Preliminaries, Sixth Preliminary: The Domains of Application of the Practical Principles

Session Five

Preliminaries, Sixth Preliminary: The Domains of Application of the Practical Principles, The Discourse of Sheikh al-Ansari, The First Formulation, The Second Formulation, The Third Formulation, The Discourse of al-Muhaqqiq al-Khurasani

September 20, 2025

Sixth Preliminary: The Domains of Application of the Practical Principles

At the outset of the discussion on the practical principles, several preliminaries had to be addressed. Thus far, five preliminaries have been outlined.

The sixth preliminary concerns the domains of application (majari) of the practical principles, examining the specific contexts in which these principles apply. Are these domains governed by systematic criteria or are they arbitrary, and can we bring the contexts where these practical principles run under a general rule or criterion?

Regarding this matter, the late Sheikh al-Ansari has put forward three formulations. The late Akhund [al-Khurasani] subsequently raised objections against him. The students of the late Akhund, and the students of their students, have each raised various objections against these domains, occasionally proposing different formulations of their own.

We will briefly and rapidly explain the three formulations presented by the late Sheikh regarding the domains of the practical principles, to clarify what kind of rule and criterion can be established for them.

The Discourse of Sheikh al-Ansari

Sheikh al-Ansari has two formulations at the beginning of the chapter on certainty (Kitab al-Qat’)—one in the main text of Fara’id al-Usul and another in his glosses on the Rasa’il, which some have attributed to one of the late Sheikh’s students—and subsequently, at the beginning of the discussion on exemption (bara’ah), he offers a third formulation.

In the first formulation, the Sheikh states: when doubt arises concerning something, two possibilities can be envisioned for the object of doubt (al-mashkuk):

At times, its previous state (al-halat al-sabiqah) is taken into account; meaning that a previous state exists, and the Lawgiver has considered and validated it. If this is the case, this represents the domain of the presumption of continuity (istishab). For example, assume a person was certain of being in a state of ritual purity (taharah) in the morning, and now doubts whether they still possess that purity or not. Here, they apply the presumption of continuity (istishab) of purity; that is, they presume the continuity of the doubted object which possesses a previous state. The Lawgiver has declared: “Do not violate certainty with doubt.” Thus, this is the domain of istishab, and that same previous state is presumed to continue.

The second possibility is that the doubted object lacks a previous state, or even if it does, the Lawgiver has not considered or validated it.

If it lacks a previous state, an example is the doubt concerning the obligatoriness of reciting a supplication upon sighting the crescent moon (al-du’a’ ‘inda ru’yat al-hilal), where after extensive search and investigation, no evidence is found. Or, for instance, it has a previous state but the Lawgiver has not considered it. This is like the doubt concerning the inherent potentiality (al-muqtadi); suppose that after a marriage contract (‘aqd) is concluded, someone doubts whether the option of lesion (khiyar al-ghabn) is still established or not. Here, although there is a previous state, they doubt whether the option of lesion that was established at that moment possesses the capability to persist and continue to this time, outside the setting of the contract assembly (majlis al-‘aqd). In this case, a previous state exists, but it belongs to the category of doubt in the capability of persistence (al-shakk fi-l-muqtadi), which the Lawgiver has not validated.

In this scenario—where the doubted object either lacks a previous state or has one that is not considered—two situations are envisioned. They say: either precaution (ihtiyat) is possible therein, or precaution is not possible. If precaution is possible, this again has two cases:

At times, the doubt concerns the obligation itself (al-shakk fi-l-taklif), which is the domain of exemption (bara’ah). For example, suppose one doubts whether reciting a supplication upon sighting the crescent moon is obligatory or not. First, there is no previous state; second, precaution is possible; third, it is an instance of doubt regarding the obligation itself. Here, exemption (bara’ah) is applied. However, if the doubt concerns the object of obligation (al-shakk fi-l-mukallaf bih), this is the domain of precaution (ihtiyat). For example, we doubt whether on Friday noon, the Friday prayer (salat al-jumu’ah) is obligatory or the noon prayer (salat al-zuhr). Here, precaution is possible, meaning one can perform both.

However, if precaution is not possible, this is the domain of choice (takhyir).

Question: The first formulation states: if there is no previous state and precaution is not possible, choice is established.

Professor: In the first formulation, he stated: either it has a previous state, or it has one but it is not considered. If it does, it is the domain of istishab. If it does not… either precaution is not possible in it, or precaution is possible. If precaution is possible, it has two cases: either doubt in the obligation itself or doubt in the object of obligation. If it is doubt in the obligation itself, it becomes exemption. If it is doubt in the object of obligation, it becomes precaution. If precaution is not possible, it is the domain of choice. We stated: where there is no previous state or it is not considered, either precaution is possible or it is not. If precaution is possible, it has two forms. If precaution is not possible, it becomes choice.

Several objections have been raised against this formulation. The Sheikh himself also raised objections, which perhaps led him to present a different formulation for the domains of the practical principles at the beginning of the discussion of exemption. We will not enter into these objections for now. After citing the third formulation, we will conduct a brief comparison between these formulations and their implications.

In the second formulation, the late Sheikh states: either the doubted object has a previous state and is considered, or it does not have a previous state, or if it does, it is not considered. Up to this point, it is identical to the first formulation.

However, in the first formulation, the Sheikh stated: where the previous state is not considered, either precaution is possible or it is not. Here, he has modified this, stating: if the previous state is not considered, either the doubt is regarding the obligation itself (al-shakk fi-l-taklif) or the doubt is regarding the object of obligation (al-shakk fi-l-mukallaf bih); meaning the subject of the doubt is either the essence of the obligation or that to which the obligation relates. If the doubt is regarding the obligation itself, it is the domain of exemption (bara’ah).

However, if the doubt is regarding the object of obligation, then either precaution is possible therein or it is not (immā an yumkina fīhi al-iḥtiyāṭ aw lā). If precaution is possible, it is the domain of precaution; if precaution is not possible, it is the domain of choice.

The difference between the second formulation and the first lies in the relocation of the second axis of the division. In the second formulation, he stated: that object in which the previous state is not considered is either a doubt in the obligation itself or a doubt in the object of obligation. But in the first formulation, he stated: either precaution is possible in it or it is not. Naturally, when the second axis changes, the third axis also changes. According to the first formulation, the third axis was doubt in the obligation itself and doubt in the object of obligation. According to the second formulation, the third axis is the possibility and impossibility of precaution.

At the beginning of the discussion of exemption (bara’ah), the late Sheikh al-Ansari explains the domain of the practical principles in another manner; this explanation, while sharing similarities with the previous ones, also introduces a divergence. He states: “The ruling of doubt is either one in which a prior certainty is considered, or not” (inna hukma al-shakki imma an yulahaza fihi yaqinun sabiqun aw la). The ruling of doubt either takes into account a prior certainty or it does not.

Notice that conceptually, this formulation does not differ from the first and second formulations, except that the terminology has changed. There, they stated: “Doubt is either one in which the previous state is considered, or not” (al-shakku imma an tulahaza fihi al-halat al-sabiqatu aw lam yulahaz). Here, he has stated: “The ruling of doubt is either one in which a prior certainty is considered.” Instead of “previous state”, he has used “prior certainty”. Perhaps this is more precise than “previous state”. In fact, even when they said “previous state”, they meant this same prior certainty; otherwise, if we assume the previous state was doubt, that would be of no use, and it would not be the domain of these principles in a certain sense. The core issue is the adoption of certainty and the attention paid to certainty in the previous state.

So, either a certain prior state is considered in the ruling of doubt, or it is not. If a prior certainty is considered, it is the presumption of continuity (istishab). And where there is no prior certain state, either precaution is possible in it or it is not.

The third formulation returns to the first formulation. There, he stated: either it has a previous state or it does not. Then, the case that has a previous state is istishab. The case that does not have a previous state—either precaution is possible in it or it is not. Thus, according to this third formulation, there is no difference from the first formulation.

However, here he states: where precaution is possible, “either an intellectual or textual evidence indicates that there is punishment for contradicting the unknown reality, or it does not; the first is precaution and the second is exemption” (imma an yadulla dalilun ‘aqliyyun aw naqliyyun ‘ala anna al-‘iqaba ‘ala mukhalafati al-waqi’i al-majhuuli, wa imma an la yadulla; fa-al-awwalu al-ihtiyatu wa-al-thani al-bara’ah). He says that where precaution is possible, either there is a rational or textual proof for punishment due to contradicting the unknown reality, or there is absolutely no such proof. If there is a rational or textual proof for punishment due to contradicting the unknown reality, this is precaution. However, if there is no such proof, this is exemption. Observe the difference:

In the first formulation, he stated: where there is no previous state and precaution is possible, either the doubt is in the obligation itself or in the object of obligation. But here, where precaution is possible, he states: either there is rational and textual proof for punishment, or there is no rational and textual proof for punishment. If there is proof, it is the domain of precaution. If there is no proof, it is the domain of exemption. Thus, as you can see, a divergence has again emerged among these domains.

The similarities, as you have observed, are not few. However, the axes have been shifted. On the first axis, they are all identical, save for one expression—there is a minor variation in terminology. But on the second and third axes, you have observed how they articulated the issue of the possibility and impossibility of precaution and the subsequent division.

Now, each of these has faced various objections. Many objections have been raised against the late Sheikh, and the Sheikh himself had objections to these formulations, which led him to make these modifications. But the objections are numerous. If we were to enter into these objections, it would take a significant amount of time, and there is no necessity for it. The objective was to provide a brief and concise report of what Sheikh al-Ansari and the late Akhund have stated in legal theory, after which we will focus more on the views of contemporary scholars and prominent authorities (a’lam), to determine which of these views is superior.

The Discourse of al-Muhaqqiq al-Khurasani

The late Akhund [al-Khurasani] raised several objections, presenting counter-examples (naqd) both to the first formulation of the late Sheikh and to his second formulation.

The late Akhund’s counter-example is that if we doubt between the obligation of one thing and the prohibition of another—for instance, if we doubt whether reciting a supplication upon sighting the crescent moon is obligatory, or if smoking tobacco (shurb al-tutun) is unlawful—here, according to the first and second formulations of the late Sheikh, exemption must be applied in both cases, because both are cases of doubt regarding the obligation itself (al-shakk fi-l-taklif). We do not know whether reciting the supplication is obligatory or not, nor do we know whether smoking tobacco is unlawful or not; this would be the domain of exemption. For in the first formulation, as you observed, if precaution is possible and there is a doubt regarding the obligation itself, this is the place of exemption. Thus, two conditions exist in the first formulation: 1) doubt in the obligation itself; 2) the possibility of precaution. In both of the exemplified cases, these two conditions are met.

In the second formulation, however, only the condition of doubt in the obligation itself is mentioned as the criterion, regardless of whether precaution is possible or not. Here too, we have doubt in the obligation itself. Thus, under both formulations, we would say exemption is applied.

Question: …

Professor: No. The assumption is that here we have doubt in the obligation itself… pay attention to the domain; what is the difference between the first and second formulations? Yes. This applies to both… ultimately we say either this is obligatory or another thing is unlawful… that is not a doubt in the object of obligation (al-shakk fi-l-mukallaf bih). This example is precisely for this reason. The Akhund has presented a counter-example showing that this does not fall under the category of doubt in the object of obligation. Yes… No. It is a doubt in the obligation itself. Do we say we have this obligation or that one?… No, no. That is clear; in cases where we have compendious knowledge (‘ilm ijmali), how the matter stands is obvious.

The late Akhund has mentioned this counter-example, and has also presented another counter-example that applies to both the first formulation and the third formulation. That is, in the view of the late Akhund, these are all open to refutation. We will explain that objection as well, and then we shall analyze them.