The Principle of Exemption (Bara’ah), The Proofs of Exemption, Second Proof

Session Seventy-Seven

The Principle of Exemption (Bara’ah), The Proofs of Exemption, Second Proof: Narrations, First Narration: The Hadith of Lifting, Examination of the Indicative Value of the Hadith of Lifting, 2. The Relative Pronoun “ma”, Second Topic: Examination of the Exclusivity or Non-Exclusivity of “ma” to Particular Doubts, The Five Paths, The Second Path, The Objection of Several Eminent Scholars to the Fourth Response, The Third Path

January 24, 2026

Summary of the Previous Session

The discussion was on the paths and proofs indicating the exclusivity of the Hadith of Lifting to particular doubts (shubhat mawdu’iyyah). The second path, namely the issue of the unity of context (wahdat al-siyaq), was examined and subjected to objection. Responses have been presented to this path and objections have been raised against it. The fourth response is that the unity of context relates to the utilizational intent (iradah isti’maliyyah), not the serious intent (iradah jiddiyyah). The relative pronoun ma in “ma la ya’lamun” (that which they do not know), “ma-dturru ilayh” (that which they are constrained to), “ma-stukrihu ‘alayh” (that which they are coerced into), and other phrases is utilized in one and the same meaning. However, they differ in their serious intent. In one place, the action is intended, and in another, what is broader, encompassing both the action and the ruling. Therefore, in “ma la ya’lamun”, both ruling-directed doubts (shubhat hukmiyyah) and particular doubts are intended, and this poses no problem regarding the unity of context. Consequently, the inclusion of the Hadith of Lifting regarding ruling-directed doubts is established, or at least, the lack of exclusivity to particular doubts is established.

The Objection of Several Eminent Scholars to the Fourth Response

The author of Muntaqa al-Usul has raised two objections to this response:

The First Objection

The claim that the unity of context relates to the utilizational intent, and not to the serious intent, is a claim without proof. He states: Your saying that the unity of context relates to the utilizational intent and that the serious intent falls outside the scope of the unity of context is merely a claim, and no proof has been established for this claim. Therefore, it is not clear that this matter is acceptable; on what basis do you restrict the unity of context only to the domain of the utilizational intent?

The Second Objection

Even if we assume (sallamna) that the unity of context relates to the utilizational intent and we set aside the first objection; does this unity in the utilizational intent actually exist or not?

The utilizational intent is, in fact, what is intended by the word and what the word is utilized in. In the previous session, we also stated that, for example, “honor the scholars” (akrim al-‘ulama’) indicates a general meaning; “the scholars” is utilized in the general meaning. Now, if a connected clue (qarinah muttasilah) is stated next to it, such as “honor the scholars except the sinners” (akrim al-‘ulama’ illa al-fasiq), whether in the form of an exception or description, meaning “honor the righteous scholar” (akrim al-‘alim al-‘adil), here what is meant by the scholar in this sentence is the righteous scholar, not the sinner. If you recall, they stated that when a specific or connected clue comes, it prevents the formulation of the general’s apparent meaning (zuhur al-‘amm) in its generality. However, this is not so in the case of a disconnected clue (qarinah munfasilah). In a case where a general word is utilized, and subsequently the specific is stated in a disconnected manner, that disconnected clue or disconnected specifying element (mukhassis munfasil) prevents the binding authority (hujjiyyah) of the general in its generality, not its zuhur, because the zuhur in generality was formulated prior to the arrival of this clue. What the disconnected clue and disconnected specifying element do is that they prevent that generality from becoming a binding authority, and obstruct the hujjiyyah of the general.

On this basis, in something like the Hadith of Lifting where ma is repeated in several phrases, all of these are in the position of a connected clue, and the connected clue relates to that very utilizational intent. Therefore, we cannot say that in “ma la ya’lamun” and “ma-dturru ilayh”, ma is utilized in one and the same meaning. Their utilizational intent itself differs from one another. If there is to be a unity of context, the action must be intended in all of them.

Because in the fourth response, ma does not possess the meaning of an ambiguous thing such that we would say it is in one and the same meaning in all phrases. Ultimately, whatever meaning they intend from ma, considering the connection of these phrases to one another, they are in the position of a connected clue and prevent ma from being utilized in one and the same meaning in these cases.

If we say ma is in the meaning of an ambiguous thing which its conjunct clause (silah) removes from ambiguity, and that also differs in the stage of application—similar to what Muhaqqiq Ha’iri and, following him, Muhaqqiq Khoei stated—that is another discussion. However, he wants to say that the utilizational intent of ma in all these phrases is unified, and the unity of context exists. However, the objection of the author of Muntaqa [al-Usul] is that here the utilizational intent is not unified.

Therefore, considering that in the other phrases ma is interpreted as action, if we want to interpret it here as action and ruling, the unity of context is destroyed. Thus, the second objection is that the relative pronoun ma in these phrases does not possess unity even according to the utilizational intent.

Conclusion of the Discussion on the Second Path

Therefore, the conclusion of all we have mentioned (fa-tahassala mimma dhakarna kulluh) is that the second path also cannot prove the exclusivity of the Hadith of Lifting to particular doubts and external actions. The correct response to this path is the very one Muhaqqiq Ha’iri stated. It is a robust and firm statement: that ultimately, ma was coined to indicate an ambiguous thing and was utilized in that very meaning, and in all phrases it is in this meaning, with no change occurring in the meaning of ma. Except that since the conjunct clause is stated to clarify the relative pronoun in order to remove it from ambiguity, the conjunct clauses in these phrases are different. The difference that arises between them in terms of inclusion and non-inclusion with respect to the ruling relates to external application, because its instances and cases are different; in one place, it is restricted to action, such as “ma la yatiqun” (that which they cannot bear), and in another place, it is broader, encompassing both action and ruling, such as “ma la ya’lamun”. Therefore, the second path is also ruled out.

The Third Path

The claim is the exclusivity of the Hadith of Lifting to particular doubts. If this exclusivity is proven, this hadith is no longer of use for Exemption, and we cannot cite this hadith in obligatoriness-directed and prohibition-directed doubts—which are the subject of our discussion—to prove Exemption.

Now, the third path for proving the exclusivity of the Hadith of Lifting to particular doubts is that:

We previously stated that in phrases such as “ma-dturru ilayh” or “ma-stukrihu ‘alayh”, the attribution of lifting to the relative pronoun ma is a figurative attribution. That is, we need a legitimizing factor (musahhih) in order to attribute lifting to “ma la yatiqun”. “Ma la yatiqun” or “ma-dturru ilayh” cannot be directly lifted, so the lifting requires implying an omitted element, which is the actual lifted object (marfu’). Because it makes no sense for necessity or coercion itself to be lifted. For all of these exist among the Prophet’s nation; they have not been ontologically removed. Therefore, it must be said that all effects (jamy’ al-athar) have been removed, meaning we must imply something as omitted; “the lifting of all effects of the coerced action or the constrained action”; this is the legitimizing factor for the attribution, that we attribute lifting to all effects rather than to it itself.

Now, if in “ma la ya’lamun” the relative pronoun is exclusive to action and does not encompass rulings and ruling-directed doubts, like them, the attribution of lifting to “ma la ya’lamun” will be a figurative attribution. That is, if what is meant by ma in “ma la ya’lamun” is a particular doubt and external action, since lifting cannot be directly attributed to “ma la ya’lamun”, we must then imply something as omitted; that which is implied as omitted here is also, like the rest of the phrases, all effects, meaning “the lifting of all effects of ma la ya’lamun”, on the scale of the other phrases. Meaning all effects of the unknown action, all effects of the coerced action, all effects of the constrained action. Precisely in all phrases, in an identical manner, it is a figurative attribution through implying all effects as omitted, where lifting is literally attributed to those “all effects” and figuratively to that constrained or coerced action, and so forth.

Now, if we consider the relative pronoun in “ma la ya’lamun” to be broader and say: “ma la ya’lamun” means the action we do not know and the ruling we do not know has been lifted—meaning lifting attaches both to the action as an external subject and to the ruling—its requirement is that in one case the attribution is literal and in another case the attribution is figurative, and it is impossible in a single attribution for us to commit both literalness and figurative use, to observe both figurative and literal attribution. Because if we say what is meant by ma is the external subject, the matter is clear: “the lifting of the action that is doubted and you do not know”; if what is meant by ma is action, naturally like the rest of the cases this attribution is figurative, because the doubted action itself is not removed, but rather its effects are removed. However, if instead of action, what is meant by the relative pronoun ma is the ruling, here the attribution is no longer figurative, but rather a literal attribution, because the lifting of the ruling has no constraint. Lifting can literally be attributed to the unknown or doubted ruling, and we no longer need to imply something as omitted. If we say what is meant is ruling-directed doubts, they themselves become the lifted object. If what was meant by ma was action, we had to imply something as omitted: the lifting of all effects of the coerced action, all effects of the unknown action; however, if it is the ruling and duty, lifting can literally remove it itself, meaning “the lifting of the unknown ruling”. Therefore, the attribution in this case becomes a literal attribution, and in a single attribution, literal and figurative attributions cannot exist simultaneously; this is impossible. Ultimately, in a single attribution (the attribution of lifting to ma), we must either commit to figurative use and imply something as omitted, or commit to literalness and say nothing is implied as omitted; both cannot exist together.

Therefore, what the claimant states in the third path is that if we consider the Hadith of Lifting to encompass ruling-directed doubts, its requirement is the combination of two attributions (literal and figurative attribution) in a single attribution, and this is impossible; therefore, the Hadith of Lifting does not encompass ruling-directed doubts.

In short, this proof is a hypothetical syllonism (qiyas istithna’i) that the claimant mentioned, to the effect that: if the Hadith of Lifting encompasses ruling-directed doubts, it requires that in a single attribution both literal attribution and figurative attribution exist.

However, in a single attribution, both literal and figurative attributions cannot exist.

Therefore, the Hadith of Lifting does not encompass ruling-directed doubts.

Discussion of the Next Session

Now, is this proof correct or not? Muhaqqiq Khoei gave two responses to this path, and we shall also explain one answer.