Session Ten, The First Stage: Examining the Existence or Non-Existence of Inherent Dignity in the Human Being
Session Ten
The First Stage: Examining the Existence or Non-Existence of Inherent Dignity in the Human Being — The Foundations of Inherent Human Dignity — The First Category: 1. Intellect — Evidence — The First Piece of Evidence: The Verse “And We have honored the children of Adam…” — Continued Discussion on the Third Aspect: The Exclusion of the Angels — The Fourth Aspect: The Exclusion of the Jinn from the Domain of the Intellect’s Honor
October 20, 2024
Summary of the Previous Session
We invoked verse 70 of Surah al-Isra to support the view that the intellect constitutes an inherent dignity for the human being—in the sense that it is unique to the human being, and non-human entities do not enjoy this gift. Concerning this verse, which was cited here as evidence for the inherency of the intellect’s dignity for the human being, we mentioned several aspects. The first aspect was the difference between honoring (takrīm) and preferring (tafḍīl); the second aspect related to the object of honor—namely, through what this dignity is actualized; and the third aspect was that the angels are excluded from the scope of this verse, meaning they fall within neither the domain of takrīm nor the domain of tafḍīl. We noted that, in the words of the late ʿAllāmah, this verse is directed at cosmic creatures (al-mawjūdāt al-kawnīyyah) and the human being’s superiority over worldly creatures.
Thus, the verse is directed at this characteristic in the human being with respect to cosmic existence; his ennoblement (takrīm) is by virtue of the intellect, and his preference (tafḍīl) is also in comparison with other material creatures—those that live in this world under the worldly system. Consequently, the angels are entirely excluded; they are included neither in the first part of the verse nor in the second. Indeed, even in the second part where it speaks of “and preferred them greatly over many of those whom We created” (وَفَضَّلْنَاهُمْ عَلَى كَثِيرٍ مِمَّنْ خَلَقْنَا تَفْضِيلًا), they do not fall within the scope of “many.”
Continued Discussion on the Third Aspect
To clarify this matter further, I shall provide a brief explanation of this part of the verse: “many of those whom We created” (kathīr mimman khalaqnā).
Several possibilities exist regarding “many” (kathīr) in this verse:
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One possibility is that “many” (kathīr) means “all” (jamīʿ), and “of” (min) is explicative (bayānīyyah). The meaning would then be: We preferred them over those whom We created, and they are many. However, this possibility is contrary to the apparent sense and context of the verse, and its invalidity is obvious, requiring no further elaboration.
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Another possibility, which is more widely accepted, is that “many” refers to other creatures besides the angels—namely, the jinn and animals, for example—meaning that the human being is preferred over all animals and the jinn. Here, “of” (min) is partitive (tabʿīḍīyyah), and thus “those whom We created” (man khalaqnā) takes on a broader meaning that includes the angels as well: angels, humans, animals, and jinn—all creatures that possess consciousness (shuʿūr) in some manner. Consequently, the “of” in “many of those whom We created” (كَثِيرٍ مِمَّنْ خَلَقْنَا) is partitive and indicates that the human being is preferred over the jinn and animals, so the angels are excluded from the scope of preference as well. Thus, this verse is not directed at the human being’s preference over the angels, and has not been revealed for that purpose. To be sure, other verses may be invoked, in which case the meaning of preference must also be clarified. Therefore, this verse has nothing to do with the angels; they are entirely excluded from its scope.
There is only one issue, which the late ʿAllāmah addressed but we shall not delve into: some have argued from this verse that the angels are superior to the human being. Those who make this claim base their argument on this very part: “and preferred them greatly over many of those whom We created” (وَفَضَّلْنَاهُمْ عَلَى كَثِيرٍ مِمَّنْ خَلَقْنَا تَفْضِيلًا). They argue that this shows there are creatures over whom preference has not been granted, and those over whom preference is not granted are the angels; since, after all, human beings are superior to other creatures. There is one group for whom preference is not mentioned here, and that is the angels; thus, it is shown that the angels are superior to the human being.
Several answers have been given to this point. The core argument, to which we referred both in the previous session and at the outset of this discussion, is that this preference is fundamentally not in comparison to immaterial or luminous beings, but rather in relation to worldly creatures.
Question:
Professor: “Whom We created” (khalaqnā) encompasses all… “Those whom We created” (man khalaqnā) is general, encompassing angels, humans, jinn, and animals. “Many of those whom We created” means We preferred the children of Adam over many of them. “Many of those whom We created”—not just of the creatures of this world. This “many” who are of “those We created” are cosmic creatures, worldly creatures.
Thus far, it has become clear why we said the verse presents the human being in comparison with these creatures. This is because, prior to this, it speaks of the ennoblement of the children of Adam and points to the aspect of dignity. The two aspects mentioned there pertain to this world, rather than the origin of the realm of creation. Let me explain these two aspects and the relationship between the beginning and the end of the verse. The origin of dignity lies in the uniqueness of the intellect in the human being, and we have explained the meaning of the intellect; however, following that, what God did with the human being—which stems from that primary dignity—was the subjugation of land and sea and employing other creatures in his service.
He provides an example, stating that the human being’s state in this divine ennoblement is like inviting someone to a meal and also sending a car to fetch him. This ennoblement is in fact ennoblement within that very act. The essence is one, and the cause of all those ennoblements is that very invitation; yet, in pursuit and continuation of it, He sends a car to fetch you, then entertains you with all kinds of food, gives you a gift at the end, and then escorts you home. The primary ennoblement stems from that invitation; yet, as a consequence of it, when these measures are taken, they become an ennoblement arising from the first one, reflecting a special and doubled care. Here, too, the case is the same: he states that God granted the intellect to the children of Adam, which is itself the ultimate cause (ʿillat al-ʿilal) of all other benefits and blessings that accrue to the human being. Yet, in continuation of this, He also presents the subjugation of other creatures, the subjugation of land and sea, and employing other creatures in his service. His phrasing is that the conjunction of “and carried them” (wa-ḥamalnāhum) and “and provided them” (wa-razaqnāhum) is in fact like joining subordinate instances to the general concept from which they are abstracted.
Thus, we see that God has established a dignity for the human being and ennobled him with the nobility of the intellect. All human beings possess this, and of course, it is exclusive to the human being, and others do not enjoy it. The angels are also excluded from the scope of this discussion and this verse; we have explained this and also pointed to some aspects concerning preference and superiority.
The Fourth Aspect: The Exclusion of the Jinn from the Domain of the Intellect’s Honor
The fourth aspect is the exclusion of the jinn from the domain of the intellect’s honor. However, a question raised in the previous session—which we can present in this session as the fourth aspect of this verse—is that if the intellect is exclusive to the human being and no other creature shares this faculty with him, then how are the jinn excluded from the domain of the intellect’s exclusivity? After all, the jinn also possess a share of consciousness and awareness; even animals possess a share of consciousness. Thus, the intellect should in fact have been presented among those blessings and gifts shared between humans and non-humans, albeit with the human being’s share exceeding that of the jinn, animals, and so forth. This is a question that can be raised here.
Our contention is that what has been given to the human being has not been given to the jinn. The intellect, in the sense of the power to discover the unknown, is exclusive to the human being. Contemplation is exclusive to humanity; the jinn do not contemplate and do not possess the power to discover the unknown. Yes, they may possess a level of consciousness or self-awareness by virtue of which they are religiously obligated (mukallaf) and subject to reward and punishment, but they do not possess intellect in this sense. We must discuss the jinn in detail, but the late ʿAllāmah himself has mentioned certain characteristics of the jinn: they have life and death, they are resurrected on the Day of Judgment, they are created from fire while the human being is from clay, and their creation preceded that of the human being. Also, they are not perceivable by the five senses, they have the power to perform arduous tasks, and they possess consciousness (shuʿūr).
Possessing consciousness is distinct from possessing intellect. A kind of awareness is also present in animals, but the intellect in the sense we have defined—the power to distinguish good from evil, the beneficial from the harmful, which has the capacity for elevation and perfection and can reach the loftiest heights—is certainly not present in these creatures. They even have male and female, believer and disbeliever, righteous and corrupt, procreation and descent, and some of them believe in and affirm the Prophet (peace be upon him and his family) and the Qur’an while others do not; they are religiously obligated and have duties, and they are subject to reward and punishment.
Question:
Professor: That applies to all creatures. When the mystics say we hear the glorification (tasbīḥ) of God even from stones and walls… I said contemplation is exclusive to humanity, and this is the human intellect. All creatures in this world glorify God the Almighty; they perceive Him, see Him, and receive grace from Him. They were commanded and told what to do. What I wish to argue is that when I say they possess a share of consciousness, do not say they share in this understanding with the human being, with the human being’s understanding merely being higher. No, the very nature of the jinn’s perceptive faculty and the nature of the human perceptive faculty are entirely different. It has not been said that they possess intellect; it is said they possess consciousness (shuʿūr). There is a difference between intellect and consciousness. Animals also possess consciousness at a low level, yet it is not said that animals possess intellect, nor is it said that the jinn possess intellect. Even if it is said of them, it is metaphorical.
The intellect is an exclusive bounty. The discussion concerns the exclusivity of this bounty to worldly creatures. Do immaterial beings also possess intellect? Yes. The verse states that among these material creatures of this world, We made the intellect exclusive to the human being; this does not mean the denial of intellect to immaterial beings. We are not concerned with that at all. We maintain now as well that the jinn do not possess intellect in the sense of the faculty of perception, contemplation, and the power to discover the unknown from the conjunction of known facts. They possess a capacity for understanding to a certain degree—the degree to which duty appropriate to them has been established; their duty is not identical to human duty. My contention is that, according to this verse… some believe they even have messengers from their own kind; this is not for all of them, but has been proposed for a specific number of them.
In any case, there is no debate that they are specific creatures with specific capabilities and a certain level of consciousness; however, what they possess of consciousness is qualitatively different from the human intellect. Indeed, the human intellect is something else entirely—a faculty whose attributes have been described in certain traditions. It is present in no other creature and has been made exclusive to the human being.
Therefore, with respect to the fourth aspect, our contention is that while the jinn and animals may possess a specific share of consciousness, they are devoid of intellect. Consequently, the jinn and animals are included in this part of the verse: “and preferred them greatly over many of those whom We created” (وَفَضَّلْنَاهُمْ عَلَى كَثِيرٍ مِمَّنْ خَلَقْنَا تَفْضِيلًا); whereas “We have honored” (karramnā) is exclusive to Adam and is a unique bounty enjoyed by the human being, with which no one else shares.
Question:
Professor: The exclusive advantage is the intellect. The exclusivity of the bounty of the intellect is distinct from preferring.
Summary of the Entire Discussion
In conclusion, we discussed this verse and cited it as evidence to accept the intellect as an inherent dignity for the human being. Consider the sum of these arguments. We find here that both honoring (takrīm) and preferring (tafḍīl) are mentioned. Honoring is exclusive to a type of gift of which others are deprived—meaning it is unique to the human being—which is the faculty of the intellect. Preferring means granting superiority to the human being in something he shares with other creatures, yet the human being has more of it, superior to it, and higher than it.
For example, the human being eats food, and animals also eat food; but compare the food an animal eats with the food a human being eats. The food a human being eats is characterized by variety, complexity, cooking, and presentation… everyone eats, but there is an immense difference. The most significant difference is that the human being cooks food, while no animal cooks food. This is preference. For example, the clothing of animals is different from that of humans… in marriage, housing, and many other things, humans and animals share, yet the quality differs. Does the animal possess choice and will? That is instinct, not will.
Thus, we have an exclusive bounty and a preference. These superiorities that the human being has acquired are presented in comparison with these material creatures and their benefits. The verse does not intend to state all the advantages of the human being here; this is not the discussion of “Indeed, I am placing a vicegerent on the earth” (إِنِّى جَاعِلٌ فِي الْأَرْضِ خَلِيفَةً) or “and I breathed into him of My spirit” (وَنَفَخْتُ فِيهِ مِنْ رُوحِي). Here, it refers to the human being from this specific aspect; why should we encompass all those other matters within it?
Therefore, in conclusion, the intellect stands as an acceptable foundation for the inherent dignity of the human being.