Ayatullah Sayyid Mujtaba Nur Mufidi in an Interview with Harim-e Imam Journal: Initial Jihad from the Perspective of Imam Khomeini

The debate over initial and defensive jihad has always been a subject of great interest, especially since Imam Khomeini uttered the famous statement, “We will not be the initiators of any war.” To begin with, please explain: fundamentally, what was the charter and purpose of the wars waged in the early history of Islam?

Before responding to your question, it is appropriate to first offer a brief overview of the legislation (tashri’) of jihad in Islam. This is because the Messenger of God (peace be upon him and his progeny), as the executor of divine commands, was duty-bound to implement the rulings of God; therefore, if any war took place, it was for the execution of God’s ruling. In this light, a brief examination of the legislation of jihad in Islam is highly beneficial.

In general, some Islamic rulings were legislated gradually and in stages, among which are the rulings concerning intoxicants (khamr). The legislation of jihad also took place gradually and in stages. The late Allamah Tabataba’i states in this regard: “In the beginning, permission for warfare, jihad, and fighting against the disbelievers and polytheists was not given, but after some time, its legitimacy was declared.”

Certain verses of the Quran refer to this first stage, such as the verse: “To you is your religion, and to me is my religion” (Quran 109:6), and the verse: “And be patient over what they say and avoid them with a gracious avoidance” (Quran 73:10). The non-permissibility of jihad occurred during conditions in which the Prophet (peace be upon him and his progeny) and his companions did not yet possess the necessary manpower and equipment; hence, despite the pressures they endured, they were commanded to practice patience, endurance, and forbearance in the face of harassment by the disbelievers.

After a period, jihad and warfare against the disbelievers were legislated. This transition was linked to the preparation of necessary conditions and the empowerment of the Prophet (peace be upon him and his progeny) and his companions. At the same time, this legitimacy comprised several stages: in the first stage, the permission to fight the polytheists of Mecca was declared, to which the verse refers: “Permission [to fight] has been given to those who are being fought, because they were wronged. And indeed, Allah is competent to give them victory” (Quran 22:39). Following that, warfare against the People of the Book (Ahl al-Kitab) was introduced. In the third stage, warfare against the polytheists was established, and ultimately, warfare against absolute disbelievers, whether polytheist or non-polytheist.

Thus, the course of the legislation of jihad in Islam begins from the stage of non-legitimacy, reaches the stage of legitimacy and permissibility, and under certain conditions, rises above mere permissibility to become an obligation and necessity. This legislative progression corresponds to the history of the Prophet’s wars; meaning, one observes a complete alignment and harmony between the revelation of the verses of jihad and what actually transpired in the history of Islam during the lifetime of the Prophet (peace be upon him and his progeny).

On this basis, it is necessary to consider this progression when examining the evidences of jihad. Furthermore, the general consensus of exegetes and jurists is that the verses of jihad are, in general, absolute (mutlaq); meaning they argue that these verses occasionally encompass absolute jihad, including both initial (ibtida’i) and defensive (difa’i) jihad.

Now, with this point in mind and based on what occurred in practice, we can state that the vast majority of the Prophet’s wars in the early days of Islam were defensive. This fact becomes even more apparent when considering the context of the revelation (sha’n al-nuzul) of the verses of jihad and the events of that era. However, after the demise of the Prophet (peace be upon him and his progeny), initial jihad and conquests began and expanded.

During the reign of the first caliph, there were two types of wars: the wars known as the Riddah (apostasy) wars, and the wars that resulted in the conquest of certain lands. During the reign of the second caliph, this type of warfare increased and expanded. During the reign of the third caliph, similar instances occurred. In this period, despite the issues that arose after the demise of the Prophet (peace be upon him and his progeny), at the very least, the non-opposition of the Commander of the Faithful, Ali (peace be upon him), to these wars can be historically inferred.

To summarize the answer to your question in a single sentence, I can say that during the lifetime of the Prophet (peace be upon him and his progeny), the majority of the wars were defensive in nature, because the conditions for initial jihad had not yet been prepared. Therefore, when the conditions were met, initial jihad was also conducted, and for this reason, we primarily witness initial wars after his demise.

What is the ruling on initial jihad during the Era of Occultation?

Before anything else, it is necessary to mention that the definition of initial jihad has not been properly refined in the treatises of jurists. At times, we speak of initial jihad, referring to fighting polytheists to establish Islam, monotheism (tawhid), and justice. According to this definition, there are no conditions or qualifications for jihad; meaning jihad takes place regardless of whether the disbelievers and polytheists have initiated an attack or not, or whether they intend to conspire, disrupt, and cause harm or not. Of course, other definitions have also been proposed for initial jihad. In any case, initial jihad, as its name suggests, is a jihad initiated by the Islamic state and ruler.

Without any reason?

No, it is not without reason; rather, it is for preparing the ground for the acceptance of Islam by the disbelievers and establishing the sovereignty of Islam. Of course, various aspects of initial jihad are debatable, including what it fundamentally means. In any case, how initial jihad is defined can affect various dimensions of this issue.

Concurrently, we can state that the core permissibility of initial jihad during the era of the presence of the Infallible Imam is verified beyond doubt. Although some have claimed that there is no such thing as initial jihad in Islam and that all jihad is defensive, the reality is that upon careful examination of the Quranic verses, narrations, and other evidences, one finds that the principle of initial jihad during the era of the presence of the Infallible Imam can be proven through the four sources of Islamic jurisprudence (the Quran, Sunnah, consensus, and intellect).

If we examine the various verses of jihad, we find that they possess a generality that encompasses both defense and initial jihad. We also possess numerous (mustafid) and indeed mutawatir (frequently narrated) narrations concerning initial jihad, as well as both acquired and transmitted consensus (ijma’ al-muhassal wa al-manqul).

Furthermore, I would claim that we can even rely on rational proof (dalil al-aqli) to establish it, with the explanation that initial jihad is outwardly offensive, but in reality, it is defensive—a defense of the rights of God, the rights of humanity, and the eradication of oppression. If we can substantiate the realization of these three titles in initial jihad, this jihad is certainly deemed necessary and obligatory by intellect as well.

The assertion that it is a defense of the rights of God (haqq Allah) is because God the Almighty, as the Creator and Sustainer of this universe, possesses an inherent lordship (mawlawiyyah) in this world—both ontological lordship (takwini) and legislative lordship (tashri’i). It is the right of God to be worshipped, served, and obeyed. Therefore, any behavior, movement, or center that seeks to stand against this right must be confronted.

That initial jihad is a defense of the rights of humanity is because human beings are innately inclined toward servitude, worship of God, and monotheism. This, like other human rights, is a fundamental right. For instance, the right to freedom is a human right, and defending it is accepted among all nations and peoples. The importance of the right to worship and servitude, if not greater than freedom, is certainly not less, and therefore, defending it is a paramount issue. If anyone deprives human beings of this right, one must stand against them. When a disbelieving government and disbelievers prevent the connection and relationship between humans and God, obstruct the attainment of monotheism, create barriers against humanity reaching true salvation, and block the evolutionary progress of mankind, one must certainly fight them. Thus, from one perspective, initial jihad is a defense of the rights of humanity. Many prominent scholars have emphasized this point. I recall that Martyr Mutahhari justifies and analyzes initial jihad from this very perspective.

From another perspective, this type of jihad is a defense of the oppressed. This is because disbelieving, according to narrations and rational proofs, is an oppression against God, an oppression against oneself, and an oppression against others. In reality, anyone living under the dominion of a disbelieving government is oppressed. If a person is deprived of certain material rights (such as housing, food, and clothing), we consider them oppressed. Therefore, if encroaching upon the material needs and rights of individuals is oppression, then encroaching upon their intellect, spirit, spiritual rights, and what concerns human salvation and the future of humanity is certainly a far greater oppression. Thus, the intellect deems this action necessary under the principle of defending the oppressed. Therefore, under this analysis that initial jihad is in reality a defense of the rights of God, the rights of humanity, and the defense of the oppressed, the intellect deems it necessary. In general, the intellect considers defense necessary and rules that it is obligatory for a human to defend themselves against the deprivation of what belongs to them.

Thus, the principle of initial jihad is fully provable through these evidences. Of course, we are currently discussing this subject within the theoretical realm. Therefore, one cannot counter these arguments with objections that might relate to the practical implementation stage. In this position, I am not concerned with what has occurred or might occur under this name throughout history; rather, in this position, we must see whether such a ruling is provable in principle or not.

Those who claim that we have nothing called initial jihad in Islam either cannot justify their intended definition of initial jihad, or, optimistically, they reduce initial jihad to defensive jihad. However, as I mentioned, the verses, narrations, consensus, and intellect indicate its legitimacy. Even the Sunnis have accepted this matter; meaning it is agreed upon by both main schools of thought (fariqayn), and thus, it can be said that both Shiites and Sunnis, in general, consider initial jihad obligatory. What has been stated concerns the core obligation of initial jihad; its specific conditions, however, must be explained on another occasion.

Now, considering the aforementioned arguments, we address the question: does this ruling apply to all eras and times, or is it limited to a specific period?

In this regard, there is a vast disagreement among Shiite jurists. The majority of Shiite jurists argue that initial jihad is not permissible during the Era of Occultation, because they consider the permission of the Infallible Imam to be one of the conditions of initial jihad. The requirement of the Infallible Imam’s permission naturally means that initial jihad is not permissible during the Era of Occultation. In contrast, a group is of the opinion that initial jihad is permissible during the Era of Occultation. Indeed, this view can even be inferred from some statements of Imam Khomeini.

Does this mean Imam Khomeini also subscribes to this permissibility?

In his formal decrees (fatwa), Imam Khomeini states that initial jihad is not permissible during the Era of Occultation. However, in his argumentative jurisprudential discussions, based on certain indications and evidence, it can be said that he leaned toward the permissibility of initial jihad during the Era of Occultation, which we will point out.

In any case, the root of the disagreement regarding the permissibility or non-permissibility of initial jihad during the Era of Occultation traces back to whether the permission of the Infallible Imam is a condition for initial jihad or not. Those who say it is a condition naturally conclude its non-permissibility, while those who do not believe in such a condition and state that merely the permission of a “just Imam” (al-Imam al-Adil) is required for initial jihad conclude that initial jihad is legitimate, and perhaps obligatory, during the Era of Occultation.

This matter depends on how the narrations are interpreted. Because the term “just Imam” is used in the narrations, there is disagreement as to what “just Imam” refers to. According to some narrations, the Imams (peace be upon them) have stated that we must grant permission. Given the presence of the term “just Imam” in the sources, many jurists have equated the “just Imam” with the “Infallible Imam.” On the other hand, those who argue for permissibility believe that “just Imam” refers to a just ruler, not necessarily the Infallible Imam. Therefore, the mere permission of a just ruler is sufficient for initial jihad, as the permission of the ruler is one of the important conditions of initial jihad, unlike defensive jihad. Of course, it has other conditions as well. This is one aspect that has been the source of disagreement.

Some jurists have argued for the non-permissibility of initial jihad during the Era of Occultation by stating that whoever wishes to initiate jihad must be the most knowledgeable of the religion (a’raf bi-al-din), and we have no one more knowledgeable than the Infallible Imam. Therefore, others cannot enter this domain.

Relying on the very same arguments I mentioned, I believe that initial jihad is permissible and legitimate during the Era of Occultation. Since there is currently no opportunity to examine every single verse and narration, I will state in general that by virtue of the generality and absolute nature of the verses and narrations, as well as the rational proof that was formulated, we must commit to the permissibility of initial jihad during the Era of Occultation (even though the majority view is that it is not permissible).

This is because initial jihad is in reality a defense of the rights of God, the rights of humanity, and the defense of the oppressed, and it is clear that these are not limited to a specific era but are considered fundamental principles of Islamic rulings. There is no reason to restrict the defense of the oppressed to a specific era.

Furthermore, the entire system of religious teachings guides us to the fact of how much emphasis is placed on the greatness of religion and Islam. In the words of the Infallible Imams (peace be upon them), the honor of Islam, the honor of Muslims, and the glory and power of Islam and Muslims have always been emphasized. The duty of the prophets, the Infallible Imams, the saints, their deputies, and the jurists is to invite and guide people toward God the Almighty, to free them from the traps of servitude to other than God, to keep them away from devils, and to strive to revive the matter of religion and establish rulings and justice. This cannot be achieved without paying attention to this issue during the Era of Occultation.

Even the late Ayatullah al-Khoei, despite not accepting the absolute guardianship of the jurist (wilayah al-faqih) in its broad sense, states: “Denying the permissibility of initial jihad during the Era of Occultation is incompatible with the Quran’s emphasis on the issue of inviting to and propagating the religion.”

Therefore, in my view, considering the sum of what has been discussed, one can commit to the permissibility of initial jihad during the Era of Occultation.

How is this jihad implemented in the present era? In fact, do international obligations not restrict both defensive and initial jihad?

Several doubts, questions, and objections may arise regarding this issue, one of which you pointed to. Some of these questions or objections can even be raised assuming the ruling of the permissibility or obligation of initial jihad during the era of the presence of the Infallible Imam.

For instance, the doubt that initial jihad is actually the imposition of belief, which is incompatible with the freedom of thought and belief, does not only concern initial jihad during the Era of Occultation but also encompasses the era of the presence of the Infallible Imam. However, it must be understood that initial jihad is not the imposition of belief, and in a way, it does not contradict what is raised in international law regarding the impermissibility of the resort to force and territorial expansion. I will offer a brief explanation of this, as it is an important issue.

The primary objective of initial jihad is neither expansionism, territorial conquest, nor the imposition of belief; rather, the objective is to dismantle the origin and root of polytheism and disbelief by resorting to force. When we speak of initial jihad against disbelievers, we first have the invitation to Islam. Without invitation, initial jihad is not permissible at all. Initial jihad is meant to eliminate the source of corruption—namely the government and sovereignty of disbelief and polytheism in a territory—because governance and sovereignty affect all aspects of life: education, livelihood, economy, social relations, and the morality of the people.

Sovereignty, through its planning, plays a pivotal role in directing society and the lives of the people. This influence is clearer and more proven today regarding what role sovereignty can play. I do not mean to say it is the sole cause (tamm al-illah), but it plays a central role. As long as sovereignty belongs to disbelief and disbelievers, the paths of invitation, selecting the truth, and choosing the correct belief are blocked. On this basis, in my view, the philosophy of legislating initial jihad was to remove the obstacles to inviting to God, Islam, monotheism, and the establishment of justice.

This is distinct from the imposition of belief. Uprooting the source of corruption as the origin of polytheism and disbelief through force—should the disbelieving rulers wish to lead people toward the servitude of Satan and away from God—has no connection to the issue of imposing belief.

Here, it is important to pay attention to one point: jurists generally issue decrees that the disbelievers, after war, must either embrace Islam or be killed. Of course, this refers to disbelievers other than the People of the Book. As you know, the disbelievers who are targeted in initial jihad, if they are from the People of the Book, are told to either embrace Islam or pay the tribute tax (jizyah). However, if they are not from the People of the Book, they must either embrace Islam or be killed. Here, the doubt may arise that this is also the imposition of belief, because even though warfare has occurred and the sovereignty of disbelief has been dismantled, the disbelievers are still asked to do so.

In response to this doubt, I propose a possibility—even though the decrees of the jurists are otherwise, there are indications for this possibility in some verses and narrations. As I mentioned, in my view, initial jihad has been legislated to prepare the ground for people to utilize their human rights so that oppression is removed from them. Furthermore, the objective of this jihad is to dismantle the structure and center that strives to keep people in a specific environment so that they do not hear the word of truth. However, after the sovereignty of disbelief is eliminated and Islam is established, what does the request for them to accept Islam mean?

Some have said: accepting Islam means that they should adopt outward Islam and pronounce the double testimony of faith (shahadatayn), otherwise they are killed. This answer does not resolve the doubt and question. Others say: accepting Islam means that they must surrender or be killed. In my opinion, this answer is also incomplete; because the assumption is that the Islamic state has been established, so asking them to accept it is the acquisition of what is already acquired (tahsil al-hasel).

The possibility that, in my view, can resolve some of these doubts is that they should be told to accept the laws and the course of Islamic ruling in the country and commit to it, not that they must adopt outward Islam or surrender. Thus, this does not mean that they must become Muslims in terms of belief or even outwardly adopt Islam, but the objective is to provide an environment in which they can choose freely. Concurrently, they must respect Islamic laws. Therefore, they cannot manifest certain prohibitions that they deem permissible.

Subsequently, in this environment, arguments and proofs are presented to them, and gradually, the ground is prepared for them to accept with their hearts. Therefore, with the explanation I offered, I do not believe that initial jihad is the imposition of belief, but it is in fact for eliminating the root of disbelief, polytheism, and the source of corruption through force, dominance, and war, not the imposition of belief and thought.

An important point that can contribute to a deeper understanding of this matter is that initial jihad has very strict conditions; for instance, specific instructions have been given regarding whom to fight and whom not to, or that jihad must be under the leadership, supervision, and with the permission of a just ruler. It has other conditions that must be prepared as well. It is not the case that anyone who comes along can do this.

Another point that helps resolve doubts is: if the Islamic ruler, assuming the conditions for jihad with disbelievers are met, sits idly by and witnesses the rulers of disbelief freely expanding and strengthening disbelief in their territories and preventing the voice of Islam from reaching the people, what will happen? Will they remain satisfied with this situation, or if they find an opportunity, will they inflict the same tragedy upon Muslims? They cannot tolerate a place or region being a center of Islam and invitation to truth, monotheism, and God, because they view this center as an obstacle.

If our logic is not to interfere with them so they do their work and we do ours, it is not certain that this situation will continue in the future. Thus, in a way, we can say that initial jihad can be a preventive measure.

Meaning that even international obligations cannot prevent this?

In today’s world, from the perspective of international law, the resort to force is condemned and prohibited. Although the oppressive powers of the world act otherwise, they have nevertheless devised consequences for such actions, and international bodies supervise them. Based on this international law, if a country is ruled by a grueling dictatorship that deprives people of their right to freedom and subjects them to severe oppression and pressure, or, for example, is unable to establish security, intervention is permitted to defend the people of that country, considering certain aspects.

Of course, if we look from the perspective of what is practiced in the world today—where international law has become a tool in the hands of superpowers—however it is interpreted, these objections remain. However, if we wish to analyze the issues based on the boundaries that have been established, what is written on paper, and the exceptions made for the resort to force by members of the international community, initial jihad can fall within the framework of defending human rights and defending the oppressed.

Of course, accepting this point is not simple and is open to debate. I know that objections will be raised against this view, but if we pay attention to the fact that initial jihad is not expansionism and territorial conquest, and the assumption is that the Islamic ruler does not wish to redraw borders and expand; rather, this action is in fact aiding and assisting the people of a country, then the theory of the legitimacy of initial jihad during the Era of Occultation is defensible. Even today, actions are carried out under these very pretexts.

In any case, this subject requires a detailed and lengthy discussion, but as a whole, I think what is mainly raised as an objection and doubt are these two points: first, that initial jihad is incompatible with the verse: “There is no compulsion in religion” (Quran 2:256) and freedom of belief, and is considered the imposition of belief, which the Quran itself has rejected; second, that it is incompatible with international law, and fundamentally, today’s world does not accept it. I think this can be a subject for an independent discussion, which I have referred to in passing.

How can we reconcile the permissibility of initial jihad during the Era of Occultation with Imam Khomeini’s statement, “We will not be the initiators of any war”? Did Imam Khomeini refer to the Islamic Republic of Iran, or to the non-permissibility of initial jihad in Islam?

Certainly, Imam Khomeini (may his soul be sanctified) did not mean the absolute non-permissibility of initial jihad; because he himself considered initial jihad legitimate during the era of the Infallible Imam. Surely, your question refers to the Era of Occultation.

In my view, Imam Khomeini stated as the state of the Islamic Republic of Iran that we are not the initiators of any war; the reason and cause for this was that the conditions were not prepared, because initial jihad has important conditions. Financial capacity, military capacity, and sufficient manpower are crucial for initial jihad. It has even been said that the number of forces and personnel of the army of Islam must not be less than the forces of the opposing side.

My understanding is that initial jihad, with the conditions mentioned for it, is predicted in such a way that its result is victory; meaning, the preliminaries are prepared in such a way that jihad is not fruitless. Therefore, all necessary conditions and precautions are predicted in it, unlike defensive jihad which is practically not conditional upon any requirement.

On this basis, the statement you quoted from Imam Khomeini, in my view, was raised more from the perspective of responding to threats and preventing the Iranophobia that was raised at the beginning of the Revolution. Iranophobia was also used to exploit the capacity of neighbors against Iran. Thus, Imam Khomeini was in fact seeking to dispel that illusion. On the other hand, the majority of Iran’s neighbors, other than the northern neighbor, were Muslims, and fundamentally, initial jihad made no sense in relation to them.

Furthermore, as I mentioned, there are several indications and evidences in the words of Imam Khomeini that indicate his inclination toward the legitimacy of initial jihad during the Era of Occultation, including:

1. Imam Khomeini states in Kitab al-Bay’ (The Book of Sale) that whatever is established for the Infallible Imam is also established for the jurist, except for two cases: first, matters established for the person of the Infallible Imam out of honor and respect (tashrifan wa takriman) and not related to governance and authority; second, matters which, although related to governance and authority, are restricted to the Infallible Imam due to specific evidence and do not include others—such as initial jihad, which the majority of jurists consider restricted to the Infallible Imam. However, he continues by saying: “Although there is reflection (ta’ammul) in this”; meaning he reflects upon whether initial jihad is restricted to the Infallible Imam and excluded from the domain of the government and authority of the jurist due to specific evidence.

2. The implication of the arguments he presented to prove the guardianship of the jurist (wilayah al-faqih) is that initial jihad should be permissible during the Era of Occultation.

3. In addition to this, I personally heard a point from the late Haj Ahmad Agha around the year 1364 SH (1985 AD). He said: “Imam Khomeini believes that if we had the capability, we would have invited some of these countries (which he named) to Islam and waged jihad with them.”

4. Another point is that when one puts together the collection of thoughts, beliefs, and ideas of Imam Khomeini, one finds that he emphasizes the honor of Islam, the Islamic government, and the preservation of the territory of Islam, considering it among the most important duties. Naturally, some of the conditions for reaching this objective are not possible except through initial jihad. Thus, by considering the sum of these points, one can discover the inclination of the late Imam toward this ruling. Apparently, this is also the opinion of the Supreme Leader.

You are aware that geographical borders are highly distinct today. Is there a boundary for defensive jihad, or can Iran enter into defense simply if a disbeliever attacks Lebanon, for example? What is the Sharia basis for this?

To answer this question, paying attention to the concept of Dar al-Islam (the Abode of Islam) and Dar al-War (Dar al-Harb) is important. Today, the concept of nation and geographical borders is an undeniable phenomenon, and the people of countries attach importance to it. For the people of Iran, the country of Iran is the homeland, and for the people of Iraq, the country of Iraq. However, in my view, from the perspective of Islam, we have two types of homeland.

Fundamentally, what is meant by “homeland” (watan), and does the homeland and its defense hold intrinsic value (mawdu’iyyah) in Islam or not?

This question and the previous one are related. Note that the homeland in its general and conventional sense gathers the concept of the nation, but in its specific sense emphasized in Islam, it encompasses the ummah (community). The emphasis of Islam, instead of the nation, is on the concept of the ummah. Islam does not wish to negate nationality and homeland, but it presents a higher concept and level, which is the concept of the Islamic ummah.

To make the issue clearer, I will quote a point from the late Allamah Tabataba’i, which greatly assists in understanding this matter. He first points to a note regarding the primary matter of this world in the ontological system (takwin) and then applies it to the legislative system (tashri’), beautifully explaining the harmony of the ontological system and the legislative system.

He states that all the effort of the primary matter of this world to transform into an element, then enter the plant kingdom, and in the next stage enter the animal kingdom and the human stage, is to seek help from other forces and powers, and by strengthening itself, to progress and ascend to the higher stage and reach its ultimate goal. This is how the system of the world operates. The further it proceeds, the more perfect the beings of this world become; because as a result of the combination and joining of elements and unity with one another, the connection and cohesion of elements become greater, and consequently, they become more perfect and powerful.

The late Allamah Tabataba’i states: the situation of human individuals in this world is also the same. Human individuals, based on their natural needs, have formed societies. The formation of the family unit and larger gatherings was based on their natural needs; meaning nationality is the offspring of the natural needs of humans. This also stems from human nature; because human nature is designed to live in society and, by gathering and strengthening what exists around it, to reach higher and loftier goals—meaning to become more perfect and to have its needs met.

He believes that the homeland was formed on this basis, so there is no objection to it, and this is a natural path. However, confining the homeland and nationality to these geographical borders is a defect; because it is incompatible with another aspect of human nature and has a negative consequence. Restricting a nation within a border means separating the body and soul of human beings from one another. For example, the body of the Iranian nation and the connection they find under this name causes them to be separated from other nations. This separation prevents the cohesion they must all find together to be strengthened and, as a result of unity, to reach higher stages. Furthermore, this separation causes one nation to view another nation from an imperialistic and exploitative perspective; because each group seeks to acquire and attract its own interests.

Therefore, in order to eliminate this defect, a stronger unity must be established, and this society must become more perfect. The perfection of human society lies in nations drawing closer to one another and uniting to be strengthened. This connection certainly causes them to gain more power. This explanation is precisely based on the ontological system. In the ontological system, the greater the connection of elements, the stronger and more perfect the resulting being. Regarding human societies, the matter is the same. This is a highly important point.

In today’s world, numerous unions have been formed. Fundamentally, the very formation of regional and international unions is precisely in this direction. In any case, Islam has paid attention to this issue as a highly important, fundamental, and basic issue, and for this reason, you see that in the Quranic culture, emphasis is mainly placed on the concept of the ummah, and it is clear that this concept does not fit within the boundaries of geographical borders.

Of course, the meaning of my words is not to ignore borders. This is, after all, a reality in today’s world that we must respect, but the discussion is whether we should remain at this level and let this be the entirety of our concern and the limit of our thoughts and ideas, or should Muslims and the rulers of Islamic countries think of establishing a powerful and strong Islamic ummah so that no one has the power to encroach upon this collective.

On this basis, the issue of Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Harb, which is raised in jurisprudential books and has consequences associated with it, finds a broader meaning. Of course, there is disagreement in the definition of Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Harb. If we consider the collection of countries currently separated by geographical borders as Dar al-Islam and the Islamic homeland, and the people living in these countries as the Islamic ummah, naturally, Muslims must rise to defend against encroachment upon any corner of this Islamic homeland. Here, there is no distinction between Iranian, Arab, and Lebanese. This is a reality and has a strong foundation.

Of course, we do not wish to ignore the homeland in its conventional sense. Iranian and national identity is important and valuable to us, but we must not be confined within this border and ignore other Muslim nations, especially in the current conditions where certain events are unfolding. Sometimes, one senses attitudes against a specific nation or race, such as Arabs, which prevents the growth and development of nations. This is a truth to which we must pay attention.

I will refer to an instance in this regard; in the history of Iran, between the years 1289 and 1291 SH (1911 to 1912 AD), Russia invaded Iran. This invasion coincided with Italy’s invasion of Libya. Refer to the decrees of the scholars during that period. The late Seyyed (the author of Al-Urwah al-Wuthqa), the late Akhund Khurasani, and the late Kashif al-Ghita issued decrees stating that defending the Muslims of Iran against Britain and Russia and defending the Muslims of Libya against Italy’s invasion with one’s life and property is obligatory. This is, in the first stage, the duty of those present in those locations, and if they are unable, others must go to their aid. This is the very universalist perspective I mentioned, which views Dar al-Islam as a whole and collective, and sees the Islamic homeland and ummah.

Meaning, for instance, we should go to Lebanon and defend its Muslims?

Undoubtedly, it is so. Some say: “What does it have to do with us what others do in Lebanon, Afghanistan, or Iraq?” This perspective is not compatible with Islamic logic at all, especially considering that in defensive jihad, the obligation of jihad is absolute and not conditional upon any requirement except the ability to defend; meaning, for example, if we had financial limitations, we must plan for them, but this does not prevent us from helping Muslims under attack by disbelievers.

In initial jihad, we have many conditions, including the permission of the Imam, financial capability, and military capability, but in defensive jihad, it is not so. Rather, the principle in defensive jihad is simply to defend to the extent of one’s capability.

If we put these points together, it becomes clear that defending all Muslims is our duty. On the other hand, when one sees what is currently occurring in the Islamic world, and on the other hand, the attention of the world of disbelief and the sensitivity they have toward the expansion and growth of Islam and the expenses they incur, and at the same time is interested in the future of the world being a good and bright future, one naturally cannot remain indifferent to these matters.

Of course, these stances are not only in the face of disbelievers, but if a group of deviant, transgressing, and power-seeking Muslims attacks other Muslims, we still have the duty of defense. Currently, Daesh (ISIS) has attacked a group of Muslims in the name of Islam. Although they are not truly Muslims and only bear an Islamic name, they act in a manner more dangerous and worse than disbelievers and damage the reputation of Islam and Muslims. Certainly, the Muslims under attack by them must be aided, and those killed in this path are certainly and without doubt considered martyrs (shuhada).

What is the Sharia ruling on employing mercenaries for initial and defensive warfare? Are those killed in these wars considered martyrs (shuhada)?

The term “mercenary” (mozdur) is not a suitable term. It is true that a mercenary, linguistically, is someone who receives a wage for an action, and a mercenary in war is someone who receives money to fight, but this word has a negative connotation in common parlance. This term should not be used here.

In any case, those who fight to defend Muslims and Islamic territory against the invasion of disbelievers or against transgressing and deviant Muslims are martyrs if they are killed. Of course, intention (niyyah) is crucial.

I must also say that all Sunni schools of thought accept initial jihad, and indeed, the scope of the view of some of them is broader than our view. They state: even if the leader of initial jihad is a transgressing, corrupt, and tyrannical ruler, and he deems initial jihad advisable, one must cooperate with him; whereas we do not say this in initial jihad.

The important point is that our jurists have stated regarding defensive jihad: accompanying a tyrannical and oppressive ruler to repel the attack and invasion of disbelief against Islamic territory is necessary, on the condition that the person’s intention is to defend Islam, Muslims, and Islamic territory, not to accompany the tyrannical ruler.

Thus, the issue of intention is crucial. Although both actions are considered a single deed—which is cooperating with the tyrannical ruler to repel the attack of disbelievers—even there, the person’s intention must be to defend Islam and Muslims, not to accompany the tyrannical ruler. Therefore, whether anyone killed in this jihad is a martyr or not depends on the individual’s intention and the purpose for which they went.

What is the difference between Shiites and Sunnis regarding defensive and initial jihad?

In the course of my remarks, I referred to the opinion of both main schools of thought (fariqayn) concerning initial and defensive jihad. All Islamic schools of thought—including the Shiite school and the four Sunni schools of law, namely the Hanbali, Maliki, Hanafi, and Shafi’i schools—in general consider initial jihad obligatory.

Some of them, based on the point I mentioned, even consider its scope to be slightly broader than we do. We have specific conditions for initial jihad, but they have approached this issue more leniently. The same applies to defensive jihad. This is the summary of the matter, and its details must be explained on another occasion.