The Principle of Exemption (Bara’ah), Intellectual Exemption from Obligation, Analysis of Shahid Sadr’s Objections to the Four Formulations
Session Forty-one
The Principle of Exemption from Obligation (Bara’ah) – Intellectual Exemption from Obligation – Reviewing Shahid al-Sadr’s Objections to the Fourfold Aspects – Elucidating the Theory of the Right of Obedience (Haqq al-Ta’ah)
November 16, 2025
Summary of the Previous Session
It was previously noted that four aspects and proofs have been advanced for the “ugliness of punishment without declaration” (qubh al-iqab bila bayan). Shahid al-Sadr has raised several objections against these four aspects. The foundation of his objections rests upon the theory of the “Right of Obedience” (Haqq al-Ta’ah). In any case, it is necessary to investigate whether “intellectual exemption from obligation” (al-bara’ah al-aqliyyah)—in the sense of the ugliness of punishment without declaration—is correct or not. In this context, the most significant obstacle is the very theory renowned as the “Right of Obedience,” the consequence of which is the denial of intellectual exemption from obligation and a commitment to the view that the primary principle is precautionary action (ihtiyat) rather than exemption.
Reviewing Shahid al-Sadr’s Objections to the Fourfold Aspects
Before elucidating the objections to this theory, and at the request of some respected colleagues, certain points will be presented to clarify and explain this theory, after which, God willing, we shall address the objections raised against it.
Elucidating the Theory of the Right of Obedience (Haqq al-Ta’ah)
The core of the objection from Shahid al-Sadr’s perspective is that the mainstream jurists (the Mashhur) have committed a grave error. They have separated two issues, assuming them to be completely distinct, whereas they are not. These two issues are “probative force” (hujjiyyah) and “mastership” (mawlawiyyah). According to the mainstream view, actual mastership is taken for granted and is not denied; however, regarding the issue of executiveness (munajjiziyyah) and probative force, if an obligation is known with certainty or has reached the agent, it becomes probative and executive. But if it is not known with certainty or has not reached the agent, it is neither probative nor executive.
According to Shahid al-Sadr, this grave error led them to commit to the ugliness of punishment without declaration. This is because this distinction and division is, in reality, a distinction within the boundaries of the Master’s mastership and the “Right of Obedience,” whereas probative force and executiveness are among the necessary concomitants of actual mastership. This means that if we believe in the right of the Master and the right of servitude and obedience of the servants, then the issue of probative force and executiveness arises. Therefore, discrimination in instances of executiveness is, in truth, discrimination in the mastership of the Master; meaning that the Master possesses mastership in some instances and lacks it in others.
This grave error itself stems from another mistake, which is the analogy drawn between “essential and real mastership” and “rational/conventional mastership” (al-mawlawiyyah al-uqala’iyyah). In conventional and rational masterships, the matter is indeed as the mainstream jurists state; that is, one must separate executiveness from mastership because they are two distinct categories. However, in essential mastership, the situation is not like this.
Thus, the locus of dispute between the mainstream jurists and Shahid al-Sadr lies in the scope of mastership and the connection of probative force with priority. This also stems from comparing essential and real mastership with rational and conventional mastership. He believes that we have three types of mastership:
- Essential Mastership: This is exclusive to the Essence of the Almighty Creator. This mastership is real and has no connection to legislative formulation or conventional postulation. Truly, God, Blessed and Exalted be He, possesses mastership over all creatures, especially human beings, by virtue of His creation, ownership, and bestowal of blessings.
- Mastership Formulated by God: This is formulated by God, Blessed and Exalted be He, who is the True Master. God, Blessed and Exalted be He, has formulated guardianship (wilayah) for certain individuals, such as the Prophets, the Successors, and the father. Naturally, the mastership formulated by God is subject to God’s formulation in terms of its breadth and narrowness. The guardianship of the Prophets, the Guardians, and the Jurists is far broader in scope than the guardianship of a father over his child or a husband over his wife.
- Mastership Formulated by the Rational Authorities (Uqala): The rational authorities themselves formulate mastership for certain persons or institutions; meaning that they can command and forbid, and obedience to them is necessary. It is obvious that the scope of influence of this mastership is also subject to the formulation of the rational authorities. Whatever scope the rational authorities consider for the mastership of some, the domain of the necessity of obedience will naturally be within that same scope.
After stating these three types of mastership, he points out the differences between essential mastership and the mastership formulated by the rational authorities, stating: Among the differences between essential mastership and conventional/rational mastership is that essential mastership cannot be stripped away, whereas rational mastership can be. Essential mastership is absolute and has no limitations, while rational mastership is limited. Essential mastership does not accept discrimination or detailed division and remains established constantly across all times, places, and instances, whereas rational mastership may be established in some instances and not in others.
From this perspective, he concludes that when absolute, non-strippable mastership is established for all times and places, probative force becomes one of the necessary concomitants of essential mastership. One cannot say that someone possesses absolute mastership, yet, for example, his instruction, command, or prohibition lacks probative force. If mastership is absolute, probative force is also absolute. If mastership cannot be stripped away, probative force cannot be stripped away by others either, except in cases where the Master Himself invalidates or strips the credibility of a proof or an obligation.
Shahid al-Sadr then addresses two aspects, the negative and the positive: in the negative aspect, he negates intellectual exemption from obligation, and in the positive aspect, he establishes precautionary action. He then mentions four proofs for intellectual exemption from obligation. These proofs were the very cases we referred to. He extracted these four aspects from the sum of the scholars’ words, and after quoting them, he notes his objections. Then he moves to the positive aspect. In the positive aspect, he actually emphasizes the same absolute mastership. On one hand, he states that intellectual exemption from obligation is not established, negating it by relying on those four proofs; in this manner, he quotes them and then subjects them to objection.
He stated that the main error of the mainstream jurists is the separation between mastership and probative force. Mastership and obedience are a reality which, in his view, does not possess degrees and does not accept increase or decrease. The right of obedience means that any obligation issued by the Master for which there is a proof must be obeyed. But what is the criterion for probative force and executiveness?
In cases where certainty (qat’) exists, he states that probative force is essential; where we have certainty regarding a matter, it is probative for us. But what should we do if we do not have certainty? For instance, we have a probability (zann), a doubt (shakk), or an apprehension (wahm). Should we set these aside? Meaning, is that which is probable, doubted, or apprehended not probative? Or are they all probative as well?
He believes that all obligations—including certain and definite obligations, as well as doubted, probable, and apprehended obligations—are probative in all cases. This is because the subject of the Right of Obedience is the “apprehended obligation” (al-taklif al-muhraz), and by apprehended obligation, he means an obligation about which absolute apprehension has been realized. Apprehension also means disclosure (inkishaf); whether complete disclosure or incomplete disclosure. In his view, the subject of the Right of Obedience is not the actual and real existence of obligations, but rather “apprehended obligations” are the subject of the Right of Obedience.
He states: Actual obligations are neither the complete subject (tamam al-mawdu’) for the Right of Obedience nor a part of the subject (juz’ al-mawdu’). He provides explanations for both aspects as to why the subject of the Right of Obedience cannot be the actual existence of the obligation in its entirety, and why actual and real obligations cannot be a part of the subject of the Right of Obedience. What constitutes the subject of the Right of Obedience in his view is “apprehended obligations.” By apprehended obligations, we should not think only of obligations that are certain or probable, but rather “absolute apprehension” is meant; meaning any obligation that is apprehended in any manner is executive for us. That is, the requirement of the Right of Obedience is to perform that obligation.
Question: …
Teacher: It is disclosure, but not complete disclosure; in whatever way it may be, that obligation becomes executive for us. Disclosure is sometimes complete and perfect, such as when a person has certainty, and sometimes disclosure is incomplete, such as when a person has a probability (zann) where the probability of the contrary is outweighed, because a part of the matter has not been disclosed; for if it were disclosed, no probability of the contrary would remain. And if we have a doubt, at least fifty percent of the disclosure has taken place.
Question: Incomplete disclosure is relative to what is probable; he knows eighty percent that there is no obligation, so he has apprehended the non-existence of the obligation.
Teacher: His view is that, in general, any obligation that has been apprehended in one way or another, even if it is a weak apprehension and a weak disclosure, is sufficient for probative force, executiveness, and the necessity of obedience. In his view, the intellect dictates this. The intellect rules that if an obligation is deemed probable even at the level of twenty percent, this very probability is sufficient for executiveness. From the perspective of the intellect, disclosure and apprehension have a high degree which is complete—attained through certainty and conviction—but they also have a lower degree, which is apprehension (wahm). Ultimately, the probability of the obligation exists, and this probability is executive. This probability does not need to be strong or dominant; even an apprehended probability must be followed.
Question: …
Teacher: The intellect has nothing to do with narration; the intellect says: whenever any probability regarding an obligation is given, the right of mastership and the Right of Obedience require that it be performed, unless the Master Himself has granted a permission (tarkhis) to omit it. He also includes this exception.
Question: …
Teacher: As I indicated yesterday and also prior to this, when he states that this is how it is from the perspective of the intellect, the meaning of this statement is not that we must act wherever we deem an obligation probable; because he states that the Lawgiver Himself has granted permission to omit. That is, he accepts scriptural exemption from obligation (al-bara’ah al-shar’iyyah), but he does not accept intellectual exemption from obligation. He denies that the primary principle according to the judgment of the intellect is exemption.
In any case, the subject of the Right of Obedience in his view consists of apprehended obligations in whatever way they are apprehended, whether this apprehension is complete or at the lowest of degrees. Apprehension or disclosure is mostly used where the disclosure is complete or at least accompanied by a dominant probability. However, in the case of doubt or apprehension, the terms apprehension and disclosure are less commonly used, but in any case, the important thing is that the probability of the obligation, even a weak probability, must exist. If there is no probability of the obligation, then the issue of the right of mastership and the right of obedience does not arise at the outset.
Regarding the scope of the Right of Obedience, he also raises certain possibilities and points to the differences between certainty and non-certainty, listing several differences. For example, he states: We cannot separate certainty from executiveness, but we can strip probability, doubt, and apprehension of executiveness. For instance, the Master cannot say, “I command you to oppose certainty,” because it entails an impossibility. However, in the case of apprehension, probability, and doubt, this can be done and no impossibility arises. Or, for example, the executiveness of certainty is absolute, whereas the executiveness of probability, doubt, and apprehension is conditional upon not apprehending an apparent permission (tarkhis zahiri) to omit precautionary action. Or, for example, he states: Certainty is probative both in terms of excusability (ta’dhir) and executiveness (tanjiz), whereas probability, doubt, and apprehension are probative only in terms of executiveness and are not probative in terms of excusability.
This is an important point: ultimately, when a person attains certainty regarding an obligation, this is both excusing and executing, in the same sense that you are aware of. But if an obligation is probable, doubted, or apprehended, it is only executing. Is it also excusing? No. That is, if the agent develops a probability, doubt, or apprehension regarding the non-existence of an obligation and, for this reason, omits the obligation, and then it becomes clear that the obligation was established, here the agent will be punished; because he entertained the probability of the obligation, and with the probability of the obligation, that obligation became executive for him.
This was a summary of the locus of dispute in the issue of the “Right of Obedience” with the mainstream jurists, and its subject, scope, and domain. Thus, the subject of the Right of Obedience has been clarified so far, and its proofs have also been stated. The subject of the Right of Obedience has only one condition, which is the permission of the Lawgiver. That is, the Right of Obedience is established by the intellect up to the point where the Lawgiver has not granted permission to omit it.
Question: …
Teacher: The intellect says it is necessary for you to act upon all apprehended obligations (including certain, probable, doubted, and even apprehended ones)… the primary principle in any place where there is no indicative evidence (Amarat) or proof is the necessity of performing that obligation.
Discussion of the Next Session
As I indicated at the beginning of yesterday’s discussion, the theory of the Right of Obedience has implications in reconciling real and apparent rulings, in the issue of acting upon probability, in the discussion of the probative force of a single-source narration (khabar al-wahid), in transgression (tajarri), and in summary knowledge (al-ilm al-ijmali). We will also point out these implications, and then, God willing, we will state its objections.
Question: …
Teacher: The probability of the non-existence of an obligation is not considered an excuse. The probability of an obligation is executive but not excusing. That is, if someone omits an obligation due to the probability that it is not established, and then it is proven that the obligation existed, this person is not excused, and his excuse is not accepted.