Preliminaries, Preliminary Eight: The Difference between Presumptive Proofs and Practical Principles
Session Twelve
Preliminaries, Preliminary Eight: The Difference between Presumptive Proofs and Practical Principles, The Correct View in This Matter
September 29, 2025
Summary of the Previous Session
The discussion in the eighth preliminary centered on the difference between presumptive proofs (amarat) and practical principles (usul amaliyyah). We noted that three well-known theories and methods exist in explaining this difference. We briefly outlined these three most famous premises and conducted a concise examination of them.
When we refer to “three theories,” we mean the most well-known frameworks, as more detailed distinctions can certainly be conceptualized. For instance, the first theory itself contains various sub-views. This is because legal theorists differ as to what exactly constitutes the legislated element (al-maj’ul). The late Sheikh states that what is legislated in the domain of presumptive proofs is the legal assimilation of the presumptive proof to the status of reality and knowledge (tanzil al-amarah manzilat al-waqi’ wa-l-‘ilm). Others maintain that the import and textual indication of the presumptive proof is the legislation of its content (ja’l al-mu’adda). Alternatively, al-Muhaqqiq al-Khurasani states that the legislated element in the domain of presumptive proofs is authority (hujjiyyah), which he defines as being binding (munajjiz) and excusing (mu’adhdhir). Al-Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini, on his part, considers the revealing nature (kashfiyyah) of the presumptive proof to be the divine legislative designation (al-maj’ul al-shar’i). All of these share the common premise that something is legislated through the presumptive proof—whether it is the legislation of authority, the legislation of the content, or the legislation of its revealing nature. These are, in fact, sub-views of that first major theory.
After mentioning these three famous methods, we outlined some of the objections raised against them, which ultimately rendered them untenable. This was either because the distinction proposed by some was not a real difference but merely a linguistic variation, or because it was a distinction open to counter-examples, and thus could not be accepted.
The Correct View in This Matter
In our view, the truth regarding the difference between a presumptive proof and a practical principle is that, fundamentally, the presumptive proof has no legislated element (maj’ul). The idea that something has been legislated by the Lawgiver in the domain of presumptive proofs is rejected. The denial of any legislated element in the domain of presumptive proofs is a view that the late Ayatollah Borujerdi committed to. Imam Khomeini (may Allah have mercy on him) also denied any form of legislation in the domain of presumptive proofs. There is nothing considered a legislated element from the Lawgiver, nor does the Lawgiver legislate anything by means of the presumptive proof.
What exists in the domain of presumptive proofs is that rational people (‘uqala’), observing that presumptive proofs yield conjecture and that conjecture carries a possibility of error, nevertheless act upon them because they recognize them as a path to reality—as they possess no other path. If rational people were to act only upon certainty and conviction in all their affairs, it would disrupt the system of their lives and livelihoods. Therefore, despite the fact that the presumptive proof yields only conjecture and carries a possibility of error, because they recognize it as a path to reality, they act upon it.
According to this formulation, we do not deny the path-indicativeness (tariqiyyah) of presumptive proofs; however, we do not, like al-Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini, assert the legislation of path-indicativeness. We say it is a path to reality (tariq ila al-waqi’), but not that the Lawgiver completes its revealing value (tatmim al-kashf). We do not say that the Lawgiver compensates for this deficiency by stating: “assimilate it to the status of knowledge and certainty.” There is neither legal assimilation (tanzil) nor completion of the revealing value. Fundamentally, there is no legislation. The Lawgiver has simply confirmed (amda) this method and practice of rational people.
Thus, rational people act upon presumptive proofs—such as the solitary report—in their daily affairs because, on the one hand, attaining certainty is impossible, and acting only upon certainty would disrupt their lives, and on the other hand, these presumptive proofs are paths to reality. Although a possibility of contradiction is entertained, the hardship and problem of not acting upon the presumptive proof is far greater for them. Therefore, they act upon presumptive proofs, and the Lawgiver has confirmed this practice. The confirmation of the Lawgiver means that He considers it a valid proof (hujjah).
Question: Is it the non-existence of a prohibition (‘adam al-rad’)?
Professor: Yes, even if it is confirmation, it is either the absence of deterrence or confirmation. In a certain sense, it is not legislation. True, the Lawgiver’s legislation is of two types: enactive (ta’sisi) and confirmatory (imda’i). What these scholars assert is that the Lawgiver has enactive legislation. We say He has confirmed it; now, if you wish to categorize this as a type of legislation, very well, but it is not a legislated element (maj’ul) in the technical sense. For both the late Ayatollah Borujerdi and Imam Khomeini explicitly declared the absence of legislation.
Fundamentally, the Imam’s view is that the legislation of a revealing nature is not within the province of the Lawgiver, because it constitutes intervention in existential matters (al-takwin). For something that is already a path to reality, for the Lawgiver to then state, “This is a path; I designate this as a path to reality,” is not within the province of the Lawgiver. Its limit is clear. Despite the fact that its path-indicativeness and revealing nature are incomplete, He has accepted it as a valid proof.
Question: Then why has the Lawgiver intervened in it?
Professor: No, this is not intervention. If we were to accept the authority of a solitary report in thematic matters (al-mawdu’at), there would be room for this objection: why is authoritative testimony (bayyinah) validated? For what reason was authoritative testimony legislated? In that case, this objection would stand. The response is: in certain cases, due to the significance of the matter, the Lawgiver has validated two just witnesses. … Is this not intervention?
The Lawgiver’s intervention in thematic matters is sometimes by way of innovation (ikhtira’), sometimes by way of qualification (taqyid), and sometimes it is the very same subject. Is trade (bay’) not a rational subject? The Lawgiver has stated regarding this very trade: “Allah has permitted trade.” Yet, alongside it, He declared: “and has forbidden usury.” Meaning, He has forbidden usurious trade. Does this constitute intervention in an external, real matter? … Confirmation sometimes applies to the exact thing that is considered a real and customary matter. At other times, it is confirmed such that a qualification is placed alongside it. Now, if usurious trade is forbidden, does this mean the Lawgiver has created something entirely new? … The enjoining of that legislative ruling is distinct from the subject. Forbidding a certain type of trade is different from stating “I legislate trade.” Fundamentally, the discussion here concerns the subject. … Does the Lawgiver legislate path-indicativeness for the presumptive proof and the solitary report? … Validation (i’tibar) is the very confirmation (imda’). It is the confirmation of that which is prevalent among custom.
The question is: if we conduct such an analysis of the behavior of rational people regarding their acting upon conjectural presumptive proofs, and ultimately assert that this has been confirmed by the Lawgiver, does this mean legislation? Does this contradict our claim that there is no legislation? … No. Which presumptive proofs? I noted that there, due to the significance of the subject, the Lawgiver has specifically stated, for example, that there must be two individuals… this does not mean He has legislated path-indicativeness… placing a qualification alongside it does not damage the core claim. We say that the Lawgiver has not, regarding presumptive proofs generally, legislated path-indicativeness.
If we state that the conjecture arising from analogy (qiyas) is not valid, does this constitute legislation? … Is deterrence and prohibition (rad’ wa man’) considered legislation or not? Are you referring to its confirmation? It is legislation. … Thus, this intervention is of two types: sometimes He says “these must not be, these are not valid.” At other times, He adds a qualification alongside it. These do not contradict the denial of legislation. Knowing that certain presumptive proofs are not valid, He has not confirmed them. Knowing that regarding certain presumptive proofs, due to specific purposes and benefits, He has added certain qualifications, this still does not constitute legislation. Qualifying what is prevalent among rational people is precisely like deterring from some of those presumptive proofs; there is no difference between them.
This is distinct from asserting from the outset that the legislated element in the domain of presumptive proofs is path-indicativeness and a revealing nature. That claim is fundamentally incorrect. The Imam has exercised great precision here. He states that the legislation of a revealing nature and the legislation of the content are all interventions in real, objective matters that are not within the province of the Lawgiver. Therefore, He states on the whole that we have no legislated element in the domain of presumptive proofs. Nothing has been legislated, and it is purely the confirmation of the very practice, method, and conduct of rational people.
On this basis, the Imam completely rejects the idea that presumptive proofs substitute for absolute certainty. In the science of Usul, this discussion is raised: do presumptive proofs substitute for certainty? They have a discussion that presumptive proofs substitute for purely path-indicative certainty (al-qat’ al-tariqi) absolutely, but they have detailed regarding subject-constitutive certainty (al-qat’ al-mawdu’i). The Imam states on the whole that in none of the types of certainty is the substitution of presumptive proofs acceptable. All of these are predicated upon the denial of legislation and the fact that we have no legislated element in the domain of presumptive proofs.
Regarding your question from yesterday as to whether it does not possess path-indicativeness, we say it possesses path-indicativeness, but this path-indicativeness is not legislated. What the Imam has denied is the legislation of path-indicativeness, a revealing nature, or the completion of the revealing value. Otherwise, rational people know that these presumptive proofs all yield conjecture and are paths to reality; this cannot be denied.
Question: …
Professor: This is the general rule in presumptive proofs. Now, if in some instances the Lawgiver Himself establishes a specific presumptive proof, this does not contradict the denial of legislation. We say that presumptive proofs generally are not legislated.
Is there legislation in the domain of the practical principles? The principle is, in reality, a practical duty that is defined for the mukallaf based on the dictate of the intellect or the sacred law. The Lawgiver or the human intellect, depending on the distinction between rational and textual practical principles, directs the mukallaf in certain situations toward a specific action. They state, for example: here you have an obligation, and here you do not. Here, the matter rotates between two incompatible alternatives, and you have choice. This is to rescue the mukallaf from confusion and bewilderment. Therefore, it is the expression of a practical duty.
Thus, these are not derived from the method and practice of rational people. Some of them may be so. For instance, in the domain of istishab, where they act upon the previous state, it can also be attributed to the practice of rational people. However, what is important is that either the Lawgiver or the human intellect directs the person toward a specific practical duty. In this, there is neither a ruling nor, in a certain sense, legislation.
Therefore, its difference from presumptive proofs is that in the case of presumptive proofs, rational people, the mukallaf, or the believers act upon conjecture, and this is because conjecture is a path to reality. However, in the case of the practical principles, there is fundamentally no conjecture involved. True, in istishab, this issue may exist. Therefore, in the past, they placed istishab within the rational proofs. Imam Khomeini himself, in the first period of his lectures, placed istishab among the presumptive proofs, and in the second period, he placed it among the practical principles. Therefore, regarding istishab, from one perspective, we can say it yields conjecture. If it yields conjecture, this conjecture is a path to reality. Thus, it lies on the boundary between the presumptive proof and the principles.
They say: “The zenith of the practical principles is the bedrock of the legal proofs” (‘arsh al-usul farsh al-adillah), because it is on the border. Its status is higher than the principles and lower than the presumptive proofs. It was upon this basis that the Imam, in the first period of his lectures, categorized it among presumptive proofs, and subsequently changed his view and categorized it among the practical principles.
Regardless of this issue, none of the other principles yield conjecture. If we entertain the possibility of an obligation, do we possess conjecture regarding the non-existence of the obligation, or in precaution, or in choice?
Therefore, it appears that we must define the difference between presumptive proofs and practical principles in this manner—not as a difference in the legislated element, nor as taking or not taking doubt as a condition in the subject, nor as a difference in mentioning or not mentioning doubt in the phrasing of the evidence. These do not represent the real, fundamental difference between presumptive proofs and practical principles.
Question: Is the obligatoriness of precaution derived from the practical principles not a ruling?
Professor: …That is the object of our doubt, regarding which the Lawgiver has stated whatever it may be… to escape confusion, if they say you must observe precaution, for instance… to escape… this is not a ruling that has been legislated. It is not legislated. This is the determination of a duty at the level of action… what kind of legislation is it?…
Notice, we said these principles are established either by the dictate of the intellect or by the dictate of the sacred law. The intellect’s duty is clear. If the sacred law, for instance, rules in favor of exemption (textual exemption)—and we will have an explanation subsequently regarding rational and textual principles—exemption negates the obligation; it says, no, this is not obligatory upon you. Or, in a certain instance of a prohibitory doubt which is also in the object of obligation, it states here that this must be performed: the obligatoriness of precaution.
Now, what does the obligatoriness of precaution mean? Does it mean this is a ruling? We state that even in the domain of presumptive proofs, there is no ruling. We say there is no legislation… Yes, indeed. There is no legislation. Then, in the domain of the principles, should we say there is legislation? … The principle of permissibility (asalat al-hill) is the very same exemption; it does not differ, it is the same exemption, except that in prohibitory doubts, this is not a ruling. No, this is the determination of a duty in the state of confusion.
See, you must return to the core of that fundamental, premise-based discussion: is a ruling legislated in the domain of the practical principles, or is this fundamentally not a ruling? A ruling in the sense of a formal religious ruling? It says: “For now, so that you do not remain without direction, act in this manner until its ruling arrives.” This is not a ruling. This is, so to speak, assigning a task to the mukallaf so that they do not remain idle or without direction. This is not a ruling. The Lawgiver fundamentally does not legislate a ruling here…
Question: A governmental ruling is also a ruling, even if temporary.
Professor: ‘Alaykum bi-l-ruju’ ila al-bahth fi-l-hukm al-zahiri (You must refer back to the discussion on the apparent ruling) as to whether, fundamentally, we possess an apparent ruling or not. All of those who state that this is a ruling assert that it is an apparent ruling. Please refer back to that discussion where we stated that fundamentally no such thing exists and indeed is perhaps impossible. When we reject its very essence and say we do not possess anything here called an apparent ruling, then the matter is clear. You must refer back to that discussion for it to become completely clear.
This concludes our discussion of the eighth preliminary.
The Topic of the Next Session
Up to this point, in the eighth preliminary, we have discussed the difference between the presumptive proof and the principle. In the ninth preliminary, we will discuss the priority and precedence of presumptive proofs over the practical principles. These discussions are highly significant. You see this very difference between the presumptive proof and the principle scattered across several chapters of Usul. One of the criticisms of our books on Usul is the fragmentation of certain important discussions. The priority of the presumptive proof over the principle is addressed in one place under the discussion of presumptive proofs, and in another place here. Therefore, these preliminaries are highly important.
They state that the presumptive proof is prior to the principle. Why? On what ground? What is the basis of this priority? Is this priority absolute, or is it specific to certain practical principles?
These are matters that we will pursue tomorrow, God willing.