The Principle of Exemption (Bara’ah), The Proofs of Exemption, First Proof
Session Fifty-Seven
The Principle of Exemption (Bara’ah), The Proofs of Exemption, First Proof: The Book, The Fourth Verse, Examination of the Fourth Verse, The Fourth Objection and Its Analysis, The Fifth Verse and Its Analysis, Two Points
December 15, 2025
Summary of the Previous Session
The discussion was about the argumentation based on Verse 145 of Surah Al-An’am for Exemption. The formulation of the argumentation (taqrib al-istidlal) based on the verse was mentioned. Furthermore, the three objections raised against this argumentation were stated and their responses were presented. The conclusion was that those three objections do not undermine the argumentation based on the verse.
The Fourth Objection
The fourth objection is the one raised by the late Seyyed against this argumentation. The objection is that the verse aims to refute the unauthorized legislation (tashri’) or the giving of legal opinions without knowledge (ifta’ bi-ghayr ‘ilm) by the Jews. The intention is to say to them (the Jews or the polytheists): Why do you decree prohibition without knowledge? In addition to the prohibitions outlined for them in the Torah, they had forbidden certain things for themselves without any scriptural proof or knowledge, and abstained from using them. The polytheists acted similarly; for instance, they would sometimes bring cattle or sheep as vows or offerings to their idols, and subsequently abstain from using them, deeming them forbidden for themselves. Therefore, the core of their practice was giving legal opinions and decreeing without knowledge. The Noble Prophet (PBUH) made this statement in the position of refuting this unauthorized legislation, decreeing without knowledge, and giving legal opinions without knowledge.
In this case, the verse will have no indication (dalalah) for Exemption; because according to the claim of the proponents of Exemption, in cases where we do not have knowledge of the prohibition and the matter is doubtful to us, we apply Exemption—meaning we say that no obligation is established. On the other hand, those who oppose the proponents of Exemption and believe in precaution (ihtiyat) do not decree the prohibition of what is of doubtful forbiddenness such that the verse would aim to refute them. Rather, they say: We abstain because we are commanded to exercise precaution and abstain. Therefore, if the verse is in the position of refuting unauthorized legislation (tashri’), it will no longer be suitable for this argumentation.
Examination of the Fourth Objection
This objection is noteworthy. When Allah addresses the Prophet, saying: “Say, ‘I do not find within that which was revealed to me [anything] forbidden to one who would eat it…’”, it means that had something been forbidden, it ought to have been found in “what was revealed to me” (ma uhiya ilayya); [yet] I did not find such a thing. Why then do you decree without knowledge? Why do you give legal opinions without knowledge? Why do you forbid that which is not forbidden and consider it prohibited? This does not contradict the fact that the verse (or the Messenger of Allah) is in the position of holding them accountable, telling them: Why do you decree without knowledge?
Overall, it appears that this objection of the late Seyyed against the argumentation is valid, because the verse debars them from unauthorized legislation (tashri’). The objection you raised yesterday—namely that if the issue of tashri’ is at play and the Prophet is in the position of refuting tashri’ and decreeing without knowledge, then this is acceptable and indeed is the apparent meaning (zuhur) of the verse—is valid. However, the second objection still remains answerable, and we have already presented its response.
The Fifth Verse
“…messengers as bringers of good tidings and warners so that mankind will have no argument against Allah after the messengers. And ever is Allah Exalted in Might and Wise.” The late Sheikh Tusi, in the book ‘Uddat al-Usul, has resorted to this verse (Verse 165 of Surah An-Nisa) and has, in a way, proven the issue of permissibility (ibahah) and Exemption.
The verse states that Allah has sent messengers who are bringers of good tidings (mubashshirin) and warners (mundhirin). What is the purpose of this sending? “…so that mankind will have no argument (hujjah) against Allah after the messengers.” In other words, Allah has sent prophets and messengers to bring good tidings to them (the believers) and convey the signs of Paradise, and to warn them (the disbelievers) of divine punishment; so that the reward awaiting humans for obeying divine commands is stated, and the punishment resulting from sin and disobedience that would befall them is declared. Therefore, if the bringing of good tidings and warning has taken place and all obligations have been declared to the people, then on the Day of Resurrection, no one can argue in the presence of Allah and present a proof (hujjah) such as: “I did not know,” or “I was not informed.” In that case, Allah can hold them accountable.
Examination of the Fifth Verse
The point that must be considered here is that the argumentation is based on the premise that, according to the verse, if the bringing of good tidings and warning does not occur in a given case, people will have an argument (hujjah) against Allah. This meaning is understood from the phrase: “…so that mankind will have no argument (hujjah) against Allah.” That is, this is the cause and ultimate purpose of sending the messengers: Why did Allah send messengers who bring good tidings and warnings? So that people would no longer have any argument against Allah.
This means that if there were no bringing of good tidings and warning, then lil-nasi ‘ala Allahi hujjah (mankind would have an argument against Allah); that is, people would have a proof against Allah. What does the bringing of good tidings and warning mean? It means those very matters whose performance or omission leads ultimately to Paradise or Hell. That is, whatever can lead a human to such a destiny has been declared, good tidings have been brought regarding it, and warnings have been given about it. Therefore, if no good tidings have been brought and no warning has been given regarding something, then in that case, lil-nasi ‘ala Allahi hujjah holds. People only lack an argument against Allah in cases of tabshir and indhar (good tidings and warning); but in other than those, they possess an argument. That is, they can debate with Allah (on the Day of Resurrection): Why do You want to punish us? Where did You bring us good tidings? Where did You warn us? We did not know this was forbidden, so we committed it; or we did not know this was obligatory, so we omitted it; because nowhere were any good tidings or warnings given to us regarding it.
Indeed, based on the apparent meaning of this verse, we can take a step further; in response to the question you raised, even if reason (‘aql), for instance, commands precaution (ihtiyat) in a certain case, since “bringer of good tidings and warner” (mubashshir wa mundhir) is exclusive to the messengers and is mentioned as an attribute for them, it can override the ruling of reason. Because the verse says: messengers who are bringers of good tidings and warners. If there was a messenger who brought good tidings and warnings, then la yakuna lil-nasi ‘ala Allahi hujjah (mankind will have no argument against Allah). However, if there was no messenger who brought good tidings and warnings in a certain case, even if human reason had declared it, according to the apparent meaning of this verse, lil-nasi ‘ala Allahi hujjah holds. People would have an argument against Allah, Blessed and Exalted is He, and we would say: Who brought us good tidings? Who warned us?
Question: …
Teacher: Your objection concerns the scope of the verse regarding cases where reason has a ruling or not. Please state your objection… The sending of messengers and their bringing of good tidings and warning ultimately encompasses a set of regulations… When prophets come, they have no mission in themselves without commands and prohibitions. They came while being bringers of good tidings and warners. To be a bringer of good tidings and a warner means to caution and frighten people against certain things and to encourage them toward others. To say in a general sense that the messengers were “bringers of good tidings and warners” and have declared everything is meaningless under this absolute application (itlaq). The main emphasis is on the cause and ultimate purpose of the verse: “…so that mankind will have no argument against Allah after the messengers.” Why are they bringers of good tidings and warners? So that people will have no argument against Allah after (the sending of) the messengers. Therefore, the meaning of this statement is that if in some place there was no bringer of good tidings and warner (whether generally or regarding the rulings and matters that ought to have been declared), then lil-nasi ‘ala Allahi hujjah holds… This makes no difference and has no effect. “After the messengers” (ba’da al-rusul) means after the bringing of good tidings and warnings by the messengers who were bringers of good tidings and warners. Certainly, in that case, la yakuna lil-nasi ‘ala Allahi hujjah. However, after the messengers, regarding matters about which no bringing of good tidings or warning has taken place, by citing this ultimate purpose, it must be said that the people have an argument.
Question: …
Teacher: This is another statement you are making. This is a different objection. You raised two objections:
1. Your first objection was that the verse is not in the position of declaring all details, but rather wants to say that the core mission of the messengers and their bringing of good tidings and warning is regarding monotheism (tawhid), the Resurrection (ma’ad), and similar matters so that la yakuna lil-nasi ‘ala Allahi hujjah.
My submission is that the verse possesses absolute application (itlaq) and encompasses everything; both regarding monotheism, the Resurrection, and beliefs, and regarding obligations, regulations, and the rulings of the sacred law. This itlaq dictates that if we doubt a ruling or a case, and that case falls outside the circle of the messengers’ bringing of good tidings and warnings, then lil-nasi ‘ala Allahi hujjah holds. This was your first objection.
2. Your second objection was that, assuming we accept this itlaq, perhaps the good tidings and warnings did occur but did not reach us.
The response is that bringing good tidings and warning is concomitant with arrival (wusul). That is, if good tidings are brought in some place and reach the addressee, it can be said that the bringing of good tidings has been realized. However, if it has not reached them, it is not, in reality, a bringing of good tidings… Yes… For me, living in the fourteenth century, if we assume the Messenger of Allah brought good tidings and warnings to the people of that time in the first year of the first century, but this bringing of good tidings has not reached me now, is the description of “being a bringer of good tidings and a warner” realized with respect to me? Where has there been a bringer of good tidings and a warner for me?.. No. These good tidings must reach everyone so that li-’alla yakuna lil-nasi ‘ala Allahi hujjah is realized…. Therefore, if (hypothetically) it had not reached the ears of the people of that time either, lahum ‘ala Allahi hujjah (they would have had an argument against Allah) at that time. If it had reached them, they would no longer have any argument against Allah. Since it has not reached us, the same ruling applies to us as well… I am not saying the verse is restricted to rulings. Its absolute application (itlaq) encompasses everything: “messengers as bringers of good tidings and warners,” meaning it covers beliefs, ethics, and rulings. It is meaningless to say they were bringers of good tidings and warners only regarding beliefs and ethics, but had no such role at all regarding rulings and did not declare these matters. This is not a correct statement. Had it been so, the people would have had an argument (claiming they were not told). Yes, that is how it is… The itlaq of the verse encompasses… No, the intention is not that they have said everything. Because they may not have declared certain matters.
Two Points
The First Point
This verse pertains to otherworldly punishment (‘adhab ukhrawi) and does not declare worldly punishment at all. Therefore, no one can claim that this verse belongs only to past nations—unlike some of the previous verses where this issue existed.
The Second Point
This verse does not have an apparent meaning (zuhur) of being exclusive to the past. It does not want to say that the issue of messengers and the bringing of good tidings and warnings only concerns the people of that time so that li-’alla yakuna lil-nasi ‘ala Allahi hujjah, and therefore if these good tidings and warnings have not reached subsequent generations and nations, this verse no longer encompasses them. That is, despite these good tidings and warnings not having reached them, yet (still) la yakuna lahum ‘ala Allahi hujjah (they would have no argument against Allah)? For what reason? This cause and ultimate purpose mentioned in the verse has zuhur in that for all individuals in all eras, if these good tidings and warnings reach them, only then la yakuna lahum ‘ala Allahi hujjah. However, if these good tidings and warnings do not reach them, Allah certainly cannot argue against these individuals as to why, for example, they did not obey or why they committed a sin.
Therefore, in some aspects, perhaps this verse (the fourth verse: “messengers as bringers of good tidings and warners” [Note: referred to as the fifth verse in our headings]) has a stronger apparent meaning (zuhur) than the first verse (i.e., “And We would never punish until We sent a messenger”); and is even stronger compared to the third verse (“And Allah would never let a people go astray…”). The fourth verse is also “Say, ‘I do not find within that which was revealed to me…’” whose discussion has passed.
The second verse does not indicate [our claim]; we said “Allah does not charge a soul except [according to] what He has given it” does not indicate the claim. We accepted the argumentation based on the third verse.
Therefore, among the five verses we mentioned, perhaps among the three verses that have zuhur in Exemption, this verse (the verse of rusulan mubashshirina wa mundhirina) is stronger in terms of zuhur than those other verses.
Hadha tamam al-kalam fi al-dalil al-awwal ay al-Kitab (This concludes the discussion on the first proof, namely, the Book).
The conclusion is that we can argue based on verses of the Quran to prove The Principle of Exemption.
Question: …
Teacher: It was said that “We sent” (arsalna) cannot be separated from “bringers of good tidings and warners” (mubashshirina wa mundhirina); that is correct. This sending is tied to that; otherwise, the mere sending of a messenger in itself is of no significance… Does the deputation of a messenger make sense without the bringing of good tidings and warning? Or is the deputation of a messenger for the purpose of bringing good tidings and warning, and is it incumbent upon Allah? … This is another discussion… Suppose you assume that a proof is established to the effect that precaution is obligatory… its absolute application (itlaq) encompasses those cases (which lack the bringing of good tidings and warning). Yes, the itlaq of the verse encompasses those matters.