Issue 7, The Meaning of “Imprudent”, The Restrictive Nature of the Qualifier “Spendthrift” (Mubadhdhir)

Session Thirty-Four

Issue 7 – The Meaning of “Imprudent” – The Restrictive Nature of the Qualifier “Spendthrift” (Mubadhdhir) – Examination of the Authority of Justice (ʿAdālah) in the Meaning of Competence (Rushd) – Arguments for the Non-Authority of Justice – First, Second, and Third Arguments – A Qualifier in the Text of Taḥrīr

December 14, 2025

Summary of the Previous Session

We stated that, before addressing the two secondary cases of the seventh issue, it is necessary to undertake a brief examination of the meaning of “imprudent.” The conclusion of our discussion was that “imprudent” is not a religious technical term (ḥaqīqah sharʿiyyah), but rather must be construed according to its very linguistic and customary meaning; therefore, it is not confined to financial matters. Any lightness of intellect and inability to discern benefit and harm, in any domain whatsoever and at any level whatsoever, is counted as imprudence. This is evidenced and corroborated by the fact that the late Sayyid, in the seventh and eighth issues of al-ʿUrwah, has addressed the imprudent person in financial matters and the imprudent person in the matter of marriage, and has stated the respective ruling for each; the very distinction between the imprudent person in financial matters and in the matter of marriage and the determination of the spouse and the dower indicates that “imprudent” ought not to be confined to financial matters — even though this is contrary to the well-known position.

The Restrictive Nature of the Qualifier “Spendthrift”

The conclusion drawn from this matter is that the qualifier “spendthrift” (mubadhdhir), which appears in the text of both Taḥrīr and al-ʿUrwah, is a restrictive qualifier (qayd iḥtirāzī), not an explanatory one (qayd tawḑīḥī) — contrary to the late Āyatullāh Khūʾī, who has regarded this qualifier as explanatory. If you recall, in setting forth the text of al-ʿUrwah, we transmitted the annotation of the late Āyatullāh Khūʾī; he stated: “It appears that he intended, by this qualifier, one who does not know what is beneficial and what is harmful for himself, and for this reason, the qualifier is explanatory, not restrictive, since that is the meaning of ‘imprudent’ with respect to financial matters; otherwise, no reason for the qualification would be apparent.” The apparent view is that the Sayyid intended, by this qualifier, the meaning of one who does not know what is beneficial and harmful for himself; for this reason, the qualifier “spendthrift” is explanatory, not intended to distinguish [him] from one who is not a spendthrift. This is because the meaning of “imprudent” with respect to financial matters is precisely this, and otherwise no reasoning for this qualification would appear evident. In light of what we have stated, a reason for the qualification becomes evident, contrary to Muḥaqqiq Khūʾī; because, according to the meaning we have adopted, “imprudent” is broader than [referring to] lightness of intellect [confined] to financial or non-financial matters — that is, sometimes imprudence pertains to financial matters and sometimes to non-financial matters. The late Sayyid, who has included the qualifier “spendthrift” here, in fact wishes to state, precisely by this means, the restriction to financial matters; the evidence for this is that, in the eighth issue, he mentions a different expression, which is precisely the converse of the imprudent person in financial matters. His statement is as follows: “If a person is mature and competent in financial matters, but has no competence with respect to the matter of marriage and its particulars, such as the determination of the spouse and the manner of setting the dower, and the like — the apparent view is that he is like the imprudent person in financial matters with respect to the need for the guardian’s permission…” In financial matters he is competent, but in non-financial matters he is imprudent; on this basis, the qualifier “spendthrift” cannot be an explanatory qualifier of “imprudent,” because imprudence is of two kinds. The introduction of “spendthrift” — meaning someone who is extravagant in financial matters and spends without justification, who pays a high amount for something of low value, who sells something that should be sold at a high price for a low price — this becomes the spendthrift. The spendthrift, in fact, indicates one kind of imprudence, namely imprudence in financial matters; therefore this qualifier is restrictive, distinguishing [him] from the imprudent person in non-financial matters, and therefore a reason for this qualification exists.

Examination of the Authority of Justice in the Meaning of Competence

In fact, in examining the meaning of “imprudent,” we must examine two qualifiers to determine whether they bear upon the meaning of “imprudent” or not. One is whether “imprudent” is confined to one who does not know what is beneficial and harmful for himself in financial matters, or is broader. With respect to the qualifier of financial matters, the conclusion was that this qualifier has no bearing upon the meaning of “imprudent.”

First Position

The other qualifier is the qualifier of justice; some have said that the imprudent person is one who is just (ʿādil) in his own religion — that is, who knows what is beneficial and harmful for himself in his religion, not merely in financial matters. Among these is the late Shaykh al-Ṭūsī, who, in his explanation of competence, states: “that he be one who improves his property, just in his religion; for if he improves his property but is not just in his religion, or is just in his religion but does not improve his property, then his property is not delivered to him.” He, too, has regarded a further qualifier as authoritative in the meaning of “imprudent,” namely the absence of justice — that is, the imprudent person is one who cannot discern benefit and harm both in financial matters and in his own religion. For this reason, the competent person (rashīd), too, is one who can discern benefit and harm both in his property and in his religion.

Second Position

Some jurists have disagreed with the view of Shaykh al-Ṭūsī, including the late ʿAllāmah; he states, in al-Tadhkirah: “The majority of the scholars have said: competence is improvement in property specifically, whether he is righteous in his religion or not” — competence is improvement in property in particular; whether he is righteous in his religion or not. Interestingly, this same disagreement exists among the Sunnīs as well; al-Shāfiʿī regards justice as constitutive of competence; Mālik, Abū Ḥanīfah, and Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal do not regard justice as constitutive of competence.

Arguments for the Non-Authority of Justice in the Meaning of Competence

Is justice, too, constitutive of the meaning of competence? In our view, justice has no bearing on competence. We can advance several arguments for this matter. The late ʿAllāmah himself has stated several arguments for the non-authority of justice in the meaning of competence.

First Argument

Just as moral corruption (fisq) is not an obstacle to dealing [with one’s property] with respect to its continuation, it is likewise not authoritative with respect to its initial occurrence. Suppose we assume that a person has the capacity to discern benefit and harm financially, but, religiously, is counted as an immoral person (fāsiq) and does not adhere to what is lawful and unlawful; has anyone said that this person becomes interdicted (maḥjūr)? No one has said such a thing; whereas, if a person cannot discern financial benefit and harm, he becomes interdicted. Therefore, with respect to the continuation of competence and the continuation of the right to deal [in one’s property], the matter of moral corruption or justice has no bearing. That is, if a believing person becomes morally corrupt, he does not become interdicted from dealing in his property; it is not said that, now that you do not pray and, God forbid, drink wine and commit forbidden acts, you therefore have no right to deal in your own property — because the loss of justice has no bearing on the application of the designation “imprudent.” Now, if there is no such problem with respect to continuation, and moral corruption does not prevent dealing in property, the same applies to its initial occurrence as well; by the very same argument by which we hold that moral corruption does not result in interdiction — because imprudence is not thereby realized — we likewise do not regard moral corruption as an obstacle to [the absence of] imprudence at the outset. Therefore, justice is not constitutive of competence.

Question:

Professor: This is not a religious ruling; it is a designation that has become the subject matter of a certain ruling; we observe this — we say that this designation, in one place, has become the subject matter of this ruling without this qualifier; in another place, it has become the subject matter of this ruling with this qualifier. This makes no sense. … ʿAllāmah states, “The majority of the scholars have said”; therefore it becomes clear that some hold the matter of justice to be constitutive of competence; he himself, too, in defining competence, has made this statement: “that he be one who improves his property, just in his religion”; he then states, “for if he improves his property but is not just in his religion, or is just in his religion but does not improve his property, then his property is not delivered to him” — he does not wish to say, in a general manner, that perhaps someone is imprudent in matters of religion as well; this is so, but he states this for the purpose of the delivery of property. …

Second Argument

The purpose of regarding competence as authoritative is so that property may be preserved; if it is said that a person must be competent in financial matters in order for his property to be given to him, this means that he must have the capacity to preserve his property. The matter of justice plays no role whatsoever in the preservation of property; after all, a person who is not just and who is morally corrupt is capable of many things and commits forbidden acts; among the acts that a morally corrupt person might commit is betrayal in connection with others’ property. A person who does not adhere to the Sacred Law and does not observe what is lawful and unlawful might well lay hands on others’ property and betray others’ property; for this very reason he is counted as morally corrupt. But no person, however corrupt he may be, betrays his own property; he might betray others’ property, but he does not betray his own property — except for the imprudent person, who likewise does not understand. A rational person does not ruin his own property. Therefore, justice is not constitutive of competence, because it has no effect whatsoever on the preservation of property. I have not seen an argument from him [Shaykh al-Ṭūsī] for this; perhaps, on the basis of certain statements made by the linguists, he has made this statement. Perhaps what he means is that one who does not discern benefit and harm is imprudent; and benefit and harm have a general meaning, encompassing both worldly and otherworldly matters. A person who lacks the capacity to discern benefit and harm — neither in financial matters, which is the most prominent manifestation of worldly affairs, nor in what pertains to his afterlife and religion — is, perhaps, the meaning he wishes to derive from this generality.

Third Argument

If we wish to regard justice as constitutive of competence, and say that the competent person is one who discerns both his financial and religious benefit and harm, this must be grounded in an argument; truly, there is no argument whatsoever for this matter. Perhaps it is precisely this generality of “benefit and harm,” which encompasses both material and spiritual matters, that has led to such an inference, but the fact of the matter is that we have no argument [for this]. The only argument we have is certain traditions, from which, however, such a meaning is likewise not derived. According to certain traditions, one who commits certain wrongful and forbidden acts is imprudent; for example, we have a tradition that the wine-drinker is imprudent, or that someone who commits such-and-such a sin — the commission of this act by him is a sign of imprudence. Perhaps reliance has been placed on this category of evidences… However, the imprudence attributed to one who commits a major sin (kabīrah) is a moral imprudence, not a legal one; ordinarily, in the sphere of ethics, the negation pertains to perfection (kamāl), not to the basic reality (ḥaqīqah) [of the matter]. For example, we have this expression in a tradition, that one who does such-and-such an act has no faith (īmān); that one who commits such-and-such a major sin is an unbeliever (kāfir); we have this expression regarding one who abandons prayer and abandons obligatory duties, and one who commits certain forbidden acts, that they are unbelievers — whereas the unbelief that, in the terminology of these traditions, is attributed to one who abandons obligatory duties and commits forbidden acts is not the technical unbelief in contradistinction to Islam; this is unbelief in contradistinction to faith, or unbelief at certain levels. Because the discourse here does not concern one who denies prayer — he still affirms prayer; the discourse concerns one who abandons prayer — that is, he does not, in practice, perform it. Naturally, from a moral standpoint, this person is imprudent; because, if he were to reflect deeply on the reality of prayer — that prayer is something the servant needs, not God, and that it is the source of his own growth and elevation — and yet, despite this, abandons prayer, this person is imprudent. This belongs to the higher levels of competence and a higher level of imprudence — that is, imprudence, from the perspective of a mystic (ʿārif), might encompass many people: those who, for example, are occupied from morning to night with worldly affairs and are heedless of God, and the like. This certainly cannot pertain to the competence and imprudence that is intended in law and jurisprudence. Therefore, since we have no argument whatsoever for the authority of justice in the meaning of competence, justice is not authoritative. These three arguments establish that justice is not authoritative in the meaning of competence, and that moral corruption does not result in imprudence — the imprudence that is the subject matter of certain rulings, including interdiction upon a person, and which prevents him from dealing [in his property]. It has thus become established from all that we have stated that this second qualifier, which is mentioned in certain statements, has no bearing upon the meaning of competence, and moral corruption does not result in imprudence and the application of the rulings of imprudence. Therefore, first, imprudence is not confined to financial matters, and second, it has no relation whatsoever to the matter of moral corruption and justice.

A Qualifier in the Text of Taḥrīr

The Imam (may God’s mercy be upon him) has a further explanation in the continuation of the text of Taḥrīr that does not appear in al-ʿUrwah, and this is, of course, a sign of the precision that the Imam (may God’s mercy be upon him) has exercised here; he states: “The imprudent spendthrift, whose imprudence is continuous from the time of his minority, or who has been placed under interdiction for squandering [his wealth].” The Imam himself, too, in connection with the statement of the Sayyid, has an annotation that explains this very matter. Where it is written, “the marriage of the imprudent person is not valid,” he has written: “if he has been placed under interdiction for squandering [his wealth]”; he has qualified this with [referring to] one who has been placed under interdiction on account of squandering [his wealth]. “Indeed, the imprudent person whose imprudence is continuous from the time of minority is under interdiction absolutely.” We have two categories of imprudent persons: one is a person who has been imprudent since childhood, and whose imprudence continues even when he reaches maturity — for such a person, “his marriage is not valid except with the permission of the guardian.” The other is a person who may not have been imprudent since childhood, and who, when he reached maturity, was competent — he may even have displayed this state of competence for two or three years — but who later became afflicted with imprudence — that is, he engaged in such extravagance, squandering, and wasteful spending that he became interdicted from dealing [in his property]. He states that this person, too, must obtain permission from the guardian for marriage; the guardian must determine the spouse and the dower on his behalf. God willing, we must examine these two secondary cases and evaluate their arguments.