The Principle of Exemption (Bara’ah), Textual Exemption, Five Points, Point Four

Session Forty-Six

The Principle of Exemption from Obligation (Bara’ah), Textual Exemption, Five Points, Point Four: The Methodology of Sheikh al-Ansari and al-Muhaqqiq al-Khurasani in the Issue, Point Five: The Root of the Disagreement between the Legal Theorists and the Traditionalists

November 30, 2025

Point Four: The Methodology of Sheikh al-Ansari and al-Muhaqqiq al-Khurasani in the Issue

We noted that prior to entering the discussions on textual exemption (al-bara’ah al-shar’iyyah), we deem it necessary to address several points. Three points were outlined in the previous session.

When Sheikh al-Ansari seeks to discuss the principle of exemption (asalat al-bara’ah), he examines it within the framework of numerous issues that exceed twelve in number; however, the late Akhund [al-Khurasani] formulated this topic under a single heading and in the form of a single issue.

Now, the question arises: why did the late Sheikh present the discussion of exemption in the form of multiple issues, whereas the late Akhund did not adopt such a methodology? The reason for this is that the late Sheikh took several aspects of this issue into account, and subsequently organized several issues sequentially on the basis of those aspects.

The late Sheikh al-Ansari states: the principle of exemption, which runs in cases of doubt regarding the obligation (al-shakk fi-l-taklif), can have several sources:

1. ’Adam al-Nass (The absence of text): in the sense that upon referring to the proofs, no proof is found indicating the religious ruling.

2. Ijmal al-Nass (The ambiguity of the text): for example, when a narration contains an ambiguous term and it is impossible to resolve this ambiguity.

3. Ta’arud al-Nassin (The conflict between two texts): such as when an authoritative narration indicates the obligatoriness of the Friday prayer and another authoritative narration indicates its prohibition, resulting in a conflict between two texts.

4. al-Ishtibah fi-l-umur al-kharijiyyah (Confusion in external matters): for example, a liquid that rotates between vinegar and wine, where its prior state is also unknown.

In this final case, doubt is acquired regarding the religious ruling; however, its source is none of the three preceding matters, but rather stems from that very confusion in distinguishing the external matter; meaning that the mukallaf is unable to distinguish whether this liquid is vinegar or wine.

The first three cases represent ruling-based doubts (shubhah hukmiyyah), and the last case represents a subject-based doubt (shubhah mawdu’iyyah).

This division itself clarifies that in ruling-based doubts, the resolution of doubt is in the hands of the Lawgiver, whereas in subject-based doubts, the mukallaf himself can resolve the doubt. Each of these divisions is sometimes obligatory (wujubi) and at other times prohibitory (tahrimi).

Therefore, one division relates to ruling-based and subject-based doubts—meaning that doubt is divided into ruling-based and subject-based—and another division is directed at the source of the doubt. In ruling-based doubts, the source of the doubt is either the absence of text, the ambiguity of the text, or the conflict between two texts. Each of these divisions is also either obligatory (relating to obligation) or prohibitory (relating to prohibition). Thus, at the outset, three aspects exist here. Consequently, ruling-based doubts are themselves divided into three categories, and each of these categories is either obligatory or prohibitory.

On this basis, various discussions are raised here. If we wish to examine them solely from the perspective of obligatory and prohibitory doubts in terms of the source of the doubt, eight categories emerge:

An obligatory doubt whose source is the absence of text, its ambiguity, the conflict between two texts, or confusion in an external matter. In prohibitory doubts, four identical categories exist. Thus, eight issues arise here that must be discussed and examined.

The late Sheikh al-Ansari, in reality, raised and examined these eight discussions one by one, stating whatever was necessary. However, the late Akhund al-Khurasani did not adopt such a methodology. He placed all of them under a single, unified heading.

Of course, two of these eight categories are set aside entirely—namely, subject-based obligatory doubts and subject-based prohibitory doubts. This is because the resolution of doubt in subject-based doubts is not in the hands of the Lawgiver, and therefore we should not seek a remedy from the Lawgiver in these cases. Thus, these two categories are set aside, and six categories remain:

• Ruling-based obligatory doubts according to the three categories whose source is the absence of text, the ambiguity of the text, or the conflict between two texts.

• Prohibitory doubts whose source is one of these three matters.

Therefore, in total, six categories exist here.

However, the late Akhund did not separate these categories from one another, but discussed all of them together. Note his phrasing. He states: “If one doubts the obligatoriness of something or its prohibition, and no proof is established regarding it, it is permissible religiously and rationally to abandon the first and execute the second, and one is secure from the punishment of violating it.” [Kifayah al-Usul]

It makes no difference whether the absence of the establishment of proof is due to the lack of text or its ambiguity. The late Akhund states subsequently: “whether the absence of the establishment of proof is due to the lack of text, or its ambiguity and its potentiality of detestability or recommendability, or its conflict in the case where no prioritizer is established between them…” He raised all of them together under the heading “If one doubts the obligatoriness of something or its prohibition” and stated the ruling of the issue.

Thus, you observed that the late Akhund, in contrast to the late Sheikh, mentioned a single heading and a single issue, and because in his view no difference exists between these cases, he analyzed all of them together.

What can, in addition to these cases, reinforce the preference for separating the issues is the difference of opinion between the traditionalists (akhbariyyin) and the legal theorists (usuliyyin) in some of these cases, which we will explain, God willing, in the fifth point. A disagreement exists between the traditionalists and the legal theorists in some of these cases, which requires that these issues be separated from one another. Nonetheless, the late Akhund did not do so.

This represents the difference in methodology between these two prominent scholars in this issue. From one perspective, perhaps the methodology pursued by the Sheikh is more precise, but from another perspective, there is no necessity to separate these issues from one another. The late Akhund’s methodology of presenting the matter in a general manner appears sufficient. If we wish to separate obligatory doubts from prohibitory doubts in an isolated manner, given that most of their proofs are identical, this would naturally entail repetition or unnecessary engagement with certain topics.

Point Five: The Root of the Disagreement between the Legal Theorists and the Traditionalists

According to what has become well-known, the legal theorists (usuliyyin) argue for exemption (bara’ah) in ruling-based prohibitory doubts. That is, whenever we entertain the possibility of the prohibition of something, we negate that possibility by means of the principle of exemption. The result of executing exemption in these doubts is that if, for example, a person entertains the possibility of the prohibition of something and commits it, they do not deserve punishment; because the ugliness of punishment without prior clarification (qubh al-‘iqab bila bayan) is established.

However, the traditionalists (akhbariyyin) believe that precaution (ihtiyat) runs in prohibitory doubts, not exemption. Therefore, if the possibility of the prohibition of something is entertained, one must absolutely avoid it. If someone does not avoid what is suspected of being prohibited, they deserve punishment. Of course, this disagreement does not exist in obligatory doubts. That is, the traditionalists do not argue for precaution in obligatory doubts; the disagreement is restricted to prohibitory doubts.

Now, we must examine where this disagreement stems from, and why, in contrast to the legal theorists, the traditionalists argue for precaution. And fundamentally, why have they detailed the distinction between obligatory doubts and prohibitory doubts? Perhaps from a primary perspective, you might assume that the traditionalists disagree with the major premise of the ugliness of punishment without prior clarification; however, this is not the case. The traditionalists, like the legal theorists, believe that punishment without prior clarification is ugly.

That is, regarding the major premise (al-kubra)—namely, this general rational ruling—there is no disagreement between the legal theorists and the traditionalists. Ultimately, they comprehend this rational ruling and possess the understanding to state that punishment without prior clarification is ugly.

The objection and disagreement lie in the minor premise (al-sughra). Meaning, in prohibitory doubts, if we are punished for committing what is suspected of being prohibited, is this punishment without prior clarification and ugly, or not? Therefore, the dispute between the traditionalists and the legal theorists is a minor-premise dispute, not a major-premise dispute. Otherwise, they also accept the core of the major premise (namely, the ugliness of punishment without prior clarification).

The traditionalists believe that in ruling-based prohibitory doubts, we actually possess an instruction to observe precaution. That is, the Lawgiver has forbidden us from committing that which we suspect of being prohibited. They believe that we possess numerous narrations that indicate the obligatoriness of precaution in such doubts. Of course, some of them may even state that precaution must be observed in obligatory doubts as well; meaning that whenever the possibility of the obligatoriness of something is entertained, one must perform it.

However, the point we intend to state here is that many of those proofs and narrations which, according to the traditionalists’ claim, indicate the obligatoriness of precaution are flawed in their chain of transmission (sanad) and their textual indication (dalalah). That is, the legal theorists state that these narrations and proofs do not indicate the necessity of precaution. Or, they do not accept these narrations in terms of their chain of transmission. Some of these narrations also pertain fundamentally to circumscribed doubts (al-shubhah al-mahsurah). In circumscribed doubts, considering the compendious knowledge (‘ilm ijmali) we possess, precaution must generally be observed. Even if those narrations they claim did not exist, our intellect would still rule in favor of the necessity of precaution; however, this ruling is restricted to circumscribed doubts.

Therefore, the fifth point in the discussion of exemption is this very disagreement we have referred to. This issue must be attended to: what do the traditionalists deny, and what do the legal theorists seek to establish? In this discussion, it became clear that the dispute between the traditionalists and the legal theorists is a minor-premise dispute, not a major-premise dispute. That is, there is no discussion regarding the major premise of the issue (which is the ugliness of punishment without prior clarification).

Nonetheless, the legal theorists state: we possess no clarification (from the Lawgiver) regarding doubt in the obligation (encompassing both obligatory and prohibitory doubts). However, the traditionalists state: no, we possess clarification; but what they recognize as clarification is unacceptable in our view, either in terms of textual indication or chain of transmission, and many of them are flawed.

Thus far, we have outlined five points prior to entering the proofs of exemption. We must outline these proofs.

Our discussion has now reached the proofs of the core principle of exemption, encompassing both obligatory and prohibitory doubts. That is, following the methodology and path of the late Akhund, we present them together; because in most cases, no difference exists between them.

Now, you observe the proofs. These proofs, in reality, by virtue of their generality and absolute application, encompass both obligatory doubts and prohibitory doubts.

To establish this claim (namely, exemption in the case of doubt regarding the obligation, encompassing both prohibitory and obligatory doubts), four proofs have been utilized: “And indeed, it has been established by the four proofs” (wa qad ustudilla ‘alayhi bi-l-adillati al-arba’ah). These four proofs are: the Book, the Sunnah, consensus, and the intellect. These are the four proofs we present to you.

The Topic of the Next Session

We now proceed to the proofs. The first proof is the Book (the Quran); certain Quranic verses have been utilized to establish exemption. Several verses exist which we must recite and analyze to see whether these verses can establish exemption or not.