Issue 7, Brief Statement of the Issue

Session Thirty-Two

Issue 7 – Brief Statement of the Issue – The Statement of the Sayyid – The Meaning of “Imprudent” (Safīh)

December 8, 2025

Issue Seven

“The imprudent spendthrift (safīh al-mubadhdhir), whose imprudence is continuous from the time of his minority, or who has been placed under interdiction (ḥajr) for squandering [his wealth] — his marriage is not valid except with the permission of his father, or his paternal grandfather, or, in their absence, the judge (ḥākim); and the determination of the dower and the woman [to be married] rests with the guardian. And if he marries without permission, [the marriage] is held in abeyance pending ratification; if [the guardian] perceives a benefit and ratifies it, it becomes valid, and there is no need to repeat the marriage formula.”

Brief Statement of the Issue

The Imam (may God’s mercy be upon him), in the seventh issue, discusses the marriage of the imprudent person (safīh). He states: the imprudent spendthrift and squanderer — one given to extravagance — whose imprudence is continuous from the time of his minority, or an imprudent person who has been placed under interdiction on account of squandering [his wealth], even if this occurred after the period of minority — the marriage of such a person is valid only with the permission of his father or paternal grandfather; and if his father or paternal grandfather are not alive, the judge has this right. The determination of the dower and the spouse likewise rests with the guardian. Therefore, in this matter, the basic marriage is contingent upon the guardian’s permission, and the dower must be determined by him, and he must also choose the spouse — that is, the entire matter of the marriage rests with the guardian. He then continues, stating: on this basis — since the matter of his marriage rests in the guardian’s hands — if this person marries without the guardian’s permission, this marriage is contingent upon the guardian’s ratification; that is, until the guardian grants ratification, this marriage is not valid. If the guardian perceives a benefit in this marriage and grants ratification, this marriage becomes effective and valid, and there is no need to repeat the marriage formula (ṣīghah); it is not the case that, if he grants ratification, the contract must be performed again. The very contract that he himself concluded suffices.

The Statement of the Sayyid

The late Sayyid, in the seventh issue of al-ʿUrwah, states: “The marriage of the imprudent spendthrift is not valid except with the permission of the guardian”; the marriage of the imprudent spendthrift is valid only with the permission of his guardian. “And it is incumbent upon him [the guardian] to determine the dower and the woman”; he must determine the dower, and, fundamentally, he must choose the spouse for him. This is the same first part that also appears in the text of Taḥrīr. “And if he marries without his [the guardian’s] permission, [the marriage] is held in abeyance pending his ratification; if he [the guardian] perceives a benefit and ratifies it, it becomes valid, and there is no need to repeat the formula.” This too is like the second part that we read from the text of Taḥrīr; in fact, the text of Taḥrīr is similar to this. He states: if he marries without the guardian’s permission, this is contingent upon the guardian’s ratification; then, if the guardian perceives a benefit in this marriage and ratifies it, this marriage is valid, and there is no need to repeat the formula. However, as we have repeatedly stated, the statements of al-ʿUrwah are sometimes interwoven with a kind of argumentation; therefore, here he states: “because he is not like the insane person or the [immature] boy, who are deprived of [valid] speech.” He provides an argument for the lack of need to repeat the formula, stating: if the imprudent person performs his own marriage contract without the guardian’s permission, there is no need to repeat it; because the imprudent person differs from the insane person and the [immature] boy. The insane person and the [immature] boy are deprived of [valid] speech; even if they were to perform the marriage formula, no effect whatsoever would follow from it. But the imprudent person is not so; because the imprudent person is aware of the contract and the performative utterance and of what he is doing, and knows what he is doing; only, because he is imprudent, it is not clear what spouse he would choose and what dower he would set. But the insane person and the [immature] boy do not understand what they are doing; therefore he states that this repetition of the formula is not necessary. “And for this reason, his agency (wakālah) on behalf of another in performing the formula is valid, and likewise his personally undertaking it for himself after the guardian’s permission.” He then provides supporting evidence for the fact that the imprudent person is not deprived of [valid] speech, stating that the imprudent person can act as an agent for another in performing the formula — for example, another person wishes to marry and tells him, “recite my contract”; here he can become an agent. The same applies outside the context of marriage as well; agency on behalf of the imprudent person in performing the formula is valid. Or even if he obtains permission from his own guardian, he himself can perform the formula for himself, and his personal undertaking of his own marriage after the guardian’s permission is valid.

Differences Between Taḥrīr and al-ʿUrwah

The addition found in the text of al-ʿUrwah is at the end of the issue, where a reason is given for the lack of need to repeat the formula; otherwise, both of the secondary cases (furūʿ) that the late Sayyid has stated here appear in Taḥrīr as well, and there is no difference between them with respect to the ruling. There is only one difference, namely that the Imam (may God’s mercy be upon him) adds a qualification regarding the imprudent spendthrift, namely “whose imprudence is continuous from the time of his minority, or who has been placed under interdiction for squandering [his wealth]”; this does not appear in the text of al-ʿUrwah. In the text of al-ʿUrwah, it is stated in a general manner that the marriage of the imprudent spendthrift is valid only with the guardian’s permission; however, the Imam states: an imprudent person whose imprudence is continuous from the time of his minority, or who has been placed under interdiction on account of squandering [his wealth]. This pertains also to someone whose imprudence is not continuous from the time of minority — someone who was not imprudent, and was mature and competent (rashīd), and had, for a time, shown competence on his own part, but later, on account of extravagance and squandering, was placed under interdiction; the matter of his marriage, too, rests with the guardian. This difference exists in his statement. We shall explain the reasoning behind this, namely on what grounds this difference, or this addition stated here, is made. The Imam (may God’s mercy be upon him), on this very basis, has an annotation at the end of the statement in al-ʿUrwah; here, where the late Sayyid has written “the marriage of the imprudent person is not valid,” he has annotated: “if he has been placed under interdiction for squandering [his wealth]; indeed, the imprudent person whose imprudence is continuous from the time of minority is under interdiction absolutely.” Yes, the imprudent spendthrift mentioned in the text of al-ʿUrwah, if his imprudence is continuous from the time of minority, is under interdiction absolutely; but with respect to one other than this, he states, “if he has been placed under interdiction for squandering [his wealth].” God willing, we shall explain the reasoning behind this addition and annotation. The late Āyatullāh Khūʾī, too, has provided an explanation regarding the word “spendthrift” (mubadhdhir) and has an annotation there, stating that the qualifier “spendthrift” here is an explanatory qualifier (qayd tawḑīḥī), not a restrictive one (qayd iḥtirāzī): “It appears that he intended, by this qualifier, one who does not know what is beneficial and what is harmful for himself, and for this reason, the qualifier is explanatory, not restrictive.” By “spendthrift” is meant someone who does not know what is to his benefit and what is to his detriment — that is, he cannot discern what is beneficial for him and what is harmful for him. For this reason, the qualifier “spendthrift” is not a restrictive qualifier; that is, he does not wish to say that we have two types of imprudent persons — some imprudent persons are spendthrifts and some are not — but rather he is explaining what “imprudent” means. “Since this is the meaning of ‘imprudent’ with respect to financial matters”; the imprudence of a person in financial matters consists in spending without justification and squandering. “Otherwise, no reason for the qualification would be apparent” — and otherwise, no reasoning for qualifying “imprudent” with “spendthrift” would appear evident. Therefore, this qualifier is an explanatory one. Here we must explain several matters.

The Meaning of “Imprudent”

First, what does “imprudent” mean? Before we enter into these two secondary cases, let us see whom we call “imprudent.” Does “imprudent” mean only someone who cannot discern what is beneficial and harmful in financial matters, or someone who, absolutely, cannot discern what is beneficial and harmful? It is possible that someone discerns what is beneficial and harmful in financial matters, but, in matters other than financial ones, cannot discern what is beneficial and harmful; therefore, we must determine what “imprudent” means. This discussion is important, because it stands in contrast to competence (rushd); competence, or being competent (rashīd), is an attribute and state distinct from maturity (bulūgh). In certain instances, competence has been made the criterion, and a ruling has been established on its basis: “But if you perceive in them competence (rushdan), then deliver to them their property” — regarding orphans, it does not say that, when they reach maturity, their property should be given to them; rather, it says that, when their competence becomes perceptible to you, their property should be given to them. Is the competence indicated in this verse financial competence, or is it broader? In any case, the meaning of imprudence and competence, insofar as they constitute the subject matter of many religious rulings, must be examined to determine their meaning. Therefore, this is an important matter. Then let us see what “spendthrift” means, and whether “spendthrift” is an explanatory or a restrictive qualifier. In fact, we must first engage in the identification of the subject matter (mawḑūʿ-shenāsī), and then proceed to the two secondary cases raised in this issue. Linguistically, “imprudent” (safīh) means someone who does not have a sound and proper intellect. This differs from the insane (majnūn); the insane person is someone whose faculty of reason does not function. The suspension of the rational faculty has degrees of intensity and weakness. Imprudence is certainly distinct from insanity; imprudence means the inability to discern what is beneficial and what is harmful. At one extreme, the rational faculty does not function at all — not merely that he does not understand what is beneficial and harmful, but that he does not understand many matters at all. He understands neither what is good nor what is repugnant; he does not adhere to proper conduct; he does not distinguish between the young and the old; a child who is not yet capable of discernment (ghayr mumayyiz) might say something disrespectful to an elder in a gathering. The insane person is the same; only these have degrees and gradations of intensity and weakness — they have no capacity whatsoever to discern anything. But the imprudent person cannot discern what is beneficial and what is harmful — that is, he has a problem in understanding matters and applying that understanding, in all of these respects. The important point is this: is the inability to discern what is beneficial and harmful, and imprudence, confined to financial matters, or does it extend to all matters? In jurisprudence, “imprudent” is generally used to refer to someone who cannot discern what is beneficial and harmful in financial matters — that is, he might, with a sum of money, enter into a transaction that a competent person would not undertake; for example, he might purchase something for which rational agents (ʿuqalāʾ) would not pay any money at all, or purchase something at a price far greater than what rational agents would ordinarily pay for it. Consider a child; if someone, in the street, approaches a child… I do not mean a child at the level of an insane person, but a child who broadly understands that money must be paid to purchase something, but does not realize that this item is not worth this amount — for example, he might pay five hundred thousand tomans for an item worth fifty thousand tomans. In any case, in the terminology of jurisprudence, “imprudent” mainly refers to one who lacks competence in financial matters; but, as I have stated, in terms of its linguistic meaning, and in terms of the subject matter we are discussing, it has a broader meaning. Here too, the foundation of the matter of marriage rests upon the spouse and the dower; the bond of marriage between two persons is established with a certain dower; this, of course, pertains to their future life. What I wish to state is this: contrary to what is well known and customary in jurisprudence, if someone is skilled in accounting and understands financial matters well, but truly cannot discern what is beneficial and harmful in the choice of a spouse — not in the sense that many people become captive to their emotions and feelings and choose someone for marriage who is not suitable; no, I am not concerned with that. Here, we must be careful. It is possible that a young person falls in love with someone (which happens quite often these days), and they are mostly captive to the fleeting emotions and excitements of these times, or are deceived by the alluring outward appearance of the other party; this person may have proper financial judgment and discernment, and may be able to discern what is beneficial and harmful [in financial matters], but errs in this matter; this is not the subject of our discussion. This is not “imprudent”; when we say “imprudent,” we do not mean that someone has formed an attachment, and we know that this is fleeting, and yet marries — this marriage is religiously valid and has no problem with respect to the elements of the marriage contract; he mistakenly sees his own benefit in this, and pays no attention to whatever others tell him. I am stating something one step beyond this: it is possible that someone, in discerning what is beneficial and harmful in matters other than financial ones, reaches such a degree that he is incapable of this. You might say that these cannot be separated from one another — that is, if someone has no problem discerning what is beneficial and harmful financially, he likewise has no problem in other matters; or, conversely, if someone discerns what is beneficial and harmful in matters other than financial ones, this entails that he is likewise so in financial matters. In our view, there is no necessary connection (mulāzamah) between these at all; it is truly possible that someone discerns well what is beneficial and harmful in matters other than financial ones, but is not so in financial matters. Conversely, it is possible that someone discerns what is beneficial and harmful in financial matters, but does not discern it in that other respect. What I wish to state is this: contrary to the technical terminology, the matter of imprudence ought not to be confined to financial matters. Perhaps the reason this has become more focused on financial matters is that this discussion has been addressed in the book on interdiction (al-Ḥajr), and naturally, when the discussion of interdiction is raised, everything revolves around financial matters. For this reason, when they have wished to define competence, they have generally placed it within the sphere of financial matters. This, too, is perhaps because of the verse stated: “But if you perceive in them competence, then deliver to them their property” — the subject matter there is property, and this verse speaks of the property of orphans. It then says that, when their competence becomes perceptible to you, place their property at their own disposal. This too has its place here, but can we truly say that “competent” means someone who discerns his own financial benefit and harm? In our view, imprudence means the incapacity to discern benefit and harm; in cases pertaining to financial matters, the discernment of benefit and harm naturally falls within that scope; outside of this, each instance must be interpreted according to its own context; and likewise for competence. In this very discussion in jurisprudence, the discussion of competence has been raised on a related occasion, and there we stated that competence is not confined merely to the matter of financial matters. Therefore, imprudence, in reality, means someone who lacks the capacity to discern what is beneficial and harmful for himself. Of course, the imprudent person who is named in this issue and similar issues, and who is taken as the subject matter of the issue, is generally understood by the scholars to mean one who does not know what is beneficial and harmful for himself in financial matters. There is disagreement on this point here. Up to this point, I have given you a general explanation regarding the imprudent person. I wished to present to you the statements that the jurists have transmitted in their books of jurisprudence — such as the late ʿAllāmah, Shahīd al-Thānī, Shaykh al-Ṭūsī, and others — so that you might see how they have generally focused this matter on financial matters; but there is no time for this. We shall need to read these statements [in a future session].