The Postulate of Exemption (Bara’ah), Intellectual Exemption, Second Topic

Session Thirty-eight

The Postulate of Exemption from Obligation (Bara’ah) – Intellectual Exemption from Obligation – Second Topic: The Juristic Basis of Intellectual Exemption – First Argument – Critique of Ayatollah Shahid Sadr – Second Argument – Critique of Ayatollah Shahid Sadr

Gregorian Date: November 11, 2025 (Corresponding to 20 Aban 1404 Sh.)

Second Topic: The Juristic Basis of Intellectual Exemption (Bara’ah)

Regarding intellectual exemption, we previously noted that two primary topics must be investigated. The first is the historical background and lineage of intellectual exemption, which we addressed in the preceding session. The second is the juristic basis of intellectual exemption. That is to say, when it is asserted that “the ugliness of punishment without declaration” is an established rule, what is its underlying proof? From where does this judgment originate? On what basis does our intellect perceive or dictate this judgment?

There is no dispute that the rule of the ugliness of punishment without declaration is advanced as the core of intellectual exemption. However, the disagreement lies in the juristic basis of this rule. When we say “intellectual exemption,” it might be more precise to term it “non-legislative” (non-Shar’i), because as you will observe in the arguments presented as bases, some of them do not view the matter as strictly intellectual (rational), but rather as a rational-consensus (rationalist) judgment. Thus, although everyone refers to it as “intellectual exemption,” what is meant is the judgment of the ugliness of punishment without declaration, and the disagreement lies in the basis of this judgment.

Several arguments have been advanced for the juristic basis of the ugliness of punishment without declaration:

The First Argument

This is an intuitive matter (artikazi) that human beings perceive by virtue of their innate disposition, conventional conscience, and rational intuition; namely, that the ugliness of punishment without declaration is self-evident. By observing conventional and rational master-servant relationships (mawlawiyyah), one observes that wherever the relationship of mastership exists among rational agents, no master reprimands a servant for failing to perform an undeclared duty. One observes that in society, wherever the relationship of servitude and mastership exists and a group is expected to obey a master, no one reprimands a servant who is ignorant of the duty, provided no declaration has been issued. Therefore, the root and basis of the rule of the ugliness of punishment without declaration, according to this argument, is the intuitive and conventional conscience of rational agents.

The Critique of Ayatollah Shahid Sadr

The late Shahid Sadr raised objections to this argument as well as the subsequent ones. The essence of these objections is uniform, and I will elaborate on it further when we analyze his personal theory.

He argues that this formulation is based on the assumption that the right to obedience and the right of mastership (mawlawiyyah) are of a single reality, and that there is no difference between the mastership of God and conventional mastership. However, conventional mastership is socially constructed (i’tibari), whereas the mastership of God is intrinsic (dhati). He posits two types of mastership: socially constructed mastership and intrinsic mastership. He asserts that everything regarding socially constructed mastership returns to social convention—both its origin and its scope, domain, and territory. The extent to which mastership is legislated among rational agents, and the extent to which the duty of obedience is constructed, is contingent upon the duty being declared. This is how rational agents have constructed it. Everything in social construction is subordinate to the view of the constructor. However they construct it, it becomes prevalent. Rational agents, in conventional mastership, have constructed it such that if declared duties are opposed, it warrants reprimand and punishment; but if a duty is not declared, punishment is impermissible, and they deem punishment for an unannounced command to be ugly.

However, this is not the case in intrinsic mastership. In intrinsic mastership, the mere probability of a duty is sufficient to necessitate its performance. Intrinsic mastership is absolute, and the right to obedience is likewise absolute. Intrinsic mastership stems from attributes such as absolute ownership, executorship of creation, and the bestowing of blessings. God, the Blessed and Exalted, is the Creator of this universe, its true Owner—not a socially constructed owner—and the Bestower of all blessings upon mankind. Therefore, He possesses an intrinsic mastership, and the servant, in the position of submission and obedience to whatever God wills, has a duty to comply, even if they do not possess certain knowledge of that duty.

Shahid Sadr later states that, legislatively (shar’an), exemption is established for us regarding duties that have not been declared to us. However, the human intellect dictates that wherever there is a probability of a duty, it must be performed. He believes that by the judgment of the intellect, the primary principle in cases of probable duty is precautionary action (ihtiyat).

Question:

Professor: These are two distinct discussions. Yes, you can say that if He wills a duty, its performance is necessary. Even if He does not manifest it, and even if He does not declare it, wherever we deem a duty probable, we must perform it. As for the notion of God willing us to do something when He has not actually willed it… that would contradict Divine Wisdom. God does nothing devoid of wisdom. It is contrary to wisdom to punish servants arbitrarily without proof… That is the Ash’arite view; the Ash’arites believe that whatever God does is the essence of justice, but we believe that God is Wise. The wisdom of God does not permit punishment without proof. Therefore, when there is no will for a duty, and no duty exists at all, what is it that we are expected to perform? However, the notion that He can punish without proof is incompatible with Divine Wisdom and Divine Justice… That is another discussion. What you mentioned is different. To say that the criterion of creation and ownership entails that He can punish even without proof does not align with Divine Wisdom. Yes, if we held the Ash’arite school of thought, we could assert such a claim.

Therefore, his primary critique of this argument is that there is a fundamental difference between intrinsic mastership and conventional mastership. This first argument is based on the assumption that the right of mastership and the right to obedience regarding God and rational agents are viewed identically, as a single entity in which no degrees or levels can be conceived. In contrast, we see that mastership is of two types: one is intrinsic mastership, and the other is legislated or socially constructed mastership.

In constructed and conventional mastership, the matter is exactly as the proponent of the argument stated. However, in intrinsic mastership, it is not so, because the Master is the Owner, Creator, and Bestower of blessings; hence, wherever a duty is deemed probable, the right of mastership and the right to obedience demand that the human being act upon that duty. That is, every probable duty must be performed.

In his view, if we separate these two types of mastership and distinguish between them, we cannot attribute the ugliness of punishment without declaration to rational intuition and conventional conscience. The issue becomes entirely different.

Since the essence of Shahid Sadr’s critiques of the four arguments is uniform, we will analyze it in detail later, God willing.

The Second Argument

The second argument is the one to which Muhaqqiq Na’ini and his followers adhered. It posits that the return of the ugliness of punishment without declaration is to the ugliness of punishment for failing to act when there is no motive for action. For example, when a person is thirsty and knows that water is ten steps away, they automatically rise, fetch the water, drink it, and quench their thirst. But if someone is thirsty and does not know that a glass of cold water is one meter away, will they rise at all to move toward the water? Movement requires a motive, and the motive for movement is knowledge and awareness. When we do not know, how can we move toward that which satisfies our desire and need?

If God, the Blessed and Exalted, has not declared a duty, we will have no motive to move, and therefore, punishment for the failure to move becomes ugly. It is as if there is a major and minor premise here, the result of which is the ugliness of punishment without declaration.

The Major Premise: Punishment for failing to move in a situation where there is no motive for movement is ugly. That is, it is nonsensical to punish someone for not performing an action when no instigator or motivator was provided for its execution.

The Minor Premise: Actual matters, including duties, act as motivators only when they reach (wusul) the human being; otherwise, their mere actual existence, while not having reached the agent, does not motivate movement. We gave an example: suppose a person is thirsty, and even through mistaken certainty, they acquire knowledge that there is water outside the school. This knowledge motivates them to move toward the water, even if there is actually no water there; because actual existence is not the criterion, rather the reached existence (al-wujud al-wasil) is the criterion. That is, I must acquire knowledge and know; even if someone lies and says there is water there, this is sufficient for that person to rise and go toward the water. But if he is sitting here, and water is one meter away but he does not know and no one has told him, there is no motive for movement.

Therefore, punishment without declaration is ugly; because our intellect perceives that human beings require a motive for any movement, and punishment for failing to move where there is no motive is meaningless. Movement is realized through reached existence, not mere actual existence.

Thus, if they wish to punish someone for an undeclared duty, it is ugly.

This is the explanation of Muhaqqiq Na’ini in this context.

Question: What is the correlation between motivatability and punishment? Is punishment conditional upon motivatability or its absence? Does the intellect perceive a correlation between motivatability and punishment?

Professor: He argues that the failure to move incurs punishment… The command that is given must motivate, and the failure to move is what causes punishment. This is the very assumption… because it is a duty.

The Critique of Ayatollah Shahid Sadr

Shahid Sadr also objects to this second argument. He states that human motivators are of two types: sometimes the motivator is ontological (takwini), and sometimes it is legislative (tashri’i).

By ontological motivator, we mean a motivator that stems from an ontological purpose. That is, a purpose that is compatible with one of the human faculties or creates an inclination and desire in him.

The legislative motivator is the very judgment of the intellect regarding the necessity of movement, whether the human being has a personal purpose in it or not.

If Muhaqqiq Na’ini’s view refers to the ontological motivator (meaning a purpose in the human being that is compatible with one of his faculties), then it is correct that the actual existence of the thing will not be an ontological motivator; rather, the reached existence is the motivator. This is because actual existence itself is neither among the origins of the will, nor is it included in any of the preliminaries of human movement, and it creates no purpose in the human being toward that desired object. Hence, he does not move to reach the desired object. However, reaching (wusul) has types; sometimes reaching is certain, and sometimes it is probable. That is, reaching has degrees. If reaching is certain—meaning I am certain that I will gain access—naturally, I will move with greater force, and the movement is more serious. If reaching is probable, the motivatability is also to the extent of the probability of the existence of the desired object. The core of Shahid Sadr’s argument is that denying motivatability altogether is incorrect. Motivatability has degrees. Sometimes motivatability is at its highest level, which is when we acquire knowledge and the duty reaches us (in his terms, reached existence), and where there is no reached existence but rather probability, naturally, motivatability is to the extent of that probability.

If the legislative motivator is meant—meaning a command and perception pushes the human being toward performing the action—here it is the intellect. The intellect can motivate the human being based on the right of mastership and the right to obedience. When the intellect sees that a Master possesses intrinsic mastership, it says: “If you have certainty in a matter and the duty is declared, you must certainly perform it. If there is no declaration but there is a probability of a duty—meaning a probable reaching—you must still perform it.” This is because a God who possesses ownership, creation, and the bestowing of blessings has intrinsic mastership, and therefore, the human being must perform the probable duty.

Question: We assume the probability of punishment, and we have not accepted the ugliness of punishment without declaration, so avoiding punishment is necessary here, and this is the judgment of the intellect; therefore, probability renders the duty binding (munajjiz).

Professor: This is by virtue of intrinsic mastership… He says that the probability of a duty, due to this right, makes its performance necessary for you. As we said at the very beginning, intrinsic mastership differs from conventional mastership. That is, reprimand for failing to perform a duty among rational agents is limited to reached duties, but in the case of God, this limitation does not exist. That is, reprimand for failing to perform probable duties is also not ugly. This is the foundation of his view.

Thus far, two arguments have been presented, both of which were critiqued by Shahid Sadr. In reality, the essence and foundation of his critique of both arguments is the same. The other two arguments are also based on this. We will subsequently evaluate Ayatollah Sadr’s view to see whether his assertion is correct or not.