Session Twenty-Four, The First Station: Examining the Existence or Non-Existence of Intrinsic Dignity in the Human Being

Session Twenty-Four

The First Station: Examining the Existence or Non-Existence of Intrinsic Dignity in the Human Being – The Foundations of the Intrinsic Dignity of the Human Being – The Second Category: 4. The Divine Trust – Examining the Intrinsic Nature of the Dignity of the Divine Trust – Conclusion

January 19, 2025

Summary of the Previous Session

Concerning the divine trust, we stated that some hold this to be an honoring on the part of God, the Blessed and Exalted, toward the human being, and that all human beings—irrespective of their belief, color, race, and geographical place of residence—have been encompassed by this honoring; they hold that, whatever meaning we ascribe to the trust, on the basis of the evidence present within the verse itself, the human being has come to partake of this intrinsic dignity. We stated that this must be examined, so that we may determine whether the divine trust is truly an intrinsic dignity or not.

Examining the Intrinsic Nature of the Dignity of the Divine Trust

In order to answer this question, we must give consideration to the meanings of the trust, for this can guide us as to whether this is an intrinsic dignity or not. In the previous session, we cited approximately ten meanings for the dignity; most of these meanings are reducible to one another.

1. If we take the trust to mean the intellect, its discussion has already passed; in the first category of foundations, we defined the intellect and stated that this is an intrinsic dignity.

2. If we take the trust to mean the primordial nature (fiṭra), this too can be accepted as an intrinsic dignity, for the primordial nature was also one of the matters that we cited as a foundation in the first category. This is, of course, with the consideration that the intellect, in this context, is other than the primordial nature, since the intellect has at times been used to mean the primordial nature as well.

3. If we say that the trust means the divine guardianship (wilāya), and the intent is that God, the Exalted, offered His own guardianship to the human being and it was accepted by him—that is, in the sense of faith in God or the monotheistic primordial nature—this too is not an independent matter. If guardianship means that God is the guardian of human beings, the Cause of all causes, and the origin of all good, this is the same monotheistic primordial nature to which we alluded earlier; it is the same inclination toward Absolute Perfection and the aversion to and abhorrence of deficiency; we have explained this as well and stated that it can be an intrinsic dignity. Thus, up to this point, you observe that these three revert to the previously discussed matters.

4. If what is intended is the universal divine guardianship for the human being himself, this reverts to the very issue of vicegerency; that is, the human being, by God’s leave, comes to possess a universal guardianship whose scope and extent, of course, differ among different individuals; thus, this in fact reverts to the human being’s becoming the successor of God, and the greater his nearness to God, the more extensive, naturally, the dominion and scope of his guardianship.

Question:

Professor: We said that this is an aptitude. Concerning vicegerency, we said that it is not an intrinsic dignity. Up to this point, everything we have stated has reverted to the previously discussed matters, which are either intrinsic or not; that is, their status has already been determined previously.

5. If we say that what is meant by the trust here is the guardianship of the People of the House (peace be upon them) or the guardianship of ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib (peace be upon him), this—while it cannot be an interpretation of the trust, but is rather an application to one of the instances and manifestations of that trust—again reverts to one of the previously discussed matters; that is, the same universal guardianship whose most complete and most perfect instance is the Prophet and the People of the House of the Prophet (peace be upon them); the acceptance of guardianship, of course, falls within the scope of the primordial nature. As divine names and not persons—that is, it is not something independent of it; this guardianship, in fact, by virtue of their being Perfect Human Beings whom God placed upon the earth for guidance and direction, and given that the human being naturally inclines toward perfection, and the very secret of their having been set as exemplars and models for the human being, is that he may observe the embodiment of perfections in the being of a human being, and, on the basis of that very inclination toward Absolute Perfection, develop an inclination toward the Perfect Human Being. Now, this Perfect Human Being is the Prophet and his Household (peace be upon them).

Therefore, this discussion too has already been raised previously, and its status has been determined; if it is the primordial nature, then yes, this is an intrinsic dignity; but this very meaning is itself subject to objection.

6, 7, and 8. If we say that what is meant by the trust is the rulings and obligatory duties, as some have stated; if we say that what is meant is the divine commands and prohibitions; if we say that what is meant is obedience—if any of these three meanings is intended… First, construing it according to these meanings appears to be subject to objection. To say that the trust which God offered to the heavens and the earth, and which they refused, consisted of these rulings, obligatory duties, obedience, servitude, and commands and prohibitions, is not correct. In light of the point that was also mentioned earlier, this is a creational characteristic in the human being. When it is offered to the heavens, the earth, and the mountains, it must naturally be something that is acceptable to them; otherwise, if there is no possibility of acceptance, offering it to them is subject to objection. We shall, of course, cite a meaning and explain what fundamentally is meant by the refusal of the heavens and the earth and the human being’s bearing of this burden.

In any case, given that the one offering the argument has himself relied upon this—and this was one of the pieces of evidence of the one offering the argument, namely that this trust is certainly a creational matter and not a legislative one—in light of this criterion that the one offering the argument cited, we state, by this very criterion, that if this is a creational matter, it is fundamentally incompatible with this meaning, namely to say that God offered the rulings, obligatory duties, obedience, and obligations to the heavens and the earth, that they refused, and that the human being accepted it.

Question:

Professor: All of those instances are of this kind; the notion that what is meant is that We granted free will to the human being and did not grant free will to the heavens and the earth—this cannot be the case. When we say that construing it according to some of these meanings is incompatible with the framework of the argument of the one offering the argument himself, this does not pertain to this meaning alone. Yes, some of the previous meanings we mentioned are also incompatible with the framework that the one offering the argument cited. What responsibility is this? Is religious obligation a creational matter? The discussion is that he says: We offered a trust to the heavens, the earth, and the mountains, “but they declined to bear it” (فَأَبَيْنَ أَنْ يَحْمِلْنَهَا); if it were so, then there would be no refusal and declining.

Thus, it appears that this meaning, too, cannot be the intended one. Moreover, if religious obligation, or obedience, or command and prohibition, or rulings and obligatory duties—any of these three meanings we alluded to in the previous session—is intended, and we overlook this objection and interpret it in such a way that the refusal of the heavens, the earth, and the mountains means that they fundamentally lacked the capacity to accept religious obligation, ruling, obedience, and disobedience, whereas the human being possesses this capacity, then this capacity and aptitude has a source; otherwise, in itself it is nothing independent. This is either derived from the intellect, or derived from free will and volition, which are themselves considered among the branches of the intellect.

Question:

Professor: We gave two meanings for the intellect; the meaning we gave for the intellect is specific to the human being, and the angels do not possess it. The intellect in this sense is specific to the human being; otherwise, it is not a dignity—when other beings possess it, what dignity is this? In all of these instances, the aspect that is under consideration is that this is an honoring specific to the human being. Then this discussion was raised: is this dignity actual, or dispositional (iqtiḍā’ī), or potential (sha’nī), or of the nature of aptitude (istiʿdādī)? This makes a great difference; in that case, the result and outcome thereof become intrinsic dignity versus acquired dignity.

In any case, if it is these two or three meanings we mentioned, and we accept that there is no objection to them, this reverts to a source such as the intellect, or volition and free will, which is the same as what we stated previously; thus, in itself it cannot be regarded as an independent foundation for dignity.

And if we do not consider a source for it and wish to consider it independently in itself, we have no choice but to say that what is meant by obedience, obligations, rulings, and obligatory duties is the capacity to accept this burden and responsibility. If this is the case, then this is not an intrinsic dignity; among the characteristics of intrinsic dignity that we stated are the actuality of the dignity, its universality, and its imperishability; we stated several characteristics for the intrinsic nature of dignity; naturally, those characteristics do not exist here. This becomes an aptitude; concerning which we shall now state that this verse fundamentally refers, for the most part, to that very aptitude and not to actuality.

Question:

Professor: As for “unjust and ignorant” (ẓalūm and jahūl), some do not regard it as a deficiency; those who take a mystical (ʿirfānī) view regard “unjust and ignorant” not only as not a deficiency, but as an advantage. They offer an interpretation of “unjust and ignorant” which, if there is an opportunity, I shall state.

Thus, this meaning, too, cannot be the one under consideration.

9. If we say that what is meant is the bodily organs of the human being—that is, that God has given the human being blessings such as the ear, the eye, the tongue, and the hand—this is fundamentally not something that He would offer to the mountains, the earth, and the heaven; offering them to these beings is meaningless and is also incompatible with the apparent meanings of this very verse.

Therefore, in sum, it appears that the divine trust is not regarded as an independent matter for the honoring of the human being; rather, it reverts to one of the matters we mentioned previously; whatever meaning we suppose for the trust, it reverts to those matters. Now, some of the meanings are not acceptable here; and those whose acceptance is possible and feasible revert to the same previously discussed matters, which, in any case, are regarded either as acquired dignity or as intrinsic dignity. Thus, in itself it is not acceptable as an independent foundation for dignity.

Conclusion

In light of what we have stated, perhaps the meaning we cite for the verse has a certain preponderance relative to the other meanings, and establishes the indisputable minimum (al-qadr al-mutayaqqan) from this verse as acquired dignity. The late ʿAllāma [Ṭabāṭabā’ī], in elucidating this verse and explaining the refusal and declining of the heavens, the earth, and the mountains, and the human being’s bearing [of the trust], says: The refusal of the heaven to accept this trust (despite the fact that they may appear to be magnificent, great creatures, and perhaps the greatest of God’s creatures) fundamentally means that they did not possess the aptitude and capacity to be the bearers of the trust; otherwise, it was not the case that God offered it to them and they said, “We cannot.” The refusal of the heavens and the earth means precisely the absence of their capacity, the absence of their aptitude (ay ʿadam qābiliyyatihā, ʿadam istiʿdādihā); that is, it means that the heavens and the earth, with all their magnificence, did not possess the aptitude and capacity to bear this trust. But the human being bore it—that is, the human being possesses this capacity, competence, aptitude, and qualification; otherwise, there was fundamentally neither any offering nor any acceptance and rejection.

Question:

Professor: “Unjust and ignorant” (ẓalūman jahūlan) has no bearing here.

His statement, “but they declined to bear it” (فَأَبَيْنَ أَنْ يَحْمِلْنَهَا), means that they fundamentally did not have the ability to undertake this burden; they fundamentally did not possess this aptitude—it is not that We offered it and they rejected it. The human being bore it—that is, the human being was created in such a way, the human being was created in such a manner, as to possess this aptitude and capacity; that is, this aptitude itself is that trust; this capacity and competence itself is the trust. That they do not possess this aptitude and competence means that they are devoid of this trust. If this is an aptitude—the aptitude for divine vicegerency, the aptitude for nearness to the Exalted Truth, the aptitude for perfection, the aptitude to become the object of the angels’ prostration, the aptitude to possess guardianship, the aptitude to accept the divine guardianship; all that which we have placed within him as the aptitude for the Absolute Good—this aptitude, it is true, itself has actuality, but in reality it is a potentiality. This aptitude means the aptitude for attaining perfection; this is an advantage and a dignity, but this is not sufficient. Those dignities for which he possesses the aptitude become acquired dignity; as for his possessing the aptitude actually, this aptitude is by virtue of that very primordial nature and intellect—and yes, this is considered an intrinsic dignity. In any case, the very fact that the human being possesses this aptitude is itself a value; but it is not an intrinsic dignity.

Here there is room for a question and objection: that the human being’s acceptance of this trust was on account of his being unjust and ignorant, and otherwise this is not in itself a virtue. The very state of being unjust and ignorant is also creational; that is, the human being is a being possessing contradictory inclinations and contradictory capacities; he can both soar to the heights and descend to the depths; he can be just, and he can be unjust; he can be knowing, and he can be ignorant. This is like: “We have certainly created the human being in the best of stature * Then We returned him to the lowest of the low.” (لَقَدْ خَلَقْنَا الْإِنْسَانَ فِي أَحْسَنِ تَقْوِيمٍ * ثُمَّ رَدَدْنَاهُ أَسْفَلَ سَافِلِينَ). If we consider it according to that criterion and regard “unjust and ignorant” as a deficiency, this is in fact in the same vein as that verse; that is, it means: We created the human being possessing the aptitude for the divine trust—that is, We provided within him the capacity to accept this trust—but it was the human being who became unjust and ignorant; instead of becoming knowing, just, and perfect, he chose injustice and ignorance.

In any case, the bearing of the divine trust, in the sense of partaking of this aptitude, is an advantage and a distinction. Partaking of the distinction itself is an intrinsic dignity; but this in itself is not regarded as independent; it in fact reverts to the same intellect, free will, and volition, or the primordial nature; otherwise, in itself it is not considered independently.