It further explains: “Karāmah is honor and superiority inherent in the thing itself, without regard to superiority over others beneath it.” The author emphasizes: “Thus, it is clear that karīm is that which is inherently superior, free from degradation and weakness.” According to this view, the primary meaning opposes degradation and weakness. Concepts such as generosity (jūd), giving (i‘ṭā’), magnanimity (saḥā), forgiveness (ṣafḥ), grandeur (‘uẓm), purity (nazāha), or being praiseworthy, good, or free from baseness are considered effects or implications of karāmah. The author asserts that karīm has a single core meaning—opposing degradation—similar to how honor opposes humiliation, while other meanings are its effects or implications. Some of these meanings are mentioned in Al-‘Ayn (nobility), Ṣiḥāḥ (opposite of baseness and lowliness), and Lisān al-‘Arab (nobility). In summary, reputable dictionaries primarily define karāmah as nobility, greatness, or magnanimity, sometimes as the opposite of weakness, baseness, or meanness. The meanings listed in Dehkhoda encompass both the core meaning and its effects, as noted by the author of Al-Taḥqīq. Thus, terms like generosity and giving are effects and implications of nobility.

Question:

Professor: If someone possesses nobility and greatness, it does not necessarily imply a conceptual necessity. When we say these are effects and implications, it means that nobility and greatness, as opposed to baseness and lowliness, entail being generous, magnanimous, and forgiving. This seems broadly correct. At this stage, we are not concerned with whether this usage is literal or metaphorical; we aim to determine the core meaning. We can say that the primary usage of this term refers to nobility and greatness as the foundation of karāmah.

View of the Author of Muqāyīs

The Mu‘jam Muqāyīs al-Lughah defines karāmah in two ways: as nobility inherent in the thing itself or as a moral quality of human character. It states: “It has two aspects: one is nobility in the thing itself, and the other is nobility in a moral quality. It is said: a noble man (rajul karīm), a noble horse (faras karīm), a noble plant (nabāt karīm), and a man is honored (akrama al-rajul) when he produces noble offspring.” Nobility is sometimes attributed to the thing itself, meaning the thing inherently possesses nobility, or to a human behavior or moral quality. This distinction is significant: if nobility is attributed to the thing itself, it may be stable and claimed to be unchangeable, not seasonal or transient. However, if it is attributed to a moral quality or human trait, it is subject to change and loss. This is crucial, as it suggests that nobility has two dimensions. The meaning of nobility is clear, and both dimensions share a common essence—nobility itself. Whether we attribute nobility to the thing itself (sharaf fī al-shay’ fī nafsihi) or to a moral quality (sharaf fī khulq min al-akhlāq), they undoubtedly share a common meaning of nobility, but their manifestation in a thing or as a human trait differs.

View of the Author of Mufardāt

Rāghib Isfahānī distinguishes between nobility as attributed to God or to humans. He states: “When karam is attributed to God Almighty, it denotes His manifest kindness and blessings, as in the verse, ‘Indeed, my Lord is Free of need, Noble (Karīm)’ [Qur’an]. When attributed to a human, it denotes praiseworthy morals and actions that are manifested, and a person is not called karīm until these are evident.” When applied to God, karam is a name for His evident kindness and blessings, as God is the source of absolute kindness, sometimes manifest and sometimes not. When manifest, karam refers to God’s apparent kindness. When we say “God is Karīm” versus “a human is karīm,” the latter refers to praiseworthy morals and actions that become evident in a person. A person is not called karīm until these qualities are manifested. Thus, a distinction is made between God’s nobility and human nobility, which has implications. A human attributed with nobility may lose this quality, making it seasonal or transient. It cannot be claimed to be permanent. Someone might argue that nobility becomes an ingrained trait (malkah), and losing such a trait is difficult, though not impossible—it requires significant conditions.

Implications of the Views of Muqāyīs and Mufardāt

These two views influence the division of dignity into inherent (dhātī) and acquired (iktisābī). Given how they define karāmah, is this division valid? Can karāmah be divided into these two categories? This depends on how we define “inherent” here, as there has been some confusion. Sometimes, “inherent” is defined as unchangeable, while elsewhere, it is defined as changeable. For example, the late Allāmah Muḥammad Taqī Ja‘farī defines inherent dignity as unchangeable in one instance but as changeable in another. I will address this later. According to Rāghib and Mu‘jam Muqāyīs al-Lughah, attributing karāmah to humans and their morals is problematic. The latter distinguishes between the human soul (nafs) being noble and their morals being noble. When we say a human is karīm, it means the human soul possesses dignity and nobility. The core issue is this: according to the inherent dignity perspective, a human—whether a criminal, sinner, or traitor—possesses nobility. This is the crux of the debate. Some lean toward acquired dignity, arguing that even a great criminal can only be punished proportionately to their crime, which does not negate their nobility. They claim the individual has forfeited their nobility through their actions. If nobility is inherent, it cannot be said that a person has stripped themselves of it. Some argue that exceeding proportionate punishment or imposing humiliation beyond what is deserved is impermissible because humans possess dignity. Thus, for some, this dignity and nobility pertain to humans regardless of their beliefs, religion, or wrongdoings. If we say the human themselves possess nobility, it means they have it irrespective of their morals or actions—al-insān bima huwa insān (the human as a human). Ibn Fāris says: “It has two aspects: one is nobility in the thing itself,” which includes the human soul, independent of their morals, actions, or ingrained traits. Alternatively, he says, “nobility in a moral quality” (sharaf fī khulq min al-akhlāq), as when we say a man is karīm because of his praiseworthy morals or actions. Some attribute it to intellect, others to innate nature (fiṭrah), and various foundations exist that we must examine to determine their validity.

Question:

Professor: It is not limited to humans. Ibn Fāris says, “nobility in the thing itself,” meaning the thing itself is noble, and humans are among things. If we define it this way, we can attribute dignity to the human themselves or to their morals. Even the latter is not exclusive to humans—a noble horse (faras karīm) or a noble plant (nabāt karīm), such as a plant that yields abundant fruit or great benefit, is called karīm. Praiseworthy actions are not exclusive to humans and extend to non-humans. Thus, both aspects—nobility in the thing itself and in moral qualities—are not exclusive to humans and have a broader meaning. Rāghib’s distinction between humans and God likely focuses on Qur’anic and narrated usages, so what we cite from Mufardāt serves more as confirmation than a definitive source.

Conclusion

In summary, the lexical meaning of karāmah encompasses nobility, greatness, status, prestige, reputation, and honor, all of which converge on a similar meaning. Defining a term by its opposite, such as nobility versus baseness or greatness versus lowliness, is helpful but not comprehensive. It aids understanding but does not fully capture the meaning. For example, we say honor (‘izzah) is the opposite of humiliation (dhillah), but what is honor itself? Thus, karāmah is established as meaning nobility, a broad and inclusive term that can apply to the thing itself or to praiseworthy morals and actions. The term karāmah has the capacity to encompass both dimensions, which is significant. We should recognize this conceptual breadth, allowing it to accommodate both aspects.