Issue 7, First Secondary Case, Arguments for the Invalidity of the Marriage of the Imprudent Person Without the Guardian’s Permission

Session Thirty-Six

Issue 7 – First Secondary Case – Arguments for the Invalidity of the Marriage of the Imprudent Person Without the Guardian’s Permission – Second Argument: Traditions – Second Category and Its Examination – First and Second Objections and Their Responses

December 20, 2025

Summary of the Previous Session

The discussion concerned the second argument for the invalidity of the marriage of the imprudent person without the guardian’s permission. The second argument is traditions; we stated that several categories of traditions can be invoked here. The first category consists of traditions that, in a general manner, prohibit any dealing whatsoever by the imprudent person. We stated that we can invoke the unqualified scope of these traditions and say that marriage, too, is among the dealings of the imprudent person, and is therefore prohibited.

Second Category

The second category consists of traditions that prohibit the transactions and financial dealings of the imprudent person; in certain traditions, any interference and dealing by the imprudent person in his own property is prohibited. If we apply “imprudent” according to the well-known terminology, to one who cannot discern what is beneficial and harmful for himself in financial matters (since the subject matter of the issue is the imprudent spendthrift — that is, an imprudent person who lacks the capacity for discernment in financial matters), his marriage, on the authority of these traditions, would be regarded as unauthorized. The approach to the argument from this category of traditions, which prohibits the financial dealings of the imprudent person, is as follows: if the Lawgiver does not regard the financial dealing of the imprudent person, without the guardian’s permission, as valid, then, with respect to marriage as well, it must likewise not be regarded as valid. In other words, we eliminate the special character (ilghāʾ al-khuṣūṣiyyah) of financial matters, and say that, when he cannot have discretion even in the most minor and smallest financial dealings, and is prohibited from every type of financial dealing (whether small or large), then, necessarily, in the matter of marriage — which is an important matter — he is prohibited as well (if we do not say all the more so, then at least he is placed in the same category as financial matters).

Question:

Professor: The discussion is precisely this; the first argument, which we objected to, was precisely this — that marriage is a financial matter, and, since this person is imprudent, he cannot marry without the guardian’s permission, because marriage involves the dower and maintenance; we rejected this. That someone might not be imprudent in financial matters but might be imprudent in the matter of choosing a spouse is a matter that the late Sayyid has raised in the eighth issue of al-ʿUrwah. The Imam (may God’s mercy be upon him) has addressed these together, because their ruling does not differ. Therefore, the arguments that we advance are unqualified — whether for one who is imprudent in financial matters, or one who has imprudence in the choice of a spouse. If someone were imprudent in financial matters but not imprudent in the choice of a spouse, and could choose his own spouse, would his marriage, too, be invalid without the guardian’s permission? We shall examine these arguments from this perspective. Therefore, the second category consists of traditions that, although they prohibit financial dealings, can, by way of the elimination of the special character or by way of priority (awlawiyyah), be said to encompass marriage as well. Of course, priority certainly exists here with respect to minor financial dealings; the matter of marriage is certainly more important than minor financial dealings. But with respect to major and general dealings, it is not clear that we can establish priority for marriage relative to them. In any case, the second category of traditions, which indicates the prohibition of the financial dealings and transactions of the imprudent person, indicates, by way of the elimination of the special character or by way of priority, the prohibition of the marriage of the imprudent person without the guardian’s permission. Only one point must be noted: this category encompasses the absolutely imprudent person — that is, one who has imprudence both in financial matters and in the matter of choosing a spouse and the like. But if someone is imprudent in financial matters but is not imprudent in the matter of choosing a spouse — meaning that he can discern well who is suitable for him to live with and who is not, and can discern what is beneficial and harmful for himself in this matter — is such a person also encompassed by this category? This appears improbable, unless one were to say that these are necessarily connected (mulāzimah) with one another — that is, that one who is imprudent in financial matters likewise lacks the capacity to choose a spouse and cannot discern what is beneficial and harmful for himself in this matter. But there is no problem in supposing [otherwise]; if we suppose (which is not improbable) a person who is imprudent in financial matters and cannot discern what is beneficial and harmful for himself, but who, in matters pertaining to knowledge and to life — in the sense of being able to understand what spouse is suitable for him — has no problem in this respect, can we regard this category and this person as encompassed by this category? This appears problematic.

Question:

Professor: It is not a [single, indivisible] period; it is divisible — it is possible that someone is truly imprudent in financial matters, in accounting, and in income and expenditure, and cannot discern what is beneficial and harmful for himself, but is not so in the matter of choosing a spouse; we have explained this. In any case, the second category of traditions certainly encompasses the imprudent person in financial matters and the imprudent person in the matter of choosing a spouse, because the elimination of the special character is correct, or even, in certain instances, priority is, to some extent (fī al-jumlah), acceptable. Therefore, if an absolutely imprudent person is prohibited from financial matters, he is likewise prohibited from marriage without the guardian’s permission. But to hold that this category encompasses one who is imprudent in financial matters but not imprudent with respect to marriage — this is problematic. In other words, if we wish to say, in an unqualified manner, that if someone is imprudent in financial matters, he is also prohibited from marriage without the guardian’s permission in the matter of marriage as well — even if he has the capacity to choose a spouse — this is problematic, and we do not accept this unqualified scope.

Question:

Professor: You state that if someone has the capacity to choose a spouse (since the choice of the wife and the determination of the dower are the most important elements of marriage), but has imprudence in financial matters, he is prohibited from determining the dower, because this is a financial dealing, and therefore both the contract and the dower are invalid; why should we say this? It is like the previous discussion, where some adopted this very position; if we suppose that the financially imprudent person undertakes marriage without the guardian’s permission — meaning someone who cannot discern what is beneficial and harmful for himself in financial matters, but has no problem in the choice of a spouse — we say that this contract can be valid, but, because the dower is a financial action and dealing, and he had no right to financial dealing, it is invalid, and recourse is had to the customary dower. The Imam (may God’s mercy be upon him) and some other eminent scholars stated precisely this in the previous issue; yes, some objected that one cannot separate the basic marriage from the dower, because we have unity of object sought (waḥdat al-maṭlūb), and there is no multiplicity of object sought (taʿaddud al-maṭlūb) here; this is a different basis. We said: what is the problem? This was the view of Shaykh al-Anṣārī and the Imam (may God’s mercy be upon him). According to the basis of multiplicity of object sought, what is the problem with our not holding the marriage to be invalid, but ruling the invalidity of the dower and recourse to the customary dower? … The discussion was whether we can regard the basic marital relation and the dower as two distinct matters and say that these are two separate matters, or not. If we hold to multiplicity of object sought, what obstacle is there? Here we do the same thing; why should we say it is invalid? Therefore, as to your statement — how can we rule the validity of the marriage without the guardian’s permission while one element of marriage is the dower, and the supposition is that this person is imprudent in financial matters — we separate these two and say: with respect to that aspect where there was no problem and no dealing from which he was prohibited, we say it is valid; but with respect to the dower, we say it is invalid, and recourse is had to the customary dower. This is because the supposition is that the second category states that, when he is prohibited from dealing in financial matters, he is prohibited from other dealings as well, because financial matters have no special distinguishing character, or, all the more so, marriage is prohibited as well. We say this pertains to a case where he has imprudence in that domain; if this person is not imprudent in the matter of marriage and the choice of spouse, why should we rule it invalid?

Third Category

The third category consists of specific traditions (riwāyāt khāṣṣah) — that is, traditions that have come specifically with respect to the matter of the marriage of the imprudent person. The first and second categories pertained either to dealings in general or to financial dealings; however, by way of unqualified scope, or the elimination of the special character and priority, we wished to make them encompass marriage. But this category pertains to marriage [specifically]. The only problem it has is that it has come specifically with respect to the woman. “The woman who has [full] possession of herself, who is not imprudent and not under guardianship, her marrying-off without a guardian is valid.” Imam al-Bāqir (peace be upon him) states: a woman whose affair and discretion rests with herself, and over whom no one has guardianship… he then explains that “has [full] possession of herself” means a woman who is not imprudent; a woman who is not under guardianship; whose father or paternal grandfather, for whatever reason, has no guardianship over her — if someone marries her off without her guardian’s permission, this is valid. According to this tradition, the independence of this woman in the matter of marriage, after reaching maturity, is qualified by her not being imprudent; because, when it states “has [full] possession of herself,” it means a woman who has reached maturity; before maturity, she did not possess herself and had a guardian; but when she reaches maturity, the matter of her marriage rests with herself — but with one condition, namely that she not be imprudent. Therefore, imprudence is an obstacle to discretion in the matter of marriage; if a woman is imprudent, she cannot marry without obtaining permission from her father or paternal grandfather.

Examination of the Third Category

This tradition has been subjected to objection.

First Objection

One objection is that this tradition is specific to the woman; because we are examining this particular tradition specifically. This tradition, and others like it, prohibit the marrying-off of the daughter, stating that an imprudent woman cannot marry without her father’s permission; therefore it does not encompass the son. At most, granting that the chain of transmission of this tradition is accepted (which, of course, has no problem with respect to its chain), and that its indication likewise has no problem, it is specific to the marriage of the daughter and does not prohibit the marriage of the imprudent son.

Response

The response is that, by way of priority, we can derive the prohibition with respect to the imprudent man as well; because if an imprudent mature woman — who neither needs to determine a dower nor has maintenance incumbent upon her, meaning that the matter of her marriage is not tied to financial matters — is nevertheless prohibited from this action, then, all the more so, the son, who must determine a dower and pay maintenance, is prohibited from marriage without the guardian’s permission.

Second Objection

A further objection is that this tradition is one of the traditions that has been invoked regarding the matter of the marriage of a mature, competent (rashīdah) daughter; if you recall, there were several positions there as to whether a mature, competent daughter can marry without her father’s permission or not. Some held to prohibition; some held to independent permissibility (jawāz); some held to a shared role (ishtirāk) — that is, they regarded both the father’s permission and the daughter’s permission as bearing upon the validity of the marriage. This tradition was one of the evidences of those who held to the independence of the mature, competent daughter in the matter of marriage. However, in that very discussion, we stated that this tradition has a conflicting tradition (muʿāriḑ) — that is, according to certain traditions, she has no right to undertake this action; in certain traditions, the combination of the daughter’s consent and the father’s permission is required. Given the existence of these conflicting traditions, perhaps we cannot invoke this tradition.

Response

This objection is answerable. The response is that, in any case, the matter of imprudence has no bearing on this issue — that is, whether we hold to independence or to a shared role, in any case, the qualifier of the absence of imprudence is authoritative in the matter. Therefore, it is not improbable that we should accept the indication of this tradition.