Preliminaries, Preliminary Nine: The Precedence of Presumptive Proofs over the Practical Principles

Session Fifteen

Preliminaries, Preliminary Nine: The Precedence of Presumptive Proofs over the Practical Principles, The Rationale for Prioritizing the Presumptive Proof over the Principle, Views, Clarifying Foundational Concepts, 1. Non-Applicability, 2. Exception, 3. Entry, 4. Government, Sheikh al-Ansari’s View on Government

October 4, 2025

The Rationale for Prioritizing the Presumptive Proof over the Principle

The subject of the ninth preliminary is the rationale or criterion for prioritizing the presumptive proof (amarah) over the practical principle (asl). True, we previously addressed the claim that “there is no dispute regarding the precedence of presumptive proofs over the practical principles” by raising an objection concerning istishab (the presumption of continuity). The objection was whether presumptive proofs precede istishab or not, which was examined and resolved. Now, having accepted the fundamental precedence of presumptive proofs over the practical principles, the discussion concerns the rationale for this precedence.

Views

Several views have been outlined here: some assert the government (hukumah) of presumptive proofs over the practical principles; others assert the entry (wurud) of presumptive proofs over the principles; and some assert customary reconciliation (al-jam’ al-‘urfi) between them. Others consider exception (takhsis) to be the criterion. One view, to which Imam Khomeini (may Allah have mercy on him) committed, is a detailed distinction in the matter; meaning that presumptive proofs precede each practical principle on a distinct criterion, which he outlines one by one. These are the views that exist in this matter.

Clarifying Foundational Concepts

Prior to discussing these views and criteria, it is appropriate to provide a brief explanation of these terms as a reminder: government (hukumah), entry (wurud), exception (takhsis), non-applicability (takhassus), and customary reconciliation or, in other words, customary appraisal (qarinah ‘urfiya). We will briefly review these terms and subsequently examine those views, God willing.

The meaning of non-applicability (takhassus) is clear. Non-applicability refers to the exclusion of an individual from the scope of the subject, essentially (dhatan) or existentially (takwinan). That an individual is excluded from the scope of the subject existentially, without requiring any supplementary evidence or conceptual effort, means they are existentially excluded. An example is the exclusion of the ignorant person (jahil) from the designation of the scholar (‘alim). If, for instance, it is stated: “Honor the scholars” (Akrim al-‘ulama’), the ignorant person is automatically excluded from the scope of this ruling, because the subject “scholars” fundamentally does not encompass him. This exclusion is essential, subject-based, or existential.

Exception (takhsis) refers to the exclusion of an individual from the scope of the ruling, meaning that although there is no issue regarding the application of the subject designation to him, he is nevertheless excluded from the scope of the ruling. For example, it is stated: “Honor the people, except Zayd” (Akrim al-qawma illa Zayda). Zayd is encompassed by the “people” (qawm), which is the subject of the obligatoriness of honoring. However, when it is stated: “Do not honor Zayd,” this excludes Zayd from the scope of the subject.

Thus, exception is the exclusion of an individual from the scope of the subject of one proof by means of another proof. This exclusion is real, but it is ruling-based (hukmi), in contrast to non-applicability, which is subject-based (mawdu’i). The exclusion of both is real, except that the exclusion of one is subject-based and the other is ruling-based.

Entry (wurud) refers to the exclusion of an individual from the scope of the subject, not existentially, but rather through devotional and legal designation (bi-l-ta’abbud wa-l-‘inayah). For example, suppose one proof states that you are in latitude regarding that which you do not know: “You are in latitude regarding that which you do not know” (Antum fi sa’ati ma la ta’lamun). Subsequently, the Lawgiver, by means of another proof such as “Authoritative testimony is knowledge” (Al-bayyinatu ‘ilmun), extends this subject to include authoritative testimony. Since the first proof stated “that which you do not know,” under this second formulation, authoritative testimony is excluded from the scope of “that which you do not know.” Here, the second proof is said to “enter” (warid) the first proof.

Alternatively, consider the well-known rational rule of “the ugliness of punishment without prior clarification” (qubh al-‘iqab bila bayan). Now suppose the Lawgiver establishes the solitary report (khabar al-wahid) as a “clarification” (bayan). Naturally, if a solitary report is established in an instance, the rule of the ugliness of punishment without prior clarification no longer encompasses it. Therefore, the second proof, which establishes the solitary report as a clarification, enters the rule of the ugliness of punishment without prior clarification, because it has excluded an individual from the scope of the subject of another proof through devotional and legal designation. Thus, entry, in brief, means that an individual is excluded from the subject of another proof through conceptual effort and devotional designation.

Legal theorists have outlined several types of entry, which we will not delve into. You may refer to them yourself, God willing.

Government (hukumah) has been subject to more debate than the other terms, because it involves differing premises and views, and it also shares certain similarities with entry. Although entry also shares similarities with non-applicability, the similarities here are perhaps more pronounced.

The similarity between non-applicability and entry lies in the fact that both represent subject-based exclusion, with the difference that the subject-based exclusion is real and existential in the former, but devotional in the latter. The way to distinguish them is that in non-applicability, we do not require a second proof; meaning we do not need a proof to exclude the ignorant person from the designation of the scholar. In entry, however, we absolutely require a second proof to exclude that individual from the scope of the subject of the first proof. This is the best way to distinguish between non-applicability and entry. In non-applicability, you do not require another proof because the individual is automatically excluded from the scope of the subject in a real manner. In entry, another proof is absolutely required for this exclusion to occur. Hence, we refer to it as “devotional exclusion”; for if the exclusion were real and existential, it would not require a second proof.

At any rate, the status of those three terms is largely clear, except in certain cases where, due to their similarities, closer attention must be exercised.

Therefore, the discussion on government is somewhat more extensive, because:

First: The premises regarding it are diverse, and various views exist. The late Sheikh himself defined government in two different ways in two places in the Rasa’il. Al-Muhaqqiq al-Khurasani raised an objection against the late Sheikh and defined government differently. Al-Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini also defined government. This divergence of views regarding the essence of government naturally expands the scope of the discussion.

Second: Extensive similarities exist between government and exception, and between government and entry. Both require two proofs. One of the types of government is the exclusion of an individual from the scope of the subject of another proof. This can naturally be confused with entry in certain instances, or with exception in others.

An important point is whether government always indicates the exclusion of the individual of the governing proof (al-dalil al-hakim) from the ruling of the governed proof (al-dalil al-mahkum), or whether it can also exclude this individual from the subject of the governed proof. Here, it shares significant similarities with entry. We will explain that al-Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini recognizes the intervention of the governing proof in both the subject-clause (‘aqd al-wad’) of the governed proof and the predicate-clause (‘aqd al-haml) of the governed proof as types of government.

This is itself a question: does government only exclude the individual from the ruling of the governed proof, or does it make them subject to the ruling of the governed proof (since government is sometimes by way of expansion and sometimes by way of restriction), or does it also encompass the subject? That is, can the exclusion of an individual from the subject designation, or the inclusion of an individual in the subject designation, also constitute government?

Thus, the discussion on government is somewhat more extensive due to these two factors. I will very briefly refer to the meaning of government and its difference from the other terms, and subsequently discuss the criterion for precedence, God willing.

Sheikh al-Ansari’s View on Government

1. The late Sheikh, toward the end of the chapter on istishab, defined government as follows: “if the Lawgiver, within one proof, rules in favor of the obligatoriness of lifting one’s hand from that which the other proof entails, were it not for this governing proof.” That is, were it not for this governing proof, the other proof would possess the entailment of that ruling. “Or in favor of the obligatoriness of acting in a case according to a ruling that is not entailed by a proof.”

The essence of his statement is that the governing proof is that proof which excludes the individual from that which the other proof entails. Within one proof, He rules in favor of the obligatoriness of lifting one’s hand from the other proof. Or, He establishes that a ruling must be acted upon in a case where that ruling is not entailed. This is the very inclusion and exclusion of the individual, which constitutes the expansion or restriction of the ruling. It either includes the individual in that subject or excludes them from it.

You have heard many examples: suppose He states “There is no doubt for the habitual doubter” (La shakka li-kathir al-shakk); this governs “If you doubt between three and four, build upon the greater number” (Idha shakakta bayna al-thalathi wa-l-arba’i fa-bni ‘ala al-akthar). That is, it is as if He is stating “the habitual doubter is not a doubter.” The habitual doubter is no longer considered a doubter. This proof has excluded an individual from the subject of another proof (which, according to the entailment of that proof, should have been included and encompassed by the ruling). It excludes the habitual doubter from the scope of the subject of “If you doubt between three and four, build upon the greater number.” Sometimes, it includes an individual within that designation, which is also termed government. One is government by way of restriction (al-hukumah bi-l-tadyiq), and the other is government by way of expansion (al-hukumah bi-l-tawsi’).

1. In another place in Fara’id al-Usul—namely, the chapter on equal balance and prioritization (al-ta’adul wa-l-tarjih)—the late Sheikh apparently completed this formulation, or referred to another aspect of this reality, or, in other words, provided its criterion rather than its definition. His phrasing is: “un dabit al-hukumah an yakuna ahad al-dalilayni bi-madlulihi al-lafzi muta’arridan li-hali al-dalil al-akhar…” (The criterion of government is that one of the two proofs, by its verbal implication, is directed at the state of the other proof, being directed at and lifting the ruling established by another proof from some individuals of its subject; thus, it clarifies the scope of its implication, is aimed at explaining its state, and is branch-derived from it).

The criterion of government is that: first, we must have two proofs; second, the governing proof must be directed at the governed proof; and third, this must be by its verbal/textual implication (al-madlul al-lafzi).

These three or four characteristics are derived from the statements of the late Sheikh. This is because the first characteristic—namely, that there must be two proofs—is obvious and was also present in his statements at the conclusion of the chapter on istishab. This is not highly significant.

First: That there must be two proofs.

Second: That the second proof must be directed at and oversee the first proof. What does “overseeing” (nazar) mean? It means the second proof interprets the first proof. When we say it is directed at it, what does a proof’s overseeing another proof mean? It means this proof, in some manner, clarifies and interprets it.

Third: That this overseeing must be by verbal implication. That is, the governing proof is always a verbal proof. On this basis, a non-verbal proof—such as the intellect or consensus—can never govern another proof. Of course, this is a subject of dispute: can a non-verbal proof fundamentally govern another proof or not?

Fourth: The fourth characteristic, which is realized following the preceding characteristics, is that were it not for the governed proof, the governing proof would be meaningless; because it is directed at it and interprets it. Suppose, for instance, the Lawgiver stated from the outset: “There is no doubt for the habitual doubter” without the existence of “If you doubt, build upon the greater number.” This “There is no doubt for the habitual doubter” would be entirely futile and meaningless. If someone suddenly told you, “there is no doubt for the habitual doubter,” you would say, “what of it?” Therefore, the second proof always acquires meaning alongside the first proof; it is meaningless without considering the first proof.

As you have observed, these two definitions and explanations of government proposed by the Sheikh do not contradict or diverge from each other, but rather we can say one is a more complete formulation than the other and has clarified other dimensions of this issue.

The Topic of the Next Session

Here, the Akhund has an objection against the late Sheikh, and subsequently, al-Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini also has a formulation. We will explain these, God willing, and then proceed to the criterion for prioritizing the presumptive proof over the principle.