The Principle of Exemption (Bara’ah), Intellectual Exemption from Obligation, An Examination of Shahid Sadr’s Objections to the Fourfold Aspects
Session Forty-two
The Principle of Exemption from Obligation (Bara’ah) – Intellectual Exemption from Obligation (Bara’ah) – An Examination of Shahid Sadr’s Objections to the Fourfold Aspects – The Theoretical Implications of the Right of Obedience (Haqq al-Ta’ah) Theory – The First, Second, Third, and Fourth Implications
November 17, 2025
The Implications of the Right of Obedience (Haqq al-Ta’ah) Theory
In the previous session, in order to examine Shahid Sadr’s objections to the fourfold aspects of the ugliness of punishment without declaration, we briefly explained the theory of the “Right of Obedience” (Haqq al-Ta’ah). In that discourse, both the subject matter of this theory and its scope and qualification were clarified, and it became evident what his primary objection is to the well-known (Mashhur) view on this matter.
Another point remains, after which, God willing, we will proceed to a more detailed examination of this theory. Since this point has also been a subject of inquiry and question, a brief reference to it seems necessary.
In any case, adherence to the ugliness of punishment without declaration entails certain consequences in the principles of jurisprudence (Usul al-Fiqh), and its denial will certainly yield different results. That is, whether we say that intellect rules on the ugliness of punishment without declaration, or does not deem it ugly, and consequently, in cases of potential obligation, establishes the default rule on precaution (Ihtiyat).
The First Implication
Based on the theory of the Right of Obedience, the most general Practical Principle is the “Principle of Precaution” (Asalat al-Ihtiyat); because the engagement of responsibility (Ishtighal al-Dhimmah) is established in general, or is at least probable, and its discharge (Faragh) must also become certain. According to this view, the responsibility of the duty-bound (Mukallaf) is engaged with every potential obligation. This perspective differs from the theory that considers the engagement of responsibility to occur only in the event of the arrival and declaration of the obligation. In the theory of the Right of Obedience, with the probability of any obligation, the responsibility is engaged, and it is necessary to practice precaution until certainty of the exemption of responsibility is achieved. The basis of this matter is the inclusion of the Right of Obedience with respect to all recognized obligations, in whatever manner, whether the recognition is complete or incomplete.
This is an analytical method of deduction that is argued and relied upon in numerous instances, and our jurists, in many cases, make this primary principle the basis of their verdicts (Fatawa). It is obvious that there is a fundamental difference between whether the most general Practical Principle is the Principle of Precaution or the Principle of Exemption from Obligation. According to this theory, the jurist can depart from this intellectual Principle of Precaution in only two instances:
- First: Where he finds categorical evidence negating the obligation and attains certainty that no obligation exists.
- Second: Where, despite the probability of the obligation, the jurist attains certainty that the Lawgiver / Legislator has issued a permission (Tarkhis) to omit that obligation.
In these two cases, the jurist is permitted to depart from the Principle of Engagement (Asalat al-Ishtighal).
Of course, he has also mentioned two other cases (namely, the instances where the jurist waives the Principle of Engagement) making a total of four cases; however, since their practical result conforms to the Principle of Engagement, they have not been mentioned. Those interested can refer to his lectures on Usul and the book “Al-Halaqat” for further study. Therefore, on this basis, the primary principle is precaution in every place where an obligation is deemed probable, except in the two aforementioned states.
The permission to omit precaution is sometimes in such a way that the Lawgiver / Legislator establishes authority (Hujjiyyah) for non-categorical indicative evidence; for example, He has said: “Deem the trustworthy to be truthful” (Saddiq al-Thiqah). When Zurarah, who is trustworthy, says: “The Friday prayer is not obligatory,” we are permitted to omit this obligation despite the probability of its obligatoriness. In such cases, the indicative evidence (the report of Zurarah) becomes a permit for departing from the primary principle (precaution). Sometimes it is also in the form of establishing a principle such as “The Principle of Lawfulness” (Asalat al-Hiliyyah); for example, when the Lawgiver / Legislator says: “Everything is lawful for you,” He has in fact issued permission to omit precaution and allowed non-compliance with the potential obligation.
Sometimes, permission to omit precaution is not granted, such as in cases where He establishes the Principle of Precaution, like the precautions that must be observed in matters of blood, private parts, and property; there, permission to omit precaution is not given. Or, for example, when He establishes authority for an indicative evidence and says: “Deem the trustworthy to be truthful” in a report that places an obligation upon us, this means the necessity of acting upon it. For instance, if the indicative evidence says: “The Friday prayer is not obligatory,” this is for the duty-bound equivalent to permission to omit acting upon that potential obligation. But if Zurarah brings news that “The Friday prayer is obligatory,” this actually means that you have no right to omit this potential obligation.
Thus, according to the school of “the Right of Obedience,” the most general principle that a jurist can utilize is the “Principle of Engagement” or “Intellectual Precaution.” However, according to the school of the ugliness of punishment without declaration, the most general principle is the “Principle of Exemption from Obligation.” This indicates a specific method of deduction, and there is a great difference whether, in cases of doubt and probability of obligation, the primary principle and the requirement of the judgment of intellect is exemption or engagement.
The Second Implication
Shahid Sadr believes that the problems the well-known (Mashhur) scholars have with the issue of establishing authority (Hujjiyyah) for indicative evidences (Amarat) are resolved according to the school of the Right of Obedience. He states: If we believe in the ugliness of punishment without declaration, we face problems that we must inevitably resolve in some way; just as the well-known scholars offered solutions for those problems, which themselves are subject to objections. Whereas, according to the theory of the Right of Obedience, those problems are removed.
He states: In certain cases, the well-known scholars must commit to the Special Specification (Takhsis) of the rule of the ugliness of punishment without declaration, whereas if the ugliness of punishment without declaration is an intellectual rule and a judgment of intellect, it does not accept Special Specification; it cannot be said that punishment without declaration is intellectually ugly, except in these cases! Because the judgment of intellect is not subject to Special Specification. While if we commit to precaution and consider the performance of every potential obligation necessary, we no longer face this problem.
The Third Implication
According to the school of the Right of Obedience, the “daring transgressor” (Mutajari) deserves punishment, whereas according to the foundation of the ugliness of punishment without declaration, the daring transgressor does not deserve punishment. Because according to the theory of the Right of Obedience, the subject of the Right of Obedience is mere discovery (Inkishaf), whether this discovery is complete or incomplete. As was stated yesterday, the subject of the Right of Obedience is neither the actual existence of the obligation, nor the actual existence of the obligation plus its discovery. What constitutes the subject is solely the discovery itself. Therefore, whenever the duty-bound assumes an obligation—whether with certainty, probability, doubt, or illusion—he must perform it; because the subject of the Right of Obedience is the discovered obligation.
Otherwise, if discovery is not realized, or discovery is realized but there was no obligation in reality, the Right of Obedience is no longer established. Thus, the Right of Obedience is established where the duty-bound reaches a degree of discovery (even if illusory) regarding the obligations, whether the obligation exists in reality or not.
If we consider the subject of the Right of Obedience to be composed of “the actual existence of the obligation” and “discovery,” then naturally the daring transgressor has not disrupted the Right of Obedience; because the assumption is that no obligation exists in reality. So, although discovery has been realized, because there is no obligation in reality, the Right of Obedience is not established in the case of the daring transgressor. Therefore, in this assumption, the daring transgressor does not deserve punishment. This is the case if we consider the subject of the Right of Obedience to be composed of the actual obligation and discovery.
But if we say that the subject of the Right of Obedience is solely “discovery,” as was previously pointed out and explained—and this is also the view of Shahid Sadr himself—the “daring transgressor” deserves punishment; because the existence of the actual obligation no longer has subject-specificity, whether there is an obligation in reality or not. As soon as an obligation is deemed probable, the subject of the “Right of Obedience” is realized, so its performance becomes necessary. The daring transgressor also, with knowledge of the obligation, abandons it, even though in reality there is no obligation; because the actual existence of the obligation is not the subject for the Right of Obedience.
In the view of Shahid Sadr, the intellect, out of regard for the right of the Master and out of respect for the Master, considers compliance necessary. The daring transgressor has certainty of the obligation, while in reality there is no obligation. If he does not act upon this discovered obligation, he has in fact violated the respect of the Master, opposed the right of mastership, and failed to observe the Right of Obedience; therefore, he deserves punishment, and in this respect, he is no different from the disobedient one (Asi). Because the disobedient one has opposed a discovered obligation that has reality. The daring transgressor has also opposed a discovered obligation, except that where disobedience is realized, this discovered obligation also has a reality, but in daring transgression (Tajari), there is no actual obligation beyond the discovered obligation. Thus, both are common in this respect that they have not observed the right of the Master, have ignored it, and have violated his respect, and therefore both are intellectually deserving of punishment. However, according to the school of the well-known, only the disobedient one deserves punishment, and the daring transgressor does not deserve punishment.
The Fourth Implication
According to the school of the Right of Obedience, the possibility of permission (Tarkhis) in all sides of cumulative knowledge (Ilm Ijmali) exists; but according to the school of the ugliness of punishment without declaration, such a possibility does not exist. The explanation of this is as follows:
Where we have certainty of the obligatoriness of the Friday prayer; in other words, we have detailed knowledge (Ilm Tafsili), here it is impossible for the Lawgiver / Legislator to permit opposition. Because this would mean that on one hand, the Lawgiver / Legislator says: you must perform the Friday prayer (the meaning of certainty and detailed knowledge is this; i.e., I am certain the Lawgiver / Legislator has commanded the performance of the Friday prayer), and on the other hand, if permission and allowance of opposition to detailed knowledge is given, its meaning is that you can omit the Friday prayer, which is impossible. Therefore, the possibility of permission from the Master and the Lawgiver / Legislator with respect to opposition to “detailed knowledge” does not exist.
But in “cumulative knowledge,” the discussion is whether the Lawgiver / Legislator can permit opposition to cumulative knowledge or not? For example, you have cumulative knowledge that at Friday noon, either the Friday prayer is obligatory or the noon prayer; that is, you have cumulative knowledge of the obligatoriness of one of these two. Can the Lawgiver / Legislator say: I permit you at Friday noon to perform neither of these two? This is permission in opposition to cumulative knowledge.
The point is that raising this question is a real-status (Thubuti) discussion, not an evidentiary (Ithbati) one. We do not want to see whether the Lawgiver / Legislator has done such a thing or not; we want to see if such a thing is “possible” from the side of the Lawgiver / Legislator at all. Is it fundamentally possible for the Lawgiver / Legislator to do this? (For now, we are not seeking evidence to see if the Lawgiver / Legislator has done this in some place or not; we are merely examining its possibility). According to the theory of the Right of Obedience, the possibility of permission in opposition to all sides of cumulative knowledge exists. But according to the foundation of the ugliness of punishment without declaration, such a possibility does not exist.
This might seem strange how, under the assumption of accepting the theory of the Right of Obedience, the possibility of opposition (i.e., permission of opposition) is given? That is, according to the theory of the Right of Obedience, it is “possible” for the Lawgiver / Legislator to permit us to oppose cumulative knowledge; that is, to permit, for example, all sides of cumulative knowledge to be committed if it is prohibitory, or all sides of cumulative knowledge to be omitted if it is obligatory. In this very example of the Friday prayer and the noon prayer, the Lawgiver / Legislator might say: whenever you acquire cumulative knowledge of the obligatoriness of one of these two, omit both! This is one of the implications of the theory of the Right of Obedience… Yes! Because our minds have been shaped by that very intellectual exemption and the ugliness of punishment without declaration. Naturally, according to the school of the well-known, it makes no sense at all that permission to oppose all sides of cumulative knowledge be given. But according to the school of the Right of Obedience, this is possible.
Discussion of the Next Session
Due to limited time and the end of the session, and the need of this discussion for further explanation, we defer this topic to tomorrow, and God willing, after presenting the fifth implication, we will proceed to examine the objections.