Ayatullah Sayyid Mujtaba Nur Mufidi in an Interview with Ijtihad Network: The Non-Prohibition of the Infallibles Is the Most Important Proof for the Legitimacy of Nowruz

Islam’s Perspective on National Occasions Has Always Been Reformist / The Non-Prohibition of the Infallibles Is the Most Important Proof for the Legitimacy of Nowruz / Joy Is the Right of the “Human Being” and Is Not Restricted to the Believers

“We are plagued by extremes. Sometimes we face a problem. Instead of mastering ourselves, contemplating, and finding a solution to resolve this problem through intellect, planning, consultation, and collective thinking, we hastily want to solve the issue with a sedative. This sedative hides the disease or problem. The problem must be cured. We are somewhat afflicted with superficiality, incorrect perceptions, and unwarranted fears. The problems are so numerous that one does not know which one to mention.”

Ijtihad: Is joy considered a right, or is it merely a jurisprudential ruling? Is this right exclusive to believers, or does it belong to the human being as a whole?

Ayatullah Nur Mufidi: In my view, joy and cheerfulness are among the natural and innate (fitri) needs of every human being. In the tradition of the hosts of intellect and ignorance (junud al-aql wa al-jahl) narrated from Imam al-Sadiq (peace be upon him), joy is considered one of the hosts of intellect, and its opposite—namely listlessness—is counted among the hosts of ignorance. Furthermore, mirth (farah) is introduced as one of the hosts of intellect, and its opposite—namely grief (huzn)—is introduced as one of the hosts of ignorance.

The basis of this noble tradition is the explanation of human innate characteristics. The late Imam Khomeini, in the explanation of the tradition of the hosts of intellect and ignorance, has explained this beautifully. All that has been introduced as the hosts of intellect is innate to human beings; however, sometimes it is the primary innate nature, sometimes the natural innate nature, and in the words of the late Imam, it is the “kneaded nature” (al-fitrah al-makhmurah). Consequently, a human being occasionally pursues what they mistakenly assume to be joy and cheerfulness, whereas in reality, it is not. Therefore, joy is an innate matter.

In addition, the holy verse in the Quran: “So let them laugh a little and weep much as recompense for what they used to earn” (Quran 9:82) is stated as a punishment for those who became arrogant and negligent and pursued the path of polytheism and disbelief. Usually, punishment is for creating constraints and awakening, and a ruling that entails punishment and warning is always contrary to human nature. Imprisonment and fines are contrary to human nature. In this verse, refraining from joy is mentioned as a punishment for a group, which indicates that joy is an innate need.

The third proof for the innate nature of joy is that the promises God has made in the Quran and narrations regarding Paradise and bounties of Paradise are all related to matters that cause human cheerfulness, joy, and mirth. This in itself indicates that joy is an innate matter.

In this very system of creation, which is the perfect system (al-nizam al-ahsan), fundamentally all beings of this world are in some way mirth-giving, joy-creating, and cheerful. All details of the days, the rising and setting of the sun, the stars, and the seasons are designed to respond to this need.

If we consider joy as an innate and natural need required by human nature, it is naturally a right for the human being. Since the foundation of the Sharia and religion is to serve as an external roadmap for human salvation, this harmony between the Sharia and innate nature definitely exists.

That is, if we consider the existential structure of human beings, whatever God has placed within the human being, whether as innate nature (fitrah) or as natural disposition (tabi’ah), is precisely compatible with this existential structure of the human being and helps guide them toward eternal salvation. Therefore, it can be said that the core need for joy, mirth, and cheerfulness—which are, of course, different from one another—is a natural and innate need. Consequently, it is a human right, and if we say it is a human right, there is no difference between a believer and a non-believer.

Are other natural needs and innate matters restricted to believers? Fundamentally, the foundation of human personality is such that this need exists within them, and there is no difference between them. I believe that because rulings are compatible with this existential structure, this aspect has also been paid attention to.

Of course, it must be noted that joy has a domain. We must ensure that joy does not damage human dignity (waqar).

Ijtihad: If we say that joy is a right, then the prerequisite (muqtadi) exists, and if at some point we doubt the existence of an obstacle, we negate that obstacle by resorting to the Principle of No Harm (Qa’idah La Darar). Do you accept this argument?

Ayatullah Nur Mufidi: In my view, in accordance with the late Imam Khomeini’s opinion, the Principle of No Harm (Qa’idah La Darar) is a state and governmental ruling (hukm-e sultani wa hukumati) and does not apply to this domain at all. Furthermore, it is not the case that the absence of a specific joy constitutes a harm, such that we lift it using La Darar.

Of course, if joy is completely removed from the social environment and cheerfulness is depleted, this certainly entails harm and difficulty (haraj), and fundamentally causes suspension, stagnation, and prevents progress, as physicians, doctors, and specialists of the field state; however, if the absence of a necessary matter constitutes harm, must we prescribe it altogether? I fundamentally disagree with this perspective. Our hands are so full of traditional proofs that we do not require traversing this path.

Ijtihad: Why is joy regarded as a trivial and undesirable (marjuh) matter in religious thinking? Does this notion have religious roots?

Ayatullah Nur Mufidi: In my view, a distortion has occurred here, and an incorrect understanding of religion has taken shape. Fundamentally, the reality of joy must be clarified first, so we can then see why a negative stance is adopted and why the perception exists that a religious and sanctimonious person must be gloomy?

The reality of joy is actually the feeling of satisfaction, comfort, and tranquility. Cheerfulness means tranquility and possessing a feeling of satisfaction, and is in a way accompanied by pleasure. Therefore, joy is an internal matter, though its expressions can be external.

How is the feeling of satisfaction realized? Fundamentally, the stance of religion regarding this issue is completely clear. The extensive emphasis in the narrations on smiling when facing others is for the purpose of transmitting the feeling of joy and cheerfulness to others.

That Imam al-Sadiq (peace be upon him) states: “Whoever brings joy to a believer has brought joy to me, and whoever brings joy to me has brought joy to the Messenger of God (peace be upon him and his progeny), and whoever brings joy to him has brought joy to God the Almighty,” indicates that God the Almighty has attached great importance to this matter regarding human beings.

The Commander of the Faithful (peace be upon him), the Prophet himself, and other Imams (peace be upon them) joked with their companions, and fundamentally, the biography (sirah) of the Imams and the religious community has been so. Therefore, there is no doubt that joy is one of the signs of faith. That it was said: “The believer’s joy is on his face, and his grief is in his heart” is also in this direction. The grief (huzn) mentioned by the Ahl al-Bayt (peace be upon them) relates to a portion of life concerning whether a person can perform their duties, and representing a responsible concern as to whether they have been able to obtain the pleasure of God the Almighty or not—similar to a child who is consistently seeking to obtain the pleasure of their teacher or parents. Therefore, this type of joy and grief do not contradict one another.

We have in the narrations that a Muslim does not spend his time except in three things: either he is seeking to secure his livelihood, or he is engaged in the worship of God, or he enjoys halal joys and recreations.

Therefore, joy is a portion of life. However, some, due to being unfamiliar with the states and sirah of the Ahl al-Bayt (peace be upon them) and utilizing incorrect interpretations of certain sources—such as the verse: “So let them laugh a little and weep much as recompense for what they used to earn”—say we are commanded to weep much and laugh little. This is a superficial view of the evidences.

A portion of this issue is also due to the fact that joys and joy-creating programs are typically mixed with a series of illegitimate matters; meaning the perception of the religious in society is that joy and cheerfulness are equivalent to negligence, unawareness, and, God forbid, the commission of prohibited and illegitimate matters. This very issue has resulted in many of them distancing themselves from joy.

Another issue is that joy, like other matters, has different degrees. When Avicenna wishes to list pleasures, he mentions sensory, imaginative, illusory, and rational pleasures. Avicenna considers the peak of pleasure to be rational pleasure. This is similar to the statement expressed by Al-Khwaja Nasir al-Din al-Tusi, who, when a scientific problem was resolved for him, said: “Where are the kings and the sons of kings to experience this pleasure?”

This is dependent on the capabilities and capacity of the human being. Anyone can conceive for themselves pleasures beyond ordinary public pleasures and proceed in that path; however, to generalize this matter to the entire society and say that because the ideal of joy is that point, we must therefore advance everyone in society with this program from now on, is incorrect.

Did the Commander of the Faithful (peace be upon him) not possess the peak of rational pleasures and joys? Yet, when he interacted with ordinary individuals, he provided the means of their cheerfulness and joy in their proportion, and accompanied them along this path himself. Or the Prophet himself, who is the most noble of creations, attained rational pleasures that are inconceivable to us; yet when he interacted with the people, observe how he behaved.

Another issue is that the expectation of the general public must not be the ideals. When the expectation of the government, the rulers, the clergy, or our religious community from society is a maximum expectation, and they wish to align the program in that direction, it naturally produces a negative reaction and results in evasion.

In the matter of governance and religious and promotional programs, we must establish goals, but we must consider the capacity of society, and based on the capacity of society, advance these step by step, and not merely through slogans and promotions.

Sometimes this misunderstanding arises for us that in interacting with individuals, we think that if we smile, it will establish a perception that one can be somewhat negligent. This is highly mistaken, and we have had many of these mistakes.

Sometimes, there seems to be a contradiction between jurisprudence (fiqh) and joy; for example, that jurisprudence opposes art. When painting, sculpting, and music are deemed prohibited (haram) in jurisprudence, while the domain of art is one of the manifestations of joy, this perception is reinforced. Is this notion correct?

Ayatullah Nur Mufidi: This notion is definitely false. Islam and jurisprudence definitely do not oppose tranquility, spiritual expansiveness, and the feeling of satisfaction, and cannot oppose them; because this is an intuitive matter. However, the discussion is: what characteristics must the tools that create this feeling in human beings possess?

Jurisprudence definitely does not agree with certain tools. Islam definitely does not permit the feeling of pleasure resulting from drinking wine; because drinking wine, although it may create a temporary feeling of pleasure, definitely poisons the soul like a spoiled food.

However, if Islam has established limitations, it has also opened paths. We express the limitations, but we either do not properly express the open paths to obtaining the feeling of satisfaction in the theoretical domain, or we close them in practice.

I will mention one instance. For example, the issue of expanding the days of mourning is something with which our grand jurists and maraji’ do not agree, and some have even taken a stance against it; yet it is not known in whose hands the initiative lies that on various occasions, these mournings are expanded. This mourning has reached several months of the year, which is a phenomenon occurring before our eyes, and continues to expand, yet no one prevents it.

We require a revision in the matter of the tools of joy. For example, if a theatrical performance is organized to make people laugh, or a game is conducted, is it an instance of vain amusement and play (lahw wa la’ib)? Many jurists find objection in it, stating it is an instance of lahw wa la’ib; yet it is currently customary in the world to utilize such programs for positive culture-making. For a program to have its influence on the general public, it must be accompanied by joy, laughter, and competition so that it possesses attraction.

Generally, it appears that some prohibitions directed toward certain arts were due to a subject-dependent factor that has completely ceased to exist in the present era, and therefore it is necessary to revise their rulings.

Regarding ancient/cultural ceremonies, can their legitimacy be negated from a Sharia perspective?

Ayatullah Nur Mufidi: Generally, based on historical reports, Quranic verses, and narrations, the stance of religion toward ethnic and national traditions and customs is a reformist stance—it is neither total negation nor absolute approval.

We have three concepts: the ethnic group (qawm)—meaning, for example, the Arab group or the Baluch group; the nation (millat)—of course in its conventional Persian sense; and the community (ummah). Each of these concepts is broader than the other. Religion has recognized all three concepts; meaning ethnicity must be preserved. For example, being Lur in Iran does not contradict their Iranian nationality, and Iranian nationality does not contradict the Islamic ummah. The Islamic ummah has a definition. Each, while overlapping with the other, also possesses boundaries.

I believe that this matter is a highly important subtlety in Islam, which has never negated ethnicity. Some Muslim extremists, under the slogan of the Islamic ummah, negated both ethnicity and nationality. This is highly mistaken, and one of the factors that caused the enemies of Islam to stand against Islam was that they claimed Islam negated your identity.

Some say: “What does being Iranian mean? We are Muslims.” This statement is false. An Iranian, by virtue of being a Muslim, must defend the Muslims of Iraq, Syria, Palestine, and elsewhere against foreigners.

Islam has respected and approved of customs, traditions, and ethnic and national practices, as long as there is no illegitimate matter within them. Particularly, some of these traditions and practices are human traditions that Islam has also emphasized.

In Islam, not only has no prohibition (rad’) been directed toward ancestral ceremonies, but they have also been endorsed (imda’). Nowruz was a practice common among Iranians prior to Islam. Iranians were deeply connected with the Ahl al-Bayt (peace be upon them), and it is unlikely that such a practice was not at least questioned at that time, or that the Imams (peace be upon them) had not witnessed this among Iranians. Therefore, it occurred before the eyes of the Imam, and the noble figures did not prohibit it.

Indeed, not all traditions common during the Era of Ignorance (Jahiliyyah) were false. Some of the traditions customary during the Jahiliyyah were not only not prohibited after the prophetic mission, but were also approved. Therefore, our assertion that Islam’s perspective on ethnic traditions is reformist has this meaning. That portion of these ceremonies incompatible with the jurisprudential and ideological principles of Islam has been prohibited, while a portion has been treated as a permissible (mubah) matter, and a portion has been emphasized