Ayatullah Sayyid Mujtaba Nur Mufidi in an Interview with Ijtihad Network: Cosmetics Cannot Be Part of Maintenance (Nafaqah) While Illness Costs Are Not!

“If someone has wealth in the spending of which they engage in luxury, extravagance, and squandering, they hold dominion over their wealth and wish to consume it far beyond what they need. Where does the intellect deem this ugly? For what reason does it deem it ugly? If you say that repelling harm is rationally obligatory, it makes no difference whether the harm is reputational, financial, or physical. The intellect, in general, considers harm as obligatory to repel; but what harm? The goodness of repelling is different from the necessity of repelling. The intellect says: it is good to distance this harm from yourself, but if you do not, it does not disrupt anything. There is a difference between the necessity of repelling and the goodness of repelling. Is imitating the most knowledgeable (a’lam) obligatory or not? They say the intellect rules on the necessity of the ignorant referring to the scholar. The scholar also has degrees, even if they are not the most knowledgeable. Here they say: does the intellect say that as long as the most knowledgeable is present, we cannot refer to the scholar? Where does the intellect say this? The intellect rules on the goodness of referring to the most knowledgeable.”

Exclusive to Ijtihad Network: Incurable and difficult-to-treat diseases, the number of which has also increased in recent years, possess various jurisprudential angles—ranging from the permissibility of euthanasia (mercy killing) and the husband’s responsibility to pay for the wife’s medical treatment, to the permissibility of organ donation from brain-dead patients to those in need of these organs.

In this regard, we conducted an interview with Ayatullah Sayyid Mujtaba Nur Mufidi. The interview with this lecturer of advanced (Kharij) jurisprudence and principles at the Islamic Seminary of Qom, although lengthy, was replete with jurisprudential and scientific notes. The details of this interview are as follows:

Ijtihad: Are actions that gradually lead to the occurrence of incurable or difficult diseases such as diabetes prohibited from a Sharia perspective? For example, can we rule on the prohibition of excessive consumption of sugary substances that leads to diabetes?

Ayatullah Sayyid Mujtaba Nur Mufidi: The return of this question is to a more general title called harming oneself (idrar ala al-nafs). The debate is whether, generally, harming oneself is prohibited, or if we must distinguish between different types of harm. It may be that the widely-held opinion (mashhur), or what has been attributed to the mashhur, is that harming oneself is absolutely prohibited, and they consider the distinction made by some between significant (mu’taddu bihi) and insignificant (ghayru mu’taddin bihi) harm to be an opinion contrary to the mashhur and prior to this period of the latter jurists.

Regardless of the differences of opinion that exist, generally, harming oneself is not absolutely prohibited. Furthermore, the evidences cited to prove the prohibition of harming oneself, seeking to derive absolute prohibition from them, cannot prove anything. In my view, the Principle of No Harm (Qa’idah La Darar) and its evidences, to which some have resorted, have fundamentally no relation to this subject, such that we would wish to rely on those evidences to prove the prohibition of self-harm.

Ijtihad: For what reason do you say this? From the aspect that its language is negation (nafy) and not prohibition (nahy)?

Ayatullah Sayyid Mujtaba Nur Mufidi: In the chapter of La Darar, I believe this tradition is a state decree (hukm-e sultani), which is the opinion of the late Imam Khomeini in the chapter of La Darar. Even if we do not accept this foundation, this negation—even if it is a prohibition—the term dirar (harming) does not mean harming oneself. This phrase is directed toward others and does not encompass the self.

Regarding the verses to which reference was made, such as “He has only forbidden you dead animals, blood, the flesh of swine” (Quran 2:173) and “Whoever does evil wrongs himself,” I do not think they can assist us in proving the prohibition of self-harm absolutely.

What is raised in the narrations specifically, such as eating soil, is due to the significant harm involved, which leads to death or the amputation of an organ. In a narration like that of Mufaddal ibn Umar, Imam al-Sadiq (peace be upon him) introduced harm as the criterion of prohibition, and this harm can be worldly and otherworldly. Of course, there is a discussion as to whether harming is the cause (illah) or wisdom (hikmah) of the ruling; but what is definite is the prohibition acquired from the narration.

Ijtihad: Is this issue not among the cases of rational beauty and ugliness (al-hasan wa al-qubh) which becomes an independent rational judgment (mustaqillat al-aqliyyah) and does not require referring to Sharia, or must reference be made to Sharia?

Ayatullah Sayyid Mujtaba Nur Mufidi: Prohibition must be derived from the Sharia, even though reference has also been made to the Book, the Sunnah, consensus, and intellect. Some expressions state: “Repelling harm is rationally obligatory” (daf’ al-darar wajibun bi-al-aql). If it is rational, one must see: repelling what harm is rationally obligatory? In cases where a harm is inflicted from a Sharia perspective—such as the obligation of jihad and khums, which is a compensated harm—does the ruling of intellect undergo specification (takhsees)? Can the ruling of intellect accept specification?! To say that all harms must be repelled except in cases where compensation occurs, even if in the hereafter? The discussion is on the absolute necessity of repelling harm.

Ijtihad: The intellect has an independent ruling in uncompensated harms; for example, if someone pricks themselves with a needle without reason, the rational people forbid him and consider this action of his ugly.

Ayatullah Sayyid Mujtaba Nur Mufidi: The intellect and the rational people (uqa’la) rule in significant harms, but the discussion is: if someone wishes to harm themselves in a manner that does not damage the pillars of their life, they may be criticized by the uqa’la—this is a foolish action—but the intellect does not say that repelling such a harm is obligatory. For what reason is its repelling obligatory? What is the criterion for the necessity of repelling harm from the perspective of intellect?

Ijtihad: If I want to prick someone with a needle, should they not defend themselves so that the needle does not strike them?

Ayatullah Sayyid Mujtaba Nur Mufidi: From the aspect that you are encroaching upon him, yes, he must defend himself. The root of this is the fear that exists in human being toward death or the preliminaries of death. This is in itself one of the factors for human preservation. This is a matter placed within humans, that they harbor a fear toward death and the preliminaries of death. If this did not exist, humans would fundamentally not preserve themselves.

It can have different aspects; its source can be love of self, preserving boundaries, and many other things; but as for this being a ruling of the intellect, you must establish a foundation for this ruling of intellect. For what reason should we say that harms which are insignificant from the perspective of intellect are prohibited?

Ijtihad: The intellect does not say it is prohibited (haram); the intellect says it is ugly (qabih). For example, if we say someone wishes to harm their own body, it is a ruin of the body and a futile act, and everyone says it is an ugly act.

Ayatullah Sayyid Mujtaba Nur Mufidi: If someone has wealth in the spending of which they engage in luxury, extravagance, and squandering, they hold dominion over their wealth and wish to consume it far beyond what they need. Where does the intellect deem this ugly? For what reason does it deem it ugly? If you say that, you must also say it is ugly here. This is also a harm.

If you say that repelling harm is rationally obligatory, it makes no difference whether the harm is reputational, financial, or physical. Harm is harm. The intellect, in general, considers harm as obligatory to repel; but what harm? The goodness of repelling is different from the necessity of repelling. The intellect says: it is good to distance this harm from yourself, but if you do not, it does not disrupt anything. There is a difference between the necessity of repelling and the goodness of repelling.

One of the places where much confusion occurs is this very issue of necessity and goodness. In the discussion of imitating the most knowledgeable (a’lam), is it obligatory or not? They say the intellect rules on the necessity of the ignorant referring to the scholar. The scholar also has degrees, even if they are not the most knowledgeable. Here they say: does the intellect say that as long as the most knowledgeable is present, we cannot refer to the scholar? Where does the intellect say this? The intellect rules on the goodness of referring to the most knowledgeable; there is no discussion in this, but does referring to the most knowledgeable have exclusivity (ta’ayyun)? The intellect does not say you must definitely refer to the most knowledgeable.

Here too, the discussion is not on the rational goodness of repelling harm; but that you must definitely repel this harm from yourself, it appears there is no basis for it. Furthermore, such a thing is not understood from the narrations either. For example, regarding the toothstick (siwak), the Prophet states: “Were it not for hardship on my nation, I would have made the toothstick obligatory upon them.”

It is clear that abandoning the toothstick causes the ruin of teeth, and this is also a harm. It may not manifest now, but it will manifest later. If someone does not use the toothstick, these teeth are ruined. Ruining affects eating food, and the teeth might become infected and create problems of this kind; yet the Prophet, while wishing to recommend the importance of the toothstick, concurrently knew that if the lives of humans were to proceed on the scale of these matters—that they must be careful even in conventional matters so that harm is not directed toward them—life would be disrupted.

Indeed, this is a good example; using the toothstick is necessary to repel harm. It is clear that whoever does not use the toothstick, harm is directed toward them; yet the Prophet explicitly stated: “I did not make it obligatory because I saw it would create difficulty (mashaqqah) for my nation.”

Regarding insignificant harms—harms that do not damage human life and do not threaten the pillars of human life—it appears there is no proof of their prohibition.

Ijtihad: Is there no difference between matters whose presence is harmful and matters whose absence is harmful?

Ayatullah Sayyid Mujtaba Nur Mufidi: There is no difference; the subject of our discussion is harm. This harm might result from certain actions or from certain omissions. What difference does it make? If harm were rationally obligatory to repel—which I do not believe is the case—it would be obligatory to repel everywhere.

Those who consider absolute harm (both significant and insignificant) to be prohibited, and say that self-harm is prohibited, rely on some narrations that have been entered in the chapters of tayammum, wudu, and fasting. They say that if, due to illness, there is fear or assumption of harm, fasting is not obligatory. Or regarding wudu, the same applies.

However, that God the Almighty, out of concession (rukhsah), lifts some of these rulings due to the occurrence of harm—which is itself a subject of discussion—does not prove that wherever there is harm, the action or omission is prohibited. Neither from the intellect, nor from the narrations, nor from the verses, is the absolute prohibition of harm derived.

Furthermore, regarding the narration I quoted from the Prophet, if the matter is to be in this manner, indeed a kind of disruption in human life will occur and human beings will fall into difficulty (usr wa haraj). Especially in this era in which we live: car exhaust, air pollution, plastic containers in which we eat food, containers in which food is cooked, these radio waves and waves used in telecommunications, telephones, and wireless devices.

If someone wishes to have a completely harmless life, they must go alone into nature, live in a corner, and bake bread themselves—and even the flour they bake, the foodstuffs most of which have preservatives, and so forth. If you wish to bring insignificant harm into the domain of the prohibition of self-harm, life is fundamentally impossible. I do not wish to conclude that since it is inevitable, it is therefore permissible; but the jurists themselves have not prohibited any of these either. This is an indicating factor, not that it is a proof.

Ijtihad: If it were prohibited, the Principle of No Difficulty (La Haraj) would lift it.

Ayatullah Sayyid Mujtaba Nur Mufidi: The core of it is a subject of discussion. Regarding the example you mentioned—where certain behaviors in life are regarded as a prerequisite for the realization of harm, and are not yet harm in themselves, other than the issue of sugary substances that a person consumes and which will make them contract diabetes in the future—listlessness and anxiety/stress are the most important roots of diabetes.

Among these three factors, you mentioned one example. First of all, the title of harm does not currently apply to these. Therefore, from the perspective of the prohibition of self-harm, we cannot say this is prohibited. We must enter into the discussion of assisting in sin (i’anah ala al-ithm).

Even if we consider self-harm to be absolutely prohibited, the furthest limit is that listlessness, overeating, excessive use of sugary substances, stress, and anxiety—some of which are fundamentally inevitable and not voluntary—are ultimately the prerequisites of harm to the self. If they were prohibited, then we must see whether the title of sin (ithm) applies to them and whether assisting in sin is prohibited or not, which is in itself a subject of debate.

Absolute assisting in sin is not prohibited. Numerous prerequisites are involved in the realization of a sin. These examples mentioned are considered remote prerequisites (muqaddamat-e ba’ideh), and in remote prerequisites, we cannot say that assistance is applicable and therefore prohibited. Therefore, in my view, we cannot say it is prohibited. Even regarding smoking, which some of the scholars issue decrees upon, it does not appear that we can issue a decree of prohibition.

Ijtihad: Among the branches of this discussion is the debate on payment of expenses for the wife. Is the non-obligation of the husband paying for the medical treatment of the wife’s difficult and incurable diseases acceptable from a rational standpoint? What is the jurisprudential proof of this ruling?

Ayatullah Sayyid Mujtaba Nur Mufidi: There is disagreement. In terms of decrees (fatawa), as you mentioned, some do not consider the payment of medical expenses for the wife’s difficult and incurable diseases to be part of the wife’s maintenance (nafaqah) at all. Some jurists consider conventional expenses in conventional illnesses to be part of nafaqah, but expenses incurred for difficult-to-treat diseases such as cancer and things that arise are not considered part of nafaqah. Others have added the condition that if it causes difficulty (haraj) to the husband, it is not part of her nafaqah; but if it does not cause haraj, it is part of her nafaqah. Some say there must also be hope of recovery. The views here are diverse.

In the first step, we must see: what does nafaqah mean? Do the evidences that made nafaqah obligatory make it absolutely obligatory or not?

Ijtihad: What is the standing of ethics in this issue?

Ayatullah Sayyid Mujtaba Nur Mufidi: That is another discussion. You are speaking from a jurisprudential and legal perspective. I am explaining from a jurisprudential perspective. When we say nafaqah is obligatory, it means that whether the man has financial capacity or not, he must pay, even if it leads to haraj upon him. He must borrow and pay the nafaqah.

Ijtihad: Why does La Haraj not lift the obligation of nafaqah?

Ayatullah Sayyid Mujtaba Nur Mufidi: Because nafaqah is his duty, and he must pay. Second, when we say nafaqah is obligatory, it means whether the woman herself has financial capacity or not. A woman may have financial capacity but says: “I will not spend my wealth, it is your duty to provide nafaqah to me.” This is important. We must pay attention: let us not merely consider a scenario in our minds where the woman has no wealth at all, and therefore, regarding your question about how it is from an ethical perspective, I wish to say that not all scenarios of the issue are bound with an ethical issue.

Suppose a woman has inherited vast wealth from her father, but her husband is a salaried clerk. Is it ethical for the woman to say: “I will not spend from my own wealth, and you must pay my expenses”? First of all, let us pay attention to the scenario of the issue: when we say nafaqah is obligatory, it means it enjoys such a breadth that even assuming the capacity of the woman, it is obligatory upon the man to pay it.

What is acquired from the sum of the narrations and evidences, in my view, is that nafaqah means that which must be given to the woman or anyone for the passage of their life. It is true that some jurists restricted this to food, clothing, and housing. Some jurists did not consider what was mentioned in the narrations to be from the category of examples, stating that nafaqah is this and nothing else. Even some jurists say: minimal sustenance (qut al-layamut), meaning just enough to keep her alive, and more than this is not necessary. Of course, this opinion is rare (shadh).

What appears to be the case is that nafaqah has a conventional meaning. Nafaqah is the wealth spent for the continuation of life. In some narrations, it states that nafaqah should be in a manner that “does not disgrace her” (la yuqabbihuha biha); meaning she should not be reproached for what she has, and they also raised the issue of status (sha’n). Status makes the domain of the subject somewhat broader. Let us set aside the issue of status, which in itself creates certain degrees.

Food, clothing, housing, and even cosmetics are part of nafaqah. If we define a conventional meaning for nafaqah and consider what relates to the status of the woman, you see that it differs in various eras and periods. Does the issue of health and treatment truly fall under nafaqah or not? The expressions of the jurists are remarkable. For example, they say: if the woman wishes to go to the public bath, the cost of her bath is not the responsibility of the man, because it is a matter that concerns herself; but what the man benefits from in some way—such as her cleanliness, or what she must perform specifically on her body, or what relates to her sexual strength—is the responsibility of the man.

It appears there is no necessity for the jurist to enter into some of these fields. When we say the wife’s nafaqah is obligatory upon the husband, the urf (common understanding) has a meaning for this nafaqah. Indeed, even in the expressions mentioned in the treatises of the jurists, they have stated points that are highly remarkable. For example, suppose a jurist, in his argumentative discussions, says: items such as kohl and oil-rubbing are part of nafaqah; but illness is not part of nafaqah. This is highly remarkable: that cosmetics are part of nafaqah, while illness costs are not. All of this indicates that the core entry into this domain was either inappropriate or not a correct entry.

If we define a conventional meaning for nafaqah—meaning the general conventional term, namely what concerns the wife’s life, and the passage of her life according to status depends upon it—we must naturally include illnesses and the costs of illness within this.

However, the discussion is: are conventional illness costs or the costs of conventional illnesses part of nafaqah? Again, what is meant by “conventional” is a subject of discussion. In my view, there is no difference between incurable (sa’b al-ilaj) and non-incurable diseases. Of course, this is contrary to the mashhur. Currently, most of the grand scholars consider the costs of incurable diseases to be excluded from nafaqah. Some have added the condition that if it is a source of haraj, it is excluded from nafaqah, and if it is not a source of haraj, it is part of her nafaqah.

In the first step, I think this is a conventional matter and among the necessities of the wife’s life, and if we consider cosmetics to be part of nafaqah, then a fortiori, these are part of nafaqah. In the discussion of khums, on a certain occasion, the discussion of nafaqah was raised. I have in mind that nafaqah is that upon which the conventional life of a human depends. This occasionally has a minimum limit of keeping her alive, and occasionally is to the extent of having a life appropriate to her status.

How is it that food and clothing are part of nafaqah, while medicine—which is more important than food and clothing—is not part of nafaqah? Even if the title of medicine and treatment consists of new things, since ancient times this issue was raised, that they did not count drugs and the fees of the physician (ajr al-tabib) as part of nafaqah.

Currently, conventional expenses and conventional illnesses, like a cold, happen to everyone in life. They consider this to be part of nafaqah, although in the past, many jurists did not consider this part of nafaqah. Why is an incurable disease, whose expense is immense, not part of nafaqah? This also concerns the life of this woman. This stands in the line of food and clothing.

Someone might say: there is no hope of this woman surviving. Food and clothing at least keep the woman alive, but in an incurable disease, there is no hope of her surviving; however, this does not justify saying that because we have no hope, we must not spend. The only difficulty that exists is where the woman has capacity and the man does not. If we say nafaqah is obligatory, it is a financial burden. It is possible that the condition of haraj that some appended here is for this direction.

Therefore, as a whole, in my view, it is appropriate that the expense of incurable diseases, even if the man falls into haraj, is part of nafaqah. Although this is contrary to the mashhur, it appears to be so.

Ijtihad: Do incurable or difficult-to-treat diseases, or the prohibition of killing a soul, encompass cases of euthanasia, which was not customary during the era of the Lawgiver, or not? For example, Dr. Mostafa Mohaghegh Damad argues for the permissibility of euthanasia. What could be their proof?

Ayatullah Sayyid Mujtaba Nur Mufidi: Euthanasia—or simple, easy, good, comfortable, and mercy-killing, accompanied by consent, under various titles—has multiple categories. A portion of its categories is performed currently and is unobjectionable; those who become brain-dead and can fundamentally no longer decide for themselves whether their life should continue and be prolonged or not.

Although in this very case there is disagreement, some of the scholars have issued decrees; because conditions are prepared where there is fundamentally no possibility of return—meaning that brain becomes like a liquid that has no possibility of returning to its original state. Brain death is a purely vegetative life and is alive only with machines. The parents or the guardian (wali) grant consent, and this work is performed. In general, some argue for its permissibility. I also believe that, considering the benefits that exist, this work is permissible.

However, in cases other than this—namely where someone, to escape the suffering and pain resulting from an illness, either voluntarily does this themselves, or their guardians or the physician does it—this has different scenarios. It appears that the opinion of permissibility is difficult; meaning, the proofs of the prohibition of killing a soul encompass this. What exists here is the consent of the victim (rida al-majni ‘alayh). The person who wishes to do this says: “I consent.” Consent might have an effect on the issue of retaliation (qisas) or blood money (diyyah), but it does not lift the legislative prohibition (al-hurmah al-taklifiyyah) of this action. After all, this is a type of suicide (intihar).

This discussion is also detailed; proponents and opponents each have proofs, but from the perspective of evidences, the prohibition of killing a soul is among the established matters, and even if someone wishes to pursue this path and act to escape a difficult physical or spiritual condition, it is suicide. If it is said that they have the right to end their own painful life, this is a right that God has not given them—to end their own life. It is true that humans have the right to life, but they do not have the right to take life—to take life from themselves.

We have many verses and narrations condemning and prohibiting this action. Therefore, my view is that this has different categories. This discussion also relates to ideological and moral discussions. Some of the suffering and pain that a person endures in this world is a means of purification and tazkiyah. In discussions related to intercession (shafa’ah), it is raised that intercession is the final stage. The human must endure worldly pain resulting from their sins, endure purgatorial (barzakh) punishments, and have the delays of the Day of Resurrection. These purify him, and if these stages were passed and he still possessed impurity and pollution, at the final moment when he is about to enter Hell, the intercession of the Ahl al-Bayt encompasses him and saves him. If we hold this belief—that a portion of these pains and sufferings in this world is in some way effective in the human’s eternal comfort—for what reason should I not endure these pains and seek escape through suicide? It is not certain that this is comfort at all. This is outwardly a comfort and release, but in reality, it is not.

Mr. Mohaghegh Damad says: “We have indications from the Quran and narrations that show this right exists for the human being.” Among these is the verse: “He has only forbidden you dead animals, blood, the flesh of swine, and that which has been dedicated to other than Allah. But whoever is forced [by necessity], neither desiring [it] nor transgressing [its limit], there is no sin upon him” (Quran 2:173). If someone is in distress (mudtarr) regarding dead animals, blood, and swine flesh, they can utilize these cases. However, in the state of distress, if they do not utilize them and perish, this is unobjectionable.

“There is no sin upon him” means he has no sin and can do this. Its meaning is that if he did not do so, he did not commit an error. If someone is in distress, if they did this, they have no sin. Some have derived obligation from this verse, saying: here he must eat, because in cutting off harm and to prevent his own destruction, he must eat these. Indeed, one of the verses to which they rely to prove the prohibition of self-harm is this very verse, deriving the obligation of repelling harm from the verse; whereas its outward meaning is that this verse does not convey the obligation of utilizing those matters, but at most, it conveys permissibility—meaning that which was prohibited is permissible for you in conditions of distress, and if you eat, there is no objection. This is the content of this verse. He says this is a testament to the fact that a human being can refrain from eating even if it leads to the destruction of their self.

It appears that this statement is open to objection, and fundamentally, the analogy of this verse with the subject of our discussion is an analogy with a discrepancy (qiyas ma’al-fariq). This is because in the subject of our discussion, there is no distress. Distress in killing a soul, or coercion (ikrah) in killing a soul, is different from this case he mentions. Distress in killing a soul is like someone committing suicide to preserve their chastity so as not to be violated, or someone performing a martyred operation to prevent the enemy’s invasion. These examples mentioned are different from someone who wishes to kill himself to escape an illness.

What is the significance of the inclusion of supplications (ad’iyah) regarding illnesses in Hadith and supplication books? Do these supplications truly have an effect on illness, or do they suffice instead of referring to a physician? Did the Infallibles recite these supplications instead of referring to a physician?

Ayatullah Seyyed Mojtaba Noormofidi: I will place a story, which I think was in Jami’ al-Sa’adat, as the introduction to my response. Hazrat Moses (peace be upon him) fell ill. The scholars of the Children of Israel visited him. They prescribed a medicine and said: “Take this medicine, you will be healed.” Hazrat Moses did not take it, saying: “I want God Himself to heal me directly.” He wanted to see whether God would directly show him His grace or not? For several days, his condition deteriorated, and then it occurred to his mind: why has God not acted to heal me? It was revealed to him: “Our healing is in this very medicine.” Afterwards, he took the medicine and was healed.

The core was that if we had healed you directly by Our will, We would have invalidated Our own wisdom. Our wisdom required that the healing be in this medicine.

In my view, supplication in the treatment of illness is to highlight a person’s trust (tawakkul) in God. If a person understands the reality of tawakkul, the answer to your question becomes completely clear. tawakkul is neither the absolute relinquishment of affairs to God and sitting idly by, nor is it the absolute reliance on material causes and means and neglecting God.

The reality of tawakkul is that the human being relies on all material causes and means for any work; but considers them as intermediaries, not independent causes, and considers the Ultimate Cause (Musabbib al-Asbab) to be God. Afterwards, he performs his tasks and concurrently believes that everything is in the hand of God.

In treatment and relying on medicine, the matter is the same. Neither absolute reliance on treatment, medicine, and the doctor is correct—such that the human considers them as independent causes and is negligent of God—nor is absolute reliance on supplication correct, because this is the negative meaning of tawakkul that the Imams themselves negated.

One day, the Commander of the Faithful (peace be upon him) entered the mosque and saw a group sitting and engaged in supplication and prayer. He said: “Who are you?” They said: “We are those who trust (al-mutawakkilun).” The Imam replied: “No, rather, you are those who feed on others (al-muta’akkilun); you are not those who trust, you are those who feed on others; meaning, parasites. Parasites are like this.” They said: “No, we sat here making supplications; if God sends us something, we eat, and if not, we are patient.” The Imam stated: “The dogs of our streets and alleys are also like this.”

Relying on supplication means that the human being pursues all tools, methods, referring to the doctor, medicine, and what must proceed based on expert investigation, and follows whatever is between the independent cause and the intermediary, and then says: “I did all my work, the rest—meaning the result—is in Your hand,” and relinquishes it to God. Supplication and treatment have such a role for curing illnesses.

One group pursues the path of excess and completely abandons treatment, saying: “Only and only supplication.” This does not work even for Hazrat Moses, let alone for me and you. Another group relies solely and absolutely on treatment, and all their reliance is on medicine, and they are completely negligent of God, who is the Ultimate Cause. One must tread the middle path.