Session Five, The First Stage: Examining the Existence or Non-Existence of Inherent Dignity in the Human Being

Session Five

The First Stage: Examining the Existence or Non-Existence of Inherent Dignity in the Human Being — Disagreement Over the Meaning of Inherent Dignity — Positions — The First Position: The Existence of Inherent Dignity in the Human Being

October 5, 2024

The First Stage: Examining the Existence of Inherent Dignity in the Human Being

We noted that dignity has several categories, and that we must address this discussion in two stages. One of the well-known divisions—though it has, admittedly, little precedent—is the division of dignity into inherent and acquired. In light of the explanations already given concerning inherent dignity, the intended meaning is, by now, fairly well established.

Disagreement Over the Meaning of Inherent Dignity

Some have presented these two categories under the headings of inherent dignity and contingent dignity (karāmat-i iqtiḍāʾī), stating that dignity is of two categories: inherent dignity, and contingent or conditional dignity (karāmat-i shaʾnī). Inherent dignity, as set against contingent dignity, carries approximately the same meaning we indicated in the previous session with respect to inherent dignity as set against acquired dignity. Inherent dignity, in fact, means that very honor, station, rank, and standing that exists for the human being qua human being, and for whose attainment the human being himself has exerted no effort or striving whatsoever. Naturally, this dignity is affirmed for all human beings, of whatever belief, color, religion, race, ethnicity, or sex. Contingent dignity, by contrast, is dignity that is realized upon the fulfillment of certain conditions and the removal of certain obstacles. This depends on human effort and striving, and on the degree to which a person exerts himself to attain that standing, honor, station, and rank. Naturally, this dignity is one attained through human striving—that is, for instance, a person’s wish to attain self-sacrifice and forbearance in order to reach that station and honor; this is the honor attained through piety, devotion, servitude, self-abnegation, and the like. In other words, the human being possesses the capacity to attain that station.

We thus have, on one usage, inherent and acquired dignity—this, of course, being a matter of terminology—and, on another usage, inherent and contingent dignity. Some have likewise divided inherent human dignity into actual inherent dignity and potential inherent dignity. It is said that the human being possesses an inherent dignity that is potential; potential inherent dignity, as it appears in certain formulations, means that the human being inherently possesses the capacity (shaʾnīyyat) for honor and station, not that this honor and station is itself inherent in him and actualized. I mention these terms so that you may become familiar with them, and so that it becomes clear that, in the exposition of the various views, positions, and arguments that have been advanced, the discussion has at times gone somewhat astray, owing to the absence of agreement on terminology. I shall read out the relevant statements for you.

The question now is whether we are dealing with several distinct divisions, or whether all of these are, in fact, a single division expressed in different terms, all seeking to convey one and the same reality. We have one usage of inherent dignity set against acquired dignity; we have one usage of inherent dignity set against contingent dignity; and we have one usage of actual inherent dignity set against potential inherent dignity. The intended meaning of those who employ each of these terms is not necessarily identical.

Those who speak of inherent dignity as set against acquired dignity have in view the honor and station of the human being qua human being—a station that cannot be divested, that does not depend on his choice and will, that does not admit of degrees, and that does not vary in intensity; this in contrast to acquired dignity, which differs from it in these respects. Acquired dignity, for its part, refers to those moral virtues that the human being acquires for himself.

Some speak of inherent dignity meaning precisely this same standing and station belonging to the human being by virtue of his essence, except that they maintain that this dignity is not actual but potential—that is, they say the human being does not possess inherent honor but rather possesses honor potentially. What matters here is precisely where these affirmations and denials are directed. We shall later, in discussing the foundations of inherent dignity, examine the grounds on which those who affirm inherent dignity do so, and the grounds on which those who deny it do so; these are matters of great importance. To clarify this point: some of those who address the foundations of inherent dignity point to the existence of the elements of intellect, will, and choice. Others add further elements and components to these three or four. For instance, being God’s vicegerent (khalīfat Allāh), having been the object of the angels’ prostration, the breathing of the divine spirit into the human being—all of these are invoked on the authority of the Qur’anic verses; it is said that when God states, “and I breathed into him of My spirit” (وَنَفَخْتُ فِيهِ مِن رُّوحِي), this breathing of the spirit occurs for all human beings, and therefore all possess inherent honor. But are these components on the same footing? Are the existence of intellect, will, and choice, on the one hand, and being the object of the angels’ prostration and the breathing of the divine spirit, on the other, situated at one and the same level and station? Consider all of this alongside the description of the human being in the Qur’an with certain highly unflattering attributes—”they are like cattle; nay, they are further astray” (أُولَئِكَ كَالْأَنْعَامِ بَلْ هُمْ أَضَلُّ), or the human being’s having been created grasping, fretful, and restless (مَنُوعًا، جَزُوعًا، هَلُوعًا)—these attributes ascribed to the human being, according to which he is even baser than the animal, more astray, more bewildered, and more lost. Are all these designations on the same footing? Do all of these pertain to that dimension of the human being’s inherent honor qua human being? Do they all pertain to his actual honor and to that fundamental honor of his, or must a distinction be drawn between them? I have set out these various expressions, then, so that you might become acquainted with them, so that it becomes clear that one scholar, for instance, may employ the expression “inherent honor” while intending something altogether different by it.

Question:

Professor: The preservation of the fiṭrah (innate disposition) within this important arena of life is, in itself, the acquisition of those perfections … It is said that the honor the human being attains is precisely those virtues, dispositions, and values, and that this is what actualizes that honor whose capacity already existed within the human being. … As for those who speak of “inherent” and “contingent,” yes—… some, such as the late ʿAllāmah Muḥammad Taqī Jaʿfarī or the late Mr. Miṣbāḥ, have employed the term “inherent” but maintain that this inherent quality is subject to change, and they offer a somewhat different account. Let me now read out their statements, and these differences will become clear.

These terms and expressions have been employed, yet there is no agreement on the use of these terms—or, in other words, the subject of discussion has not been adequately clarified. One scholar says this is inherent dignity, and that which is inherent admits of no causal explanation (lā yuʿallal) and admits of no change whatsoever; it can neither be divested nor established anew. Another employs the term “inherent” while nonetheless maintaining that this inherent quality is conditional upon certain conditions, such that, should those conditions fail to obtain, this dignity and station naturally does not exist.

In any case, we are confronted with these two categories, expressed in differing terminologies. We stated that our discussion proceeds in two stages: the first stage concerns whether the human being fundamentally possesses inherent dignity or not. The second stage concerns whether this inherent dignity, assuming it is accepted, constitutes a source for establishing rights and duties for the human being or not—so that we may subsequently arrive at the question of whether we can regard it as a governing principle (qāʿidah) or not.

The Positions

Several positions exist here; I shall set out these positions and then proceed to an examination of the foundations of inherent dignity. We shall first state these positions, and then clarify what we mean by inherent dignity; after that, we shall turn to the Qur’anic verses, to examine whether the verses of the Qur’an establish such a standing, honor, and station for the human being or not.

The First Position: The Existence of Inherent Dignity

Some hold, in general terms, that the human being possesses inherent dignity. By inherent dignity here is meant, in fact, the existence of an honor and a rank in the human being qua human being. Among those who have stated this with particular clarity, and who subsequently maintain, in the second stage as well, that this honor pertaining to the essence of the human being has also been pursued as a legislative principle (khaṭṭ-i tashrīʿī), both in the Qur’an and in the traditions—and who have accordingly affirmed certain rights and particular privileges for the human being qua human being—are figures such as Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn Faḍlallāh, the late Mr. Muntazirī, and the late Mr. Ṣāniʿī; these are scholars who have explicitly affirmed the existence of this inherent dignity.

1. Ayatollah Muḥammad Ḥusayn Faḍlallāh

Muḥammad Ḥusayn Faḍlallāh has a book entitled Min Waḥy al-Qurʾān; in this book, he states explicitly that, among God’s constitutive favors (alṭāf-i takwīnī) toward the human being, are certain dignities or honors that He has placed within human nature and within human life. He writes: “It occurs to the mind that this declaration of honoring the children of Adam is not merely a statement about what God has bestowed upon the human being by way of constitutive honoring within his nature and his role in life, but rather extends beyond this” (وَيَخْطُرُ فِي الْبَالِ أَنْ لَا يَكُونَ هَذَا الْإِعْلَانُ أَنَّ تَكْرِيمَ أَهْلِ بَنِي آدَمَ مُجَرَّدُ حَدِيثٍ عَمَّا أَفَاضَ اللَّهُ عَلَى الْإِنْسَانِ مِنْ أَلْطَافِ التَّكْرِيمِ التَّكْوِينِيِّ فِي طَبِيعَتِهِ وَدَوْرِهِ فِي الْحَيَاةِ بَلْ يَتَعَدَّاهُ). From here he proceeds to the second category, namely that this honor extends into the sphere of legislation, and that, on the strength of this human nature and this human advantage, certain rights have accordingly been established for the human being. He then emphasizes a further point: that this is accepted as a foundational principle, as a governing rule (qāʿidah)—a matter we shall not address for the moment, as it belongs to the next stage of our discussion—not in the manner of the principles of “no harm” (lā ḍarar) and “no hardship” (lā ḥaraj), which operate as secondary categories governing the proofs of primary rulings, but rather as something that, like the principle of personal sovereignty (qāʿidat al-sulṭanah), expresses a foundational principle and a primary ruling in its own right; this, in itself, constitutes a primary ruling. We shall explain this further when we reach the second stage.

2. Ayatollah Muntazirī

The late Ayatollah Muntazirī, in a published pamphlet entitled Islamic Punishments and Human Rights, states explicitly: “The human being possesses certain rights, such as the right to life, the right to think, and equal access to the use of natural and economic resources; and in this respect, there is no difference between the Muslim and the non-Muslim. Were a difference in belief to entail a difference in this category of rights, then the Muslim whose faith is stronger and more complete would necessarily have to enjoy more of these rights—whereas no one holds to this position.” He maintains that human beings possess an inherent honor and certain inherent advantages and distinctions that exist for all, irrespective of being Muslim, and irrespective of religion, sect, or sex. He then takes this as the foundation for a series of juridical rulings and takes it into account in the process of legal derivation (istinbāṭ); this we shall examine in the second stage.

Question:

Professor: We are, for the moment, simply citing statements; that matter, too, belongs to the second stage of the discussion. The question here, rather, is whether inherent dignity exists as such, in principle, or not; afterward, we shall examine its bearing on rights or, for instance, on duties.

3. Ayatollah Ṣāniʿī

The late Mr. Ṣāniʿī has stated this in a certain place; pamphlets have been published from him under the title Fiqh wa Zindagī (Jurisprudence and Life). In various places, including the discussion concerning the equality of blood-money (diyah) between man and woman, as well as the equality of inheritance between the Muslim and the non-Muslim, he relies on this very inherent dignity; this constitutes, at the very least, one of his arguments—that is, he at the very least raises an objection against those juridical rulings, maintaining that, as a matter of principle, this equality ought to be realized.

4. Martyr Muṭahharī

The late Martyr Muṭahharī has certain expressions that I shall read out, and you may judge for yourselves whether we can derive inherent dignity in this sense from them. He has a statement concerning the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the substance of which is that the foundation of this Universal Declaration of Human Rights is the inherent station of the human being and his natural honor. In this Declaration, the human being, by virtue of a particular honor and dignity belonging to himself, has been accorded a series of rights and freedoms, of which other living beings, lacking that quality, honor, and inherent dignity, remain deprived; and this, too, is reckoned as a point of strength in this Declaration.

Question:

Professor: He means to say that a series of rights and freedoms are affirmed for the human being on the strength of that inherent honor, and that this, too, is reflected in this Declaration.

We encounter, in the statements of these scholars, a number of expressions of this kind that are, in truth, somewhat unsettled and ambiguous. That is, we cannot simply take it upon ourselves to determine which of these various senses is intended by them.

He has stated elsewhere: from the standpoint of the Qur’an, the human being is a being chosen by God, His vicegerent and successor upon the earth, half-angelic and half-material, possessed of a God-recognizing innate disposition (fiṭrah), free, independent, God’s trustee, responsible for himself and for the world, master over nature, earth, and sky, inspired toward both good and evil; his existence begins in weakness and incapacity and journeys toward strength and perfection, rising ever upward; yet he finds rest nowhere save at the divine threshold and in remembrance of Him; his scientific and practical capacity is unlimited; he is possessed of an inherent honor and dignity; his motivations, at times, bear no material or natural coloring whatsoever; he has been granted the right to the legitimate enjoyment of God’s bounties, yet stands answerable before his God. Although Muṭahharī employs the expressions “inherent dignity” and “inherent honor,” he also states that the human being’s existence begins in weakness and incapacity, and that he must traverse this path, rise upward, and attain perfection. The emphasis on his having been chosen by God, on the vicegerency and succession of God upon the earth, on his possessing a half-angelic aspect, on the fiṭrah, on his having been created independent, free, and as a trustee—these are characteristics possessed by all human beings. If inherent dignity is invoked here, it is on the strength of the existence of certain of these elements. All are inspired toward both good and evil; all hold mastery over nature and the earth; yet we must examine whether he is speaking of the human species or of particular individuals. In any case, this is Martyr Muṭahharī’s position. We may therefore, in a certain sense, count him among those who affirm inherent dignity.

Question:

Professor: We are not, for the moment, concerned with the second stage; what is presently under discussion is simply the existence of inherent dignity in the human being as such.

The Second Position: The Non-Existence of Inherent Dignity

1. ʿAllāmah Jaʿfarī

The late Mr. Muḥammad Taqī Jaʿfarī raises, in effect, an objection against inherent dignity, in a particular formulation. He states: God, glory be to Him, has established within the human being’s existence the ground (zamīnah) for value and dignity—not that the human being possesses inherent honor and dignity in every circumstance and condition. Accordingly, should a human being set out upon self-indulgence and tyranny, employing the capacities placed within his existence toward base ends, he not only forfeits any claim to inherent dignity, but, insofar as he obstructs the life and freedom of others, must be held to account. He states, quite clearly, that the human being possesses, in effect, an inherent honor, but not perpetually, not always, and not in every condition and circumstance. This account is closer to the division we mentioned earlier, namely that we have two types of honor: inherent honor, and contingent honor—contingent honor meaning that the human being is capable of attaining honor, or, in other words, that the capacity for honor exists within him. As for whether it is correct to say that the human being does not possess inherent honor and dignity in every circumstance, we must examine whether this is so, or rather examine what is meant by “inherent” in his statement, and offer the appropriate interpretation; the apparent sense of his statement is that he wishes to say that the human being is, at certain times, possessed of inherent honor, while at other times he is deprived of this inherent honor. We must then ask: if this is so, what, here, does “inherent” mean? Is it correct, in that case, to employ the term “inherent” at all?

The Discussion of the Coming Session

The late Mr. Miṣbāḥ likewise has a statement that you must examine carefully, noting what differences exist among these various usages. Mr. Javādī, too, has a statement of his own. The account that Mr. Javādī offers in denying inherent dignity differs from the account offered by Mr. Miṣbāḥ. I would note that there is no agreement on these expressions and terms, and it remains unclear precisely what these affirmations and denials are directed toward—a fact that renders the matter somewhat more difficult and complex.