Session Twenty-Six, The First Station: Examining the Existence or Non-Existence of Intrinsic Dignity in the Human Being

Session Twenty-Six

The First Station: Examining the Existence or Non-Existence of Intrinsic Dignity in the Human Being – The Foundations of the Intrinsic Dignity of the Human Being – Summation of the First Station

February 1, 2025

Summation of the First Station

When we began the discussion of the rule, after stating certain terms and clarifying the subject of the discussion, we said that we must first discuss the foundations of the intrinsic dignity of the human being and that these foundations must be examined. The first station of the discussion concerned these foundations themselves; first, what matters have been cited, or can be cited, as a foundation for intrinsic dignity. The second station concerns whether these matters can serve as a foundation for particular rights pertaining to the human being or not.

Our discussion in the first station is more or less concluded; the first station pertained to the matters that have been cited, or can be cited, as a foundation for intrinsic dignity. We divided these into two categories; we said that one category comprises matters for which we can cite evidence for the intrinsic nature of this dignity in the human being. We included six instances in the first category: the intellect, will and free will, the subjugation of beings, the primordial nature (fiṭra), moral and human emotions, and the finest of creation. Of course, we also explained at the very outset that our acceptance of six instances as the foundation of intrinsic dignity does not necessarily mean that these are regarded as six matters independent of one another; perhaps they revert to two or three matters. Here, there are several views:

Some hold that the only thing that brings about the intrinsic dignity of the human being is the intellect; that is, they reduce to the intellect that dignity which is mentioned in the verse “And We have certainly honored the children of Adam” (وَلَقَدْ كَرَّمْنَا بَنِي آدَمَ), and the subjugation and certain other matters that follow it. Perhaps, among those who have addressed this subject, the late ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī has stated this explicitly; he says that the principal characteristic of the human being is the intellect, and the human being possesses only one thing that other beings do not, namely the blessing of the intellect; for this reason, this is considered an honoring—in contrast to preferment (tafḍīl), which other beings possess as well, but of which the human being partakes more than other beings. Will and free will revert to the intellect; the fact that the human being has the power to bring other beings under his subjugation; the fact that the human being can choose a dwelling, marriage, and clothing for living; the fact that the human being can, in order to attain his goals, bring all the beings of this world under his subjugation. No being has such a capability at its disposal; only the human being possesses this capability. The root of all of these is the intellect; it is by means of the intellect that the human being can distinguish the beneficial from the harmful, the false from the true, and the good from the evil. He has not, of course, spoken of these five matters one by one; that, for instance, the finest of creation or the primordial nature reverts to the intellect has not appeared clearly in his words, but he says that the most important characteristic of the human being, which is considered an honoring of him and of which all human beings partake, is the blessing of the intellect.

Question:

Professor: Some have raised this as an objection against the late ʿAllāma, but in our view this objection is not valid; for the intellect in this sense exists only in the human being and in nothing else. Indeed, something called the discovery of the unknown exists only in the human being. The angels were created from the beginning with pure actuality. Something called potentiality has no place in the angels; the angels are pure actuality, and something called potentiality and aptitude has no place in them; yes, they are pure intellect, but something called the power to discover the unknown and to analyze fundamentally has no meaning in them. Therefore, the intellect in this sense exists in no being other than the human being.

Certain other great scholars have also accepted this; from certain of the words of the late Imām [Khomeini], it emerges that the sole criterion of the human being’s superiority over other beings is the intellect, although in certain expressions he has mentioned the breathing of the divine spirit and has held it to be the cause of the angels’ prostration before the human being; in certain places he has alluded to the intellect, and in certain places reference has also been made to the station of divine vicegerency. The aspects differ; of course, whether the matter of the angels’ prostration and the breathing of the divine spirit, or divine vicegerency, has a connection with the intellect or not, we do not wish to enter into these discussions. In any case, among these six factors, or six matters, that we cited as a foundation for intrinsic dignity, some have confined themselves to one matter and some to two matters, and have reduced the other matters to this one or two matters. You observed that, in the first category, we mentioned neither being the object of the angels’ prostration, nor vicegerency, nor the breathing of the spirit, nor the trust—none of them—and we had a reason for separating these matters, namely that, in our view, those six matters we cited in the first category possess characteristics by virtue of which we can regard them as intrinsic dignity. The intellect, of course, in one of the two senses we alluded to—what is meant by the intellect is not the intellect free of impurities and vain imaginings; that is the intellect of which not everyone partakes; but the intellect as the faculty for discovering the unknown and comprehending the known exists in all human beings, and both the disbeliever and the Muslim possess it. All human beings possess moral emotions; all human beings have been created in the finest of creation; their creation, whether spiritual or physical, has been in the best manner. That is, they possess intellect, possess the primordial nature, possess moral emotions, and the totality of these constitutes the finest of creation; now, that they should transform this finest of creation into the most hideous is another matter; but this in itself is an advantage that other beings do not possess. Even the primordial nature, we stated, all possess; the Muslim and the disbeliever possess this primordial nature; therefore, you observe that the prophets and the saints have always called attention to the primordial nature, and religion has been legislated on the basis of the human being’s primordial nature; the religious laws are all consonant with the human primordial nature; the prophets have always sought to awaken the human being—that is, to alert and make aware and to direct him toward that inner call. These all exist actually in the human being.

The characteristics of intrinsic dignity exist in these first six matters; the human being qua human being has come to partake of these; these cannot be stripped from the human being. Of course, we state these according to the species; now, do not raise the objection that someone is without intellect or someone is such-and-such. They are not subject to change in the sense that they should be taken away and something else placed in their stead. They are not a graded (tashkīkī) matter; the principle of the divine blessing, from one standpoint, is not graded. Perhaps someone might cast doubt on this characteristic as well, [arguing] that being graded or not graded is not considered a fundamental difference between intrinsic and acquired dignity; for we might say that one human being is magnanimous and another is more magnanimous; this is an attribute; and one might not be magnanimous at all. This being magnanimous and being more magnanimous means that this attribute possesses degrees. We might say this concerning moral emotions as well; moral emotions might be greater in one and lesser in another. The same is true concerning the intellect. Therefore, although we said that, in four respects, there is a difference between acquired dignity and intrinsic dignity, the principal points are the three matters that were alluded to; the human being qua human being, the essence of the human being, partakes of this dignity. It is not subject to change and not subject to being stripped away; these matters possess these [characteristics]. Now, whether we reduce these to one matter, or to two matters, or regard those six matters as wholly independent, these are actual in the being of the human being and possess actuality. It is not a matter of aptitude; human beings possess this; they need not strive, exert themselves, and acquire it in order to obtain it.

As for the second category, in which we included five matters, it consisted of the breathing of the divine spirit, divine vicegerency, the divine trust, knowledge of the names with that interpretation we offered, and becoming the object of the angels’ prostration. We stated that these matters do not pertain to the human being without faith; they do not pertain to the human being with any belief whatsoever, even disbelief; not every human being, even the disbeliever, is regarded as the successor of God and is the object of the angels’ prostration; he has not borne the divine trust; in none [of them] is this trust actually upon his shoulders at present.

These matters do not pertain to the essence of the human being; therefore, unlike the two groups, we made a distinction among these matters. We hold that the human being can be the successor of God, possesses the aptitude to become the successor of God, possesses the aptitude for the divine trust, possesses the aptitude to become the object of the angels’ prostration, possesses the aptitude for the manifestation of the divine names. That God states that We breathed into his spirit [means that] the human being acquires the aptitude for the divine spirit to be made manifest within him; otherwise, we cannot say that a being such as Shimr, Yazīd, or Genghis the Mongol, or Netanyahu—that these are divine successors; we cannot say that these are the objects of the angels’ prostration; we cannot say that the divine spirit has been breathed into them. These, as human beings, possessed the aptitude to attain the highest degrees by acquiring these dignities. Therefore, we said that these five matters are regarded as acquired dignities, whereas those six matters are intrinsic dignities. This is the detailed distinction we made between the two categories of dignities.

In contrast to this view, there are two other views to which I alluded at the beginning of the discussion.

One view is that none of these eleven matters is regarded as intrinsic dignity; therefore, they wholly negate the intrinsic nature of dignity for the human being and say that the human being does not possess intrinsic dignity, but rather an aptitudinal or dispositional dignity, in the sense that he can acquire certain worthinesses, and can attain lofty stations and degrees. Therefore, they hold, on the whole, that we have nothing called intrinsic dignity. From the expressions of certain eminent scholars, this emerges; perhaps from the expressions of Ayatollah Javādī Āmolī and the late Mr. Miṣbāḥ; from certain expressions of the late Mr. Muṭahharī—for he spoke in different contexts with different arrangements, and a single, consistent statement is not much to be seen from him in this regard. In one place he discusses that, in certain respects, the human being’s dignity is intrinsic, and in certain respects he states explicitly that the human being without faith has no value and nobility, no advantage whatsoever, but rather there exist problems as well.

[Another] view is that they have regarded all of these matters as dignity; that is, they have made no distinction between the first category and the second category. They have cited the intellect, the primordial nature, moral emotions, and will and free will in the same rank as divine vicegerency, knowledge of the names, and the like, and have regarded all as intrinsic dignity. Their argument, too, is that, after all, the very fact that the human being can attain the station of vicegerency, that the human being can become the object of the angels’ prostration, is a possession; other beings do not possess this ability. From this perspective, they have regarded all of these matters as intrinsic dignity.

But as we stated, it appears that this is not correct; we must distinguish between the two categories of matters, as you have observed. In our view, six matters (regarding which, of course, we have no insistence whatsoever on the number six; this may be placed within the framework of two or three matters) are intrinsic dignity, and you have observed its evidence as well; with the meaning we gave for each of these, you observed that these undoubtedly exist in human beings; all human beings, the disbeliever and the Muslim, partake of these dignities.

There is only one point, which we also alluded to and which I recall here, namely that, with respect to certain of these matters, such as the primordial nature and human emotions, an objection might be raised by [pointing to] the existence of certain human beings in whom the primordial nature has been entirely extinguished; certain human beings in whom moral and human emotions have entirely perished. If these are intrinsic dignity, they should not perish and should not be stripped away; the characteristics you stated for intrinsic dignity were that it pertains to the essence of the human being, is not subject to being stripped away, is not subject to change, and is not voluntary and a matter of free will. Certain of these characteristics do not exist with respect to certain human beings.

We answered this at that very time as well: that the primordial nature exists in the inner constitution of all human beings, and is fundamentally the principal capital of the call of the prophets; that is, it is by relying upon this inner call of human beings that the prophets are always regarded as reminders. The letters written to the leaders of disbelief, the disputation of Moses with Pharaoh, the letter of the Prophet (peace be upon him and his family) to the emperor of Persia and Rome—all were by way of calling attention to that inner call and the primordial nature; thus, all possess the primordial nature. Of course, someone might oppose this light to such a degree, but this light exists in the being of the human being and someone covers it over; the covering over and rusting of the primordial nature is other than the annihilation of the primordial nature; it is precisely for this reason that it creates a state of regret, remorse, and contrition—even in the final moments of life—for many human beings. The same is true of moral and human emotions; many human beings, even if they undertake the most criminal of acts, are nevertheless always inwardly encompassed by the pangs of conscience, which do not release them. These are actual as well.

Thus, with respect to the first category, we can truly claim, with firm evidence, that these are intrinsic dignity for the human being—that God bestowed these upon the human being while no being partakes of these advantages. But with respect to the second category, the human being possesses the aptitude, with these possessions, to acquire certain dignities, to attain the station of vicegerency, to be regarded as the trustee of God, to become the object of the angels’ prostration, and for that spirit which God breathed into him to manifest itself. That divine spirit does not exist actually in all human beings; I stated that if we reduce this spirit to the primordial nature, its status is clear; but if what is meant is the manifestation of the divine names and attributes, its status is clear as well. We have also addressed knowledge of the names. Therefore, the second category is undoubtedly not regarded as among the foundations of the intrinsic dignity of the human being. This view is, in fact, a detailed distinction within these matters, in contrast to those two other views we mentioned.

Question:

Professor: One group has negated all of these matters outright; one group has accepted all of them outright; we made a detailed distinction within these matters—we accepted some and did not accept others.

Topic of the Next Session

Now we come to the second station of the discussion; the second station, which is important, is this: now that intrinsic dignity has been established for the human being, does this become the source and foundation of particular rights for the human being or not? If there is any fruit [to this discussion], it appears here. We said at the very outset that we have a discussion in two stations; this station is very important. If the human being possesses intellect, possesses will and free will—or, in other words, possesses freedom of choice—does this matter create a particular right for the human being? Does this intrinsic dignity, and this special blessing of God to the human being, create for him a particular and special right? This goes beyond positive law (al-ḥuqūq al-mawḍūʿa), which is termed natural rights (al-ḥuqūq al-ṭabīʿiyya). We must speak somewhat about natural rights.