Preliminaries, Tenth Preliminary: Classification of Practical Principles into Predictive and Non-Predictive

Session Thirty-one

Preliminaries – Tenth Preliminary: Classification of Practical Principles into Predictive and Non-Predictive – Ambiguities and Challenges in the Discourse of Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini – First: Discrepancy Regarding the Legislative Object (Maj’ul) of Predictive Principles – Second: The Meaning of Practical Conduct (Al-Jary al-Amali)

October 26, 2025

Ambiguities and Challenges in the Discourse of Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini

Our discussion was centered on the Tenth Preliminary of the preliminaries to the Practical Principles. This preliminary is established to address the classification of Practical Principles into predictive (muhrizah) and non-predictive (ghayr muhrizah) principles. Since this classification and terminology are among the innovations of Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini, we explained his discourse yesterday. However, we noted that this discourse is itself fraught with ambiguity and obscurity; it differs from what his transcribers (muqarririn) have recorded, and Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini himself has passages in certain places that are inconsistent with these assertions. Furthermore, various interpretations have been offered for these statements. Therefore, while the core of the subject is highly significant, it has acquired complexity due to these issues. Consequently, we stated that we must investigate these discrepancies and differences.

First: Discrepancy Regarding the Legislative Object (Maj’ul) of Predictive Principles

There is a discrepancy between what is recorded in the book Fawa’id al-Usul (which constitutes the transcriptions of the late Kazemi from the lectures of Ayatollah al-Na’ini) and what is recorded in Ajwad al-Taqrirat (which constitutes the transcriptions of the late Ayatollah al-Khoei from his lectures, supplemented by the annotations of Ayatollah al-Khoei himself). I will refer to some of these passages so that you may precisely recognize these differences.

1. Practical Conduct in Accordance with the Dictum of the Principle on the Assumption that It Is the Reality

In Fawa’id al-Usul, he states the following expression:

“Thus, the legislative object (maj’ul) in regulatory principles (al-usul al-tanziliyyah) is not something distinct from reality; rather, the legislative formulation (al-ja’l al-shar’i) is exclusively attached to the practical conduct (al-jary al-amali) in accordance with its dictum, on the assumption that it is the reality, as guided by the statement of the Imam (peace be upon him) in some narrations concerning the Rule of Passage (Qa’idat al-Tajawoz)…”

Here, he outlines a distinction between predictive principles and non-predictive principles. Of course, predictive principles are sometimes referred to as regulatory principles (al-usul al-tanziliyyah), as is the case here. He asserts: That which is legislated in regulatory principles is not something distinct from reality; rather, the legislative formulation “is exclusively attached to the practical conduct in accordance with its dictum, on the assumption that it is the reality.” The legislative formulation has been attached to the practical conduct in accordance with the dictum of the principle, on the assumption that it is the actual reality. Therefore, according to this explanation, practical conduct is qualified by a condition: “practical conduct on the assumption that it is the reality.” The legislative object (maj’ul) in predictive and regulatory principles consists of the practical conduct and the application of action in accordance with its dictum, based on the premise that it is the actual reality.

However, in non-predictive principles, the qualification “on the assumption that it is the reality” does not exist. In predictive principles, “the legislative formulation is exclusively attached to the practical conduct in accordance with its dictum, on the assumption that it is the reality.” Thus, it is as if in Practical Principles, there is first a legislative object (maj’ul); according to this explanation, this legislative object consists of practical conduct in accordance with the dictum of the principle. However, in predictive Practical Principles, the qualification “on the assumption that it is the reality” exists as a condition, whereas in non-predictive Practical Principles, this qualification is absent; rather, it merely possesses an effect, and its effect is excusability (ta’dhir) and liability (tanjiz).

According to this explanation, it is as if in predictive principles, regulation (tanzil) exists, whereas in non-predictive principles, there is no regulation. “Based on the assumption that it is the reality” means that these are regulated as occupying the status of reality. But in non-predictive principles, this regulation does not exist; rather, it is merely effective and obligating. In another passage in Fawa’id al-Usul, in distinguishing between indicative evidences (Amarat) and Practical Principles, he states:

“Yes, the legislative object (maj’ul) in the domain of Practical Principles absolutely is the mere application of action to the dictum of the principle.”

He states: In all Practical Principles, that which has been made the legislative object is the application of action to the dictum of the principle. This is common to all of them. “For there is nothing in Practical Principles that necessitates discovery and predictive disclosure (al-kashf wa al-ihraz).” In Practical Principles, there is nothing that entails discovery and predictive disclosure. At the same time, regarding predictive principles, he provides an explanation and then states:

“For the meaning of a predictive principle is not that it is a path (tariq) to the dictum.”

He says: The meaning of predictive principles is not that they serve as a path to the dictum (disclosing the reality). “Rather, its meaning is the practical stance (al-bina’ al-amali) upon one of the two sides of doubt, on the assumption that it is the reality, and the cancellation of the other side.” The meaning of predictive disclosure in these Practical Principles is the practical stance that one of the two sides of doubt is the actual reality, thereby dismissing the other side. “Thus, the legislative object in a pure principle is the third power among the powers of knowledge, which is the movement and practical conduct toward the known object.”

He states: That which is legislated in a pure principle is that very movement and practical flow toward the known object—which is the third characteristic we explained yesterday.

He himself states: Predictive disclosure in the domain of predictive principles is different from predictive disclosure in the domain of indicative evidences (Amarat). Here he states: Predictive disclosure in predictive principles means: practical conduct or the application of action to the dictum of the principle, based on the assumption that it is the reality; meaning, on the basis that one treats the dictum of the principle as the actual reality.

In another passage, he states:

“For predictive disclosure in the domain of indicative evidences (Amarat) is the disclosure of reality irrespective of the station of action. However, predictive disclosure in the domain of pure principles is the practical disclosure in the station of applying action to the dictum; thus, the difference between the two disclosures is virtually unmistakable.”

Therefore, one issue is: what is the legislative object (maj’ul) in the domain of Practical Principles in the first place? Is the legislative object in the domain of Practical Principles that very practical conduct (al-jary al-amali) that you mentioned? The expression of Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini was: “rather, the legislative formulation is exclusively attached to the practical conduct in accordance with its dictum, on the assumption that it is the reality.”

2. Intermediacy in Proof (Al-Wasatiyyah fi al-Ithbat)

However, in Ajwad al-Taqrirat, he states that the legislative object in the domain of Practical Principles is something else, almost identical to what he says regarding indicative evidences (Amarat). Observe what he has stated:

“But the correct view, as you have known, is that the legislative object (maj’ul) therein as well is the intermediacy in proof (al-wasatiyyah fi al-ithbat).”

And “the principle being predictive of reality from the aspect of practical conduct.” Here, he refers to the principle as predictive of reality, but from the aspect of practical conduct, without stating “based on the assumption that it is the reality.” It is different to say that the principle is predictive of reality, or to say that you must base your stance on the assumption that this is the reality.

The discussion concerns the legislative object (maj’ul). Ultimately, is the legislative object in predictive principles the application of action or practical conduct, or is it intermediacy in proof (the issue of predictive disclosure and discovery)? When we say “intermediacy in proof,” it is as if the legislative object is predictive disclosure, or indicativeness… Intermediacy in proof means it possesses indicativeness, meaning it discloses, and these two views are completely different.

Under the assumption of accepting the premise that the legislative object in predictive principles—and, so to speak, in all Practical Principles—is as he stated: “to apply practical conduct to the dictum,” with the qualification “based on the assumption that it is the reality” being considered in predictive principles, while non-predictive principles lack this qualification; here, however, he states that the legislative object in the domain of indicative evidences (Amarat) is “intermediacy in the station of proof,” and these two are different.

Question: …

Professor: The meaning of intermediacy in proof is clear, especially considering that they have stated this in the discussions on reconciling real (waqi’i) and apparent (zahiri) rulings.

Question: …

Professor: Yes, the Practical Principles themselves are also authoritative (hujjah), but the discussion is: what is the legislative object (maj’ul) in Practical Principles? In one place, he states that the legislative object is application, and in another, he states it is intermediacy in proof. These two are distinct.

Question: …

Professor: We can reconcile this with an explanation such that the title of “intermediacy in proof” also encompasses it, which we will present later.

Thus, this is one discrepancy: ultimately, what is the legislative object in the domain of predictive Practical Principles? Indeed, what is the legislative object in the domain of Practical Principles altogether?

Of course, some eminent scholars, such as the late Ayatollah Sheikh Husayn Hilli in his book Usul al-Fiqh, maintained that Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini retracted his initial theory in his later lectures. He first cited the passage from Fawa’id which states: “because the legislative object therein is the practical stance upon one of the two sides of doubt, on the assumption that it is the reality, and the cancellation of the other side,” which is the same passage we previously mentioned. He then states: “It is not hidden that he (may his soul be sanctified) in his final cycle retracted this.” He retracted this; from what? “Meaning, that the content of regulatory principles is the necessity of a practical stance, but rather the legislation of…” He says he retracted this. Previously, he had stated that the content of predictive principles and regulatory principles consists of establishing a practical stance upon one of the two sides of doubt as being the actual reality, and dismissing the other side. He states that in his final cycle, he retracted this and held that: “rather, the Lawgiver / Legislator made the content of the evidence of their authority identical to the content of the evidence of the authority of indicative evidences (Amarat), which is intermediacy in proof, but specifically in regulatory principles from the aspect of practical conduct.” When he states in his final cycle that the legislative object in predictive principles is intermediacy in predictive disclosure, having previously stated otherwise, this must be regarded as a retraction of his earlier discourse.

Now, the question arises: did a “retraction” actually occur, or can these two expressions be reconciled in some manner?

In summary, one of the difficulties is the discrepancy in the expressions of Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini himself across different books, such as Fawa’id and the transcriptions (Taqrirat), regarding the definition of the legislative object. In Fawa’id, he considered the legislative object in predictive Practical Principles to be “the application of practical conduct to the dictum based on the assumption that it is the reality,” whereas elsewhere, he considered the legislative object to be intermediacy in the domain of proof.

Furthermore, one of his prominent students (Ayatollah Sheikh Husayn Hilli, Ayatollah al-Khoei, and Kazemi were students of Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini) deemed this change to be a retraction, which has added to the complexity and ambiguity of the subject.

Question: …

Professor: We will explain later what objections this produces; if we assert that this “intermediacy in proof” is the legislative object in Practical Principles, we must examine it to see what becomes of the issue of indicative evidences (Amarat).

Second: The Meaning of Practical Conduct

Another issue concerns the very concept of “practical conduct” (al-jary al-amali). What does it mean? It is necessary to analyze these concepts precisely. First, these differences must be clearly identified, and then the possibility of providing a solution for them must be assessed.

What exactly does “the application of action to the dictum” or “practical conduct in accordance with the dictum” mean? Is the application of action itself the legislative object, or is the legislative object something else? The application of action to the dictum is the act of the duty-bound (mukallaf)—meaning that the duty-bound applies their action in accordance with the dictum. Should we say that the legislative object consists of the application of action in accordance with the dictum, meaning that the Lawgiver / Legislator has made the action of the duty-bound the “legislative object”? Or should we say that the objective is not the application itself as an act of the duty-bound, but rather the necessity and obligation of this application that has been subjected to legislative formulation? In the expressions of Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini, the discourse is about application, and application is considered an act of the duty-bound.