Ayatullah Sayyid Mujtaba Nur Mufidi in an Interview with Hozour Publication: What Distinguishes Someone Like Ayatullah Bojnourdi from Others Is Knowledge Blended with Insight

Question: What were his seminary tastes and inclinations mostly drawn toward—jurisprudence (fiqh), philosophy, theology (kalam), or gnosis (irfan)—and what was the extent of his knowledge and expertise in these fields? You may begin with any introduction you wish.

Ayatullah Nur Mufidi: We must pay attention to the fact that the late Ayatullah Bojnourdi was raised in a noble and deep-rooted household (bayt). His father, the late Grand Ayatullah Mirza Hasan Bojnourdi, was among the students of the late Na’ini and the Three Great Figures (A’lam-e Thalathah) and was considered one of the eminent scholars of the Seminary of Najaf. His book Qawa’id al-Fiqhiyyah (Jurisprudential Rules) is a comprehensive and detailed book on jurisprudential rules, which—both in terms of the number of rules and in terms of content, quality of approach, and organization of discussions—is truly a peerless book; or his book Muntaha al-Usul, in which, despite its conciseness, he addressed various opinions, views, and their arguments. In any case, the late Grand Ayatullah Mirza Hasan Bojnourdi was one of the prominent figures of the Seminary of Najaf and almost a comprehensive personality. The late Ayatullah Bojnourdi himself would sometimes speak of his father’s mastery and command over various sciences, even Persian literature, stating: “My father had memorized thousands of couplets of Persian and Arabic poetry and recited them on various occasions.” In any case, the late Mirza Hasan Bojnourdi himself was a distinguished, comprehensive, and well-regarded scholarly figure in the Seminary of Najaf. This was an advantage for someone like the late Mr. Bojnourdi to be raised in such a household and under the care of such a father.

From his mother’s side, he was the grandson of the late Ayatullah Sayyid Abu al-Hasan Isfahani, who was the absolute religious authority (Marja’ ‘Ala al-Itlaq) of his time and held absolute religious authority (marja’iyyah-ye mutlaqah) over the Shia world. He was a personality completely respected and regarded, whose leadership (za’amah) was most prominent, and who was also distinguished academically. Imam Khomeini wrote the book Tahrir al-Wasilah based on the book Wasilat al-Najat by the late Aqa Sayyid Abu al-Hasan Isfahani, which became a famous work. In any case, his upbringing in such a family was an advantage and an opportunity that is not afforded to everyone.

In addition to all this, the late Ayatullah Bojnourdi studied under the greatest masters of the Seminary of Najaf; both under his father and under the late Ayatullah Khoei, and perhaps for about fourteen years (as he himself used to say) he also benefited from the presence of Imam Khomeini. Naturally, the family environment and the vibrant environment of the Najaf Seminary, combined with his own talent and effort, joined hands to prepare the grounds for his success. He was truly a diligent, talented, and good-memorizing person. All of this, coupled with the presence of certain friends and companions with whom he was close both academically and in other respects, placed him in an atmosphere where he could achieve good scholarly growth. He also had a very good memory; he himself had memorized many Persian and Arabic poems and would sometimes recite a long Arabic or Persian ode (qasidah) from memory. In any case, he was blessed with a great memory, keen understanding, and high talent.

In the sciences you mentioned, he had familiarity, but the field in which he mostly engaged in teaching, authoring, and possessed expertise was the field of jurisprudence (fiqh) and juristic practice (faqahat). From the totality of his writings, teachings, and statements, one can deduce this fact as well as his inclination and tendency toward this very field. Of course, the needs and necessities that arose, especially after the Revolution, further reinforced this.

Question: As you mentioned, was his jurisprudential insight mostly influenced by his family and environmental upbringing, or were other factors also influential?

Ayatullah Nur Mufidi: He naturally acquired the core substance of jurisprudential knowledge in the presence of his honorable father and mainly Imam Khomeini and the late Ayatullah Khoei. However, as you know, many individuals ultimately studied in that seminary; that someone should develop a specific insight, pay attention to the exigencies of his society, focus on needed issues, diagnose the knots, and seek to untie these knots and resolve deadlocks is not universal. Among the students of the Islamic seminaries, or specifically the Seminary of Najaf, not everyone possessed this characteristic. He used to say that becoming a jurist (faqih) today is more difficult than during the time of the late ‘Allamah and his likes, because back then neither the world nor the subjects were as vast, complex, and developed. But now, we are faced with a world in which extensive issues have arisen and new subjects have emerged; hence, practicing jurisprudence (faqahat) in this era is harder than in the past.

The reason for this is clear: if jurisprudence is confined to subjects and issues that were raised and discussed in the books of the predecessors (qudama), this does not require much burden. But if we are to use that power and capacity to solve new issues, it relies on two or three prerequisite steps. First, subject-identification (mawdu’-shenasi) must take place, which is a very important matter—knowing what subjects have emerged. The next stage is problem-identification (mas’alah-shenasi), and the third step is applying the capability and power of deduction (istinbat) to provide solutions and answer the issue. Many people even now confuse subject-identification with problem-identification, whereas subject-identification is at a stage prior to problem-identification. When you live in a world where it is no exaggeration to say new subjects emerge moment by moment, recognizing these subjects (at least the part that relates to human life and turns into an issue) itself requires serious effort and a specific awareness. Therefore, jurisprudence that seeks to identify problems and provide solutions is more difficult. If one raises an issue that everyone has already discussed, at most one raises an objection to others’ solutions and then offers another solution. How can that compare to wanting to build a structure from scratch—that is, first refining its subject, then defining the problem itself, and then seeking help from one’s capacity and talent to present a solution? Well, it is clear that utilizing absolute generalities (itlaqat), comprehensive rulings (‘umumat), and jurisprudential rules (qawa’id al-fiqhiyyah) must be appropriate and within the proper framework; this is not an easy task. One problem we currently have regarding new chapters of jurisprudence is the shortage of sources. Of course, work is being done, but the reality is that a major obstacle facing students, researchers, and professors in entering this field is the lack or shortage of resources that can assist them.

Naturally, jurisprudence in such an arena is a harder task. He used to say the same, and in my view, it is a correct statement that practicing jurisprudence now is a hard and difficult task. What distinguished him to some extent (and of course we cannot say this was the product of a single teacher, a single environment, or merely because of his father, although his father certainly had an impact) was his circle of friends, his studies, and ultimately a collection of factors joining together to make him more sensitive and concerned regarding contemporary jurisprudence or contemporary juristic practice (faqahat-e mo’aser).

Question: Respected Master, can we call him a neo-thinker jurist (faqih-e no-andish)? Why, and if he was so, what were the characteristics of his neo-thinking?

Ayatullah Nur Mufidi: Stating the criteria for neo-thinking (no-andishi) in jurisprudence requires a detailed discussion. It must be clarified what is meant by neo-thinking. Perhaps some people’s perception is that neo-thinking means presenting an opinion that aligns with the prevailing taste of society or social excitement. Certain opinions are expressed, especially in these times, that are derived from incorrect foundations or influenced by media dominance. Sometimes discussions and talk start in the world, whether in academic or public spheres, and some want to go along with them. We cannot go along with such hype and say that because an issue has become widespread and inclinations have swung in this direction, we too should join them. We see this kind of intimidation in some people, which unfortunately leads to the denial of certain established facts and certainties; this is unacceptable, and we cannot consider this neo-thinking or based on correct principles.

Neo-thinking in jurisprudence, in its precise sense as I mentioned, means that the jurist understands the world around him, comprehends the exigencies of time and needs, and is able to provide correct answers to new issues within accepted jurisprudential frameworks and based on recognized sources, or even offer a new solution to issues raised in the past. In other words, if he addresses new subjects, identifies new problems, and provides solutions based on time exigencies, or re-reads issues raised in the past and presents a new solution, we can call such a jurist a neo-thinker jurist (faqih-e no-andish).

Of course, this can also have additions; for instance, someone might discover new rules from jurisprudence owing to emerging needs, or even extract certain rules in the science of methodology (usul), which teaches us the method and technique of deduction. A neo-thinker jurist is such a person, not anyone who has not studied properly, learned a couple of terms, and presents an opinion only to be called a neo-thinker jurist—something we are observing these days. I consider this pretension and bandwagon-riding, which definitely causes damage.

Imam Khomeini is a true neo-thinker jurist. When Imam Khomeini raises the issue of the intervention of the elements of time and space (zaman va makan) in deduction (istinbat), this is genuine neo-thinking. Although this matter must also be interpreted correctly; some have an entirely rigid mindset. Another group, who are a bit further ahead, want to solve all arising problems and matters either through secondary rulings (ahkam-e thanawiyyah) or governmental rulings (ahkam-e hukumiyyah), if they accept the latter. One step prior to these, Imam Khomeini explains the impact of time and space on deduction and believes that if a jurist acts otherwise, it will lead to stagnation, standstill, and the alienation of humanity from human civilization. Imam Khomeini believes that with these very proofs we possess, by taking these two elements into account, we can save humanity from deadlocks. Now, I do not wish to enter into this discussion.

From this perspective, the late Bojnourdi had grown old and deeply rooted in the seminary; that is, no one had any doubt about him in this regard. He observed the frameworks of deduction (istinbat). Of course, due to some of his views and opinions, he came under heavy attack, and because of certain opinions, he was severely criticized by some scholars both in Tehran and Qom. I even heard that some Tehran scholars went to his brother, the late Ayatullah Sayyid Mahdi Bojnourdi, and asked him to stop these expressions of opinion. Now, I do not mean to say all his opinions were correct, but in any case, some scholars later adhered to them—for instance, the question of whether a decrease in currency value creates liability (dhaman) or not. From early on, he used to state that the reality of money is purchasing power itself; naturally, when we face a phenomenon called inflation, it reduces this purchasing power. What can be bought this year for one hundred Tomans, if inflation is twenty percent, must be bought next year for one hundred and twenty Tomans; therefore, if an extra amount equivalent to the inflation rate is paid in a loan by a bank, an individual, or an institution other than a bank, this is not considered usury (riba). This principle affects dowry (mahriyyah), khums, blood money (diyah), and so forth. For now, we are not concerned with what the reality of money is, as there is disagreement among scholars, but ultimately some scholars hold this view. The late Ayatullah Hashemi Shahroudi also held the same belief, albeit with a slight difference; some scholars also believe a distinction must be made between high inflation rates and drastic versus minor differences. In any case, at that time, objections were raised asking “What kind of talk is this?”, or regarding women serving as judges—that women can become judges or even hold other positions such as minister or president. Examples like these were raised, and for this reason he came under attack. Now, I do not want to enter into the essence of his views or arguments as to whether they are correct or wrong. Ultimately, proposing such views and opinions requires courage and boldness and carries risks. If I were to give examples, there are many.

Question: Even regarding family and women, economy, culture, politics, and society, points can be extracted from the late Bojnourdi.

Ayatullah Nur Mufidi: There are two separate discussions. One is when we want to place someone at the level of jurisprudential neo-thinking, and another is when we want to see whether his views are correct or accepted or not. Regardless of how correct these views are from an argumentative standpoint, it can be said that he is considered a neo-thinker jurist.

Question: Did he also possess specific characteristics, or are your remarks sufficient in this regard?

Ayatullah Nur Mufidi: Ultimately, see, neo-thinking itself is a characteristic. This is no small thing; it is something that today’s society urgently needs. Look, we are in conditions where the world is progressing rapidly. If the caravan of jurisprudence (fiqh) and juristic practice (faqahat) moves hand in hand with the world, understands the subjects, extracts the issues, organizes the system of issues in various new chapters of jurisprudence, and provides solutions for them, we can say it is efficient and capable of organizing human life in current circumstances. But if it does not move hand in hand with this caravan, it will lag behind. Moving hand in hand does not mean that whatever, for example, Eastern or Western thinkers, economists, or politicians say, we should say the same to be along with them—no. What is meant is that we should understand the subjects, formulate the system of issues, and proceed based on those very frameworks, namely the methodology of Jawahiri Jurisprudence (fiqh-e Jawahiri)—which in my opinion is also dynamic—and of course with the intervention of the element of time and space and understanding the exigencies. We must be up to date—not just up to date, but forward-looking—so that we even recognize issues that will happen in the future and formulate their system of issues in advance. If we organize these with greater capability and greater command, then we can say our jurisprudence is efficient, possesses solutions, is not an obstacle, and does not invite humanity to return to the past and stay away from civilization. Now, especially when our political system is a system based on jurisprudence, we must step further in this path. Truly, if we want to look at this issue from the dimension of providing the theoretical infrastructure of efficiency (which is an important category in the realm of politics, economy, and culture), we must provide this capability. Otherwise, we will naturally be left behind, the world will continue its movement, and this will ultimately lead to isolation.

Question: What was his serious critique regarding the views of his intellectual and jurisprudential opponents?

Ayatullah Nur Mufidi: On various subjects specifically, he certainly had critiques, but generally it can be said that regarding those who took a stance against neo-thinking and new views, he considered part of it to be caused by scholarly weakness—the very thing I referred to, that practicing jurisprudence today is much harder and more complex than in the past. Another part he considered to be caused by fear, apprehension, and specific considerations of the clerical and religious environment, as he used to say that some hold these beliefs but lack the courage to express them. Of course, this is not unique to this period either; we have always had this in all academic environments and in the seminary environment as well. In any case, speaking contrary to the prevalent juristic opinion (khilaf-e mashhur), even from a skilled jurist, ultimately has consequences. It is not simple for someone to issue a fatwa contrary to the prevalent opinion. Of course, worldly considerations are not necessarily involved; truly, a part of these considerations might stem from doctrinal and religious aspects. When it comes to argumentation, the late Sheikh Ansari relentlessly critiques proofs and challenges the proofs of the prevalent view; yet, with all these ups and downs during the examination of proofs, when he wants to issue a fatwa at the end, he exercises precaution (ihtiyat). That is, he attributes an importance to the understanding of the majority of jurists and the prevalent view, and perhaps considers this to stem from a deficiency in his own understanding; hence, when he wants to issue a fatwa, he exercises precaution. This also stems from fear of God. That a person should show consideration toward the prevalent opinion is not always out of fear for oneself; sometimes it is fear for the sake of God. This also exists, and we do not intend to fault everyone. Therefore, one factor is scholarly weakness, one is fear for oneself, and one is fear for the sake of God. Of course, this concern is justified from one perspective, but it should not become an impediment. Ultimately, some have a concern that if these views are disrupted or changed, or if speech is made contrary to the prevalent opinion, it might gradually spread and turn everything upside down, whereas if this is within a proper framework, this concern has no basis.

Question: Is his intellectual distinction from others related to his level of knowledge or to his type of insight and wisdom?

Answer: I consider both to be involved, and in a sense, these are inseparable from each other. Human knowledge is certainly blended with a type of insight. The knowledge that everyone acquires in the seminaries is the same; students all use these same books and these same professors. The textbook books in the seminary—everyone reads these texts, the professors are the same—so why does so much divergence in viewpoints arise? Several factors cause this. One is the individual’s upbringing environment—in what family environment one was raised, in what social environment one grew up, even father and mother; these naturally have an impact. Who the teachers were, to what extent the person himself showed interest in understanding the environment around him, and how much effort he made. Therefore, I want to say that what distinguishes someone like him from others is knowledge blended with insight, and this insight is the product of upbringing and the environments in which he grew up, the product of that individual’s own personal effort, and the product of the master’s outlook. That is, when one grows up under the care of a master, the master’s outlook ultimately leaves its impact. Look at the students of Imam Khomeini (of course, not that this is the sole factor, but it increases the level of influence) compared to the students of the late Mr. Khoei; naturally, their intellectual foundations, part of which is knowledge-based, have an impact. Both of these are influential, both in the university and in the seminary. Why is it that in the Islamic seminary or in the university, which has a large number of students all engaged in studies, a certain number (apart from aspects of genius, talent, and hard work of individuals) approach those ultimate goals, a certain number approach the goals intended by the designers of this educational system, while many do not? This shows that this educational system has weaknesses that must be addressed, but in any case, the two main pillars, which are inseparable from each other, are definitely influential, and we cannot express an opinion here without considering the other.

Question: Are you aware of his written works, and fundamentally what central question is prominent in these works and his intellectual current?

Ayatullah Nur Mufidi: Mainly, what remains of him (according to what I know) is perhaps mostly those lectures he delivered, which his students organized, collected, and published, as well as a section consisting of articles written by his own pen. If we want to mention their main feature, in my opinion, what concerned him was correcting the incorrect view and inaccurate perception formed in some minds regarding religion, jurisprudence (faqahat), the clergy, and the seminary—especially in intellectual or university environments or even outside Iran in certain seminars and conferences—and presenting an efficient, up-to-date image of religion and the clergy. Now, to what extent he was successful, to what extent he managed to achieve this goal, and to what extent the backing of these views was strong is another discussion, but what I can say was his concern was this.

Question: What was the reason why he inclined more toward the university and engaged more in teaching at the university?

Ayatullah Nur Mufidi: In the beginning, when he returned from Najaf, he settled in Qom. However, perhaps the necessities and the need that arose for presence in certain positions, such as the Supreme Judicial Council, primarily caused him to leave Qom. Yet I remember he used to say, “I wished to stay in Qom and engage in teaching.” So part of it stemmed from the necessities of the early Revolution, and part of it was a need felt in the university for the presence of seminary scholarly figures who were both scientifically respected and understood that atmosphere well, being able to be effective in that setting. Many clerics entered university environments, but only a few became effective figures. Before the Revolution, the late Martyr Motahhari was present, and you know what impacts he had, and even now there are some. This goes back to individuals’ intellectual makeup and scientific strength. Some have scientific strength but lack an intellectual makeup suitable for university environments; some have a suitable intellectual makeup but lack scientific strength—the scientific strength expected by a university academic environment. If the clergy truly wants to have an effective presence in the university, it must possess both aspects: that is, an intellectual makeup and insight suitable for that environment—someone who intellectually understands that setting. Sometimes someone wants to attract through behavior, ethics, and courtesy; this is effective, but it is not enough. A cleric who wants to be effective in the university must possess several things together: humility, ethics, courtesy, kindness, broad-mindedness, and fatherly care toward everyone. This is a necessary condition for all, and even more necessary for a cleric who wants to be present in an academic university environment. But alongside this, that insight and intellectual makeup are important. This intellectual makeup must both include an understanding of the exigencies of the time and know the nature of students and the university. This is very important; it requires tolerance, broad-mindedness, and scientific strength—that is, having such firm foundations scientifically that, like a gushing spring, one can respond to questions, inquiries, and doubts.

Question: Are you aware of what subjects and disciplines he used to teach?

Ayatullah Nur Mufidi: It was mostly related to the fields of jurisprudence and law. I do not know much about the details.