The Principle of Exemption (Bara’ah), The Proofs of Exemption, The First Proof: The Book, The Second Verse
Session Fifty
The Principle of Exemption from Obligation (Bara’ah), The Proofs of Exemption, The First Proof: The Book, The Second Verse, Analysis of the Second Verse, Al-Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini’s Discourse on the Fourth Interpretation and Its Analysis, Al-Muhaqqiq al-Iraqi’s Discourse, Part One, Part Two
December 6, 2025
Summary of the Previous Session
We noted that certain verses of the Holy Quran have been utilized to establish the Principle of Exemption from Obligation (Bara’ah) in cases of doubt regarding the obligation, which is the context of doubt regarding the obligation (al-shakk fi-l-taklif). The first verse was examined, and the conclusion was that this verse can serve as a proof for exemption.
The second verse was the verse “Allah does not charge a soul except [according to] what He has given it” (la yukallifu Allahu nafsan illa ma ataha). First, the formulation of the argument based on this verse was outlined. It was stated that the meaning of the verse from the perspective of the arguer is: “Allah does not obligate a soul except with the obligation He has given it” (la yukallifu Allahu nafsan illa taklifan ataha). In this formulation, “ma” was interpreted as ‘obligation’ and “ataha” was interpreted as the announcement and clarification of the obligation; meaning that “itaha al-taklif” means “bayan al-taklif” (the clarification of the obligation). This argument was subjected to objection.
The primary objection was that besides the interpretation outlined by the arguer, three other interpretations exist regarding the verse. Among these four interpretations, two interpretations are not suitable for the argument, one interpretation is conceptually impossible at the level of reality (maqam al-thubut), and only one interpretation is valid. And because various interpretations exist regarding this verse, the aforementioned argument is negated; therefore, “when the possibility arises, the argument is negated” (idha ja’a al-ihtimal batala al-istidlal). If the argument were possible according to the other interpretations, no obstacle would arise, and we would say that, at any rate, the verse indicates the claim; however, because four interpretations exist, based on three of which the verse is not useful for the argument, it can no longer be utilized to establish the argument.
Al-Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini’s Discourse on the Fourth Interpretation
The objection was directed primarily at the fourth interpretation, according to which this interpretation is conceptually impossible and mummified at the level of reality. Here, al-Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini, as if in response to the objector, wishes to state that the fourth interpretation is conceptually possible and seeks to reject its impossibility at the level of reality.
The fourth interpretation was that the relative pronoun “ma” in the verse has a comprehensive meaning; meaning a common denominator (qadr-e-jami’) that encompasses all meanings: both the meaning of obligation, the meaning of wealth, and the meaning of action and deed. This is because according to those three interpretations, the relative “ma” possessed a specific meaning in each; on one hand, “ataha” in one place meant the clarification of the obligation, in another place meant granting, and in another meant the granting of capability over the obligation, i.e., that action and deed which God has granted the person the capability to perform. In this case as well, they stated that according to the fourth interpretation, “itah” is interpreted as the common denominator, and the interpretation of “itah” will vary in accordance with the meaning of the relative “ma”.
The objector had objected that we cannot conceptualize a common denominator here; because the rank of the direct object (maf’ul bih) and the rank of the absolute object (maf’ul mutlaq) are not identical. The rank of the direct object is prior to the verb, whereas the rank of the absolute object is posterior to the verb—meaning that the absolute object is like an adjective for the verb. For example, it is said: “la yukallifu taklifan” (He does not obligate with an obligating duty), meaning God does not obligate, an obligating duty that has this characteristic. It possesses an adjectival aspect, and the adjective is always placed after the qualified noun. Conversely, the direct object is the opposite; it must be prior to the verb so that the action of the verb falls upon it.
Therefore, the direct object and the absolute object are, as it were, two mutually exclusive (mubayin) realities, and it is impossible to conceptualize a common denominator between them. How can two things, one of which must be prior to the verb and the other posterior to the verb, be conceptualized and combined within a single comprehensive meaning? This is the objection that exists against the fourth interpretation at the level of reality.
Of course, based on those other two interpretations as well, the verse is fundamentally not useful for the argument. Therefore, the primary focus is directed at two points: one is this fourth interpretation and its impossibility at the level of reality. Al-Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini has sought to conceptualize this common denominator and escape this objection.
He states: we can establish a common denominator between the direct object and the absolute object; in such a way that if we add the preposition “with” (bā’) of genitive (bā’ al-jarr) to the absolute object, we can treat it like the direct object. For example, we say: “la yukallifu Allahu illa bi-taklifin” (Allah does not obligate except with an obligation) or “la yukallifu Allahu bi-taklifin kadha” (Allah does not obligate with such-and-such an obligation).
Now, how can we combine these two and consider a common denominator?
He states: obligation (wujub) and prohibition (tahrim) possess an infinitive meaning (ma’na masdari) and a verbal-noun meaning (ma’na ism-masdari). The essence of his statement is: the infinitive meaning of enjoining (iyjab) means making obligatory, and the infinitive meaning of prohibiting (tahrim) means making prohibited; however, the verbal-noun meaning is being obligatory and being prohibited. Therefore, making obligatory is the infinitive meaning, and being obligatory is the verbal-noun meaning; and the same applies to prohibiting.
Now, what common denominator and comprehensive meaning can be conceptualized between these two? In real terms, we cannot conceptualize a common denominator between them; because making obligatory and making prohibited cannot be realized prior to the construction (insha’) by the Master. However, the verbal-noun meaning—meaning being obligatory and being prohibited—can be conceptualized figuratively prior to the construction. In other words, conceptualizing the verbal-noun meaning at the stage prior to the construction does not face any obstacle. Since the objection was that the absolute object cannot be prior to the verb, whereas the direct object is prior to the verb; hence, no common denominator exists between them.
However, we can conceptualize the existence of the verbal-noun meaning prior to the verb, just as is the case regarding the direct object; we conceptualize the direct object prior to the verb so that the action of the verb falls upon it. Therefore, we can also conceptualize the absolute object prior to the verb, and this is indeed possible figuratively.
In terms of phrasing and articulation as well, if the absolute object is expressed with a preposition, it acquires the ruling of the direct object, as though it is the direct object. Therefore, he states: the common denominator between these two is an object upon which the preposition bā’ has entered; and this can be applied both to the absolute object and to the direct object. Therefore, the fourth interpretation is possible at the level of reality.
Critique of the Discourse of al-Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini
Now, does this path proposed by al-Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini really establish the conceptual possibility of this interpretation or not?
It appears that conceptualizing a common denominator between these two is in reality difficult. Of course, he stated that figuratively and with a degree of leniency, we can conceptualize the matter in such a way that we can utilize a common denominator. However, the direct object and the absolute object fundamentally possess different relations and additions to the verb; and because they possess different relations, they are fundamentally not combinable.
According to his view, if we wish to conceptualize a common denominator, we must, in a single usage (isti’mal), assume two different types of relation and addition between the verb and these two objects; two types of relation exist whose natures are also different from each other. Therefore, one is prior to the verb and the other is posterior; one must be prior to the verb and the other posterior. That we figuratively and with a degree of leniency place, for example, the absolute object prior to the verb and in the rank of the direct object lacks any basis.
That we merely bring the preposition to the object and state that the issue is resolved with this preposition is not the case. If it were so, all mutually exclusive things in this universe would possess a common denominator. You can establish a common denominator between all mutually exclusive things through figurative speech; however, the common denominator must be actual and real. A figurative common denominator is in reality ineffective.
Al-Muhaqqiq al-Iraqi’s Discourse
Al-Muhaqqiq al-Iraqi possesses a more detailed discourse in this regard, taking a step further than the late al-Na’ini.
In the first stage, he states: the fourth interpretation is not conceptually impossible in the verse.
Subsequently, in the second stage, he states: we cannot extract this interpretation from the verse at the level of proof (maqam al-ithbat). That is, he transfers the problem to the domain of the level of proof, asserting that it is possible conceptually, but rejected at the level of proof. Then, in the third stage, he outlines another point.
As to why it is conceptually possible: because the relative pronoun “ma” in this verse is employed in its general meaning, namely, ‘thing’ (shay’): “Allah does not charge a soul except [according to] what He has given it”; “ma” means what? “ma” in its general meaning, namely, a thing or matter. This general meaning fundamentally has nothing to do with the specific characteristics and details of the instances. We are fundamentally not concerned with that common denominator which some have mentioned; this very apparent meaning of the word itself, naturally, this ‘thing’ is applicable to different instances.
Therefore, it applies to wealth, to clarification, to obligation, and to the action and deed of the mukallaf; it can apply to all of these. That is, the relationship between the relative “ma” and these meanings is the relationship of the universal to the particular; these are its instances. Or, in other words, it is the general and the instance; these are its individuals and instances.
However, the word “ataha” also acquires a different meaning depending on “ma”: if “ma” applies to obligation, “ataha” becomes “bestowal”; if it applies to action, “ataha” becomes “iyta’u qudrah” (giving capability and power); and if it applies to wealth, “ataha” is interpreted as what God has granted. Therefore, the objection is invalid and the conceptual obstacle is removed. Why?
Because the objection arises when we wish to apply and interpret “ma” in relation to specific characteristics and particular instances; when we say “ma” means wealth, or means action, or means obligation; then we also interpret “ataha” in its various meanings, and there we are compelled to conceptualize a common denominator. However, here we no longer require a common denominator; rather, we say that the word “ma” is employed in its general meaning. “ataha” is also interpreted in accordance with the case to which “ma” applies.
This is similar to all relative pronouns. In the case of relative pronouns, you never pay attention to the relationship and addition between the relative pronouns, such as what kind of relation it has; it is clear that the meaning of the relative pronoun and its clause (silah wa mawsul) can vary.
After this first stage, where he states that there is no obstacle to this meaning at the level of reality, he states: our problem is at the level of proof; meaning that on the basis of the fourth interpretation, the verse cannot establish exemption. Now, pay close attention to what the problem is. I will outline it in brief.
He states that the verse has absolute application (itlaq); the absolute application of the verse also encompasses exemption. Naturally, the first interpretation mentioned here (namely, what the arguer mentioned and on the basis of which he considered the verse to indicate exemption) is also within the scope of this verse’s application; meaning that the absolute application of the verse also encompasses that meaning. However, an obstacle exists against the absolute application which prevents us from relying upon it. Thus, the conducive ground (muqtadi) for the absolute application exists, but in contrast, an obstacle (mani’) also exists.
The obstacle is the existence of the definitive minimum in the context of address (qadr-e-mutaqayyan fi maqam al-takhatub). They say: one of the conditions for relying upon the absolute application is the non-existence of the definitive minimum in the context of address. If such a thing exists, we cannot resort to the absolute application.
Now, what is the definitive minimum in the context of address here? Wealth. Meaning, one of these cases to which “ma” applies—because the verse is regarding spending; the preceding and subsequent phrases are regarding wealth and monetary spending: “Let a man of wealth spend from his wealth…”; it is clear that this verse is regarding wealth. Therefore, the existence of this definitive minimum from the meaning of this word prevents relying upon the absolute application. Thus, this problem returns to the level of proof.
Question: …
Professor: Fundamentally, whether the definitive minimum in the context of address is a condition for the validity of relying upon the absolute application is itself a subject of debate. The late Akhund mentioned this point, and subsequently many have rejected it.
Therefore, he states that at the level of reality, the verse has no problem and also encompasses that meaning which the arguer intends, and the conducive ground for it exists, but we cannot rely upon its absolute application. Consequently, that interpretation is fundamentally excluded from the scope of utilizing the verse; because the verse, according to this definitive minimum, applies to that very meaning of wealth and monetary spending, and is no longer related to exemption.
The Topic of the Next Session
A third point has also been proposed by him, and we must subsequently analyze whether these three points raised by al-Muhaqqiq al-Iraqi here are complete and perfect. I will present this discussion tomorrow, God willing.