Preliminaries, Preliminary Nine: The Precedence of Presumptive Proofs over the Practical Principles

Session Twenty-Seven

Preliminaries, Preliminary Nine: The Precedence of Presumptive Proofs over the Practical Principles, The Criterion for Prioritizing Presumptive Proofs, The Fourth View: Detailed Distinction, The Discourse of Imam Khomeini: The First, Second, and Third Points, The Lack of Government in a Universal Manner, Detailed Distinction

October 20, 2025

The Fourth View: Detailed Distinction

Up to this point, we have outlined six formulations within three views regarding the criterion for prioritizing presumptive proofs (amarat) over the practical principles (al-usul al-amaliyyah). All of these formulations have been examined and subjected to criticism.

Imam Khomeini (may Allah have mercy on him) did not propose a single, universal rationale for prioritizing presumptive proofs over the principles, but rather committed to a detailed distinction (tafsil). He states: in some instances, presumptive proofs enter (warid) the practical principles; in other instances, they govern (hakim) them; and remarkably, certain practical principles, such as istishab (the presumption of continuity), are preceded by presumptive proofs such as the rules of completion (faragh) and passing past (tajawoz). We will briefly outline his discourse to subsequently examine whether it is acceptable or not.

The Discourse of Imam Khomeini

He begins by outlining several points:

Imam Khomeini refers to the criterion of government (hukumah), stating: government is when the governing proof (al-dalil al-hakim) is structured such that it addresses and is directed at (muta’arrid) the governed proof (al-dalil al-mahkum). Therefore, a major aspect of one proof’s government over another is the governing proof’s addressing of the governed proof. In his view, the quality of this addressing is secondary; he states: “the manner of addressing, even if by way of rational and customary necessity” (nahwu ta’arrudin, wa-law bi-nahwi al-luzumi al-‘urfi wa-l-‘aqli). The core requirement is that one proof must address and be directed at the other proof.

However, this addressing has a limit: “that which does not lead to collision at the level of apparent meaning” (mimma la yarji’u ila al-tasadumi fi marhalati al-zuhur). It is true that the governing proof addresses the governed proof, but this addressing does not reach the level of collision at the level of apparent meaning. For instance, there is a conflict between the general (‘amm) and the specific (khass), but this is a primary, non-settled conflict that is ultimately resolved. However, some conflicts are settled and cannot be reconciled. He states: the governing proof addresses the governed proof, but this addressing does not reach the level of collision in their apparent meanings.

The governing proof may even address a certain aspect among the aspects of the governed proof, rather than the governed proof itself. That is, for example, an aspect that the governed proof was not responsible for clarifying, but the governing proof arrives and, by way of expansion or restriction in that aspect, performs its function. This is also a form of addressing.

If the presumptive proofs are to govern the practical principles, this criterion must be present. That is, the proofs of the presumptive proofs must address the proofs of the practical principles.

It is here that the Imam states: “And from the criterion we have outlined, the rationale for prioritizing presumptive proofs over the principles becomes manifest” (wa-mimma dhakarna… yuzharu wajhu taqdimi al-amarati ‘ala al-usul). This is because the first characteristic—namely, that there must be two proofs—is obvious. We must see whether we can really assert that the proofs of all presumptive proofs address the proofs of the practical principles in some manner. This is certainly not the case.

This, then, was the first point: what the criterion of government fundamentally is, prior to analyzing these two formulations.

The second characteristic, which is realized following the preceding characteristics, is that were it not for the governed proof, the governing proof would be meaningless; because it is directed at it and interprets it. Suppose, for instance, the Lawgiver stated from the outset: “There is no doubt for the habitual doubter” without the existence of “If you doubt, build upon the greater number.” This “There is no doubt for the habitual doubter” would be entirely futile and meaningless. If someone suddenly told you, “there is no doubt for the habitual doubter,” you would say, “what of it?” Therefore, the second proof always acquires meaning alongside the first proof; it is meaningless without considering the first proof.

As you have observed, these two definitions and explanations of government proposed by the Sheikh do not contradict or diverge from each other, but rather we can say one is a more complete formulation than the other and has clarified other dimensions of this issue.

Student Inquiry: …

Teacher Response: Behind this, we are currently analyzing this… No, we are currently discussing based on the first formulation… in the second formulation, they interpret certainty and knowledge as that very customary certainty… the reason why al-Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini has outlined three formulations here is precisely due to these differences.

He maintains that the governing proof must be a verbal proof. We noted this previously. There is, of course, a disagreement as to whether a non-verbal proof—such as consensus or the intellect—can also govern another proof. The well-known view is that the governing proof must be verbal. Although some argue that the governing proof does not necessarily have to be verbal and that a non-verbal proof like consensus or the intellect can also serve as a governing proof, in our view, the correct opinion is that the governing proof must be verbal. We have previously mentioned and explained this.

In light of these three points:

1. The criterion of government is that the governing proof must address the governed proof.

2. The issue of government is between the proof of the presumptive proofs and the proof of the practical principles.

3. Only a verbal proof can govern another proof.

The Lack of Government in a Universal Manner

Therefore, if all your proofs are verbal, you can raise the issue of government. (I am stating this as an explanation of his discourse). If we accept this criterion, we can no longer assert absolutely that, for instance, the proofs of the solitary report’s authority govern the proofs of the practical principles. This is because, for example, the practice of rational people (sirat al-‘uqala’) is one of the proofs of the solitary report’s authority, yet this proof is not verbal. We cannot assert that this governs the proofs of the practical principles, and the same applies to other presumptive proofs.

Or, for example, among verbal proofs, if a proof does not address another proof, it is meaningless to assert that it governs it. The governing proof oversees the governed proof; it addresses the governed proof. This characteristic must be present in a proof for us to argue for government.

Do all proofs of presumptive proofs possess this addressing and overseeing in relation to the proofs of the practical principles? In reality, this is not the case. For instance, among the proofs of the solitary report’s authority, consider the Verse of Announcement (Ayat al-Naba’). Even assuming that its implicature (mafhum) is authoritative and indicates the authority of the solitary report, does this verse possess any addressing or overseeing in relation to the proofs of the practical principles? Does it oversee, for example, the proof of exemption? Does it oversee the proof of istishab? In many cases, we do not observe this addressing and overseeing within the proofs of the presumptive proofs.

Therefore, in light of these points, it appears that we cannot assert absolutely that the proofs of the presumptive proofs govern the proofs of the practical principles. Although Sheikh al-Ansari, al-Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini, and many others argued for government, the reality is that this cannot be accepted in a universal manner.

Student Inquiry: …

Teacher Response: Regarding the presumptive proofs and the principles, upon what criterion do you argue that we must consider government, entry, or similar relations between the principles themselves? It is meaningless to assert that, for instance, this [particular presumptive proof] governs that [particular principle]. For example, a specific presumptive proof states that the Friday prayer is not obligatory. A report from Zarah, for instance, has been transmitted stating that the Friday prayer is not obligatory during the era of Occultation. Now, what addressing does this have to istishab? What addressing does it have to exemption? Or in relation to exemption, for example. When we formulate the issue of government such that one proof is directed at and oversees another proof, we must compare the proof of the presumptive proof with the proof of the practical principle to see whether this addressing and overseeing exists within it or not.

At any rate, we cannot assert that the proofs of the presumptive proofs absolutely govern the proofs of the practical principles. This is because, in light of the three points we have outlined, government as a universal affirmative proposition (al-mujabah al-kulliyyah) is set aside. However, as a particular affirmative proposition (al-mujabah al-juz’iyyah), we may argue for government in certain cases, just as we argue for entry in other cases.

Detailed Distinction

Subsequently, Imam Khomeini (may Allah have mercy on him) states that the proofs of the presumptive proofs vary. Sometimes the proof of a presumptive proof is the practice of rational people, and at other times it is consensus. Where the proof of the presumptive proof is consensus or the practice of rational people, we cannot consider it to govern the principle. For example, suppose we look at the principle of correctness in the action of others (asalat al-sihhah fi fi’l al-ghayr). On the assumption that this is a presumptive proof and not a principle, it indicates the correctness of a Muslim’s action.

Now, the proof of the principle of correctness is primarily the practice of rational people or consensus. The practice of rational people and consensus are non-verbal proofs, not verbal proofs. If we assert that the principle of correctness is prior to istishab, we can no longer say that it governs it. This is because this proof is fundamentally non-verbal, and in government, the condition is that the governing proof must be verbal. Here, the precedence is not by way of government, but rather by way of entry or exception.

Student Inquiry: Doubt existentially remains, because existentially the subject must be eliminated, and you do not consider the solitary report to be legally assimilated to the status of knowledge. Naturally, this cannot be entry.

Teacher Response: He has discussed this in detail in the chapter on istishab, where various views are outlined. It is either exception or entry. We do not wish to enter into that here… Yes, this can be asserted… The point is that we are currently stating that it is not government… No, I am not saying it is entry. I noted. His phrasing is also: “It is not by way of government, but rather by way of entry or other than that” (lam yakun bi-nahwi al-hukumati, bal bi-nahwi al-wurudi aw ghayri dhalik)… If someone bases the principle of correctness upon a narration, rather than on the practice of rational people or consensus, naturally the possibility of government also exists. This is only one of its conditions… I noted, on the assumption of its being a presumptive proof… We have assumed two premises. He himself has also exemplified this with two premises. First, he states: like the principle of correctness in the action of others on the assumption of its being a presumptive proof… assuming it is a presumptive proof, its proof is the practice of rational people or consensus; its proof consists of these two. Now, if someone asserts that its proof is verbal, it exits this case. Or if they assert that it is not a presumptive proof, naturally it is not considered an example of this.

Another example he outlines is the proofs of the authority of a trustworthy report. The proofs of the authority of a solitary report vary—some are verses, some are narrations, and some represent the practice of rational people. There are three primary proofs:

1. If the basis for the authority of the solitary report is the Verse of Announcement (Ayat al-Naba’): “If an unrighteous person comes to you with information, investigate, lest you harm a people out of ignorance.” [Quran 49:6]

We have a debate as to whether this indicates authority or not, but let us assume that this verse has an implicature (mafhum) and that this implicature is also authoritative. Its meaning is that if a just person brings you information—a non-unrighteous person brings a report—investigation is no longer required. This is because the report of a just person is itself clarified, and “lest you harm a people out of ignorance” is no longer realized. If someone acts upon the report of a just person, it is not out of ignorance.

Therefore, the Verse of Announcement indicates that the report of a just person is clarified and acting upon it is not out of ignorance; rather, it is knowledge. (We can express this with various phrasings here). That is, it is no longer ignorance… In this case, it governs the proofs of the practical principles. Meaning, it is not improbable to be government, although the Imam did not explicitly state this, but the possibility of entry is also possible. He states: “It is not improbable that it is by way of government” (la yab’udu an yakuna bi-nahwi al-hukumah).

Student Inquiry: Ignorance in ‘lest you harm…’ is not ignorance as opposed to knowledge, but rather means foolish or imprudent action.

Teacher Response: Yes, we are stating this here on the basis of the assumption.

2. If the basis consists of the narrations, he states: “The phrasing of some of them is by way of government” (fa-lisanu ba’diha yakunu bi-nahwi al-hukumah). This is because the phrasing of some proofs is by way of government. Since it possesses this addressing, it is a verbal proof and in reality either expands or restricts the subject of the other proof. However, he states: “Although most of them are not of this stature” (wa-in kana ghalibuha lam takun bi-tilka al-mathabah); most narrations have not been delivered in this manner so as to possess the phrasing of government.

3. If the basis of the solitary report is the practice of rational people, “It is not improbable that the precedence is by way of entry” (la yab’udu an yakuna al-taqdimu bi-nahwi al-wurud). If it is the practice of rational people, it is not improbable to state that the proofs of the presumptive proofs enter the practical principles, based on the explanation I have outlined. When the practice of rational people is to act upon the trustworthy report, it eliminates the subject of the entered proof. That is, it is now a case of the negation of the subject (salibah bi-inti’fa’ al-mawdu’).

Student Inquiry: …

Teacher Response: The late Sheikh himself explicitly states there that the proofs of presumptive proofs govern the proofs of the practical principles. He explicitly states this there. However, here, he has applied it. Therefore, this comparison is not performed between the proof of the presumptive proof and the proof of the principle here. No, in reality, this example you are raising—where if a narration is established contrary to a ruling, it precedes the principle—is not what is under discussion. We do not specifically wish to examine whether this obligation is prior to, for example, the requirement of the principle, which is non-obligation. Rather, we wish to examine in a general manner: wherever a collision arises between these two, which one is prioritized? When we wish to analyze it in this manner, we must compare their proofs with one another.

Student Inquiry: …

Teacher Response: Indeed, this discussion may even arise within the practical principles themselves, between two practical principles. But here, we wish to extract a criterion such that if a presumptive proof collides with a principle, which one is prioritized.

Up to this point, the Imam has stated: the proofs of the presumptive proofs vary; some govern the proof of the practical principles, some enter them, and they may even be considered as exceptions. It varies depending on the cases.

The Topic of the Next Session

Subsequently, the Imam states: “And as for the proofs of the rules of completion and passing past, they govern istishab on the assumption of the presumptive character of istishab” (wa-amma adillatu qa’idati al-faraghi wa-l-tajawozi, fa-hiya hakimatiun ‘ala al-istishabi bina’an ‘ala amariyyati al-istishab).

“And if istishab is a principle, there is no dispute regarding the government of their proofs over its proofs” (wa-amma in kana al-istishabu aslan, fa-la ishkala fi hukumati adillatiha ‘ala adillatih). If we maintain that istishab is a principle, there is no dispute that the proofs of the rule (the rules of completion and passing past) govern the proofs of istishab.