The Principle of Exemption (Bara’ah), Intellectual Exemptionfrom Obligation, Reviewing Shahid al-Sadr’s Critiques of the Fourfold Aspects
Session Forty-three
The Principle of Exemption from Obligation (Bara’ah) – Intellectual Exemption – Reviewing Shahid al-Sadr’s Critiques of the Fourfold Aspects – Theoretical Implications of the Fourth Aspect – The Fifth Aspect – Reviewing the Theory of the Right of Obedience (Haqq al-Ta’ah) – The First Critique
November 17, 2025
Summary of the Previous Session
A portion of the late Shahid al-Sadr’s view remains to be discussed, after which, God willing, we will proceed to examine the theory of the “Right of Obedience” (Haqq al-Ta’ah). Previously, we presented discussions regarding the core of this theory, his disagreement with the mainstream consensus (Mashhur), as well as the subject matter, conditions, and scope of this theory. The implications of this theory were also pointed out; however, one or two other implications remain, which we will mention, God willing, before providing a brief critique and evaluation of the theory.
The Fourth Aspect
The fourth aspect, the introduction of which we addressed yesterday, is that based on the discourse of the Right of Obedience, the possibility of “permission for non-compliance” (Tarkhis) exists in the cases of cumulative knowledge (‘Ilm al-Ijmali); whereas, according to the mainstream view, such permission in the cases of cumulative knowledge is impossible. Of course, this discussion is ontological (Thubuti) rather than epistemological/evidentiary (Ithbati); meaning we are not searching the textual proofs to see whether such permission has actually been issued or not, but rather we are solely in the position of examining whether, intellectually, the possibility of permission for non-compliance in the cases of cumulative knowledge exists or not.
In cumulative knowledge regarding the obligation of one of two matters, two sides exist:
- The probability of obligation on one side (such as the probability of the obligation of the Zuhr prayer on Friday noon).
- The probability of obligation on the opposing side (such as the probability of the obligation of the Friday prayer on Friday noon).
According to the discourse of the Right of Obedience, both the certain knowledge of an obligation is actualized/binding (Munajjas) and the probability of the obligation; however, the binding nature of probability is different from the binding nature of certainty. If we possess detailed knowledge (‘Ilm al-Tafsili) and attain certainty regarding an obligation, this is binding, and it is meaningless for the Lawgiver to issue a permission for non-compliance regarding it. However, if it is a matter of probability, although the binding nature of probability is indisputable, the Lawgiver can still issue a permission for non-compliance regarding it.
In other words, by the judgment of intellect, the binding nature of probability is suspended upon the absence of an apparent permission (Tarkhis al-Zahiri) from the Master (Mawla). That is, the intellect rules that the requirement of the Right of Obedience and the Right of Mastership (Haqq al-Mawlawiyyah) is that the obligation, as soon as it is perceived—and at any degree of perception and discovery—must be performed; the very concept referred to as “precaution” (Ihtiyat). However, this is conditional upon the Lawgiver (the Master) himself not having issued an apparent permission for non-compliance regarding it.
Therefore, it is true that we have a probability of obligation on both sides of cumulative knowledge, and this probability possesses a binding nature; but the binding nature of probability according to the discourse of the Right of Obedience is contingent upon the absence of an apparent permission from the Lawgiver, and this implies the possibility of non-compliance with cumulative knowledge. For instance, we deem it probable that on Friday noon, the Friday prayer is obligatory, and we deem it probable that the Zuhr prayer is obligatory. Each of these two probabilities is binding for us, but on the condition that the Lawgiver has not permitted omission.
Thus, it is possible for the Lawgiver to grant permission for non-compliance regarding the omission of either of these obligations (whether the Zuhr prayer or the Friday prayer). Therefore, in terms of the ontological stage and based on this discourse, we can state that the possibility of non-compliance with the sides of cumulative knowledge exists. It is true that if both sides are non-complied with, it will ultimately lead to definitive non-compliance (Mukhalafah Qat’iyyah); nevertheless, the Holy Lawgiver can take such action. It is possible for the Lawgiver to issue a permission for non-compliance in each of the sides of cumulative knowledge, even if this permission leads to definitive non-compliance. However, according to the discourse of the “Ugliness of punishment without declaration” (Qubh al-Iqab bila Bayan), the possibility of permitting non-compliance with all sides of cumulative knowledge fundamentally does not exist. Please note that the discussion is about “definitive non-compliance,” not “probabilistic non-compliance.” This discussion is considered another implication of this theory.
The Fifth Aspect
In discussing the Verse of Departure (Ayat al-Nafr) to prove the authority of the solitary report (Khabar al-Wahid), Shahid al-Sadr states that based on this discourse, the binding rulings of the Sharia become actualized/binding by means of a probabilistic solitary report, and are no longer dependent on the legislative assignment of authority (Hujjiyyah) to the solitary report. In other words, even if we do not consider the solitary report to be authoritative, any report that is established and contains the declaration of an obligation will be binding for us by the judgment of intellect, even if we have no proof for the authority of the solitary report. This is because, ultimately, when that report is established, it instills the probability of an obligation, and this is sufficient for the necessity of following that obligation, since every probable obligation, according to the theory of the Right of Obedience, must be followed.
However, according to the discourse of the Ugliness of punishment without declaration, as long as the solitary report is not deemed authoritative, it is not considered a “declaration” (Bayan). Consequently, punishment for omitting an obligation that is merely deemed probable, while there is no valid proof for it, would be ugly. This is the fundamental difference between these two discourses.
Question: Then practically, it has no fruit.
Teacher: If you want to say this, you must say it regarding the core of the issue: fundamentally, this is a pointless discussion; why should one set aside the scriptural exemption from obligation (Bara’ah al-Shar’iyyah), which is accepted, and look for intellectual proof? … The same applies to the fourth aspect; ultimately, there is a theoretical fruit. At most, one can say it has no practical fruit, but it is undoubtedly a scholarly discussion with scholarly fruits.
Question: […]
Teacher: His discussion is that if we accept this discourse, the issue of the authority of the solitary report is bypassed, and there is no need to search for its proofs.
In any case, the structure of the theory of the Right of Obedience, along with its implications, scope, and conditions, has been briefly explained.
The denial of intellectual exemption from obligation is also based on this very theory, because based on the theory of the Right of Obedience, he has denied the Ugliness of punishment without declaration.
Reviewing the Theory of the Right of Obedience
Now the question is whether this theory is acceptable or not? If we were to address all parts and aspects of his view and all the statements he has made in various places, it would require a vast space. However, in brief, we will mention some of the critiques directed at this theory so that it becomes clear whether the punishment without declaration is ugly or not, or in other words, whether intellectual exemption from obligation can be proven or not.
The First Critique
The first critique is, in fact, a foundational critique directed at a theological premise that has been relied upon in his arguments, which is the connection between the legislative mastership (Mawlawiyyah al-Tashri’iyyah) of God and His existential mastership (Mawlawiyyah al-Takwiniyyah). The meaning of God’s existential mastership is clear: God is the Creator, Owner, Sustainer of this world, and the True Bestower of Blessings. God Himself states in the Holy Qur’an: “Allah is the Guardian (al-Wali)”, which refers to the existential mastership of God in this world. Alongside this guardianship, God also possesses legislative mastership; in the sense that He has the right of legislation, commanding, and forbidding. He both creates the beings and has the right to command that this action be performed and that action be abandoned. Of course, this legislative mastership is rooted in that very existential mastership. Why do we say God has the right of legislation? Because fundamentally, legislation is exclusive to God. No one other than God can legislate. Others can only command and forbid with the permission of God. It is also indisputable that the exclusivity of this right to God stems from that very existential mastership. Thus:
- Firstly, God possesses existential mastership.
- Secondly, God possesses legislative mastership, which is rooted in that very existential mastership.
- Thirdly, obedience to this Master is necessary. That is, we humans, as servants and slaves of God, are duty-bound to follow His law. The necessity of compliance and obedience to the Master is also indisputable.
These three points are accepted, and even the mainstream consensus accepts them; meaning both the late Shahid al-Sadr and the mainstream accept these three points.
The dispute lies solely in the limits of legislative mastership. That is, the limits of the Right of Mastership and the Right of Obedience are disputed. Its core is accepted by everyone, and the disagreement is over where the scope of legislative mastership and the limits of obedience lie. The entire discussion is concentrated on this very point.
The critique directed at the late Shahid al-Sadr is at this very point: why does he consider the breadth of legislative mastership to be a function of the breadth of existential mastership? Why does he not differentiate between legislation (Tashri’) and existence (Takwin) in this regard? Fundamentally, the realm of legislation should not be analogized to the realm of existence. The realm of legislation is in the domain of conventional/construct affairs (I’tibariyyat), whereas the realm of existence pertains to realities (Haqa’iq), and analogizing conventional affairs to real affairs is incorrect.
God, Blessed and Exalted be He, possesses mastership. He has existential mastership. The entire universe is created, owned, and under His governance, and in this regard, it is absolute. The core of legislative mastership is also established as a consequence of that existential mastership. God has the right of legislation, but whether we should assume absoluteness in the domain of legislation and say that the scope of God’s conventions in the realm of legislation follows the existential scope, this itself is subject to debate. Why have you assumed absoluteness in this domain as well? Fundamentally, the realm of convention is a realm different from the realm of existence.
We do not say here that there is no such connection, but deriving the conclusion of such mastership in the domain of legislation from that existential mastership is problematic; because it is based on analogizing conventional affairs to real affairs.
Naturally, if we do not accept this breadth in the domain of legislation, the limits of the Right of Obedience will differ, and the limits of the intellectual judgment regarding the necessity of complying with the Master’s commands will also change. If we consider the Right of Mastership to be absolute, the Right of Obedience also becomes absolute; but if we consider legislative mastership as a conventional matter, it will be different from existential mastership.
When we say God’s legislative mastership is conventional, we do not mean to negate the core of this right. Fundamentally, the fact that God has this guardianship to legislate is rooted in that very existential mastership, and there is no discussion about its core. However, to say that within its scope, this right also has no limitation and is absolute, simply because it is so in existence, is a false analogy; it is analogizing conventional affairs to real affairs and analogizing the realm of legislation to the realm of existence.
Of course, we can rely on the principle of harmony between legislation and existence. The principle of harmony between legislation and existence is accepted, but to consider the realm of legislation to be identical to the realm of existence in all details, limits, boundaries, and scope is the very point of contention. This is the root, foundation, and basis of the theory of the Right of Obedience. The main problem lies in this premise.
If we want to state the critique in two sentences, we say: Why does Shahid al-Sadr consider the breadth of legislative mastership to be a function of the breadth of existential mastership, and why does he analogize the realm of legislation to the realm of existence? It is this very matter that leads to his view that: performing every probable obligation is necessary, because God’s mastership is broad and absolute, hence the probability of obligation is also binding. We critique this very argument.