Preliminaries – Second Preliminary – The Three Stages of Practical Principles – First Stage – Second Stage – Third Stage

2025-2026

Lecture Two

Preliminaries – Second Preliminary – The Three Stages of Practical Principles – First Stage – Second Stage – Third Stage
September 15, 2025

Summary of the Previous Lecture

We mentioned that before entering the discussion on the practical principles (al-usul al-amaliyyah), it is necessary to present certain preliminaries.

The first preliminary, which we mentioned yesterday, was that the term “practical principle” (al-asl al-amali) is a terminology that has found its way into our books of principles (usul) and jurisprudence (fiqh) in recent centuries, and this term was not utilized in the early centuries; although the content and substance of some practical principles can be traced in those books.

Second Preliminary

The second preliminary concerns the evolutionary trajectory of the practical principles; how were these practical principles initially proposed and relied upon, and what path have they traversed subsequently until today to reach this point?

The Three Stages

Generally, we can identify three stages and three periods for the practical principles:

First Stage

The first stage belongs to the early scholars (al-mutaqaddimin), namely the era of Sayyid al-Murtada, Ibn Zuhrah, and Shaykh al-Tusi. In this stage, several points are noteworthy:

The substance of some of these principles was presented as a rational proof (al-dalil al-aqli). These scholars listed the sources of jurisprudence and the foundations of derivation (istinbat) as four: the Book, the Sunnah, consensus (ijma’), and intellect (‘aql); they placed the principle of exoneration (asalat al-bara’ah) under the fourth proof and source, and subsequently mentioned the presumption of continuity (istishab) within the domain of the rational proof. This means that istishab, which itself was based on certain narrations, along with bara’ah, was presented as a rational proof.

What they meant by bara’ah in their discourse was the istishab of the exoneration of liability (istishab bara’at al-dhimmah); namely, before the arrival of Shari’ah, human liability was free from obligation, and now we doubt whether an obligation has been placed upon humans or not. They would apply istishab to the exoneration of liability and the freedom from obligation. Sometimes they also referred to this as “the presumption of the original rational state” (istishab hal al-‘aql). This much can be observed in the books of some scholars like Sayyid al-Murtada and Ibn Zuhrah.
Another point worthy of attention in this stage is that they presented these proofs as definitive proofs (adillah qat’iyyah); meaning that the Book, the Sunnah, consensus, and intellect were introduced as definitive proofs. Acting in accordance with bara’ah was regarded as acting upon a definitive rational proof. This stood in contrast to the Sunni scholars (al-ammah) who acted upon certain conjectures (zunun) and indications (amarat). The claim of the Shia scholars in that period was that we have no need for conjecture, and all our proofs are definitive, and among the definitive proofs, they mentioned bara’ah and istishab.

Therefore, the practical principle was included under the proof of intellect alongside the other three proofs; the Book, the Sunnah, consensus, and intellect; and istishab and bara’ah were also a part or an instance of the rational proof.

Second Stage

In the second stage, they recognized these proofs uniformly as proofs for the actual ruling (al-hukm al-waqi’i); meaning, as though these are tools with which the actual ruling can be discovered. The discussions of the apparent ruling (al-hukm al-zahiri) and the jurisprudential proof (al-dalil al-fiqahati) (which emerged later) were not proposed at all at that time. They used to say we have four proofs: the Book, the Sunnah, consensus, and intellect. A part of the rational proof was related to rational implications (mulazamat), another part was this very bara’ah and istishab, and perhaps in some cases, actual choice (takhyir waqi’i). Therefore, in this stage, they considered the proof to be definitive and a discoverer of the actual ruling.

In the second stage, differences and shifts arose that perhaps began from the time of al-Muhaqqiq, the author of al-Sharai’. Regarding this stage, several points are noteworthy:

First, they argued for permissibility (ibahah) through bara’ah, but not as a definitive rational proof. Sometimes, they negated obligations whose application was doubted and unknown with the help of the principle of bara’ah and ruled for permissibility; however, not in the sense that this ruling is actually permissibility, nor that they accepted it as a definitive proof. They said: ultimately, all rulings have reached us; if we do not find a proof for a ruling in a certain place, it becomes clear that no ruling is established: “the absence of proof for a ruling is proof of the non-existence of the ruling” (‘adam al-dalil ‘ala al-hukm dalil ‘ala ‘adam al-hukm). However, they did not say this was in an actual manner; they said: God has not obligated us to do what is beyond our capacity (mukallaf bi ma la yutaq); so how is it possible that in a place where we do not know something, we are obligated to it? Therefore, the ruling of permissibility is established for us, but not as an actual ruling. Even the terminology and title of “apparent ruling” (al-hukm al-zahiri) had not emerged yet; they simply established permissibility in cases where no proof for a ruling was found.
Another point that was paid attention to in this period, and which they explicitly stated in their books and expressions, was that the Shari’i proofs relied upon in jurisprudence are not definitive, but rather many of them are conjectural (zanni). Observing the statements of the predecessors, they said that not all of our proofs are definitive; some or many of these proofs are conjectural, but they are valid (mu’tabar). The Shari’i validity of these proofs was accepted, but they said these proofs are not definitive, they yield conjecture. Therefore, gradually, the door of attention to conjecture and the acceptance of acting upon conjecture was opened among the Usulis—yet, not just any conjecture, but a conjecture that possesses a valid Shari’i proof.

From this time, the path of practical principles was separated from those other three proofs. It was in this period that they accepted practical principles as conjectural proofs. This, to some extent, led to a greater opening of the issues. For instance, some scholars of this period considered istishab to be a binding authority (hujjah) because it yields conjecture. The author of Ma’alim officially introduced bara’ah as a conjectural proof, and this perspective persisted until the time of Shaykh al-Ansari. Thus, bara’ah and istishab departed from being regarded as definitive proofs and were categorized among conjectural proofs.

Third Stage

In the third stage, which begins with the era of the great renewer, Wahid al-Bihbahani, and in which some of his students—particularly the author of the Glosses on Ma’alim—played a role, they constructed a novel framework for practical principles, a framework that remains in place to the present day. Of course, Shaykh al-Ansari made this framework highly robust and addressed its various dimensions with clarity and transparency; however, the root of his endeavors lay in the works that had begun since the era of Wahid al-Bihbahani. Some describe this as a major breakthrough in the science of principles (‘ilm al-usul), and perhaps most attribute it to Shaykh al-Ansari because he thoroughly refined this framework, particularly in the book Fara’id al-Usul, where he addressed the discussion of practical principles and explained it in a very clear and expressive manner. Currently, the general framework and position of the practical principles, in brief (excluding the differences that exist in many detailed matters), is the same framework and position that was founded in the third stage and refined by Shaykh al-Ansari. This was the work carried out in this period.

In this stage as well, several points are noteworthy and changes are observed which, compared to the first period, present a vast distance and deep differences.

The issue of jurisprudential proofs (adillah fiqahatiyyah) and ijtihadi proofs (adillah ijtihadiyyah) was proposed, which Shaykh al-Ansari quoted from Wahid al-Bihbahani and examined. He introduced indications (amarat) under the name of “ijtihadi proofs” and principles under the name of “jurisprudential proofs.” He then explained the reason why amarat are called ijtihadi proofs and practical principles are called jurisprudential proofs; the root of this goes back to the definition of ijtihad and fiqahat (jurisprudence); because they defined ijtihad as the acquisition of conjecture regarding the Shari’ah ruling, and fiqahat as the acquisition of knowledge regarding the Shari’ah ruling. In defining ijtihad, Wahid al-Bihbahani interpreted the Shari’ah ruling as the actual ruling, as if ijtihad means “the acquisition of conjecture regarding the actual Shari’ah ruling” (tahsil al-zann bi-al-hukm al-shari’i al-waqi’i), and in defining fiqahat, he took the Shari’i obligation and Shari’ah ruling in a general sense, including both actual and apparent rulings, which encompasses practical duties as well.

Question: Is it only apparent?

Answer: Yes, it is general in this very sense; not that it only includes that as well. Meaning that which is of the apparent ruling (al-hukm al-zahiri) that a person gains certainty of through the practical principles, if we want to define fiqh as something that leads to knowledge of the actual Shari’ah ruling, it is incorrect; certainly, we cannot say we have knowledge of the actual Shari’ah ruling except in the case of some essentials (daruriyyat), otherwise in other cases we cannot make such a claim.

Question: …

Answer: No, that is a matter of disagreement. “Treating as equivalent to knowledge” (tanzil manzilat al-‘ilm) is one foundation in the issue; many do not accept that amarat have been treated as equivalent to knowledge.

In any case, in this stage, the practical principle is no longer a definitive proof for the Shari’ah ruling, although it is valid. Yes, it is a valid Shari’i proof and a binding authority (hujjah). But it is not a definitive proof. (This had of course occurred in the second stage as well.) That is to say, we cannot say they were regarded as definitive proofs for the Shari’ah ruling. However, since no distinction had been made between the actual and apparent rulings in the first and second stages, in this stage they said: it is not a definitive proof for the actual Shari’ah ruling; it is a definitive proof for the apparent Shari’ah ruling, and of course, it is a valid proof, because its validity and authority have been established. We certainly do not obtain the actual Shari’ah ruling through practical principles. Thus:

First: It is not a definitive proof. Second: It does not possess indicatorship (kashfiyyah) with respect to the actual Shari’ah ruling; it merely prescribes a practical duty for us until the actual Shari’ah ruling becomes known or a conjectural indication (amarah zanniyyah) is established for the actual Shari’ah ruling, but it establishes the apparent ruling for us in a definitive manner. Therefore, it is no longer regarded as one of the four sources of Shari’ah rulings; it does not stand alongside the four sources of our jurisprudence, but rather stands in their longitudinal path (in a vertical hierarchy). They no longer attribute indicatorship of the Shari’ah ruling to it, whereas in the past, particularly regarding bara’ah and istishab, they attributed an aspect of indicatorship to them at least within certain limits.

If we wish to mention the differences in a comparative manner, at least several cases can be stated, such as:

Practical principles clarify a practical duty that merely serves to resolve the person’s perplexity (tahayyur) so that the human is not left without duty and abandoned.
If one’s hand is short of an ijtihadi proof, they can resort to a jurisprudential proof.
It does not discover the Shari’ah ruling, but at the same time, it is valid; we can say in a definitive manner that this is a valid proof.

With these explanations that I have briefly presented, it became clear what changes have occurred in the practical principles from the beginning until today; they have also become more refined and greater in number.

Today we say: rational bara’ah, Shari’i bara’ah; rational takhyir (choice), Shari’i takhyir; rational caution (ihtiyat), Shari’i caution; these are branches and subdivisions of these principles; they are all in the position of clarifying the practical duty, and we will, God willing, discuss them in detail later.

These differences are, in fact, the result of the evolution of the science of principles. Some aspects were neglected, overlooked, or ambiguous in the first stage. For instance, their presentation of bara’ah alongside the Book and Sunnah, or their mention of istishab alongside the Book, Sunnah, and consensus as a rational proof—what they meant by that bara’ah or istishab was not what we are discussing today.

Question: …

Professor: No… they considered this to be the very narration itself… No, this was not proposed at all. Look, for example, if they acted upon istishab, it was on the basis that the Infallible Imam (a.s.) said in a narration: “Do not violate certainty with doubt.” This much, in fact, was that when contradictions arose among the narrations themselves, they mentioned ways to prefer them; the discussion… No, the discussion of longitudinality (verticality) was not proposed under this title. They said: in a place where a ruling has not been stated, we act upon bara’ah, or if we had certainty and then doubted, we do not violate that certainty with doubt; they acted upon that as a narration issued by the Infallible.

No, why? Refer back; the term “istishab” was not used as a technical term at all. If, for example, I doubt whether this obligation is established for me or not? They would say: original exoneration (bara’ah asliyyah); they said: before the Shari’ah, there was no obligation, and all rulings have reached us, and nothing has been stated in this regard, so they would rule for permissibility (now, ruling for permissibility arose only in the second stage); they said: no obligation is established, they raised the exoneration of liability from obligation and considered it definitive. Longitudinality was not proposed at all; they considered this to be coordinate (horizontal), and coordinate means this, meaning that in some places they did not violate their certainty with doubt because it was itself the command of the Infallible Imam. They said: if we had certainty in a place, we do not violate it with our doubt; this is a command, like other commands given by the Imams and stated in the narrations; they saw no difference between these from this perspective.

Question: …

Professor: No, they did not pay attention to this at all, but subsequently, their boundaries became known and separated.