Issue 8, Brief Statement of the Issue, Three Aspects Affecting the Suppositions of the Issue

Session Forty

Issue 8 – Brief Statement of the Issue – Three Aspects Affecting the Suppositions of the Issue – Five Suppositions – The Statement of the Sayyid – The Background of the Issue

December 28, 2025

Issue Eight

“If the guardian marries off the ward to one who has a defect, [the marriage] is not valid and is not effective, whether the defect is among those that necessitate the option [of rescission] or otherwise — such as being immersed in sins, or being a wine-drinker, or foul-mouthed, of bad character, and the like — unless there is a binding benefit (maṣlaḥah mulzimah) in marrying him off to such a person; and in that case, neither the guardian nor the ward has the option of rescission, if the defect is not among those defects that permit rescission; but if it is among them, the apparent view is that the option is established for the ward after he reaches maturity. All of this pertains to a case where the guardian had knowledge of the defect; otherwise, there is hesitation and uncertainty regarding it, though validity is not improbable, provided he has exercised his utmost effort in ascertaining the benefit; and, on the basis of validity, he has the option in the case of defects necessitating rescission, just as the ward likewise has this after the interdiction is lifted from him; and with respect to other [defects], neither he nor the guardian has the option, according to the stronger view.”

Brief Statement of the Issue

The eighth issue concerns the marrying-off, by the guardian, of the ward to someone who has a defect; we indicated in the previous session as well that, if the ward is married off by the guardian to someone who has a defect, various suppositions can be conceived here. I shall state the general suppositions of the issue and refer to the ruling stated in the text of Taḥrīr, and then we shall examine these suppositions one by one.

Three Aspects Affecting the Suppositions of the Issue

If we wish to state the aspects bearing upon the suppositions of the eighth issue, there are three aspects: First aspect: the guardian’s marrying-off, in this supposition, is, at one time, with the guardian’s knowledge of the defect, and, at another time, with his ignorance of it; this is the first aspect that we can mention here. At times, when the guardian wishes to marry off the ward to another who has a defect, he knows that the other party (husband or wife) has a defect, and at times he does not know. Second aspect: these defects fall into two categories; at times they are among those defects that necessitate the option [of rescission] — as has been explicitly stated in certain traditions, regarding defects on account of which the husband or wife has the option of rescission — and at times they are among the defects that do not necessitate the option. Third aspect: at times there exists a binding benefit in this marrying-off, and at times there is corruption in it — that is, it is contrary to benefit, and there is no benefit in it whatsoever. A further aspect, which perhaps is not of great importance and has no bearing on the basic issue, is whether an effort has been made to ascertain the benefit, or whether no such effort has been made in this respect.

Five Suppositions

In light of these aspects, if the guardian has knowledge of the existence of these defects, this has two suppositions: at times there is a binding benefit in this marrying-off, and at times there is no such benefit. If there is a binding benefit, at times these defects are among those that necessitate rescission, and at times they are not among the defects necessitating rescission. Where the guardian has no knowledge of the defect and is ignorant of it, if he has exerted effort and striven to ascertain the benefit, validity is not improbable; and if a ruling of validity is given, the guardian has the option, and the ward likewise has the option, in defects necessitating rescission; but if the defects are not among those necessitating rescission, neither has the option. This is a depiction of the suppositions of this issue. Now, pay close attention, one by one, to the ruling for each of these, as stated in the text of the eighth issue. If the guardian has knowledge of the defect, and there is also benefit in this marrying-off, then, in defects necessitating rescission, the option is established for the ward; but in other defects — that is, defects that do not necessitate rescission — neither has the option. These are all the suppositions pertaining to the case of the guardian’s knowledge of the defects. That is, in this supposition, we have three or four suppositions. Pay close attention to this part of the text of Taḥrīr; this opening section of the text of Taḥrīr refers precisely to these suppositions:

First Supposition

“If the guardian marries off the ward to one who has a defect” — if the guardian marries off the ward to someone who has a defect — “[the marriage] is not valid and is not effective” — this marrying-off is not valid and is not effective. “Whether the defect is among those that necessitate the option or otherwise” — whether that defect is among those that necessitate the option, or is otherwise — that is, a defect that does not necessitate the option; “such as being immersed in sins” — that is, someone who exerts effort and diligence in sin; according to some, he is excessive [in this] — that is, it is as though he pursues sin, rather than that a sin occasionally befalls him. “Or being a wine-drinker” — someone who drinks wine; “or foul-mouthed” — someone who is foul of mouth, foul of tongue.

Question:

Professor: It is a sin; only, its difference from the preceding ones is that “being immersed in sins” means that he is not content with a single sin; the totality of his actions is such that he pursues wrongful conduct. This one refers to a specific sin; everything about him is good, but, for example, he is a wine-drinker, or foul-mouthed. “Of bad character, and the like” — or, for example, ill-natured. These too are defects, but among those defects that do not necessitate rescission. “Unless there is a binding benefit in marrying him off to such a person” — unless there is a binding benefit in marrying him off to such a person. Therefore, [the text] up to “unless” pertains to a case in which the guardian marries off the ward without any benefit whatsoever. Without benefit, which, in the expression of the late Sayyid, appears in this wording, “contrary to benefit” — some of the eminent scholars, such as the late Āyatullāh Khūʾī, have written that there is a looseness in this expression; “contrary to benefit” does not mean the absence of benefit, but rather refers to corruption, and alludes to the existence of corruption. Here too, where it states, “unless there is a binding benefit in marrying him off to such a person,” it means that the guardian marries off the ward without any benefit whatsoever — indeed, with corruption — to someone with these defects, whether among the defects necessitating rescission or those not necessitating rescission. In the text of Taḥrīr, “knowledge” has not been introduced here, but is mentioned several lines below, where it states, “all of this pertains to a case where the guardian had knowledge of the defect” — all of these suppositions that have been stated pertain to a case in which the guardian has knowledge of the defect. Therefore, the first supposition is one in which the guardian has knowledge of the defect, and there is no binding benefit whatsoever in this marrying-off. The Imam has stated that this supposition is not valid, is not effective, and is invalid; it is not even contingent upon ratification.

Second Supposition

The second supposition is one in which the guardian has knowledge of the defects, but this defect is not among the defects permitting rescission; he knows that this person is foul-mouthed. Therefore, he has knowledge of the defect; however, it is among those defects that do not necessitate rescission. Here, neither has the option; “and in that case” — that is, in a case where there is benefit — “neither the guardian nor the ward has the option of rescission” — the option of rescission is not established, neither for the guardian nor for the ward. This, however, is on the condition that “the defect is not among those defects that permit rescission” — provided the defect is not among the defects permitting rescission.

Third Supposition

The third supposition is one in which the guardian has knowledge, and the defect is also among those that necessitate rescission; here he states, “but if it is among them” — that is, if it is among the defects permitting rescission — “the apparent view is that the option is established for the ward after he reaches maturity” — here, the option is established for the ward after reaching maturity. He has not established the option for the guardian; for the ward, and that too after reaching maturity. “All of this pertains to a case where the guardian had knowledge of the defect” — I have stated that he did not indicate this at the beginning of the issue, but rather, at the conclusion of these three suppositions, has stated, “All of this pertains to a case where the guardian had knowledge of the defect.”

Question:

Professor: The first supposition was one in which there is no benefit; the second supposition was one in which there is benefit; where there is no benefit, there is no difference between defects permitting rescission and those not; but where there is benefit, he has drawn a distinction between these two categories of defects, and states that, if the defects are not among those permitting rescission, neither has the option; but if the defects are among those permitting rescission, the option is established for the ward after maturity. These three suppositions pertain to the supposition of the guardian’s knowledge of the defects.

Fourth Supposition

“Otherwise” — that is, if the guardian has no knowledge and is ignorant of the defects — “there is hesitation and uncertainty regarding it” — here there is hesitation as to its validity or invalidity; from one angle we can say it is valid, and from another angle we can say it is not valid. “Though validity is not improbable, provided he has exercised his utmost effort in ascertaining the benefit” — although, in this supposition, ruling validity is not improbable, but only on the condition that the guardian has made every effort to ascertain the benefit. That is, he has truly assessed and exerted effort and striving and has determined that benefit exists here; he did not know that the other party had a defect; he made every effort of his own and it seemed to him that this marrying-off possesses benefit; here he states that it is not improbable to say that it is valid. In the first instance, a ruling of validity must be given, and then we shall see whether the option is established or not. Here he says, “validity is not improbable.” He then states: “And, on the basis of validity, he has the option in the case of defects necessitating rescission, just as the ward likewise has this after the interdiction is lifted from him” — if we accept the validity of this contract, we can say that the guardian has the option in defects necessitating rescission, just as the ward has the option in this category of defects; only this option is established after the interdiction is lifted from him. If he is a minor, this is after maturity; if he is imprudent, this is after the imprudence is removed; and in each case, according to its own circumstance.

Fifth Supposition

“And with respect to other [defects], neither he nor the guardian has the option, according to the stronger view” — but with respect to defects other than those necessitating rescission, neither the guardian nor the ward has the option. In the supposition of ignorance of the defects, he, as it were, rules validity after passing through hesitation and uncertainty; he states, “otherwise, there is hesitation and uncertainty regarding it, though validity is not improbable,” on the condition that he has exerted his utmost effort in ascertaining the benefit. Therefore, he states that ruling validity is not improbable; here too, however, he makes two suppositions, stating that at times these defects necessitate rescission, and at other times they do not necessitate rescission. In defects necessitating rescission, the option is established both for the guardian and for the ward; but with respect to other [defects] — that is, defects not necessitating rescission — the option is not established. The total number of suppositions that arise in the eighth issue, in light of these three aspects, comes to five — that is, the eighth issue comprises five suppositions, according to what appears in the text of Taḥrīr. Now we must examine these one by one.

The Statement of the Sayyid

The late Sayyid, in al-ʿUrwah, has stated nearly the same order; he states: “It is not permissible for the guardian to marry off the ward to one who has a defect… but if the guardian is ignorant…” — that is, he too has first mentioned the suppositions pertaining to the guardian’s knowledge, and then has addressed the supposition in which the guardian is ignorant. Because the text of the tenth issue of al-ʿUrwah is lengthy, if I were to read the text of the issue from beginning to end, it would take time; the general framework of the statement of al-ʿUrwah is roughly the same framework that the Imam has in the text of Taḥrīr. There are, of course, certain details and additions in the text of al-ʿUrwah which I shall indicate in due course — that is, when we wish to examine these suppositions one by one, we shall, God willing, also indicate the differences between al-ʿUrwah and Taḥrīr.

The Background of the Issue

This basic issue has, in the past, been raised in the statements of the jurists, but in a very general manner — that is, without a detailed branching of cases. From Shaykh al-Ṭūsī down to the late ʿAllāmah and Muḥaqqiq, they have, in a general manner, addressed the basic matter of the marrying-off of the ward to one who has a defect, but have not entered into these details — for example, whether the guardian has knowledge or not. It is true that, in the statements of Shaykh al-Ṭūsī, no explicit distinction is drawn between defects necessitating rescission and otherwise, but the examples and instances of defects that he has mentioned are all among the defects necessitating rescission. Shaykh al-Ṭūsī, in the 49th issue of al-Khilāf, states: “It is permissible for the father to marry off his minor daughter to a slave, or an insane person, or a leper, or one afflicted with vitiligo, or a eunuch”; he states, in the following issue: “If he marries her off to one of those whom we have mentioned, the contract is valid” — if he marries off his daughter to one of these persons, the contract is valid. Here he draws no distinction between the supposition of knowledge and ignorance. It is true that he has not named defects necessitating rescission and otherwise, but the examples mentioned are examples of defects necessitating rescission; nevertheless, he has ruled validity. In later statements, such as that of the late Muḥaqqiq in al-Sharāʾiʿ, the matter of defects necessitating rescission has been explicitly stated. The statement of Muḥaqqiq in al-Sharāʾiʿ is: “Sixth: if the guardian marries her off to an insane person or a eunuch, [the marriage] is valid, and she has the option when she reaches maturity; and likewise if he marries off the [minor] child to one who has one of the defects necessitating rescission.” Here, the matter of knowledge and ignorance is not raised, but defects necessitating rescission are mentioned. Nearly the same appears in the statement of the late ʿAllāmah in al-Tadhkirah. These, too, have referred to these defects necessitating rescission and otherwise. The matter of benefit has also been referred to by the late ʿAllāmah in al-Qawāʿid, where he states: “Is the option established for the guardians? The [correct] view is that this is so, given the benefit of the ward.” In any case, the further the discussion has progressed, the more the branching and depiction of suppositions has increased. But, again, a distinction between the supposition of knowledge and ignorance is not observed in the [earlier] statements; this is reflected in the statements of later figures, such as the late Sayyid and those after him. Even the author of Jawāhir has not referred to all of these suppositions — the supposition of knowledge, the supposition of ignorance, whether there is benefit or not. Of course, defects necessitating rescission and otherwise have received attention since the time of the late Muḥaqqiq in al-Sharāʾiʿ; but certain aspects that I indicated at the outset of my discussion are not found in the statements of the earlier scholars, but are found in the statements of the later ones.

Discussion for the Next Session

In summary, altogether five suppositions have arisen here; we must examine these five suppositions.