Issue 4, Second Position: Examination of the Condition of Benefit
Session Nine
Issue 4 – Second Position: Examination of the Condition of Benefit – Examination of the Statement of the Sayyid – Positions – The Objection of Āyatullāh Ḥakīm to the Sayyid – Arguments for Invalidity – First, Second, and Third Arguments
October 4, 2025
Summary of the Previous Session
The discussion of the fourth issue of Taḥrīr has come to an end; however, the late Sayyid, in continuation of this issue, has stated a further matter which it is worthwhile to examine as well. The substance of our discussion on the fourth issue of Taḥrīr was that, in addition to the absence of corruption, benefit too must be observed—that is, if the guardian (the father or paternal grandfather) wishes to marry off his daughter, the validity of this marriage and its effectiveness, or in other words his guardianship, is contingent upon the observance of benefit, let alone the mere absence of corruption. If we hold that the observance of benefit is necessary, then, all the more so, the absence of corruption is a condition. Question [posed in the session]: Professor’s response: Benefit is determined according to whatever criteria exist for discerning it; actual benefit, and what may happen later, is not knowable. The interests of the daughter in marriage are likewise known—though this is not specific to the daughter, but applies equally to a minor boy and a minor girl, even though the apparent sense of the statements here is directed more toward the marrying-off of the daughter. In any case, although the Imam (may God’s mercy be upon him) has exercised obligatory precaution regarding the observance of benefit, it is not improbable that we can issue a definitive ruling, because, as you have observed, some of the arguments can establish this matter.
Examination of the Statement of the Late Sayyid
The addition that the late Sayyid has made here is as follows: “Indeed, validity is problematic if there are two suitors, one of whom is more suitable (aṣlaḥ) than the other in terms of social standing, or because of the abundance or paucity of the dower relative to the minor, and the father chooses the one who is not more suitable out of his own personal inclination.” After stating that observing benefit is an obligatory precaution, he goes further and states that a ruling of validity is problematic in one particular case, namely where a daughter has two suitors, one of whom is more suitable than the other. He also explains “more suitable,” stating that this pertains to social standing—whether of the suitor himself or his family, not false standing, but, for example, being more learned, more knowledgeable, having a better position, having a better income; or, for example, having better character, being more devout; or because he is willing to pay a greater dower. In such circumstances, where there are two suitors and marriage with either of them possesses benefit, but one is more suitable than the other, if the father or paternal grandfather chooses the less suitable one merely because that is his own personal inclination and preference, not for the sake of the daughter’s benefit, the validity of this contract is problematic. If he prefers the less suitable suitor over the more suitable one purely to satisfy his own desire and his own wish, the validity of this marriage is problematic.
Positions
Two stances have been taken regarding this statement of the Sayyid. Some have affirmed it, and others have rejected it. First Position: Among those who have not accepted this is the late Āyatullāh Khūʾī; his statement is: “The matter has become clear from what preceded, for the requirement of the unqualified evidences, free of any restricting qualifier and encompassing this case, is the ruling of validity and effectiveness.” The unqualified statements require that any marriage, even to one who is not more suitable, be valid; nor is there any restricting qualifier opposing it; therefore we must rule it valid and effective. The late Āyatullāh Gulpāyigānī, in his annotation on al-ʿUrwah, has likewise stated: “Rather, there is no problem in it so long as there is no corruption therein, even though it is more cautious and preferable for the father to observe what is more suitable.” Therefore, these two eminent scholars hold that there is no problem with validity; [the question becomes] why has the late Sayyid stated, “Rather, validity is problematic”? Second Position: One view is in agreement [with the Sayyid]; among these is the late Āghā Ḍiyāʾ ʿIrāqī, who, in his annotation on al-ʿUrwah, has written as follows: “And perhaps, in such a case as this, such a marrying-off would amount to a betrayal (khiyānah) against the minor, and the evidences of guardianship are restricted away from this circumstance.” He has affirmed the view of the late Sayyid and has identified the basis for the problem as being that the evidences of guardianship do not encompass this case, because this constitutes betrayal, and if the marrying-off is an instance of betrayal, the evidences of guardianship do not encompass it. Thus, altogether, two positions exist here: one is a ruling of validity, and the other is invalidity, or at least the expression “problematic with respect to validity”; you have observed those who hold each position.
The Objection of Āyatullāh Ḥakīm to the Sayyid
The late Āyatullāh Ḥakīm, however, has here raised an objection to the late Sayyid which is, in fact, an objection to the example and not to the substance of the matter; he is, in essence, in agreement with the substance of the ruling of invalidity, but he states that the example which the late Sayyid has presented here is problematic. His statement is: “This example is not free of difficulty”—the example is not free of difficulty. By “example” is meant this statement: “Indeed, validity is problematic if there are two suitors, one of whom is more suitable than the other in terms of social standing, or because of the abundance or paucity of the dower relative to the minor.” He has objected to the phrase “or its paucity relative to the minor.” What is the objection? The statement of the late Āyatullāh Ḥakīm is: “Because if the minor [boy] is married with a large dower, that marrying-off would be harmful to him, not [merely] contrary to what is more suitable.” The example that the late Sayyid has given here is that if a [minor] boy (since guardianship pertains to both a minor boy and a minor girl) is faced with two options for marriage to girls, one of whom has a smaller dower and the other a larger dower, the benefit relative to the minor [boy] lies in the dower being smaller. Hence he has construed the guardianship over the minor [boy] in marrying him to the girl with the larger dower as an instance of choosing the less suitable option. His objection is that if a minor [boy] is married with a large dower, it is not that his benefit is merely lesser; rather, this is actually harmful (ḏarar) in itself. Why has the late Sayyid cited this as an instance of “not more suitable” or “lesser benefit”? In this case, there is only harm, and no benefit at all. If the dower is small, this is a benefit [to the boy]; but if the dower is large, it is not merely a lack of benefit but actually corruption, and for this very reason it falls outside the scope of this discussion and belongs instead to the previous case [of corruption]. “Because if the minor [boy] is married with a large dower, that marrying-off would be harmful to him, not [merely] contrary to what is more suitable”—this marriage is not [merely] contrary to what is more suitable; it actually involves harm and corruption. “Unlike the minor girl, if she is married with a small dower, for that is contrary to what is more suitable, and nothing more”—but with respect to the minor girl, the matter is reversed; if she has two suitors, one offering a larger dower and the other a smaller one, the benefit lies in the larger dower. What about a smaller dower? Why do you not say this is harmful to the girl, but rather say it is contrary to what is more suitable? He states that, with respect to the girl, the matter is not so; after all, she is the recipient, and something accrues to her—whether more or less. Naturally, in a situation oscillating between more and less, one option becomes more suitable and the other less suitable; this is no longer an instance of harm or corruption. Thus, in effect, three different assessments have been made regarding this statement of the late Sayyid: some have agreed, some have disagreed with him; and someone like the late Āyatullāh Ḥakīm, while agreeing with the substance of his ruling, has found fault with the example. Now we wish to determine, first, which of these views is correct. Should we rule for validity, or, like the late Sayyid, raise a problem regarding validity? Then we shall examine the statement of the late Āyatullāh Ḥakīm objecting to the example. Question [posed in the session]: Professor’s response: This is at the discretion of the guardian; … this pertains to the minor boy and minor girl … the supposition is that the minor boy or minor girl has not yet reached the age of discernment; or has reached it, but until the age of maturity, his guardianship rests with the father or paternal grandfather. When he is able to marry, ascertaining that is also his responsibility; but the subsequent discussion, in the fifth issue of Taḥrīr, concerns whether, if the marrying-off occurred by way of guardianship and the father or paternal grandfather married this boy or girl to another, the boy or girl, after reaching maturity, has the option [of rescission], or whether this is binding and they must accept it—this is a separate discussion. At present, the supposition is that this discretion rests with the guardian, and the ward is either a minor boy or a minor girl; we have stated that the condition is, first, that there be no corruption (which the Imam and other eminent scholars have ruled definitively), and as for the existence of benefit, they have exercised obligatory precaution, which we have said it is not improbable to issue a definitive ruling on here, namely that benefit must be observed. The supposition of our discussion is that one option carries greater benefit and another lesser benefit; now, if he marries [the ward] to the option carrying lesser benefit, is this contract valid or not?
Arguments for Invalidity
We shall later address the objection that the late Āyatullāh Ḥakīm has raised regarding the example. The main point is whether the late Sayyid’s problem with the validity of such a contract is sound or not; in other words, on what grounds have those who hold to invalidity ruled it invalid? On what grounds has the late Sayyid raised a problem regarding validity? Several arguments may be invoked here.
First Argument
The first argument is that if there are two suitors for this daughter, one of whom is more suitable and the other merely suitable—one carrying greater benefit and the other lesser benefit—then, if the guardian chooses the one who is not more suitable, and that too purely out of his own personal inclination, this amounts to harm to the ward. After all, the guardian, out of his own personal inclination, has chosen, from between the two options, the one carrying lesser benefit; the very absence of [greater] advantage, or the lesser benefit relative to the greater benefit, constitutes harm. This is because access to the greater benefit was available, yet the father or paternal grandfather disregards this possibility and marries her to someone offering a smaller dower. Now, do not say here that perhaps the one with the smaller dower has better character; this itself would be part of the benefit calculus. If all other conditions were equal, but one offered a larger dower and the other a smaller one, and he gives her to the one with the smaller dower, this amounts to harm to the ward. If we consider this an instance of harm, the unqualified statements do not encompass it; because the unqualified statements are, in any case, either restricted by a qualifier or are restricted away from a case in which the benefit is lesser, since this amounts to harm; therefore the unqualified statements fall short of encompassing a case that is, in some manner, equivalent to harm, and do not include it. Therefore, the problem regarding the validity of this marrying-off is sound, just as the late Sayyid has stated.
Second Argument
The second argument is that the evidences indicating the authority of the absence of corruption—including the tradition of Abū Ḥamzah al-Thumālī, which states, “Indeed, God does not love corruption”—encompass this case as well; it states that God does not love corruption. Naturally, in the case we are discussing, corruption arises, or at the very least there exists therein the propensity for subsequent corruption. After all, this daughter or boy, when they later reach the age of maturity and grow up, will then be able to object: why, despite better conditions being available to us, did you, merely out of your own personal inclination, disregard those conditions and marry us off to the less suitable party? This results in dispute, hostility, and disagreement—and what corruption could be greater than this? It is natural that hostility, dispute, disagreement, and contention would arise. Therefore, on the authority of the evidences for the condition of the absence of corruption, we must rule this invalid.
The Difference Between the First and Second Arguments
The difference between the first and second arguments is that, in the first argument, it was claimed that the unqualified statements of the evidences of marriage are either restricted to the case of the absence of harm, or carry a qualifier excluding the less suitable option, or are restricted to a case carrying greater benefit. Thus, the focus in the first argument is upon the unqualified scope of the evidences of guardianship. But the second argument is fundamentally directed at the fact that every type of corruption is detested by God; “Indeed, God does not love corruption,” in the tradition of Abū Ḥamzah al-Thumālī, was applied to one particular case; here too the matter is the same—God does not love corruption. Therefore, here we must rule this invalid.
Third Argument
The third argument is that, in general, the matter of guardianship, especially with respect to the father in relation to the child, is not a foundational ruling (ḥukm taʾsīsī) but rather a ratifying ruling (ḥukm imḑāʾī). This means that the Lawgiver did not originate this matter from the outset and did not establish it ab initio; rather, what was current among rational agents (ʿuqalāʾ) has been ratified by the Lawgiver. Therefore, we must determine what is current among rational agents. In the matter of guardianship, it is, as it were, among the deep-rooted convictions (irtikāzāt) of rational agents that whoever undertakes custodianship of someone, such as a child or grandchild, does so for the purpose of observing the interests of the ward; it is not meant that he should decide on the basis of his own personal inclination. From the perspective of common usage and the customary deep-rooted convictions—which have likewise received the confirmation and ratification of the Lawgiver—guardianship with respect to the child in particular is contingent upon the observance of benefit, not upon the personal inclinations of the guardian himself. When this is also ratified by the Lawgiver, we can no longer say that, for example, rational agents would accept this even if it were not the more suitable option; no, this is not the case. Therefore, this customary, deep-rooted conviction, which has been ratified by the Lawgiver and has thereby attained legitimacy, requires that we rule this invalid.
Discussion for the Next Session
These were the three arguments for the ruling of invalidity. Are these arguments acceptable or not? Can we accept these arguments? What arguments do those who hold to validity have? God willing, we shall examine these matters, along with the objection of the late Āyatullāh Ḥakīm regarding the example given by the late Sayyid, in the next session.