Ayatollah Seyyed Mojtaba Nourmifidi in an Interview with Harim-e Imam: Jurisprudential Islam and Jawaheri Jurisprudence

The “Jurisprudential Islam” envisioned by the Imam (ra) is comprehensive and constitutes a political, social, cultural, and revolutionary Islam. It encompasses rulings related to human life from the cradle to the grave, and government is its necessity.
While this Islam is not opposed to modernity, it simultaneously emphasizes the preservation of tradition.
“Jawaheri Jurisprudence,” while preserving the authentic frameworks of derivation, possesses the capability of responding to novel issues.
One of the characteristics of “Jawaheri Jurisprudence” is paying attention to the element of expedience (maslahah) and its impact on the derivation and implementation of Shari’ah rulings.

Our discussion concerns Jurisprudential Islam and Jawaheri Jurisprudence in the thought of Hazrat Imam (ra). First, from the perspective of Hazrat Imam (ra), please define Jawaheri Jurisprudence and Jurisprudential Islam, before we address other topics.

“Jurisprudential Islam” (Islam-e Faqahati) and “Jawaheri Jurisprudence” (Fiqh-e Jawaheri) are two terms utilized in the words and speeches of the Imam (ra). These two terms differ and stand in a general-and-specific relationship. In “Jurisprudential Islam,” jurisprudence (faqahat) serves as an adjective for Islam; of course, the Imam’s precise wording was the “Islam of Jurisprudence” (Islam-e Faqahat), rather than “Jurisprudential Islam.” In “Jawaheri Jurisprudence,” the word “Jawaheri” serves as an adjective for jurisprudence. Since jurisprudence is more specific than Islam, the relationship between them is one of absolute generality and specificity. Therefore, the subject and the adjective differ in these two terms.

The meaning of “Jurisprudential Islam” becomes clear in light of its opposites. “Jurisprudential Islam” stands in contrast to “non-jurisprudential Islam,” and there are various differences of opinion regarding both. Consequently, the classifications of “non-jurisprudential Islam” also differ from various perspectives. For instance, in one interpretation, “non-jurisprudential Islam” includes “Modernist Islam” and “Traditionalist Islam.”

“Modernist Islam,” according to its common definition, is an Islam that has accepted all manifestations of modernity and reduced religion to individual acts; this Islam is entirely non-political and fundamentally believes that religion is not responsible for political and social affairs. A spectrum of intellectuals, both in Iran and in the Islamic and Arab world, is inclined toward this type of Islam.

There is also a “Traditionalist Islam” that opposes the manifestations of modernity and believes that in all matters we must return to tradition, with no justification for accepting modernity. According to this view, Islam is either not political, or if it is, it is afflicted with stagnation (jumud) and narrow-mindedness.

I must point out these classifications so that the boundaries of “Jurisprudential Islam” in the thought of the Imam become clear.

Another reading in contrast to “Jurisprudential Islam” is “Cultural Islam.” By Cultural Islam, it is meant that religion is present solely within the scope of beliefs and religious and cultural affairs, not in the political arena. A spectrum of Muslims or Shias believes in this Islam. We also have a “Political Islam” that is non-jurisprudential. According to this view, although Islam possesses a political dimension and believes in the presence of religion in the political arena, its proponents do not believe in the necessity of establishing an Islamic government; they say Muslims must interact with the secular governments existing in the world, while simultaneously participating in certain political arenas.

We also have a “Socio-Political Islam” that is also non-jurisprudential; or to put it differently, a “Revolutionary Islam” whose essence is political and social activism but is not built upon jurisprudence and faqahat. This Islam perhaps carries a more sociological aspect. These all stand in contrast to Jurisprudential Islam.

However, “Jurisprudential Islam,” in the view of the Imam (ra), is an Islam that possesses comprehensiveness and is based on a jurisprudence that is responsible for human life from the cradle to the grave. The “Jurisprudential Islam” envisioned by the Imam (ra) is a political, social, cultural, and revolutionary Islam. He believed that jurisprudence and faqahat fundamentally encompass rulings related to human life from the cradle to the grave in all dimensions. This Islam is one in which all these dimensions are present. According to this view, Islam is opposed neither to modernity nor to tradition; meaning, it accepts modernity within the framework of Islamic values, while its return to tradition is not of a kind that opposes modernity and modernism. Therefore, Jurisprudential Islam carries such a meaning.

“Jawaheri Jurisprudence” is more specific than “Jurisprudential Islam.” The word “Jawaheri” is indeed an adjective used for jurisprudence. In the view of the Imam (ra), “Jawaheri Jurisprudence” means a jurisprudence that represents the essence of the jurisprudence of past and predecessor scholars, while simultaneously possessing the capability to respond to all the problems and difficulties of human society encountered over time.

“Jawaheri Jurisprudence” is a jurisprudence based on the authentic foundations of derivation, operating within the framework of conventional rules of ijtihad, while possessing the capacity to respond to the novel and contemporary issues of its time.

In the early days of the Revolution, in meetings with individuals employed in revolutionary institutions, the Imam (ra) emphasized: “Do not distance yourselves from the Islam of Jurisprudence, and strive to strengthen this aspect within yourselves.” Similarly, addressing the seminaries, he emphasized the Jawaheri method of derivation and ijtihad. Therefore, “Jurisprudential Islam” in a sense addresses the general public, whereas “Jawaheri Jurisprudence” addresses the graduates or scholars of the seminaries.

Of course, I must also point out that “Jurisprudential Islam” is not necessarily political; meaning, Jurisprudential Islam itself has two branches: it can be political, and it can be non-political. Some may emphasize “Jurisprudential Islam” but distance themselves from political action. Perhaps the most important distinguishing aspect of the “Jurisprudential Islam” envisioned by the Imam, compared to other readings of Islam, is that the Imam’s Jurisprudential Islam is by no means separable from religious and Islamic government and sovereignty—a government that must be administered based on jurisprudential rules.

What unique features exist in “Jurisprudential Islam” that Hazrat Imam emphasizes so heavily, and is one of its pillars particularly favored by him? Or does the Imam view it as a whole?

I answered this question of yours to some extent in my previous response. The Imam’s emphasis on “Jurisprudential Islam” is based on the understanding he has of the entirety of religion, the Shari’ah, and jurisprudence. Jurisprudential Islam was emphasized to separate the correct path from that of those who might claim to be Muslims but deny the necessity of establishing an Islamic government. He wanted to distinguish the path of “Jurisprudential Islam”—true Islam, or in other words, pure Islam (Islam-e Nab)—from the path of those who wish to reduce Islam to the sphere of individual actions, and to prevent the calamity that befell the Church after the Renaissance, which resulted in the leaders of the Church dealing with the afterlife and spirituality while the rulers of power and politics dealt with the world and politics.

This was a matter that the Imam intensely sought to confront. The Imam’s emphasis on “Jurisprudential Islam” was to prevent Muslims, revolutionaries, and revolutionary youth from drifting from the reality of Islamic rulings. This drifting in the early days of the Revolution brought about losses, such as the Furqan group or some of the groups that resorted to assassinations; they were precise examples of non-jurisprudential Islam—practicing a “revolutionary Islam” of their own design that lacked commitment to Shari’ah rulings.

The reason for the Imam’s emphasis was that “Jurisprudential Islam” is the central core of religiosity and religious knowledge, which strives through the establishment of an Islamic government to realize Islamic goals and ideals. Other readings of Islam, in the view of the Imam, are afflicted with deficiency. An Islam that seeks to focus only on cultural affairs, or an Islam that merely seeks to deal with the sphere of social action without political activism, is incomplete in the view of the Imam, and ultimately leads to deviations.

The Imam wanted to lay down a path. The foundation of his movement in the نهضت (uprising) was established on this basis. Of course, sometimes incorrect interpretations of “Jurisprudential Islam” are also presented. Some might say, “Our intention is this very ‘Jurisprudential Islam’ that the Imam speaks of,” yet their interpretation of Jurisprudential Islam is a stagnant and frozen one that carries numerous harms and difficulties; this can create dead-ends in society that ultimately inflict losses upon Islam and Muslims. One must examine precisely what this path laid down by the Imam is and its boundaries with other readings.

What are the characteristics of Jawaheri Jurisprudence that earned the Imam’s emphasis?

The advantage of Jawaheri Jurisprudence is that it possesses all the elements that must be present in a correct derivation; meaning, reliance on the authentic sources of ijtihad—the Book, the Sunnah, consensus (ijma’), etc.—all remain in their proper place. This is because the author of Jawahir [al-Kalam] never departed from the framework of correct rules of derivation and ijtihad.

Alongside this, what has perhaps received greater attention and attracted the Imam is that the author of Jawahir paid attention to certain categories that can be solution-providing for society and the people, such as the issue of government and the authority of the ruler and guardian of Muslims. According to the author of Jawahir, the Islamic ruler and the leader of society possess significant authority.

The Imam, who organized and led this Revolution and subsequently established the Islamic government and the Islamic Republic, was fully aware that the Islamic Republic, as a political system in today’s complex world, requires capabilities that can break dead-ends and resolve human problems in the complexities encountered. This matter was taken into account in Jawaheri Jurisprudence and the derivation method of the author of Jawahir.

Another point is the attention paid to expedience (maslahah). Throughout the various jurisprudential books of Jawahir and its different chapters, this matter was specifically considered by the author of Jawahir; meaning, one of the characteristics of Jawaheri Jurisprudence is paying attention to the element of expedience and its impact on the derivation and implementation of Shari’ah rulings.

Another point is that the author of Jawahir, despite relying on the authentic sources of derivation and ijtihad, did not distance himself from custom (urf) and common understanding. In deriving meanings from narrations and utilizing verses, he paid great attention to common understanding. Regarding the subject matters and attachments of rulings, the author of Jawahir assigned many of these matters to custom; meaning, he did not seek to attribute every single subject matter to the Shari’ah and extract a definition from the Shari’ah for it.

I believe the combination of these characteristics in the derivation method of the author of Jawahir created this attraction for the Imam to emphasize that we must not distance ourselves from Jawaheri Jurisprudence: both preserving the authentic rules of derivation and the capability of this jurisprudence to respond to human problems in the contemporary world.

As you are aware, Hazrat Imam refers to jurisprudence as the “theory of government” and to government as the “practical philosophy of jurisprudence.” What issues exist within jurisprudence that lead to such an understanding of government?

If we wish to cite specific examples, it would be extremely lengthy. I will answer your question briefly: in his speeches, the Imam (ra) explicitly stated that we do not possess as many verses and narrations regarding worship (ibadat) as we do regarding politics, social affairs, interactions, and the livelihoods of the people.

If you examine the sources of jurisprudence—namely the verses and narrations, alongside the intellect—the vast majority of them fall within the scope of rulings related to human life, most of which are administered by the government. He states that we have nearly fifty-odd chapters of jurisprudence; of these, only seven or eight chapters relate to worship, while the rest relate to the lives and livelihoods of the people in various dimensions—transactions (mu’amalat) in the broad sense.

With this proportion in the verses and narrations, and with the jurisprudential chapters being as such, how can anyone claim that Islam has nothing to do with government? It is true that our jurisprudential chapters in this era have certain voids and new chapters must be added, but can we say that jurisprudence is not the theory of government? If he says that government is the practical philosophy of jurisprudence, this is precisely derived from the authoritative religious sources and taken from our jurisprudential texts, and indeed, the method and conduct of many of our jurists were as such.

Look at the subject matter of jurisprudence: the subject matter of jurisprudence is the actions of the duty-bound (af’al al-mukallafin). The actions of the duty-bound mean every action a person performs—whether in their relationship with God, with others, or with nature; these are all encompassed by Shari’ah rulings. Shari’ah rulings possess such a scope.

Since the subject matter of the science of jurisprudence is the action of the duty-bound, and the duty-bound has these threefold relationships, the very nature of jurisprudence dictates that this matter be addressed. Furthermore, our sources and jurisprudential chapters are structured this way.

Therefore, if we want religious rulings to be realized, if we want the Shari’ah to materialize, this is impossible without possessing power and without establishing a political system that holds power. How can one speak of implementing penal laws (hudud) without establishing a political system? How can one speak of establishing regulations regarding many affairs of people’s lives, yet have this occur without a government?

Indeed, throughout history, to what extent was there a guarantee of implementation for many of these Shari’ah rulings? Even those who did not accept the absolute guardianship of the jurist (Wilayat al-Faqih) and under whom no government was established, at least adhered to it in non-litigious public affairs (umur-e hasbiyyah). Matters requiring a custodian were all referred to the Shari’ah judge. If these minimums require the presence and involvement of a Shari’ah judge, then if you wish to implement religious rulings on a broader scale, this certainly requires a government equipped with the necessary tools.

Considering the extensiveness of “Jawaheri Jurisprudence” and the capabilities to which you referred, was jurisprudence in the past deficient?

It is better not to accuse jurisprudence of deficiency. What can be accused of deficiency are the jurisprudential schools or the methods that jurists occasionally followed in their derivations. Ultimately, there is no doubt that multiple jurisprudential schools have existed throughout history and that derivation and jurisprudence have undergone developments. Even now, the terms “Qom School,” “Najaf School,” and “Samarra School” are common; even if we do not designate them as distinct schools, they are defined under a broader and more general jurisprudential school.

These developments have always existed. At one time, we had Sheikh Saduq, who followed a narrative-based approach, or Ibn Junayd, who followed a rationalist approach. Later, Sheikh Mufid arrived and established a balance between the two, laying the foundation for a method and a school that was subsequently continued by his students.

Ultimately, there have been rises and falls in the history of ijtihad and jurisprudence, and the further we have progressed, the more complete these methods have certainly become. For instance, the period in which Akhbarism gained strength created a deficiency in the scope of ijtihad and derivation, but the great reformer, Allamah Wahid Behbahani, rescued jurisprudence and derivation from this decline.

Therefore, for various reasons, jurists have occasionally fallen into these deficiencies; jurisprudential schools were created, and sometimes excess or negligence occurred in certain areas. However, as I mentioned at the beginning of my remarks, “Jawaheri Jurisprudence” is the essence of the jurisprudence, ijtihad, and derivation of past scholars, whilst preserving all those advantages, frameworks, rules, capabilities, and capacities.

Consequently, we can neither completely detach, separate, and cut off “Jawaheri Jurisprudence” from its past, nor can we say that “Jawaheri Jurisprudence” is the absolute final and complete stage of jurisprudence; meaning, we must not close the door to the evolution of this method and this style of derivation. The capacity certainly exists for this method to become even more complete, as efforts are currently being made for “Jawaheri Jurisprudence” to achieve greater evolution while preserving its established characteristics.

Is “jurisprudential management” opposed to “scientific management”? Why? Or to put it differently, in light of Hazrat Imam’s views in the sphere of “Jurisprudential Islam,” is the management envisioned by the Islamic Shari’ah and him a “jurisprudential management”? And what must we do for “jurisprudential management” to be accepted as an undeniable norm, while providing a correct response to those who challenge it and view management as strictly scientific?

In my view, some terms must be treated more scientifically. Sometimes, a term is coined within an academic environment; this is vastly different from a term created in a non-academic environment. This is highly important. Ultimately, the issue of jurisprudence and faqahat must be evaluated within the scope of scientific rules; every term in this regard must also be based on a scientific rule.

However, terms are occasionally fabricated that I believe carry a more sarcastic tone, and an academic basis cannot be envisioned for them, such as “jurisprudential management” (modiriyyat-e faqahati). I do not know who coined this term, but it carries an ambiguous and vague meaning.

It is possible that by “jurisprudential management,” “management of the jurist” (modiriyyat-e faqih) is meant; the “management of the jurist” is different from “jurisprudential management.” Another probability is to say that by “jurisprudential management,” “management based on jurisprudential rules” is meant; again, this is different. The “management of the jurist” or “management based on jurisprudential rules” carries a much clearer meaning.

However, as for “jurisprudential management” in a way where “jurisprudential” serves as an adjective for management, I do not highly agree with this term, and I assume that some have used this fundamentally to create a confrontation between “Islamic management,” “management based on jurisprudential rules,” or “management of the jurist” on one hand, and “scientific management” on the other.

In my view, the essence of this term is not correct. “Jurisprudential management” is currently used by some as a sarcastic remark and criticism of the situation currently existing in society, wishing to create a confrontation between “jurisprudential management” and “scientific management,” implying that a country cannot be administered through “jurisprudential management,” but rather management must be scientific.

The term “jurisprudential management” is a groundless and baseless term. Yes, if “management of the jurist” is meant, this is comprehensible; or “management based on jurisprudential rules”—these two carry absolutely no opposition to “scientific management.”

“Management of the jurist” means the management of a fully qualified jurist who administers society based on the theory of Wilayat al-Faqih. The “management of the jurist” certainly operates—and has operated and will operate—by performing whatever is necessary for administering the country on the basis of science, expertise, and human experience. It is not the case that the “management of the jurist” has nothing to do with science, knowledge, and human experience. No one makes such a claim.

Similarly, if it is said that society is administered based on jurisprudence and the rules governing it, this does not mean that “scientific management” is set aside. What is meant by the “management of the jurist” or “management based on the rules governing jurisprudence” is that the values, ideals, and goals envisioned for a religious society—which is bringing humanity to happiness in this world and the hereafter—are taken into account in administering society. That is, we do not wish to advance society while ignoring these values and ideals. If this is the meaning, it carries absolutely no opposition or contradiction to utilizing human expertise, science, and experience.

In my view, what is necessary to be addressed as a chapter in jurisprudence—and is important, as this matter is currently being addressed in the seminary—is Fiqh al-Idarah or Fiqh al-Mudoriyyah (the Jurisprudence of Administration or Management). The “Jurisprudence of Management” is an entirely correct and accepted term. The Jurisprudence of Management means that group of Shari’ah rulings related to this aspect of the actions of the duty-bound; ultimately, a natural person as a manager must have a series of behaviors in an organization and institution. We must determine the stance of jurisprudence regarding these behaviors of the legal person of the manager; this itself can be a chapter in jurisprudence and one of the novel jurisprudential chapters—Fiqh al-Idarah. Therefore, “jurisprudential management” is in my view an incomprehensible and ambiguous term; primarily, those who utilize this term perhaps focus on its sarcastic aspect. I have also not observed this term being used much among scholars and thinkers. Some may also use this term out of inattention without any ill intent.

In your opinion, how far is our society from the Jawaheri Jurisprudence envisioned by the Imam?

What do you mean by society? The audience of the Imam—namely the seminaries, students, clergy, and mujtahids?

These are two separate discussions. There is no doubt that it is currently necessary to add new chapters to jurisprudence. At the Contemporary Jurisprudence Research Institute, like other institutions striving in the seminary where excellent works are being produced, we are currently working on identifying and researching these chapters, which is itself an important and deep discussion. The subject matters and issues that can be examined in these chapters must be specified.

For instance, in the department operating under the title of “Jurisprudence of Citizenship Rights and Duties,” we are currently compiling the network of subject matters and issues of citizenship rights and duties. Each of these subject matters and issues requires a detailed and extensive discussion. These works are being carried out.

Jurisprudence requires this transformation and evolution. In the sphere of the “Principles of Contemporary Jurisprudence,” we are performing certain works; in other spheres related to politics, culture, and the media, works are being carried out.

The Imam (ra) himself placed great emphasis on the involvement of the two elements of time and space in derivation and ijtihad; regarding this very involvement of the elements of time and space in ijtihad, we see that there is no single, clear interpretation of it. Sometimes, interpretations are presented of the role of time and space in ijtihad that are fundamentally different from what the Imam stated.

The Imam states that a subject matter which apparently remains the same as in the past, yet due to the developments and complexities that have arisen in the modern era, acquires a new ruling; the subject matter has not apparently changed, but the complexities that have arisen in its relationships dictate that a fresh ruling be given regarding this subject matter. Here, the involvement of time and space becomes highly important; time and space are involved in derivation.

If we limit this involvement solely to the sphere of changing the subject matter (taghyeer-e mawdhu’), this was already stated by everyone previously and does not count as an innovation on the part of the Imam. Sometimes, the interpretation presented of these two elements and their involvement in ijtihad is no different from what was said before the Imam. If it is the same, then it was nothing new that the Imam stated; whereas I assume the Imam wished to present something beyond this.

Therefore, understanding these relationships, interactions, and complexities of today’s world is highly important. The seminaries, students, clergy, and professors must rely on the essence of this method—namely the “Jawaheri Jurisprudence” method of deriving issues—but relying on this method under these conditions must be based on the dynamism of this jurisprudence and resolving the problems and difficulties of contemporary human life.

Therefore, to summarize in one sentence: if we wish to pay attention to the depth of this statement of the Imam, I even believe that we perhaps still have a distance to cover to fully realize this method of derivation. This is a matter that must be addressed in a broader scope