Preliminaries, Tenth Preliminary: Classification of Practical Principles into Indicative and Non-Indicative
Session Thirty-four
Preliminaries – Tenth Preliminary: Classification of Practical Principles into Indicative and Non-Indicative – Summary of the Distinction between Indicative and Non-Indicative Principles – Analysis of the Seven Hypotheses – Examination of the Fifth Hypothesis – Examination of the Sixth Hypothesis – Examination of the Seventh Hypothesis – The Correct Position on the Issue – Commentary on the Treatise on Rights (Risalat al-Huquq) – The First Right – The Necessary Condition of Hajj – Imam Sajjad (as) and Hajj
October 29, 2025
Continued Examination of the Seven Hypotheses
Our discussion continues regarding the hypotheses and perspectives put forward concerning the distinction between indicative principles (al-usul al-muhrizah) and non-indicative principles (al-usul al-ghayr al-muhrizah). Whether all of these perspectives are explicitly found in the words of Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini is a separate matter. At any rate, four hypotheses have already been examined.
Examination of the Fifth Hypothesis
The fifth hypothesis states that an indicative principle is one in which the requirement of practical implementation (al-jary al-amali) is legislated as valid, whereas a non-indicative principle is one in which the requirement of practical implementation is not legislated as valid.
This formulation and hypothesis are also subject to objection. As previously stated, the fundamental meaning of “practical implementation” and “conforming one’s action to the indicated reality” (muda) is unclear. Does it refer to the actual physical action of the duty-bound (mukallaf), or does it refer to the obligation of conforming one’s action to the indicated reality?
If the physical action of the duty-bound is meant, its invalidity is obvious; it makes no sense for this physical action to be legislated as valid. Practical implementation in the sense of the duty-bound performing the action cannot fundamentally fall under the legislative designation (ja’l) of the Lawgiver. What would the Lawgiver be establishing as a devotional obligation (ta’abbud) here? That action belongs to the duty-bound and has no direct relation to the Lawgiver’s legislative act. Therefore, practical conformity or practical implementation under this hypothesis is incorrect.
If, however, the obligation of practical implementation is meant, this reverts to the first or second hypothesis; namely, what Muhaqqiq al-Iraqi stated regarding a path-indicative command (amr tariqi) toward reality. According to the second hypothesis, it is as if the Lawgiver commands the arrangement of the effects of certainty and conviction, rather than devotionally obligating him to certainty itself. This is a command to arrange the effects of certainty and knowledge, just as we explained in the first hypothesis, and its objection has already been made clear.
Therefore, to say that an indicative principle is one in which the basis is laid upon practical implementation, and a non-indicative principle is one in which this basis and conformity do not exist, ultimately reverts to what we discussed under the first hypothesis.
Examination of the Sixth Hypothesis
The sixth hypothesis posits that an indicative principle is one in which the practical basis is laid upon the actual establishment of reality. Conversely, a non-indicative principle is one in which the practical implementation and basis are laid upon one of the two sides of doubt. This hypothesis does not concern itself with reality; it simply commands: “Act upon one of the two sides of doubt; lay your practical basis on acting upon one of the two sides of doubt.” For instance, in Exemption from obligation (Bara’ah), the practical basis is laid upon the negation of obligation, and in Precaution (Ihtiyat), the practical basis is laid upon the establishment of obligation. Ultimately, one of the two sides of doubt is taken into consideration.
This hypothesis also either reverts to the first hypothesis or the second; it cannot escape these two states. In the first hypothesis, it was stated that in indicative principles, there is a path-indicative command to arrange the effects of certainty and conviction; meaning, it is as if we are told to apply the effects of certainty, whereas in a non-indicative principle, this is not the case. Thus, this hypothesis reverts to the first one.
By “laying the practical basis on the establishment of reality,” the meaning might be: “If you had certainty, what effects would you have applied? Now that you do not have certainty and are, for example, applying the Postulate of Continuity (Istishab), apply those very same effects here.” This is one perspective, suggesting that the essence of the sixth hypothesis is nothing other than the first hypothesis, albeit expressed in different words; the phrasing has changed, but its reality remains the same. If this is the case, the same objection raised against the first hypothesis applies here as well.
The second perspective is that this hypothesis reverts to the second hypothesis. The second hypothesis was that indicative principles are those in which all effects are arranged, whereas a non-indicative principle is one in which only some effects are arranged.
Here too, we might say that this is in fact the second hypothesis; saying that in indicative principles, the practical basis is laid upon the establishment of reality means that if reality were clear to us, all of its effects would be arranged, whereas in non-indicative principles, the basis is laid only upon one of the two sides of doubt. If this is the case, it means you can no longer arrange all effects, but rather only some of them. Therefore, this does not constitute an independent perspective.
Examination of the Seventh Hypothesis
The seventh hypothesis was that, in general, in Practical Principles (whether indicative or non-indicative), practical conformity and practical implementation are not taken into account; meaning, practical implementation is not legislated. Rather, what is legislated is the practical basis upon one of the two sides of doubt. Thus, the difference between an indicative principle and a non-indicative principle becomes that in an indicative principle, the effects of reality are legislated for one of the two sides of doubt, whereas in a non-indicative principle, this is not legislated.
This hypothesis also either reverts to the second hypothesis (where practical implementation and the like are not raised at all) or to the first hypothesis.
Conclusion
From the sum of these seven hypotheses, you have observed that some do not fundamentally constitute independent perspectives.
- The seventh hypothesis reverts to the second hypothesis.
- The sixth hypothesis may revert to either the first or the second hypothesis; thus, the sixth hypothesis is not considered an independent perspective.
- The fifth hypothesis itself suffers from a fundamental objection, in that practical conformity and implementation have no coherent meaning; because under one assumption, it is the physical action of the duty-bound, and under the other assumption, it reverts to the first hypothesis (the path-indicative command to arrange the effects of certainty). Thus, the fifth hypothesis is also dismissed.
- The fourth hypothesis (which was examined previously)—stating that in an indicative principle there are two devotional obligations (ta’abbud) while in a non-indicative principle there is only one—although it can generally be an independent perspective, its objection has also been stated.
Three other hypotheses remain.
The third hypothesis was that in an indicative principle, a metaphorical projection (tanzil) takes place; meaning, it is as if it is said: “Treat it as certainty,” but with the explanation that this is not path-indicative, but rather, solely from the aspect of practical implementation, treat it as certainty. It is like telling someone: “You are a scholar, not from the aspect of path-indicitness, but from the aspect of the requirement of practical implementation,” meaning, consider yourself in the position of a scholar, but not because this knowledge of yours is path-indicative. Now that you have placed yourself in the position of a scholar, does this knowledge of yours possess path-indicitness? No. If you were a scholar, what would you do? You would certainly act upon your knowledge; now, act upon your knowledge as well.
This, although an independent perspective, is rejected; because metaphorical projection (tanzil) cannot actually be proven, and the textual evidences do not indicate such projection.
Two primary hypotheses remain:
First, that an indicative principle is one in which there is a command to arrange the effects of certainty (a path-indicative command to arrange the effects of certainty). A non-indicative principle is one in which there is only an apparent ruling (hukm zahiri)—whether permission, obligation, or necessity—but there is no longer a command to arrange the effects of certainty within it.
We said that this is the very hypothesis expressed by Muhaqqiq al-Iraqi; however, its problem is that we cannot derive this meaning from the textual evidences. From the evidence of the Postulate of Continuity (Istishab), which states: “Do not violate certainty with doubt,” it cannot be derived that it is issuing a path-indicative command to arrange the effects of certainty.
An examination of the proposed hypotheses regarding the distinction between indicative and non-indicative principles shows that among the various options, the second hypothesis possesses the greatest strength. Based on this, an indicative principle is defined as a principle upon which all effects of reality are arranged, whereas a non-indicative principle is one upon which only some effects are arranged.
It appears that this definition, compared to other formulations and definitions of these two principles, has fewer objections and can be adhered to.
This concludes the discussion on the Tenth Preliminary.
Thus far, ten preliminaries of the discussion on Practical Principles have been explained, and one or two other preliminaries remain, after which, God willing, we shall enter the discussion on Exemption from obligation (Bara’ah).
Commentary on the Treatise on Rights (Risalat al-Huquq)
Today we resume the discussion on the Treatise on Rights and address the Right of Hajj. Of course, in some manuscripts, this is referred to as the right of this worship, and in others, the right of fasting is addressed after the right of prayer.
We read these luminous words of Imam Sajjad (peace be upon him) regarding the right of Hajj, where he said:
“And the right of Hajj is that you know it is an arrival before your Lord, and a flight to Him from your sins; and in it is the acceptance of your repentance, and the fulfillment of the obligation that God Almighty has made incumbent upon you.”
In the previous session, a brief explanation of this passage was presented, and now we proceed to a concise commentary on each of these phrases.
The First Right
The first right of Hajj is to know that Hajj is a means of entering the presence of your Lord: “an arrival before your Lord” (wifadatun ila Rabbik). This term appears as “wiqadah” in some manuscripts. It is as if Hajj is a gateway for entering the presence of God, Blessed and Exalted; as if it is an entry, a banquet through which human beings enter the threshold of the Lord.
We had a similar expression regarding prayer, which was also called “an arrival before your Lord.” This indicates a similarity between Hajj and prayer. But what does it mean that Hajj is the threshold of entering the presence of God Almighty? Is it not the case that all acts of worship are performed for God and all are for seeking proximity to the Almighty? Nonetheless, regarding certain specific acts of worship like prayer and Hajj, this expression “arrival before God” has been used, meaning that these acts of worship place the human being directly at the threshold of the Divine Sanctuary. Therefore, regarding prayer, it was emphasized that a person must have humility (khushu’) to enter that presence; you must know the lofty position you occupy through this action.
The Necessary Condition of Hajj
Imm Ali ibn Musa al-Rida (upon whom be thousands of greetings and praise), in a statement regarding Hajj, points to several matters indicating that a person must be aware that they are entering the Divine Sanctuary. His Eminence states:
“They were commanded to enter Ihram so that they might become humble before entering the Sanctuary of God and His security, and so that they do not engage in play or occupy themselves with any worldly affairs, its adornments, and its pleasures. They should be serious in what they are doing, heading towards Him, turning to Him with their entire being, along with the glorification of God, Mighty and Majestic, and His House, and humbling themselves when intending to reach God, Mighty and Majestic, and arriving before Him, hoping for His reward, fearing His punishment, proceeding towards Him, turning to Him with humility, submissiveness, and lowliness.”
His Eminence points to a very important note to make human beings realize where they are going. This expression “their arrival before Him” (wifadatihim ilayh) has also been narrated in the words of Ali ibn Musa al-Rida (as). He states that a person must be humble and show modesty before entering the secure sanctuary of God. This humility and turning away from preoccupation with worldly affairs, its adornments, and its pleasures, is a necessary condition for an individual to turn with complete seriousness and effort toward the goal that prompted this journey, and to engage in it with their entire being.
In the first place, one must “be humble before God”; because a person who lacks humility will not attain these realities. One who does not understand where they have gone and for what purpose will never reach these truths. There are other matters in Ihram as well, such as glorifying God, glorifying the House of God, and showing modesty and humility when they intend the House of God and turn toward Him; all of these must be realized.
The root of creating this state in a human being is to see oneself as insignificant. If one wishes to attain this reality, one must view the world and its pleasures as trivial and worthless. One must have modesty and humility and see oneself as small. If a human being considers himself humble, submissive, and insignificant before God, Blessed and Exalted, many of his problems will be solved. The greater this feeling of insignificance before God, the sooner he will reach this goal, and the more it will assist him in attaining this objective.
If a person’s mind is occupied with worldly affairs during circumambulation (tawaf), naturally no effect will be arranged upon it. If a person is not prepared from before entering the Miqat until the rituals of Hajj are completed, and does not know what position they occupy, before whom they stand, and what the purpose of this journey is, they will derive no benefit from this journey. One whose mind is constantly occupied with matters that hijack the human soul will naturally not reach this level of awareness and knowledge, and will have no share. This is an important point. When His Eminence says: “The right of Hajj is that you know it is an arrival before your Lord,” it means you must know that this is the gateway to entering the threshold of the Almighty. Whenever a person wishes to enter a gathering or a banquet, the greater their preparation and attention, the greater their benefit from that banquet will be.
The important and subtle point here is that a person must be prepared both beforehand and during the act. Before going to Hajj, one must know that this threshold of the Almighty is his gateway of entry; meaning, this act of Hajj is his gateway of entry to the threshold of the Almighty. Therefore, he must have humility and know where he is going.
Imam Sajjad (as) and Hajj
There is a very long tradition from Imam Sajjad (peace be upon him) that is highly worth reading. In that tradition, His Eminence names every single part and ritual of Hajj and asks a person about each of them: “When you did this, were you attentive to that?” The story is that during one of the journeys, when Imam Sajjad (as) was returning from Hajj, a person named Shibli came to welcome him. Upon their first meeting, His Eminence asked him: “Have you performed Hajj?” He said: “Yes, I performed Hajj.” Then the Imam asked: “Did you go to the Miqat for Hajj? Did you take off your tailored clothes? Did you perform the ritual bath?” He said: “Yes.” The Imam said: “When you entered the Miqat, did you intend, after putting on the clothes of Ihram or after taking off those clothes, to strip off the clothes of sin and put on the clothes of obedience and submission to God?” He said: “No, O son of the Messenger of God! This intention was not in my mind. I took off my clothes and put on the [Ihram] clothes, but to intend simultaneously to cast away the clothes of sin and put on the clothes of obedience was not in my mind.” … In this manner, the Imam continued these questions part by part. Then His Eminence asked: “When you took off your tailored clothes, was it in your intention not to wear and possess the clothes of showing off (riya) and hypocrisy?” He said: “No, O son of the Messenger of God!” Again, “When you performed the ritual bath, did you have such an intention?” and the Imam asked about every single ritual, whether he had such an intention, and he kept saying: “No.”
You observe that here we are faced with two types of preparation: the preparation that must exist before Hajj, and the preparation that must be maintained during Hajj. This subject requires further explanation, which, God willing, we shall address in the coming session.