Preliminaries, Preliminary Nine: The Precedence of Presumptive Proofs over the Practical Principles

Session Twenty-Three

Preliminaries, Preliminary Nine: The Precedence of Presumptive Proofs over the Practical Principles, The Criterion for Prioritizing Presumptive Proofs, The Second View: Entry, The Essence of the Third Formulation, Critique of the Third Formulation, First Objection, Second Objection

October 14, 2025

The Essence of the Third Formulation

We noted that three formulations have been proposed to explain the entry (wurud) of presumptive proofs (amarat) over the practical principles (al-usul al-amaliyyah). The first and second formulations were examined. The essence of the third formulation, which we outlined yesterday, is that we interpret the knowledge and certainty mentioned as the limit/end-point (ghayah) in the proofs of the practical principles to mean the attainment of proof (ihraz) and its revealing nature (kashfiyyah).

Therefore, when it is stated: “Every thing is permissible for you until you know it is specifically forbidden” (Kullu shay’in laka halalun hatta ta’lama annahu haramun bi-‘aynih), it means that everything is permissible for you until you establish proof of its prohibition—until the prohibition is revealed to you.

The reason why knowledge and certainty are interpreted as attainment of proof and revealing nature is that, like knowledge and certainty, they possess path-indicativeness to actual reality (tariqiyyah ila al-waqi’) and have a revealing nature. The difference is that absolute certainty (qat’) and conviction possess complete revealing value (kashfiyyah tammah), whereas these, although not possessing complete revealing value, nevertheless possess a revealing nature.

Objection: What is the connection between this discussion and subject-constitutive certainty by way of path-indicative character (al-qat’ al-mawdu’i ‘ala wajh al-tariqiyyah)? For we explained in the preliminary note that subject-constitutive certainty is of two types: subject-constitutive certainty by way of psychological attributes (al-qat’ al-mawdu’i ‘ala wajh al-sifatiyyah) and subject-constitutive certainty by way of path-indicative character.

Response: “Every thing is permissible for you until you establish proof of its prohibition” (Kullu shay’in laka halalun hatta tuhriza annahu haram) indicates that the limit in this proof—namely, attainment of proof (ihraz)—is not intended as a psychological attribute. Rather, what is taken as the limit in this proof is the aspect of revelation and attainment of proof—meaning absolute revelation and attainment of proof—which is the limit of the validity of the practical principles.

Therefore, when the proof of the authority of a presumptive proof (such as the solitary report) is complete, its import is: the establishing solitary report, the revealing solitary report. Thus, with the establishment of the report contrary to the import of the principle, the subject of the practical principle is eliminated. “Every thing is permissible for you until you establish proof of its prohibition” indicates that in the subject of this proof, attainment of proof is taken by way of path-indicative character, not as an attribute residing in the soul.

Therefore, because certainty is taken in the subject of the proof of the principle, and the aspect of attainment of proof as a path to reality is intended in that context, with the completeness of the proof of the presumptive proof (such as the solitary report), the presumptive proof takes the place of certainty by way of path-indicative character.

Consequently, the proof of the solitary report enters (warid) the proof of the practical principle, because it eliminates its subject. This is highly clear. The proof of the practical principle states: everything is permissible for you until you establish proof that something is forbidden. The solitary report arrives and establishes proof of the prohibition of something for us. When the prohibition is established, the subject of the proof of the principle is automatically negated. This is because the subject consists of certainty and conviction by way of path-indicative character, and we have stated that certainty here means attainment of proof—indeed, by way of path-indicative character, not by way of psychological attributes. Thus, with this explanation, the proofs of the presumptive proofs enter the proofs of the practical principles.

This is the essence of the third formulation, which al-Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini considers the superior among these three formulations.

Critique of the Third Formulation

Al-Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini has also raised an objection against this formulation, and from this very point, and by means of this objection, he prepares the ground for the claim of government (hukumah). He states: the proofs of the presumptive proofs govern the proofs of the practical principles. Therefore, we must examine his objections, and subsequently see what government means and what interpretation of government must be proposed.

The foundation of the third formulation is built upon the premise that the presumptive proof substitutes for subject-constitutive certainty by way of path-indicative character. They stated that certainty and knowledge are taken in the subject of the practical principles, and this is by way of path-indicative character, not by way of psychological attributes. “Until you know” (hatta ta’lama) in the proof of the principle of permissibility (asalat al-hiliyyah) has this meaning. “If you know the prohibition of something, it is no longer permissible for you” (idha ‘alimta bi-hurmati shay’in fa-lam yakun laka halalun)—the import of this proof of the principle of permissibility is that if you acquire certainty regarding the prohibition of something, then whatever whose permissibility was doubtful to you is no longer permissible.

In the third formulation, knowledge is interpreted to mean attainment of proof (ihraz), and since certainty itself is taken in the subject by way of path-indicative character, attainment of proof is also taken in the subject by way of path-indicative character. Therefore, if we establish proof of the prohibition (absolute attainment of proof), the subject of “Every thing is permissible for you” is eliminated. Thus, the foundation of the third formulation is built upon the premise that the presumptive proof substitutes for subject-constitutive path-indicative certainty. That is, specifically, subject-constitutive certainty by way of its path-indicative character.

The objection is precisely this: even assuming that in a proof, certainty is taken as the subject or a part of the subject by way of path-indicative character, upon what criterion do you substitute attainment of proof for certainty? In other words, upon what basis do you interpret certainty to mean attainment of proof? For what reason do you substitute the presumptive proof for certainty?

Question: …

Professor: The entirety of this discussion lies in this. He stated in the third formulation: we derive the general designation of “absolute revealing proof” (mutlaq al-kashif), and this substitutes for knowledge and certainty. The question and objection is: upon what basis do you substitute the general designation of absolute attainment of proof and its revealing character—or absolute establishing and revealing proof—for certainty? … It is not path-indicative, except under the assumption that the subject is path-indicative… he wishes to say that fundamentally, certainty in this sense does not substitute for it. In that previous [discussion], this was subject to objection. It was subject to objection regarding the substitution. Therefore, he does not accept this premise.

What strengthens this objection is that neither lexicography nor custom (‘urf) supports this substitution. Upon what criterion do you remove certainty, knowledge, or conviction, and replace it with the term attainment of proof (ihraz) and revealing nature (kashfiyyah)? What relationship does certainty and conviction have with attainment of proof, absolute certainty (qati’iyyah), and revealing nature?

An objection was raised in the first formulation that if we state that what is meant by knowledge, certainty, and conviction is “proof” (hujjah), and what is meant by doubt is “non-proof” (la hujjah), this is contrary to the apparent meaning of the proofs. The same applies to attainment of proof. Interpreting the terms certainty, conviction, and knowledge to mean establishing and revealing proof is contrary to the apparent meaning. To say that this means attainment of proof and revealing nature “is supported neither by custom nor by lexicography” (la yusa’iduhu al-‘urfu wa-l-lughah); neither custom supports this nor lexicography.

Furthermore, I wish to assert that if we commit to taking certainty as a part of the subject in this proof—meaning we state that certainty here is subject-constitutive—it is not improbable (la yab’ud) that the other division is taken here, namely, certainty by way of psychological attributes, not by way of path-indicative character—this is what is apparent. It states: “Every thing is permissible for you until you know it is forbidden”; until you acquire certainty that it is forbidden. If we consider this knowledge and certainty as subject-constitutive, and state that subject-constitutive certainty has two divisions, the primary apparent meaning of this sentence is that knowledge and certainty are taken as the subject by way of psychological attributes—meaning that which is realized within the horizon of the soul has been made the subject, not because it is a path to actual reality. It is not improbable to make this claim.

Question: When he says path-indicative and subject-constitutive certainty, it means he is no longer concerned with custom and lexicography, and we must provide an indicator.

Professor: He explains two stages:

First, that in the proof of the practical principles, a limit is mentioned called certainty and conviction. Therefore, certainty here is subject-constitutive, specifically subject-constitutive by way of path-indicative character. This is the first claim. In the second stage, he states: attainment of proof is that very certainty.

First, he claims that what has been placed as the limit here is, according to the word and phrasing, taken in this proof as subject-constitutive certainty by way of path-indicative character. In the second step, he states: we interpret this knowledge to mean attainment of proof. Therefore, the presumptive proof can substitute for subject-constitutive path-indicative certainty.

Question: If it is the second, is there no need for substitution?

Professor: Absolute attainment of proof (mutlaq al-ihraz), even if it is incomplete attainment. The entirety of the discussion lies in this. Who says it is inevitable? Is it fundamentally impossible there? Indeed, he states: we derive a general designation, which is absolute attainment of proof and absolute revealing proof, in order to encompass the presumptive proof. This seeks to resolve the issue with conceptual effort and a degree of strain. Otherwise, if the inclusion were inevitable, it would not have required this much discussion.

The other objection is based on the premise to which al-Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini himself commits—namely, that fundamentally, if we analyze this very statement, we cannot argue for entry (wurud). Fundamentally, entry is not meaningful here; rather, in a precise view (bi-nazar-e-daqqi), this is fundamentally government (hukumah). Why?

They state that the presumptive proof substitutes for subject-constitutive certainty by way of path-indicative character, but nevertheless, we cannot replace certainty with attainment of proof here. How can these two statements be reconciled? I noted that in two stages, the issue of entry was raised according to the third formulation.

First, it was claimed that the subject of the principle is subject-constitutive certainty by way of path-indicative character. Subsequently, they stated that certainty means attainment of proof. Al-Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini states: yes, we also agree that the presumptive proof can substitute for subject-constitutive path-indicative certainty, but under what designation? This is important; the aspect of substitution, the direction of the substitution is important. He states: what is legislated in the presumptive proofs consists of attainment of proof and revealing nature. The Lawgiver has designated presumptive proofs devotionally as revealing of reality and establishing of reality; He has designated presumptive proofs devotionally as knowledge and certainty—He has assimilated them to the status of knowledge and certainty.

If we state that what is legislated in the domain of presumptive proofs consists of revealing nature, attainment of proof, and legal assimilation to the status of knowledge—meaning that devotionally, the presumptive proof is considered knowledge—then there is no longer any need to modify the meaning of certainty. Rather, we say this is knowledge; it is as if the Lawgiver has stated: “Every thing is permissible for you until you know it is forbidden,” and subsequently, by means of another proof, stated: “the solitary report is knowledge” (khabar al-wahid ‘ilm). Fundamentally, this is knowledge, and therefore we do not need to modify the meaning so as to say that this eliminates the subject of the proof of the presumptive proof.

If we state this, it becomes government. For example, He states: prayer is conditioned upon purity, and subsequently states: “Circumambulating the House is prayer”; He devotionally commands us to consider circumambulating the House as prayer. This is government. Here, the case is identical. When He states: “until you know it is forbidden,” it means that in the subject of the practical principles, certainty, knowledge, and conviction are taken by way of path-indicative character.

The solitary report arrives and takes its place, but not because it eliminates the subject of that proof, but because the import of the proofs of the presumptive proofs is that presumptive proofs are knowledge; since they are legally assimilated to the status of knowledge, substitute for knowledge, and are devotionally considered knowledge. Therefore, this is no longer called entry, but is rather government.

Question: What is its outcome?

Professor: We noted previously that this has outcomes which we will outline in the continuation of the discussion.

Al-Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini subsequently takes this a step further. After objecting to the third formulation (with objections that are indeed robust), he states: fundamentally, entry is impossible. Fundamentally, the conceptualization of entry is not possible here. At one time, he states that its possibility exists, but it is plagued by obstacles; therefore, we cannot commit to entry. However, after these objections, he states that the possibility of arguing for entry here does not exist. Why is it impossible? This is left for tomorrow.

Therefore, we must outline this claim of the late al-Na’ini—who states that the realization of entry is impossible—and subsequently proceed to government. This is because there are also disagreements within government itself, after which we will see what results.