Issue 4, Second Position: Examination of the Condition of Benefit

Session Ten

Issue 4 – Second Position: Examination of the Condition of Benefit – Examination of the Statement of the Sayyid – Arguments for Invalidity – Fourth Argument – The Common Thread of the Four Arguments – The Correct View on the Matter – Examination of the Objection of Āyatullāh Ḥakīm

October 5, 2025

Summary of the Previous Session

We stated that, in the fifth issue of al-ʿUrwah, the late Sayyid has referred to a matter which the Imam (may God’s mercy be upon him), in the fourth issue of Taḥrīr, did not state. The matter is this: if two persons seek the hand of a daughter, one of whom is more suitable than the other, but the paternal grandfather or father, out of his own personal inclination and heartfelt preference, gives precedence to the one who is not more suitable, “validity is problematic.” We stated that two views exist here: some agree with the late Sayyid and, like him, say “validity is problematic”; others hold to validity. This is distinct from the objection that the late Āyatullāh Ḥakīm raised regarding the late Sayyid’s example. We stated that those who hold to invalidity have advanced several arguments for their claim; we mentioned three arguments. The first argument was that when the less suitable option is given precedence over the more suitable one, harm is thereby realized; because greater benefit could have accrued to the ward, but the guardian did not pursue this due to his own personal inclinations. Therefore, the category of harm is realized, and the unqualified statements do not encompass it. The second argument was that the category of corruption is realized, and “God does not love corruption” prevents the unqualified statements from applying. The third argument was that the matter of the guardianship of the father and paternal grandfather is not a foundational matter but rather a ratifying one, and the Lawgiver has ratified precisely what is current among people and rational agents. What is current among rational agents and is counted among their deep-rooted convictions is a guardianship in which the more suitable option is given precedence over the less suitable one. Therefore, this case is, in essence, not encompassed by the confirmation and ratification of the Lawgiver; hence the unqualified statements, which carry the aspect of confirming and ratifying the practice of rational agents, do not encompass this case. The common thread of these three arguments is that the unqualified statements do not encompass this case; in all three arguments, emphasis was placed on the point that the unqualified statements regarding guardianship—on the basis of which the guardianship of the paternal grandfather and father is effective and their marrying-off valid—do not encompass this case; because it is either restricted away from this case, or some argument has qualified it. After all, either the category of harm is realized, or the category of corruption, or, fundamentally, according to the deep-rooted conviction of rational agents, this case falls outside the scope of guardianship.

Fourth Argument

A further argument can also be mentioned here, though it is not improbable that it reduces to the second argument; the fourth argument, which is drawn from the statements of Muḥaqqiq ʿIrāqī, whose statement we read, is that such a marrying-off is an instance of betrayal (khiyānah). The statement of Muḥaqqiq ʿIrāqī is: “And perhaps, in such a case as this, such a marrying-off would amount to a betrayal against the minor, and the evidences of guardianship are restricted away from this circumstance.” He states that the basis for the problem regarding the validity of such a marriage is that this marriage is an instance of betrayal against the minor. When the paternal grandfather or father, out of his own personal inclination, prefers the less suitable option and sets aside the more suitable one, this is a betrayal of the ward, and the evidences of guardianship certainly do not encompass this case. Thus, this argument too rests upon the same foundation as the previous three arguments, namely that the evidences of guardianship are restricted away from our present case; and that, too, on the grounds that it is an instance of betrayal; the evidences that establish guardianship for the father and paternal grandfather pertain to a situation in which there is no betrayal. Certainly, guardianship lapses in a case that constitutes an instance of betrayal, and this case is an instance of betrayal.

The Common Thread of the Four Arguments

What we stated as the common thread of the previous three arguments exists here as well. The spirit of these four arguments is one and the same: the restriction of the evidences of guardianship away from such a case—whether on account of the realization of the category of harm, or the category of corruption, or the category of betrayal, or on account of the deep-rooted conviction of rational agents that we have mentioned. Of course, perhaps betrayal too reduces to the second argument. However, I emphasize again that, in the first and fourth arguments, the discussion concerns the unqualified scope of the evidences of guardianship, whereas in the second argument, the category of corruption is raised, which is derived from “Indeed, God does not love corruption,” and this prevents the realization of the unqualified scope in the evidences of guardianship.

The Argument for the Position of Validity

In contrast, the position of validity has one clear argument, which the late Āyatullāh Khūʾī has likewise indicated. The requirement of the unqualified statements of the evidences of guardianship is validity; these evidences are neither restricted to the case of the more suitable option, nor qualified by it. He states that the evidences of guardianship are unqualified; that is, they establish guardianship for the paternal grandfather and father whether the marrying-off is to the more suitable option or to the [merely] suitable option (the less suitable one, which we call “suitable”). The unqualified scope of the evidences of guardianship requires that marrying-off to the [merely] suitable option be valid as well; and, in opposition to this, there exists nothing that would qualify [these evidences] or cause their restriction to a particular case. Therefore, they encompass this case, and the evidences of guardianship, with respect to our present case, dictate a ruling of validity and effectiveness. Therefore, the path of those who hold to validity diverges from that of those who hold to invalidity at one specific point: those who hold to invalidity say that those unqualified statements are either qualified or restricted to marrying-off to the more suitable option; those who hold to validity say that those unqualified statements are not qualified and are not restricted to this case. This is the point of divergence between them; in the statement of the late Āyatullāh Khūʾī, this matter has been indicated: “for the requirement of the unqualified evidences, free of any restricting qualifier and encompassing this case, is the ruling of validity and effectiveness.” He states that these unqualified statements are immune and free from restriction.

The Correct View on the Matter

Now, what is the correct view on this matter? Should we, like the late Sayyid, raise a problem regarding validity, or, like the late Āyatullāh Khūʾī, rule for validity? We must determine whether those unqualified statements have been restricted or not; whether those unqualified statements [as invoked by the opposing argument] have succeeded in establishing the restriction or not. We have previously spoken at length about these unqualified statements; we stated that the unqualified statements regarding the guardianship of the father and paternal grandfather are restricted to the case of benefit. That there be no corruption is, all the more clearly, evident; but when the father or paternal grandfather wishes to marry off his daughter or granddaughter while she is still a minor, the marriage must certainly be free of corruption, and beyond that, it must possess benefit. We even said that, going beyond the obligatory precaution that the majority hold to, a definitive ruling can be issued. We said that, from the totality of several arguments, we can conclude that the observance of benefit is necessary. But, going beyond this, is the observance of the more suitable option, or of greater benefit relative to lesser benefit (that is, the merely suitable option), also obligatory? Do the considerations that required us to set aside the unqualified statements and depart from the unqualified scope of the evidences of guardianship—saying that guardianship is established for the father on condition that it be accompanied by benefit—also require that the observance of the more suitable option be necessary? According to that argument, marrying-off is valid only if this element [benefit] is observed therein; does that same argument or statement require that the more suitable option be given precedence over the [merely] suitable one? The substance of the arguments of those who hold to invalidity is that the very same arguments that render the observance of benefit obligatory also require that the observance of the more suitable option be necessary here as well. In contrast, those who hold to validity believe this is not so; rather, the observance of the more suitable option is preferable (awlā), not obligatory. There is a difference between saying that the observance of the more suitable option is necessary and saying that it is better—is it preferable that the more suitable option be observed, or must the more suitable option necessarily be observed? It appears that the observance of the more suitable option does not reach the level of obligation; what can qualify the unqualified statements of guardianship is the observance of the basic element of benefit—that there be no corruption, harm, or betrayal counted against the daughter; but that he must take the more suitable option into consideration is not clearly capable of causing the restriction or qualification of those unqualified statements. Lesser benefit is not counted as betrayal. Yes, it is better that the more suitable option be chosen; this preferability may even be emphatic; but to say that if, for whatever reason—even out of his own personal inclination—he marries his daughter or granddaughter to one who is [merely] suitable in preference to one who is more suitable, “validity is problematic,” is difficult to establish. This is because the causes that would necessitate restriction or the qualifiers in this case are not strong enough to overcome the unqualified statements of guardianship. Yes, it is better that the more suitable option be given precedence over the [merely] suitable one; but if, for whatever reason, this is not realized, can we say that this contract is void? This is difficult [to maintain]. Therefore, it appears that here we should rule that this is a matter of commendable precaution (ḥusn al-iḥtiyāṭ), or, in other words, say that it is a matter of recommended precaution (iḥtiyāṭ mustaḥabb) that the more suitable option be chosen. Question [posed in the session]: Professor’s response: They state this, but we must truly examine whether this amounts to betrayal and corruption. Betrayal and corruption are not categories that are simply realized as a matter of course. Yes, the more suitable option carries preferability, but if he sets aside the more suitable option, is this betrayal? … The point at issue is that they say these qualify those unqualified statements or cause their restriction; why? Because this action is either an instance of betrayal, or an instance of harm, or an instance of corruption. Our response is that this action is not an instance of betrayal, harm, or corruption. Therefore, the correct view in this position, contrary to the author of al-ʿUrwah, is validity; here we rule for validity. It is, however, a matter of recommended precaution that he choose the more suitable option.

Examination of the Objection of Āyatullāh Ḥakīm

One matter remains, which we shall address before turning to the fifth issue of Taḥrīr. We stated that the late Āyatullāh Ḥakīm raised an objection regarding the example given by the late Sayyid in the text of the fourth issue; we also read the statement of the late Sayyid. The objection of Āyatullāh Ḥakīm was that this matter is not correct with respect to a minor boy; because if a minor boy is married to a girl with a large dower, this is an instance of harm and falls outside our discussion, since our discussion pertains to a case in which lesser benefit is realized, not one in which harm arises. The supposition pertains to a case where one person is [merely] suitable, and marriage to him carries benefit, while the other is more suitable, and marriage to him carries greater benefit. To say that if a boy is married to a girl with a large dower, this constitutes harm to the boy, falls outside our supposition—this is the objection he has raised with respect to the minor boy; he states that this objection does not apply with respect to the minor girl. This is because if a minor girl (an immature girl) is given in marriage to a boy, even with a small dower, this is not harm; there, we can envision a girl having one suitor who offers a larger dower and another suitor who offers a smaller dower; the former becomes the more suitable option and the latter the [merely] suitable one. Thus, the objection of the late Āyatullāh Ḥakīm pertains to the marrying-off of a minor boy. It appears that this objection is not sound; two responses can be given to this objection. First: the statement of the late Sayyid pertains, for the most part, to the marrying-off of a minor girl; because he says: two suitors have come forward, one of whom offers a larger dower and the other a smaller dower; this is certainly an instance suitable for [illustrating] “more suitable” and “[merely] suitable.” The apparent sense of the late Sayyid’s statement does not appear to pertain to the marrying-off of a minor boy and has nothing to do with the marriage of a boy; the discussion concerns the marriage of a girl. Therefore, we ought not to bring the statement of the Sayyid within the scope of the marrying-off of a boy; it is true that, in the statement of the late Sayyid, this appears: “Indeed, validity is problematic if there are two suitors, one of whom is more suitable than the other in terms of social standing, or because of the abundance or paucity of the dower relative to the minor, and the father chooses the one who is not more suitable out of his own personal inclination.” The phrase “relative to the minor [boy]” is, in the view of the late Āyatullāh Ḥakīm, problematic, creating difficulty with respect to the marrying-off of a minor boy; but when we look at the totality of the statement, we see that it pertains to the minor girl. Because it states that two suitors have come forward, one of whom, due to social standing or the abundance or paucity of the dower, is more suitable relative to the minor [boy]; the phrase “relative to the minor [boy]” carries an allusion to the supposition of the marrying-off of a boy, but the totality of the statement pertains to the marrying-off of a girl. Second: why has the late Āyatullāh Ḥakīm stated, “Unlike the minor girl”? His statement was: “Unlike the minor girl, if she is married with a small dower, for that is contrary to what is more suitable, and nothing more.” He accepted the objection with respect to the minor boy but states that the matter is not so with respect to the minor girl—that is, if a minor girl marries for a large dower, this is the more suitable option; if she marries for a small dower, here lesser benefit is realized, and the category of harm does not arise. The question is: what is the difference between a boy and a girl? Why is it that if a boy marries for a large dower, this is counted as harmful to him, but if a girl marries for a smaller dower, this is not counted as harmful to her? What is the difference between these two? After all, by this very criterion of Āyatullāh Ḥakīm’s, a smaller dower, relative to a larger one, would be counted as harmful to the girl, just as a large dower is counted as harmful to the boy relative to a smaller one. After all, either the category of harm must be realized in both, or it must not be realized in either; therefore, this distinction and separation between the two cases is not correct.

Discussion for the Next Session

This concludes the discussion of the fourth issue. God willing, in the next session we shall begin the fifth issue.