Preliminaries, Preliminary Nine: The Precedence of Presumptive Proofs over the Practical Principles

Session Seventeen

Preliminaries, Preliminary Nine: The Precedence of Presumptive Proofs over the Practical Principles, The Precedence of Certainty over the Practical Principles, The Rationale for Prioritizing Presumptive Proofs over the Practical Principles, The First View: Conflict, Analysis of the First View

October 6, 2025

The Precedence of Certainty over the Practical Principles

Following the explanation of the concepts upon which the various views are based, we now proceed to analyze these views. We have briefly examined non-applicability (takhassus), exception (takhsis), entry (wurud), government (hukumah), and customary reconciliation or customary appraisal.

The current discussion concerns the criterion or rationale by which presumptive proofs (amarat) are prioritized over the practical principles (al-usul al-amaliyyah). The precedence of absolute certainty (qat’) over the practical principles is obvious. Therefore, there is no dispute regarding the criterion for prioritizing certainty over the practical principles. The disagreement relates specifically to the criterion for prioritizing presumptive proofs.

That we say there is no dispute regarding certainty and the criterion for its precedence over presumptive proofs is because when a person acquires certainty regarding a ruling, the subject of the practical principles is lifted. This is because the subject of the practical principles is doubt (loosely speaking), and when a person acquires certainty, doubt no longer exists. If, for instance, we acquire certainty regarding the obligatoriness of the Friday prayer during the era of Occultation, this certainty—since it is intuitive and not devotional—is authoritative, and its authority is intrinsic (zati).

It is obvious that with the existence of such certainty, there is no room for the practical principle; for no doubt remains to warrant returning to the practical principles. With the attainment of certainty, the subject of the practical principles is lifted. Therefore, we can say that certainty and absolute conviction enter (warid) the practical principles, because certainty eliminates the subject of the practical principle. When certainty arrives, it enters the practical principles by eliminating their subject. This is undisputed and uncontested (la kalama wa la khilafa fih). The real discussion lies in the precedence of presumptive proofs over the practical principles (inama al-kalam fi taqdim al-amarat ‘ala al-usul).

The Rationale for Prioritizing Presumptive Proofs over the Practical Principles

As we noted previously, several views exist in this regard.

1. Some believe that there is a conflict (ta’arud) between presumptive proofs and practical principles.

2. Others assert that presumptive proofs enter (warid) the practical principles.

3. Some maintain that presumptive proofs govern (hakim) the practical principles.

4. Others consider exception (takhsis) to be the criterion.

5. One view, to which Imam Khomeini (may Allah have mercy on him) committed, is a detailed distinction in the matter; meaning that presumptive proofs precede each practical principle on a distinct criterion, which he outlines one by one. These are the views that exist in this matter.

The First View: Conflict

Among these views, perhaps the oldest is the view of conflict (ta’arud). That is, prior to the introduction of the concepts of government and entry and their distinction from exception and non-applicability (which were mainly formulated by Sheikh al-Ansari), many legal theorists believed that the presumptive proof and the practical principle conflict with one another. The proof of the presumptive proof’s authority conflicts with the proof of the practical principle’s authority. The author of al-Riyad committed to this view and presented an explanation which I will outline.

As we noted, this is the oldest view regarding the relation between presumptive proofs and practical principles. The late Sheikh himself referred to this view in the Rasa’il and raised objections against it.

The author of al-Riyad maintains that the proof of the presumptive proof and the proof of the principle relate to each other as general and specific in some aspects (‘umum wa-l-khusus min wajh). This is because the proof of the presumptive proof indicates its authority absolutely, regardless of whether a principle exists contrary to it or not. Thus, from this perspective, the proof of the presumptive proof is more general.

Conversely, the proof of the practical principle indicates its validity and authority absolutely, regardless of whether a presumptive proof exists contrary to it or not. These two possess one point of intersection (maddat al-ijtima’) and two points of divergence (maddat al-iftira’). This is why we say their relationship is general and specific in some aspects. For some presumptive proofs, no principle exists contrary to them; for some principles, no presumptive proof exists contrary to them; but some presumptive proofs and principles are incompatible, meaning there is a presumptive proof contrary to a principle, or a principle contrary to a presumptive proof. Thus, the relationship between the proof of the presumptive proof and the proof of the principle is general and specific in some aspects.

Despite the fact that the relationship between the principle and the presumptive proof is general and specific in some aspects, we nevertheless treat them as general and specific absolutely (‘umum wa-l-khusus mutlaq). To explain:

The proof of the principle’s authority is excepted (takhsis) by the proof of the presumptive proof’s authority. That is, for example, one proof states that the solitary report is authoritative, and this is more general than whether a principle exists contrary to it or not. On the other hand, the proof of istishab indicates its authority, regardless of whether a presumptive proof exists contrary to it or not. However, when we except the proof of istishab by the proof of the presumptive proof, it means that the authority of istishab is restricted to the assumption where no presumptive proof contrary to it exists. Thus, we treat their relationship as general and specific absolutely, and deal with them as amm and khass absolute.

Objection: Why should it