Preliminaries, Preliminary Eight: The Difference between Presumptive Proofs and Practical Principles

Session Eleven

Preliminaries, Preliminary Eight: The Difference between Presumptive Proofs and Practical Principles, Critique of the First, Second, and Third Theories

September 28, 2025

Summary of the Previous Session

The discussion centered on the difference between presumptive proofs (amarat) and practical principles (usul amaliyyah). We noted that three theories and methods are the most well-known in explaining this difference. We outlined these three theories in the previous session.

The first theory, which is derived from the statements of Sheikh al-Ansari and al-Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini, posits that the difference between presumptive proofs and practical principles lies within the legislated element (al-maj’ul). That is, the legislated element in presumptive proofs is path-indicativeness (tariqiyyah), its revealing nature (kashfiyyah), and knowledge-equivalence (‘ilmiyyah), whereas the legislated element in the practical principles is the necessity of practical conduct or the legal assimilation of the principle to the status of knowledge in practical conduct.

The second theory states that doubt is not taken as a condition in the subject of presumptive proofs, whereas doubt is taken as a condition in the subject of the practical principles.

The third theory states that in presumptive proofs, the ruling in the phrasing of the evidence is not made dependent upon doubt, whereas in the practical principles, the ruling in the phrasing of the evidence is made dependent upon doubt.

The difference between the second theory and the third is that in the second, taking doubt as a condition in the subject of the principles relates to the level of construction (maqam al-insha’), whereas in the third, taking doubt as a condition in the subject of the principles relates to the level of proof and textual indication (maqam al-ithbat). This represents, in brief, the three theories concerning the difference between presumptive proofs and practical principles.

We also noted that although Sheikh al-Ansari and al-Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini share the core of the first theory, a distinction nevertheless exists between their views. We detailed that distinction and examined the objection of the late al-Muhaqqiq al-Khoei against what al-Na’ini added to the Sheikh’s formulation.

Critique of the First Theory

Regardless of this distinction and whether al-Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini’s claim is correct or not, we wish to examine whether this theory is acceptable. Whether or not the authority of normal, rational, and mediated religious implications in presumptive proofs (and their lack of authority in the practical principles) is predicated upon this distinction is secondary; the primary issue is whether this criterion for distinguishing between the presumptive proof and the principle in the first theory is acceptable.

From one perspective, this formulation appears correct. According to the mainstream view, which asserts the existence of the apparent ruling (al-hukm al-zahiri) and maintains that the import of the practical principle is also an apparent ruling, this formulation is correct under that view—namely, that the legislated element in presumptive proofs is path-indicativeness and their revealing nature, whereas the legislated element in the practical principles is an apparent ruling (enjoining practical conduct, whatever we may call it). However:

First: According to our preferred view, fundamentally, no such thing as an apparent ruling exists. We have rejected the apparent ruling and stated that dividing the ruling into actual and apparent is incorrect.

If we reject the apparent ruling, we cannot assert that the import of the practical principle and the legislated element in the domain of the practical principles is the enjoining of practical conduct. Yes, the practical principle defines a practical duty for us. It says: in order not to remain suspended and without direction, perform this action.

Question: …

Professor: The discussion on the apparent ruling and the reasons for rejecting it has been explored previously in detail. Therefore, we do not address at all those discussions which are sometimes raised at the beginning of the practical principles concerning the actual and apparent rulings and the methods of reconciling them. While some scholars have discussed the actual and apparent rulings and the ways to reconcile them, we do not address this because we discussed it in detail in previous years, and those discussions have been published under the title Apparent Ruling: Acceptance or Rejection. In that work, we established that the Lawgiver does not possess two distinct rulings, nor does He have two acts of legislation (ja’l), such that one is named the actual ruling and the other is named the apparent ruling.

Second: Even in the domain of presumptive proofs, asserting that the legislated element is path-indicativeness, a revealing nature, and knowledge-equivalence is also subject to question under our preferred view.

The late al-Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini asserted that we possess a legislated element in the domain of presumptive proofs; meaning that the Lawgiver has legislated path-indicativeness and a revealing nature for presumptive proofs. Under our preferred view, this is also unacceptable. Fundamentally, the Lawgiver has legislated nothing. If rational people act upon presumptive proofs despite their yielding only conjecture, it is solely because they observe, on the one hand, that attaining absolute certainty is an arduous, if not impossible, task. That is, if they were to act only upon certainty in their daily affairs and mundane lives, everything would grind to a halt. For instance, if someone says: ‘From the moment I wake up, everything must be absolutely certain and definitive for me,’ they would be stopped at the very first action until certainty is attained, and they would never reach any other task. This would lead to the suspension of affairs, chaos, severe hardship (‘usr wa haraj), and intolerable difficulties.

Therefore, to ensure that their lives proceed smoothly, they act upon matters that do not yield absolute certainty, precisely to prevent the aforementioned problems. Fundamentally, this is not a matter of legislating path-indicativeness and a revealing nature. Rational people do not consider presumptive proofs to be authoritative on the ground that they are legally assimilated to the status of knowledge. Rational people do not act upon presumptive proofs because the Lawgiver has made them a path and a revelation to reality. This aspect is completely ignored by them. Thus, asserting that the legislated element in the domain of presumptive proofs is path-indicativeness and a revealing nature is also unacceptable. Therefore, the first theory or premise regarding the difference between the practical principles and the presumptive proofs appears to be open to objection.

Question: …

Professor: I explained both issues in their proper place. Imam Khomeini (may Allah have mercy on him) has also adopted both premises. Although some scholars believe that the Imam does not deny the apparent ruling, I demonstrated in that book and cited evidence and indicators showing that the Imam also does not accept the apparent ruling. In the domain of presumptive proofs, specifically regarding certain specific conjectures (particularly the solitary report, khabar al-wahid), he explicitly states that if rational people act upon non-certainty, it is not because they legally assimilate it to the status of certainty… by no means… they do not consider it equivalent to scientific and certain paths. For upon what basis should the legal assimilation to the status of certainty or certain paths be established? The issue is fundamentally not that we are instructed to assimilate this to the status of certainty.

Question: One view is legal assimilation (tanzil) and another is path-indicativeness (tariqiyyah); path-indicativeness does not require legal assimilation to the status of knowledge, it says because complete revelation is impossible…

Professor: …meaning He has completed the revelation (tatmim al-kashf); that is, He has assimilated the incomplete revelation to the status of a complete revelation. When He says “make this a scientific path,” what does this mean? It means that this incomplete revelation, this conjecture, is assimilated to the status of knowledge, certainty, and complete revelation. However, this is fundamentally not the case. The core and foundation of al-Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini’s view is precisely that the Lawgiver intervenes to complete the revealing value for us; meaning that revelation through a solitary report is incomplete because a possibility of contradiction exists. Certainty is a complete revelation. When a person possesses certainty (even if it is compound ignorance, al-jahl al-murakkab), they entertain no possibility of contradiction. Everything is manifest and clear to them. Its revealing value is complete.

Conversely, presumptive proofs, which yield only conjecture, do not possess complete revealing value. Here, the Lawgiver intervenes to compensate for this deficiency, stating: “I complete this revealing value for you; meaning, treat this as equivalent to intuitive certainty.” This implies that a form of legal devotion is introduced, and we are bound by devotion. This is precisely the point of our disagreement. We say that this is not the case.

Question: You stated that since they have no other way to reveal reality, they do not possess path-indicativeness either.

Professor: No, but if they had no other way, could they act upon analogy (qiyas)? Upon the conjecture arising from analogy? … It is not like that… That is also because we observe that rational people act in this manner, and the Lawgiver has not prevented or deterred (man’ wa rad’) them from it. Otherwise, if the Lawgiver had prohibited it, we would not have acted upon it either.

Critique of the Second Theory

As for the second method or theory—which states that the difference between the presumptive proof and the principle lies in the fact that the condition of doubt is taken in the subject of the principle, whereas the condition of doubt is not taken in the subject of the presumptive proof—the objection is that this is logically untenable (ghayr ma’qul). This is because the claim that doubt is not taken as a condition in the subject of the presumptive proof entails that the presumptive proof possesses absolute application (itlaq) during the state of absolute certainty. If doubt is not taken as a condition, it implies that even if one possesses absolute certainty, they must still act upon the presumptive proof—meaning that this presumptive proof is authoritative for them. However, if absolute certainty and conviction exist, there is no room for the presumptive proof. Do you see what the objection is?

When we say that doubt is not taken as a condition in the subject of the presumptive proof, this encompasses both the state of certainty and that of conjecture. If one possesses conjecture, there is no issue; it is an authoritative presumptive proof. However, this also includes the assumption of absolute certainty, because it merely presents the negation of doubt. The negation of doubt or the absence of doubt is compatible with both conjecture and certainty. Thus, the conclusion is that the presumptive proof would be authoritative and valid even in the context of absolute certainty. However, this is clearly absurd (zahir al-fasad). For with the existence of certainty and conviction, there is no room for the presumptive proofs [or the practical principles].

Question: …

Professor: Where does it lie? It says “that in whose subject doubt has been taken”?… By what external proof… Now a criterion is proposed: what is a presumptive proof? “That in whose subject doubt has been taken [as a condition].” This also includes that instance…

Question: You are in the position of explaining the difference, not in the position of definition.

Professor: We are in the position of explaining the difference. However, when we say “that in which…”; that in which doubt is taken, and that in which doubt is not taken.

Critique of the Third Theory

According to this theory, if doubt is mentioned in some manner in the phrasing of the evidence and the level of proof (maqam al-ithbat), it constitutes a practical principle; otherwise, it is a presumptive proof. This is identical to the second theory, with the difference that the second relates to the level of construction (maqam al-insha’), while the third relates to the level of proof and textual indication (maqam al-ithbat).

While this represents a way to introduce and discover the distinction, it is not, in reality, a real difference. It shows us how to distinguish where a principle lies and where a presumptive proof lies. Thus, it is in truth a method of recognition and discovery, but it does not clarify the real, fundamental difference between the principle and the presumptive proof.

Further, it is open to counter-examples (naqd); because in some cases, it is not indicated at all in the phrasing of either. Suppose, for instance, we look at the Verse of Warning (Ayat al-Nafar) and the Verse of Announcement (Ayat al-Naba’): “If an unrighteous person comes to you with information, investigate.” In the phrasing of the evidence, doubt is not taken as a condition; according to this criterion, this would be a presumptive proof. The same applies to the Verse of Warning. However, if we wish to establish the authority of the presumptive proof through the Verse of Questioning, it would become a practical principle: “Ask the people of the remembrance if you do not know.” Here, doubt is mentioned in the phrasing of the evidence; it states: “if you do not know.”

Question: …

Professor: Why not? No, why not? Meaning the absence of knowledge… what is that doubt? The doubt we speak of is not the equal probability of the two sides. The absence of knowledge encompasses both conjecture, the technical doubt, and illusion (wahm). The entailment of your claim is an absurd implication (tali-ye-fasid) whereby, for instance, if we utilize the Verse of Questioning, this becomes a practical principle, but if we utilize the Verse of Announcement, it becomes a presumptive proof; meaning that under this criterion, a single thing becomes a practical principle in one place and a presumptive proof in another. This criterion is certainly incorrect.