The Principle of Exemption (Bara’ah), The Proofs of Exemption, The First Proof

Session Fifty-Two

The Principle of Exemption from Obligation (Bara’ah), The Proofs of Exemption, The First Proof: The Book, The Second Verse, The Result of the Analysis of the Second Verse, The Truth of the Matter, Analysis of the First, Second, Third, and Fourth Interpretations

December 8, 2025

The Result of the Analysis of the Second Verse

Regarding the verse “Allah does not charge a soul except [according to] what He has given it” (la yukallifu Allahu nafsan illa ma ataha) [Sura al-Talaq, Verse 7], certain discussions were raised during which the formulation of the argument based on this verse and the possibilities/interpretations existing within it were outlined. The essence of the view regarding this verse is what I will now present. After outlining the objections raised by al-Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini and al-Muhaqqiq al-Iraqi against some of these interpretations, and the answers provided to them, a summary of this verse is necessary.

Of course, we did not outline the entirety of the discourses of al-Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini and al-Muhaqqiq al-Iraqi; because the discussions of these two great legal theorists exceed the amount presented here. Naturally, others also possess views and points in this regard, but to avoid prolonging the discourse, we limit ourselves to this extent. Subsequently, we must examine once again whether this verse can be utilized as a proof or not.

The Truth of the Matter

If someone asserts that the verse has an apparent meaning in that very interpretation claimed by the arguer, they can certainly rely upon it to establish the Principle of Exemption from Obligation (Bara’ah). That interpretation, which was mentioned as the first among the four interpretations, is that “ma” (ma al-mawsulah) means “obligation” and “itah” also means the announcement and clarification of the obligation. On the basis of this interpretation, the meaning of the verse is: “Allah does not obligate a soul except with an obligation He has clarified (or announced)” (la yukallifu Allahu nafsan illa taklifan bayyanahu [aw a’lamahu]). Under this assumption, naturally the obligation is lifted and is unestablished in relation to whatever has not been announced and clarified; and this is the very meaning of exemption. Exemption from obligation means that where an obligation has not been clarified and announced, no obligation is established.

Of course, some have raised an objection here, stating that even if we accept this interpretation, the verse cannot be relied upon; because it is contrary to the apparent meaning (khilaf-e-zahir). In the sense that accepting this interpretation requires the assuming of an ellipsis (taqdir) in the verse, and ellipsis is contrary to the apparent meaning. That word is “obedience” (ita’ah). That is, they say we must interpret it as: “Allah does not obligate a soul except with the obedience of an obligation He has announced (or clarified)” (la yukallifu Allahu nafsan illa ita’ata taklifin a’lamahu [aw bayyanahu]). Therefore, they state that even under this interpretation, the verse cannot be relied upon; because it requires an ellipsis, which is contrary to the apparent meaning.

Now, let us assume that we can answer this objection, asserting that the verse has a correct meaning even without an ellipsis and no problem arises; “la yukallifu Allahu nafsan” means Almighty God binds the person to an obligation. Under this assumption, obedience is a matter that occurs subsequent to the obligation. In other words, obedience is the dictate of the intellect; God obligates, commands, and forbids. Obedience is the comprehension of the intellect that binds us to follow the divine commands and prohibitions. Therefore, if this interpretation is accepted, and this objection is also answered, the verse can be relied upon. However, the primary difficulty is that due to the indicators present within the verse, it possesses an apparent meaning in “wealth” (mal).

We noted that prior to this verse, two phrases and two sentences exist: “Let… spend” (li-yunfiq) and “is restricted” (ma qadara ‘alayhi). The verse first commands spending from what God has granted the person: “Let a man of wealth spend from his wealth.” These two phrases and sentences in the verse, in reality, serve as indicators that what is meant by “ma” in this verse is wealth. The relative pronoun “ma” means wealth, and consequently “ataha” means bestowal and giving (a’taha). In this case, it no longer has any connection to the issue of exemption.

Therefore, the first interpretation, which creates the capacity to rely upon the verse, is negated. Thus, the first interpretation is set aside on its own.

The second and third interpretations, as we noted, are not suitable for the argument. If the relative pronoun “ma” is interpreted as the action which God has enabled the person to perform, this fundamentally enters the domain of enjoining what is impossible (taklif ma la yutaq); whereas our discussion is regarding enjoining what is unknown (taklif ma la ya’lam). This interpretation is also excluded from the scope.

Question: The first interpretation was useful for the argument, assuming we answer the objection raised. However, we possess indicators showing that we cannot interpret “ma” as ‘obligation,’ but rather its interpretation as ‘wealth’ is correct… Now we must see what that indicator is… Of course, we will also reach that narration; that very narration which the late Sheikh al-Ansari quoted in the Rasa’il. Indeed, the objection I intended to outline after presenting these interpretations is this narration, which we will quote and examine.

The third interpretation was that “ma” means wealth and “ataha” also means spending—namely, bestowal. In the previous interpretation, the meaning of “ataha” was “iqdar” (enabling), whereas here it means “i’ta'” (bestowal); meaning that God does not obligate anyone to spend, except to the extent of the wealth He has given them. Everyone must spend to the extent of what they possess. According to this interpretation as well, it has no connection to exemption.

Question: …

Professor: That is, observe: “Allah does not obligate a soul except with the wealth He has given it” (la yukallifu Allahu nafsan illa bi-malin ataha), i.e., “except with the spending of the wealth He has given it” (illa bi-i’ta’i malin ataha). Here too, they may state that, as you say, an ellipsis is required… in this case as well, it can be answered.

In many obligations, we sometimes observe that the obligation relates to the physical objects; but the correlation between the ruling and the subject (tanasub al-hukm wa-l-mawdu’) requires that the action compatible with that object be the actual obligation. For example, the verse: “Indeed, intoxicants, gambling, [sacrificing on] stone altars [to other than Allah], and divining arrows are but defilement from the work of Satan” [Quran 5:90], and subsequently He declares: “so avoid it” (fa-jtanibuh). In jurisprudence, you frequently state: “wine is prohibited” (al-khamru haramun), “prayer is obligatory” (al-salatu wajibah)… there is no mention of “drinking” in these propositions.

Here too, the case is identical. The subject of the obligatoriness is wealth—namely, spending—by the indicator of “li-yunfiq” which precedes it. Furthermore, here, the ellipsis is in reality one whose action was indicated prior to it. It is clear that when He clarifies it prior to the obligation itself: “Let a man of wealth spend from his wealth,” here when He states: “Allah does not charge a soul except [according to] what He has given it,” it is clear that this obligation is that very spending; meaning: “Allah does not obligate a soul to spend except spending what He has granted it” (la yukallifu Allahu nafsan ‘ala al-infaqi illa infaqa ma a’taha). This is not contrary to the apparent meaning; because it was mentioned prior to it and therefore faces no difficulty. Thus, up to this point, these three interpretations are negated.

The fourth interpretation was that “ma” has a general meaning and means ‘thing’ (shay’), and “ataha” is also interpreted in accordance with the meaning of “ma”. (Now, whether we adopt the fourth interpretation according to those who argue for a common denominator and state that “ma” means the common denominator among all meanings, or whether we proceed according to al-Muhaqqiq al-Iraqi’s interpretation that “ma” means ‘thing’—not a common denominator—but rather a thing that is applicable to all of these meanings, like the general and the instance, the universal and the particular). At any rate, according to the fourth interpretation—whether under the formulation of those who argue for a common denominator regarding “ma”, or under the formulation of al-Muhaqqiq al-Iraqi or others, even al-Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini who sought to construct a formulation for the common denominator—whichever of these we consider, it is still not useful for the argument.

To explain: that this verse is not suitable for the argument—despite the fact that al-Muhaqqiq al-Iraqi resolved the conceptual difficulty of this interpretation at the level of reality and accepted the conducive ground (muqtadi) for absolute application in this verse, but stated: an obstacle called “the definitive minimum” in the context of address (qadr-e-mutaqayyan fi maqam al-takhatub) exists here which prevents us from relying upon the absolute application of this verse and establishing exemption based on it. Al-Muhaqqiq al-Iraqi raised an objection from this path, and we also answered his objection, stating that the issue of the definitive minimum in the context of address cannot serve as an obstacle. However, another difficulty exists.

The difficulty that prevents relying upon the absolute application, or in other words, does not permit relying upon the absolute application, regardless of the conceptual objection, is that in the first instance, we must establish that this word, in terms of its locutionary intent (al-iradah al-isti’maliyyah), has been employed in the absolute meaning. Subsequently, if the premises of wisdom (muqaddimat al-hikmah) run, we state that the serious, actual intent (al-iradah al-jiddiyyah) of the speaker also relates to that same absolute meaning, and we then rule in favor of the absolute application based on the conformity of the serious intent with the locutionary intent, and derive the absolute meaning from it.

The case is identical in all instances of the general (‘amm) and the absolute (mutlaq). When, for example, the speaker states: “Honor the scholars” (akrim al-‘ulama’), the word “scholars” has a general meaning which, as a plural made definite by the article, encompasses all scholars. The locutionary intent relates to this general meaning. When the speaker states “Honor the scholars,” here he has employed the word “scholars” in its general meaning. However, if he does not mention any exception after this sentence, it becomes clear that his serious intent is also this very general meaning. He states “Honor the scholars” and mentions no exception, either connectedly or disconnectedly; we understand that the speaker’s locutionary intent and serious intent are identical. This very word he has employed, he seriously intended this same meaning from it.

However, if he mentions an exception after this sentence, either connectedly or disconnectedly, and states: “Honor the scholars except the unrighteous” (akrim al-‘ulama’ illa al-fasiq) or “except the unrighteous among them” (illa al-fussāqa minhum), here, where initially in “Honor the scholars” the speaker’s locutionary intent related to the general meaning—namely, all scholars—as soon as the exception “except the unrighteous” is mentioned alongside it, we say: he did not intend all scholars from the word “scholars,” but rather his serious intent related to the just scholars. We discover this from the exception. Here, there is no longer conformity between the locutionary intent and the serious intent. Therefore, to carry a general term on its general meaning, we require the establishing of the conformity of the serious intent with the locutionary intent. The case is identical regarding the absolute. To carry an absolute term on its absolute meaning, we require the establishing of the conformity of the serious intent with the locutionary intent.

However, in the verse under discussion, this is not established for us. When it is stated: “Allah does not charge a soul except [according to] what He has given it,” it is true that “ma” is a word that possesses scope and absolute application; meaning it can apply to anything. The locutionary intent in this word is absolute. But does the serious intent also relate to this same meaning? This is not established for us, and the difficulty lies precisely here. With the existence of these interpretations regarding the verse—the interpretation of carrying it on wealth, the interpretation that “ma” means wealth, the interpretation that, for example, it means obligation—at minimum we do not possess a dominant probability in this verse. All are possible, and each is also subject to objection. Even the least burdensome of them is that carrying “ma” (ma al-mawsulah) on wealth is possible.

Even if we do not carry “ma” on wealth, and merely consider it in the range of a possibility, it means that the meaning of “ma” has not been established for us so as to treat it as absolute. We do not know what has been intended; which meaning has been intended. Consequently, the establishing of the conformity of the serious intent with the locutionary intent faces an obstacle, and if this is not established, we cannot carry the verse on its absolute meaning.

We cannot assume that He has used the word in its absolute meaning in terms of His serious intent, because there are multiple interpretations and each of these interpretations has its own distinct requirements. Therefore, we do not know with certainty which of these meanings was seriously intended. Consequently, we cannot carry the verse on its absolute meaning and derive exemption from it—even if that conceptual obstacle at the level of reality is set aside. This is the conclusion of the discussion on this verse and the argument based on it.

The Topic of the Next Session

Now, the difficulty is that a narration has been transmitted from Imam Sadiq (peace be upon him) in this context, where this verse was utilized as a proof for exemption. Thus far, we have exerted extensive effort to state that this verse does not possess the capacity to serve as a proof. We cannot rely upon this verse to establish the Principle of Exemption from Obligation (Bara’ah).

However, a narration has been transmitted in this context where, upon analyzing this narration, we observe that Imam Sadiq (peace be upon him) himself relied upon this verse to negate the obligation. Under this assumption, how can it be claimed that this verse does not indicate exemption? What must be done with this narration?

We will quote and examine this narration to see how it is interpreted. Does it really, as the arguer claims, represent the Imam’s relying upon this verse to establish exemption, or is the case fundamentally different? I will present this discussion tomorrow, God willing.