Session Three, The Meaning of Dignity (Karāmah), The View of General Custom and Specialized Custom

Session Three

The Meaning of Dignity (Karāmah) — The View of General Custom and Specialized Custom — Disagreement in Application — Categories of Dignity

September 23, 2024

Summary of the Previous Session

In the previous session, we offered some remarks on the meaning and concept of karāmah (dignity) in its lexical sense. What was established in that session may be summarized as follows: karāmah lexically means honor, distinction, greatness, and a particular standing that sets one being apart from other beings; this is the lexical meaning of karāmah.

The View of General Custom and Specialized Custom

But within custom—whether general custom or specialized custom—what does karāmah mean? From the standpoint of general custom, karāmah carries the very meaning that the lexicographers have set down; that is, among the people and within general custom, karāmah means honor, greatness, distinction, and eminence.

By specialized custom, we mean, for instance, the custom of jurists, the custom of fiqh scholars or those versed in jurisprudence, the custom prevailing among certain followers of other religions, or the custom of psychologists. There too, it appears that no distinct technical usage exists; that is, when we examine works of jurisprudence and the writings of fiqh scholars, we find that karāmah carries the same meaning of honor, station, rank, distinction, or those qualities that set one being apart from other beings—particularly the human being, who is our concern here. The same holds among jurists. In works of psychology as well, when human dignity is discussed, the same meaning is intended. The fact is that within specialized customs we do not observe any technical usage contrary to what has taken shape in the lexicon and in general custom. There is, however, one point worth noting: in each field of knowledge, depending on that field and on how dignity becomes objectified within that particular domain, dignity may take on different manifestations. Thus, if jurists say that human dignity means safeguarding human station and human rights—that is, observing human rights within law, or within anything connected to human rights, such as statutes and regulations—this is in fact a corollary of dignity, not dignity itself. Some define it this way and say that, in the science of law, or among jurists, or in works of jurisprudence, karāmah means: the observance of human station and human rights. Yet the observance of human station in the drafting of laws and the enactment of regulations is not itself the meaning of dignity; rather, it is the application of that meaning within this particular sphere and domain. Indeed, the human being who possesses dignity—the human being who possesses station and a distinguished standing, who holds a rank and a unique position relative to other beings—when a law is to be enacted for him, that station, standing, and rank must naturally be taken into account. It is therefore mistaken to say that in the science of law and in the discipline of jurisprudence, karāmah means the safeguarding of human station through the enactment of rights, regulations, duties, and the like. Dignity, then, carries one and the same meaning everywhere: station, standing, rank, honor, greatness. However, when human dignity enters the science of law, its corollary is that this station must be safeguarded in the form of enacted laws and regulations; this is the application of that station within the sphere of laws and regulations.

The same holds in jurisprudence; we have no distinct technical term for karāmah in fiqh—that is, karāmah in fiqh bears the very meaning it bears among the lexicographers: station, standing, rank, honor, and greatness. However, when this is to enter the sphere of duties and rights, which constitutes the axis and pivot of the science of jurisprudence, the natural corollary is that should a duty be prescribed for a human being, that duty must be appropriate to, and consistent with, that station and standing; that is, human station must be safeguarded within this sphere. This becomes the corollary of that dignity, or, expressed otherwise, the application of that dignity within this domain. Accordingly, we find no technical usage—whether in general custom or in specialized custom—contrary to what the lexicographers have said concerning karāmah. Rational people, those versed in the various sciences, and specialists all understand dignity in this very same sense.

Disagreement in the Application of the Meaning of Dignity to Its Instances

There is, however, a matter here that warrants attention: there is no disagreement over the meaning of karāmah as station, standing, honor, and distinction. When I say that we have no distinct technical usage, and indeed that there is virtual consensus, I mean that with respect to this general meaning of dignity, views do not diverge. But once particular instances come into play, disagreement arises. That is, for example, the followers of one religion may regard a given matter as baseness and lowliness and say that it is incompatible with dignity, while the followers of another religion may regard that very same matter as the very essence of dignity. I would go further and say that even the followers of a single religion, given the cultural diversity found across different lands and regions, may differ from one another regarding instances; one person may recognize a given matter as dignity, or as an instance of dignity, while another regards it as an instance of baseness, vileness, and lowliness. The same holds true with respect to justice and injustice; the general concept of justice and injustice is clear and evident. This is among those matters that the human intellect grasps independently of any intellectual or doctrinal affiliation; yet with respect to its instances, there is considerable disagreement.

I raise this point because we observe no disagreement concerning the concept and meaning of dignity such that we would require a referential authority. An authority is typically needed to adjudicate disputes at the point of disagreement and conflict. With certain terms and expressions that we encounter in the traditions (riwāyāt) or in the verses (āyāt), we sometimes turn to custom in order to see how that term or expression is understood. On this basis, with respect to karāmah, given the explanations summarily presented, we observe no disagreement. We are therefore not in need of a referential authority to determine its meaning and concept. Should disagreement nonetheless arise, the natural authority would of course be custom, rational people, and the lexicon; whatever is current among lexicographers and whatever rational people and the populace say constitutes its meaning. The principal question, however, lies in what we ought to do given disagreement over instances. In the disagreement over the instances of dignity, ought we to make custom the referential authority? This custom varies according to cultures, according to geographic regions, and according to the degree of general or specialized awareness possessed by individuals. A person lacking deep understanding might judge a certain treatment of a human being to be contrary to dignity, while, viewed more deeply, this might in fact be the very essence of dignity. There exist different levels for applying this concept to its instances. Given all these disagreements, we cannot say that the criterion for determining and identifying the instances of dignity is custom, since many matters remain genuinely disputed; for example, one person regards a given treatment as falling within the bounds of dignity, while another says it is incompatible with dignity. We therefore cannot, in such a situation, make custom or rational people the referential authority for this determination. As for what ought to be done instead, that is a separate discussion to which we shall turn at the appropriate time. Disagreement over instances, so long as it has not become the subject of a set of rulings, effects, and rights, carries no great significance; although, in any case, dignity, honor, or the degradation of a human being is in some sense always either consonant or dissonant with some human right—that is, when you degrade a human being, some right of his is invariably violated; these matters are not separable from one another. In any case, this requires further discussion as to what ought to be done regarding the referential authority for determining the instances of dignity, honor, and degradation.

Question:

Response: Refraining from shaking hands with a woman and avoiding the touch of a woman who is not a maḥram (unmarriageable kin) is, within Islamic and religious culture, a religious duty; here, no one regards this as constituting degradation. Yet in many other settings, this very act is itself regarded as degrading. This is one instance. … As for what we ought to do in such cases, that is a separate discussion; a given act of conduct is, in itself, degrading within one culture and honoring within another. … Because when the subject is the human being, given the discussions we shall have going forward, there we wish to discuss the matter independently of these sub-cultures or sub-identities; ultimately, even though there is no disagreement over the meaning and concept of dignity, and all are in agreement, broadly speaking, upon a certain common core and upon certain matters as constituting the meaning and concept of dignity, there is disagreement regarding its instances. … I raise this so that we do not suppose that custom is also a reliable guide in determining instances; rational people and custom, while they disagree with one another in many cases, also encounter genuine ambiguity in certain instances, such that we find ourselves at an impasse as to what to do. For example, there may be a case in which a certain act of conduct or a certain religious duty, from a juridical standpoint, appears outwardly to conflict with human dignity. The intellect, up to a certain point, comprehends and discerns whether this conflicts with dignity or not; yet there are also instances in which the human intellect is unable to make this determination. If we were to entrust this matter to custom and to rational people—whether a given instance constitutes honor or not—then, when confronted with the duties, rulings, and rights that the sharīʿah has established for the human being, what ought we to do? Let me offer a further example: the disparity between man and woman with respect to blood-money (diyah) and with respect to inheritance is a settled matter, established in the traditions, with the juridical rulings (fatāwā) also well known; it is virtually among the settled matters that a woman’s share of inheritance is half that of a man. Yet when these are set side by side and compared, is this an act of degradation? … At present, from the standpoint of many cultures and many rational people in various places, this is regarded as incompatible with the dignity of woman; yet we maintain that this carries no conflict whatsoever with dignity. I set aside, for the moment, by what reasoning we justify this; what is certain is that, from the standpoint of many people in the contemporary world, this is regarded as degrading, whereas from our standpoint it is not so. Some hold that the testimony of two women alone does not suffice, and that four women must testify in order for it to be accepted as legal evidence (bayyinah) …

Cultures therefore differ from one another; it may be that, from our standpoint, none of these matters conflicts with dignity and none is degrading, while from the standpoint of many cultures, they are indeed so regarded. Should we, then, entrust this matter to custom and to rational people and say that the determination of instances likewise rests with custom? In truth, we encounter genuine difficulty in certain cases. We ought not erect a structure that we would later be compelled to demolish ourselves.

Question:

Response: The Lawgiver (Shāriʿ), in certain instances, introduces qualifications and conditions; naturally, certain instances thereby fall outside the scope of the juridical ruling of permissibility (jawāz) and licitness (ibāḥah) … Why is it that we are discussing dignity at all? We are presently confronted with a series of questions and problems, and we wish to determine whether a governing principle exists or not; it is these requirements and necessities that have led us into this terrain. The same applies here; we observe that the very issues that come to mind at present concern cultural differences in determining the instances of dignity and honor; this much is evident. I am not now asserting that custom is the referential authority, nor am I denying it; let us not say that custom is the referential authority, because within custom itself there exists a remarkable and considerable disagreement. … Where there is no disagreement, we face no difficulty.

Question:

Response: The case you raise—those qualifications that the Lawgiver introduces—constitutes, in fact, a qualification and restriction at the level of the ruling (ḥukm), not at the level of the subject-matter (mawḍūʿ); it establishes a particular technical category. For instance, it is said that usurious trade (bayʿ-i ribawī) is forbidden; it remains trade, yet if the trade possesses this particular characteristic, it becomes forbidden; the ruling of prohibition attaches to this category of trade, whereas with respect to the subject-matter as such, there is no dispute. … For instance, with respect to travel, if the Lawgiver introduces a qualification concerning travel, this means that He has, in effect, established a particular technical category for travel; that is, He has there specified that, from His standpoint, travel is defined thus—this is, in reality, the positing, creation, and establishment of a subject-matter. Subject-matters fall into two categories: those that are juridically constituted (mukhtaraʿāt) and those that are not. The treatment of juridically constituted subject-matters differs accordingly; hence, we must not conflate these categories with one another.

Categories of Dignity

Categories have been set forth for dignity; two common, prevalent, and customary categories of dignity are, first, inherent dignity (karāmah dhātīyah), and second, acquired dignity (karāmah iktisābīyah). I shall define these two in accordance with what has, at the very least, become current in usage and in the literature. This is not to say that I am now affirming that these two categories are themselves established and accepted; that is a matter we must take up later.

A Preliminary Note

By way of reminder, I note that with respect to inherent human dignity, there is, on one occasion, a discussion of whether this dignity exists at all in the first place—does the human being inherently possess dignity, or not? In the first session, in the course of three fundamental questions, I touched upon this matter. Does the human being possess inherent dignity at all, or not? This remains open to discussion; some have denied inherent human dignity altogether. Those who have affirmed inherent human dignity have, for their part, set out to explain the foundations of this inherent dignity. We shall ultimately answer the question of the existence or non-existence of inherent dignity only after examining the foundations of inherent dignity, at which point it will become clear whether the human being possesses inherent dignity or not. For instance, can intellect, awareness, choice, will, and freedom—these attributes that belong to the human being and not to other beings—establish a particular standing, station, rank, and distinguished position for the human being, or not? This will become clear later.

Once it has been established that inherent dignity is affirmed for the human being, the next question becomes whether this dignity has had, and continues to have, a bearing on the sphere in which duties and rights attach, or not; this is a matter of great importance. For it is precisely here that the point of contention lies; some hold that the human being possesses inherent dignity, and they accept what is presented as the foundations establishing inherent human dignity, yet they maintain that this in no way gives rise to the attachment of any right or duty for the human being; this constitutes the most significant point of disagreement and contention at present. Others, from the very outset, categorically maintain that we have no such thing as inherent dignity; dignity, they say, is of one category only, namely acquired dignity. This acquired dignity is, in a certain sense, virtually a matter of consensus, accepted by all without dissent—namely, that the human being can, through effort and striving, develop within himself degrees of knowledge, perfection, moral character, and virtue; that he can become learned, become generous, become forbearing, and advance in rank—all of this is accepted by everyone. Yet they deny inherent dignity and maintain that we have no such thing as inherent dignity. As for what they make, then, of these matters—namely, human awareness, human will, human choice, and freedom—that question may be set aside for now.

In any case, this division has been set forth as such; the exposition of these two categories does not mean that we have, at this point, accepted both. I have offered this introduction precisely so that it becomes clear exactly what these two categories are and what differences exist between them. When we speak of inherent dignity, do we mean a dignity that is absolutely immutable and incapable of change, or a dignity that is subject to decline and capable of change? What, indeed, does “inherent” mean here?

God willing, next week we shall set forth these two categories—inherent and acquired dignity—along with the differences between them.