Issue 4, Second Position: Examination of the Condition of Benefit

Session Seven

Issue 4 – Second Position: Examination of the Condition of Benefit – Arguments for the Condition of Benefit – First Argument – Examination of the First Argument – Second, Third, and Fourth Objections

September 28, 2025

Summary of the Previous Session

The discussion concerned the conditioning of benefit (maṣlaḥah) and its authority in the guardianship of the father and paternal grandfather in the matter of the daughter’s marriage; we stated that arguments have been invoked to establish this conditioning. We mentioned the first argument in the previous session; the substance of the first argument was that, given the authority of this condition in the guardian’s financial dealings—such that any dealing of his in the child’s property is contingent upon the observance of benefit—and given as well the elimination of the special character (ilghāʾ al-khuṣūṣiyyah) of property, or the priority (awlawiyyah) of marriage relative to property, the result is the conditioning of benefit in the guardianship of the father and paternal grandfather. Then the discussion turned to the argument for the authority of benefit in financial dealings. We said that the primary argument for the necessity of observing benefit in the dealings of the father and paternal grandfather in property is the verse: “And do not approach the property of the orphan except in the most virtuous manner.” The approach to the argument from this verse was set forth; we said that the verse prohibits dealing in the property of orphans without taking benefit into consideration. Then, by way of the elimination of the special character [of property] or the priority of marriage relative to property, the result is the authority of benefit in the marrying-off of the daughter by the father and paternal grandfather. Objections were raised regarding this argument, particularly regarding the reliance on the verse; we mentioned two objections and responded to them. These two objections, however, are not of great significance; the first objection was that the verse does not encompass the father but rather establishes this matter with respect to the paternal grandfather or others. The response was that, by way of mutual concession (tasālum) and the absence of any position differentiating [between them], we can say that there is no difference between the father and the paternal grandfather in this respect, because the observance of benefit is necessary either for both or for neither. The second objection was that the verse indicates the preferability of observing benefit, not its necessity. We responded to this as well, stating that, on the indication of the preceding verse and the context of this verse, it cannot be construed as indicating preferability and recommendation regarding the observance of benefit. These two objections were resolved to some extent; however, there remain further objections regarding this verse, or in other words, regarding the first argument.

Third Objection

The third objection concerns the elimination of the special character of property. The arguer claimed that “And do not approach the property of the orphan except in the most virtuous manner” prohibits any dealing in the property of orphans without the observance of benefit. He then stated that financial dealings have no special distinguishing feature, but rather, in any matter that is in some manner recognized as a dealing in the affairs of the ward, the observance of benefit is necessary. The objector states that there is no basis for eliminating this special character; why should we eliminate the special character of financial dealings and extend and transfer it to marriage? After all, the elimination of a special character requires a justification and a supporting basis; we cannot simply extend a ruling stated specifically with respect to property to something else without warrant. This is on the supposition of accepting the verse’s indication of the necessity of observing benefit in financial dealings, which is itself a matter of dispute. Even granting that the verse establishes the necessity of observing benefit in financial dealings, by what criterion do we establish this with respect to matters other than financial dealings? This elimination of the special character has no basis. It is even possible for someone to say that we proceed by way of the concept of priority (mafhūm al-awlawiyyah), as was indicated in the arguer’s statement, where we proceed by way of the concept of priority and extend the ruling of the necessity of observing benefit from property to marriage; we say that since, with respect to property—whether small or large in amount (for no distinction has been made between small and large property, minor and major property)—the observance of benefit is necessary, then, all the more so, it will be necessary in the matter of marriage. Even the concept of priority is not effective here, because this priority itself is open to question. Yes, marriage is an important matter, but for us to wish to establish the ruling with respect to marriage by this route is contingent upon our accepting, in the first place, that this verse indicates the necessity of observing benefit in financial dealings. If we accept that, then perhaps we could accept this priority as well. In any case, the third objection pertains to the elimination of the special character or to the priority [argument]—that is, relying on one of these two, the ruling has been extended from financial dealings to marriage, and the observance of benefit has been deemed necessary [there as well]. Therefore, in order to say that the observance of benefit is necessary in marriage, and that too by way of reliance on this verse, we must, first, establish that the verse indicates the necessity of observing benefit in financial dealings, and second, extend that ruling to marriage either on the criterion of the elimination of the special character or on the criterion of priority—whereas the first of these is itself open to question (namely, whether benefit must be observed in financial dealings on the authority of this verse or not), and even if benefit must be observed in financial dealings, why should we extend that to marriage as well? Therefore, neither does the elimination of the special character have a basis, nor can the priority be established.

Examination of the Third Objection

This objection may well hold in certain respects, but it does not hold in other respects. First: that this verse itself does not indicate the necessity of observing benefit, especially given that it does not encompass the father—the response given by some, such as the late Āyatullāh Khūʾī, is open to dispute. The claim that everyone either holds to the necessity of observing benefit by the father and paternal grandfather, or that everyone denies this—this mutual concession is open to question. The claim that everyone agrees there is no difference between the father and the paternal grandfather in this matter, and that there is mutual concession regarding this matter, is open to question. What obstacle is there to others, including the paternal grandfather and those other than him, being obligated to observe benefit, while the father is not so obligated? This is because the designation “orphan” applies to one who has no father; the verse wishes to say that anyone—whether the paternal grandfather or someone else—who wishes to deal in the property of an orphan must take benefit into consideration; that is, the orphan has a special characteristic [warranting this]. In that era, many relatives, associates, and friends would enter into the lives of orphans and deal in their property; the verse has issued this severe prohibition specifically with respect to the orphan, one who has no father; but if there is a father, he himself knows what to do—after all, there is a responsible guardian (masʾūl) and supervisor over him. Therefore, the absence of a differentiating position, or mutual concession, and the like, cannot establish the scope of this verse with respect to the father, because no such mutual concession exists, especially in light of the point we have indicated. Therefore, first, we would have to accept the very indication of the verse regarding the necessity of observing benefit in financial dealings, which is itself open to question. Second: as for the matter of the elimination of the special character or the priority [argument], upon which the argument relies for extending the ruling of the necessity of observing benefit from financial dealings to marriage—the elimination of the special character cannot be established; that is, on what basis can we truly eliminate the special character of property and say that the verse encompasses marriage as well? This is especially so given the unqualified statements (iṭlāqāt) that exist in the matter of marriage. The priority [argument] is, from one angle, correct; that is, the matter of marriage, being a [whole] life, is certainly more important than property that is not so substantial and is meager. If we accept the necessity of observing benefit, there is no difference between meager and substantial property; that is, dealing in meager property must likewise be undertaken with regard for benefit. If we accept the verse’s indication that the observance of benefit is necessary, there is no difference between small and large amounts of property. Certainly, marriage carries greater importance relative to a meager amount of property; therefore we said that the matter of marriage is, at the very least, of greater importance than some forms of property. This is acceptable to some extent (fī al-jumlah); but to say, in a general and unqualified manner, that marriage takes absolute priority over property in every respect cannot be established. The conclusion, therefore, is that we accept this objection to some extent with respect to the first argument; the discussion concerns the first argument, and there are further arguments here as well.

Fourth Objection

The fourth objection concerns the scope of the verse with respect to marriage; granting that the verse establishes the necessity of observing benefit in financial dealings—that is, setting aside the previous objections and saying that the verse indicates that, if the father or paternal grandfather wish to deal in property, they must necessarily take benefit into consideration—nevertheless, this cannot be established with respect to marriage. This is because there exist stronger unqualified statements opposing the unqualified scope of this verse; it is true that this verse has unqualified scope, it is true that this verse states that benefit must be observed in the matter of dealing with the daughter’s property—we accept this. But we have, in opposition, traditions whose unqualified scope encompasses even the case where there is no benefit. We referred to this tradition several sessions ago; this tradition concerns both property and marriage. Traditions in the chapter on marriage are not few; they state the guardianship of the father and paternal grandfather over the daughter. We have previously read these traditions; there were several categories of traditions. For example, the chapter on “the establishment of guardianship for the father, and for the paternal grandfather specifically in the presence of the father, and not for others”—all the traditions that indicate the establishment of guardianship are unqualified. By “unqualified” I mean that in none of them is the matter of the observance of benefit mentioned; none of them have stated that, if the guardian wishes to marry the daughter to another, he must take her benefit into consideration. Given these unqualified statements regarding the absence of restriction to the observance of benefit, how can we condition guardianship upon benefit? You might say that if these traditions are unqualified, the verse is likewise unqualified; the verse has, in a general manner, established the authority of benefit for the paternal grandfather (let us now suppose it does not encompass the father).

Examination of the Fourth Objection

The response is that the unqualified scope of the traditions is stronger than the unqualified scope of the verse, because the traditions have stated this matter repeatedly, yet there is no indication whatsoever that benefit must be taken into consideration in the matter of marrying off the ward. Indeed, one thing has been mentioned, namely that there be no corruption or harm; this matter is mentioned in these very traditions, but no reference whatsoever is made to benefit. Thus, the fourth objection is that we do not accept the conditioning upon the observance of benefit with respect to marriage, because there exist, in opposition to it, stronger unqualified statements. Let us suppose that the verse establishes the matter that the guardian must observe benefit. But those unqualified statements present an obstacle; because here an objection might come to mind, namely that those unqualified statements could be restricted (taqyīd) by this verse. It is true that the traditions are unqualified and do not mention the condition of benefit; [one might say] this verse restricts those unqualified statements and states that guardianship is established on condition of the observance of benefit. This is not feasible, because the unqualified scope of the traditions is stronger than the apparent sense (ẕuhūr) of this verse; this verse does not have the power to restrict those traditions. The verse can scarcely even establish this matter with respect to the paternal grandfather. One might say that the verse does not pertain to the paternal grandfather, and it is not even clear that it encompasses the paternal grandfather; rather, it was addressed to those who, after the death of certain persons, would pursue their property. Therefore, this verse does not even have strong apparent indication with respect to the paternal grandfather, let alone the father. Therefore, we cannot, by means of this verse, restrict those unqualified statements and establish the necessity of observing benefit. Thus, the fourth objection regarding this argument has likewise become clear. It has thus become established from all that we have stated that the first argument, due to certain objections raised against it, is not acceptable. We responded to some of the objections, but there remain certain objections that prevent reliance on the verse to establish the necessity of observing benefit in the matter of marrying off the daughter.

Discussion for the Next Session

Apart from this argument, there are one or two further arguments which we must also examine.