Issue 4, First Position: Examination of the Condition of the Absence of Corruption (Mafsadah)

Session Three

Issue 4 – First Position: Examination of the Condition of the Absence of Corruption (Mafsadah) – Arguments for the Condition – Second Argument: Traditions (Riwāyāt) – Examination of the Second Tradition – Third Tradition and Its Examination – Third Argument: The Restriction (Inṣirāf) of Unqualified Statements (Iṭlāqāt)

September 20, 2025

Summary of the Previous Session

The discussion concerned the arguments for the condition of the absence of corruption (mafsadah) in the guardianship of the father and paternal grandfather over the daughter in the matter of marriage. We stated that several arguments have been mentioned in this position. The first argument, consensus, was examined; the second argument is traditions. We transmitted two traditions; the first tradition was the tradition of Abū Ḥamzah al-Thumālī; the second tradition was the tradition of al-Faḍl ibn ʿAbd al-Malik. The content of this tradition is that if the paternal grandfather marries off his granddaughter while her father is alive, and the paternal grandfather is one whose conduct is approved, and if the father has married her to one person and the paternal grandfather has married her to another, and both are equal in justice and consent, this is valid and permissible—although it is preferable that she consent to the statement of the paternal grandfather. The approach to this argument, as stated by the late Āyatullāh Khūʾī, was that the correspondence between the ruling and its subject matter requires that what is meant by the paternal grandfather’s conduct being approved is that the matters pertaining to that daughter be approved—in other words, that there be no corruption in it. If there is corruption in it and it is to the daughter’s detriment, this contract is not effective, and this is a condition for the validity of the contract. This is the approach to the argument from this tradition, which was also mentioned in the previous session.

Examination of the Second Tradition

Several objections have been raised regarding this tradition.

First Objection

The first objection is that what is meant by “approved” (marḍiyyan) in this tradition is not what the arguer has claimed; he has interpreted “approved” to mean that the matters pertaining to the daughter be approved. Naturally, if corruption is involved, the term “approved” would no longer apply. Some have said that “approved” means just (ʿādil)—that is, that the paternal grandfather is just. If the paternal grandfather is just, then he is approved; and this is corroborated by the phrase “and the two are equal in justice and consent,” meaning that they are equal in justice and consent. This indicates that “approved” means justice. In effect, the objector wishes to say that justice is a condition here.

Examination of the First Objection

This objection is not valid, because the term “approved” is not conventionally used in reference to justice; this usage in the sense of justice is not customary. Moreover, the phrase “and the two are equal in justice and consent” may itself corroborate the contrary of the objector’s claim; the default in a conjunction (ʿaṭf) is that it is not explanatory (ʿaṭf tafsīrī). It is as though the objector has taken the conjunction of “consent” to “justice” as an explanatory conjunction, whereas it appears that “justice” refers to one meaning and “consent” refers to another. As for whether the justice of the guardian is a condition for the effectiveness of the guardian’s marriage contract on behalf of the daughter—this is a matter of dispute and disagreement; some have considered the justice of the guardian a condition, while others have not considered it a condition. That the validity and effectiveness of the contract of the guardian, the paternal grandfather, and the father be contingent upon their justice is not universally accepted. Now, we are not concerned here with whether justice is in principle a condition or not; the important matter is whether an action undertaken by the guardian, if it entails corruption, is valid or not. This tradition seeks to say that if corruption is involved, his contract is, as it were, not permissible. Therefore, the effectiveness and permissibility of the guardian’s contract has been made conditional upon the absence of corruption. Thus, this objection too appears to be untenable. We cannot conceive of another meaning for “approved.” If we were to say that what is meant is that this action of the paternal grandfather be to the daughter’s satisfaction, and we were to make the effectiveness of the daughter’s marriage contingent upon her consent, this would mean that the paternal grandfather has no guardianship at all. If the effectiveness of the contract and its permissibility were to be made contingent upon the daughter’s consent, this would indicate the negation of guardianship. Therefore, being “approved” means that there is no corruption in his action and that it is commendable; and being commendable in marriage, for the daughter who is the ward, means that it is not to her detriment—otherwise it has no other meaning.

Second Objection

Another objection is that the subject of our discussion is the condition of the absence of corruption with respect to the guardian in general, encompassing both the paternal grandfather and the father; we wish to determine whether, if a father or paternal grandfather marries off his daughter or granddaughter to someone, it is effective or not. In the tradition, a condition has been stated for the effectiveness of the paternal grandfather’s contract, namely, his being approved; it states: “and the paternal grandfather is one whose conduct is approved.” However, this qualification and condition has not been mentioned for the father; at one point the paternal grandfather undertakes this action, at another point the father does; even though the tradition addresses both—that is, both the paternal grandfather and the father—this qualification and condition is stated for the paternal grandfather but not mentioned for the father. In other words, this tradition is narrower than the claim; the claim is the condition of the absence of corruption in the marriage of the daughter by the guardian, whether paternal grandfather or father; but the tradition has established this condition only with respect to the paternal grandfather.

Examination of the Second Objection

It appears that the paternal grandfather has no particular distinction here, because the question concerns the action of the paternal grandfather. It states: “Indeed, when the paternal grandfather marries off the daughter of his son, while her father is alive and the paternal grandfather is one whose conduct is approved, it is permissible”; the question concerns the marrying-off of the daughter by the paternal grandfather, and naturally the answer likewise pertains to the action of the paternal grandfather. Subsequently, the questioner says: “What if the father of the girl desires one match and the paternal grandfather desires another, and the two are equal in justice and consent”—now what if both undertake this action, while both are equal in terms of justice and being approved? The Imam (peace be upon him) said: “I prefer that you consent to the statement of the paternal grandfather.” I prefer more that consent be given to the statement and action of the paternal grandfather. If the equality in consent refers to the equality of the father and the paternal grandfather, it means that the approved nature of the father’s contract has, as it were, already been taken for granted. Hence, the matter of equality in this respect has been raised; in our view, this in no way indicates that being approved is raised only with respect to the paternal grandfather. Since the question was about the paternal grandfather, the Imam (peace be upon him) said that if her father were alive and the paternal grandfather married off his granddaughter to another, and his action did not entail corruption, it is permissible. Indeed, it continues by saying: what if both have done this, and both are equal in justice and consent? The Imam (peace be upon him) has said: it is better that consent be given to the contract of the paternal grandfather; thus here, the approved nature of the father’s action has been taken for granted. Therefore, this objection too is untenable. Accordingly, as the late Āyatullāh Khūʾī has made use of it, this tradition indicates the claim. Perhaps the indication of this tradition is even stronger than that of the previous tradition.

Third Tradition

[The text of the tradition]: “From ʿUbayd ibn Zurārah, who said: I said to Abū ʿAbd Allāh (peace be upon him): There is a girl whose father wishes to marry her to one man, and whose paternal grandfather wishes to marry her to another man. He said: The paternal grandfather has priority in this, provided he does not act to her detriment, if the father has not already married her off before him; and the marriage [contracted] by either the father or the paternal grandfather is valid with respect to her.” ʿUbayd ibn Zurārah states: I said to Imam al-Ṣādiq (peace be upon him) that there is a girl whose father wishes to marry her to a man, and whose paternal grandfather also wishes to marry her to another man. The Imam (peace be upon him) said that the paternal grandfather has priority in this matter, “provided he does not act to her detriment, if the father has not already married her off before him.” For the priority of the paternal grandfather’s marriage, two conditions have been set: first, that the father has not previously married her to another; second, that this action of his not result in harm to the daughter. This is precisely the absence of corruption. It then continues: “and the marriage [contracted] by either the father or the paternal grandfather is valid with respect to her”—both may marry this girl to another person, but if the paternal grandfather has done so earlier and there is no harm or corruption in it, this is valid and permissible. Approach to the argument: The approach to this argument, as stated by the late Āyatullāh Khūʾī, is that the qualification of “not acting to her detriment” indicates that if harm is involved, the contract is not valid—that is, as it were, no guardianship whatsoever would be established for the paternal grandfather in such a case. Therefore, the guardianship of the paternal grandfather and the father is contingent upon there being no harm and no corruption for the daughter. The late Āyatullāh Khūʾī has presented the approach to the argument from these three traditions in his book al-Nikāḥ.

Examination of the Third Tradition

Regarding this tradition as well, certain objections have been raised.

First Objection

One objection is that this tradition indicates that, in the case where both the father and the paternal grandfather have married off the daughter, since a conflict (tazāḥum) has arisen between the action of the paternal grandfather and the action of the father, the Imam (peace be upon him) has said that the paternal grandfather has priority. The condition of not acting to her detriment pertains only to the case of conflict between the action of the father and that of the paternal grandfather. Therefore, this condition is not unqualified; according to this tradition, the absence of corruption is authoritative in a case where a conflict has arisen between the contract of the father and the contract of the paternal grandfather; but whether this condition holds even when there is no such conflict cannot be derived from this tradition.

Examination of the First Objection

In the tradition, the condition of the father’s marriage not having preceded—that is, that the daughter not have already been married to another person by the father before the paternal grandfather’s marriage—has been raised; this is an obvious and clear matter. Moreover, the tradition is addressing the manner of the validity and effectiveness of the paternal grandfather’s contract; it is as though the Imam (peace be upon him) wishes to say that the operative cause (muqtaḑī) for validity exists, but provided there is no impediment, this contract is complete. What could constitute an impediment? Two things: his acting to her detriment, and the father having married her off before him. The mention of these two points to impediments; otherwise, the operative cause exists in both the father and the paternal grandfather alike. The question concerns the contract of the paternal grandfather; subsequently, the father is also mentioned: “and the marriage [contracted] by either the father or the paternal grandfather is valid with respect to her.” Therefore, a distinction between the contract of the paternal grandfather and the contract of the father, such that the marriage by the paternal grandfather must not entail corruption while the marriage by the father is permissible even if it entails corruption, cannot be maintained. Nor is there any basis for construing the tradition as pertaining only to the case of conflict; on what grounds would we construe it thus? The question was: if the father has contracted a marriage and the paternal grandfather has also contracted a marriage, what should be done? The Imam (peace be upon him) said that, given that both may contract marriage, provided the father has not contracted it beforehand and there is no harm in it, the paternal grandfather’s contract is valid. Thus, the operative cause exists and the impediment is also absent. Therefore, this objection appears to be resolved.

Second Objection

Another objection raised regarding this tradition is the same objection that was raised regarding the tradition of al-Faḍl ibn ʿAbd al-Malik. The objection was that, ultimately, this tradition yields the restriction of this condition to the paternal grandfather alone—that is, that the marriage not being detrimental is a condition with respect to the paternal grandfather, but it carries no indication with respect to the father.

Examination of the Second Objection

The answer is the same answer; that is, the same answer we gave to that objection applies here as well, namely that it carries no such indication.

This concludes the discussion of the second argument.

Third Argument: The Restriction (Inṣirāf) of Unqualified Statements

The third argument is the restriction of unqualified statements (iṭlāqāt) away from the supposition of corruption. The unqualified statements that indicate the permissibility of the contract by the paternal grandfather or guardian (which we have mentioned previously)—all of these are restricted to the supposition of the absence of corruption. In these traditions [previously discussed], this condition has been explicitly addressed. Now, whether we say it carries an indication or does not carry an indication, in some manner reference has been made to the matter of harm and the absence of corruption therein. However, a number of traditions have come in an unqualified (muṭlaq) form—traditions which indicate, in some manner, the guardianship of the father and the paternal grandfather in all matters, including the matter of marriage. It is true that in some of these traditions the condition of the absence of corruption has not been mentioned, but this is restricted away from the supposition of corruption; it is true that these traditions are unqualified, but we cannot rely on their unqualified scope and say that, in general, the father or the paternal grandfather may marry off their daughter or granddaughter to another, regardless of whether it entails harm and corruption for the daughter or not. The unqualified statements are restricted away from this supposition; the reason for this restriction is that we are certain that the matter of harm and corruption is in no way accepted in the Sacred Law (sharīʿah); the notion that someone should wish to cause harm to another, that one should drive another toward corruption—all the arguments indicate the impermissibility of causing harm and corruption, whether in a general or a more particular manner. Therefore, it is true that these traditions are unqualified and make no reference to the matter of corruption within them, but there certainly exist strong indications (qarāʾin) by virtue of which these unqualified statements are restricted away from the supposition of corruption. Thus, we have so far stated three arguments: the first was consensus, which we said does not indicate the condition. The second was traditions, of which, among several traditions, at least one indicates the absence of corruption. The third is the restriction of unqualified statements to the supposition of the absence of corruption, which, in our view, is likewise acceptable.

Discussion for the Next Session

The fourth argument remains, namely the principle of “no harm” (lā ḍarar); this principle has also been invoked as an argument, and we shall address it in the next session.