The Principle of Exemption (Bara’ah), The Proofs of Exemption, Second Proof

Session Seventy-Three

The Principle of Exemption (Bara’ah), The Proofs of Exemption, Second Proof: Narrations, First Narration: The Hadith of Lifting, Examination of the Indicative Value of the Hadith of Lifting, 2. The Relative Pronoun “ma”, First Topic: The Literal or Figurative Nature of the Attribution, Possibilities in Figurative Attribution, The Second Possibility and Its Examination, The Third Possibility, Supports for the Third Possibility, Second Topic: Examination of the Exclusivity or Non-Exclusivity of “ma” to Particular Doubts

January 18, 2026

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Summary of the Previous Session

The discussion was on the premise that, assuming we accept the figurative nature of the attribution of lifting to “ma la ya’lamun” (that which they do not know), we need to imply a word as omitted (taqdir) in order for this attribution to be correct; therefore, we must imply a word as omitted. There are several possibilities regarding the implied omitted element (muqaddar). Some of these possibilities were stated by Sheikh Ansari in Al-Rasa’il, and we mentioned two possibilities:

The first possibility was that the word “punishment” (al-mu’akhadhah) is implied as omitted, and we explained the objections to this possibility.

The second possibility was that an effect among the effects of these descriptions is implied as omitted, namely the effect suitable for each description; for example, the effect suitable for coercion is validity (sihhah), so according to the Hadith of Lifting, this effect is lifted. Or in the case of necessity, or in the case of error; on this basis, the effect suitable for “ma la ya’lamun” is the obligation of precaution. The effect suitable with the unknown obligation is the obligatoriness of precaution. When it says: “rufi’a ma la ya’lamun”, it means the lifting of the obligatoriness of precaution for the sake of preserving the reality where the obligation is unknown; if the obligation was unknown, that important thing which is suitable for this matter is lifted, which is that very obligatoriness of precaution.

Examination of the Second Possibility

The First Objection

Considering the attribution of lifting to the description itself—which apparently is attributed to the entirety of this description—what is meant cannot be only a single effect. When it is said “rufi’a ma-stukrihu ‘alayh” (lifted is that which they are coerced into), if what is meant is the effect suitable for it, this would perhaps be contrary to the apparent meaning of the attribution of lifting to this description in a general manner, even if this effect is the apparent effect or is suitable for this description. But when it is attributed to this entirety, why should we restrict it to a single effect, even if that effect is an apparent effect?

Therefore, a single effect being the lifted object (marfu’) cannot be the legitimizing factor for the figurative attribution of lifting to the entirety and the whole of that description.

The Second Objection

Even assuming we set aside the first objection, the meaning of this statement is that the remaining effects remain. When you consider only a single effect from among several effects (even if that effect is the most prominent of them) to be lifted, it means that the remaining effects have not been lifted and remain. The existence of the remaining effects also indicates the survival of that very description in the domain of legislation, and this is incompatible with the apparent meaning of this hadith.

In other words, lifting a single effect and the survival of the remaining effects means the survival of that description itself, whereas when we observe “rufi’a ma la ya’lamun” or “lifted from my nation are nine,” it is as if the Prophet (PBUH) says: these matters have no place at all in the domain of legislation and formulation, and this is incompatible with the lifting of a single effect.

The spirit of these two objections is that it is contrary to the apparent meaning, but in each of these two objections, a certain aspect is observed.

Therefore, the second possibility—that the intended suitable effect, the apparent effect, or the most important effect is implied as omitted—is also rejected.

The Third Possibility

The Third Possibility: What is meant is all effects (jamy’ al-athar). “rufi’a ma la ya’lamun” is in the meaning of lifting all legislative effects resulting from “ma la ya’lamun”, and likewise in the case of “ma la yatiqun” and “ma-stukrihu ‘alayh”. Of course, there are some objections regarding some of the descriptions, and we shall examine them; how whisperings regarding creation and envy correspond with the rest of the descriptions will be examined later. Meaning that we are forced to deal with some of the phrases of this hadith and we must interpret them, but apart from that, regarding these very descriptions—those that relate to the duty-bound—all legislative effects resulting from them are lifted.

Supports for the Third Possibility

In light of the objections we raised against the two previous possibilities, we can infer the supports for this possibility.

First: When lifting is attributed to these descriptions themselves, it means all effects are intended, and therefore this can be the legitimizing factor for the attribution of lifting to this description itself; “rufi’a ma la ya’lamun” meaning “the lifting of all effects of ma la ya’lamun”, all legislative effects, everything that can result from “ma la ya’lamun” in the domain of legislation has been removed by virtue of this hadith.

Second: The Hadith of Lifting was introduced in the position of imtinan (granting a favor), and the requirement of this position is that all effects are removed. Naturally, imtinan, expressing a favor, kindness, and grace regarding these descriptions lies in removing all the effects that bind the people through these descriptions. Therefore, the position of imtinan dictates that all effects are removed.

Therefore, this is both in accordance with the apparent meaning of the hadith and in accordance with the position of imtinan; because imtinan upon the nation requires that all legislative effects of these matters be removed.

Accordingly, that which can be the legitimizing factor for this attribution is implying the words “all effects” as omitted.

If we accept the figurative nature of the attribution—which is our assumption; because other claims have also been raised here occasionally that this attribution is literal but through another explanation; we briefly stated one explanation from Muhaqqiq Na’ini that the lifting is attributed to “ma la ya’lamun” and this attribution is a literal attribution. We stated and examined his clues, evidences, and claim, and rejected them, and the result was that this attribution is a figurative attribution.

Some seek to state through another formulation that this attribution is a literal attribution. How can the attribution be both literal and the lifting attach to these matters themselves? If the attribution is literal, there is no longer any need for us to imply something as omitted. We say that since lifting cannot attach to these matters themselves, we must say there must be a figurative use in the attribution; whether a figurative use in the word or in the attribution. Or rather, some say that this attribution is literal because there is no problem at all in attributing lifting to these matters themselves, because the lifting is a claimed lifting (raf’ iddi’a’i), not an actual lifting. There is a difference between actual lifting and claimed lifting. Of course, this is different from actual and apparent lifting.

We previously raised a discussion regarding the word raf’, as to whether this lifting is apparent or actual, where we concluded that this lifting is apparent, not actual.

Some say this lifting here is claimed. What does this claimed lifting mean? A claimed lifting of what? What is the lifted object here? This itself has a discussion: whether the claimed lifting attaches to these matters themselves, their rulings, or what is on the liability of the duty-bound? Such a discussion exists here, which we shall examine later.

The main thing is what this “ma la ya’lamun” means. We said this hadith has parts, words are used in it: the word raf’, ma, and la ya’lamun; currently we must interpret what la ya’lamun itself means; does la ya’lamun mean lack of knowledge (‘adam al-‘ilm) in the sense of ignorance, or does it also encompass doubt? Or rather, does lack of knowledge mean lack of attention (‘adam al-iltifat)—ignorance, doubt, and heedlessness, the opposite of lack of attention is heedlessness. What does this la ya’lamun mean? Does it encompass all of these? It certainly does not encompass forgetfulness, because the description of forgetfulness (nisyan) is mentioned in this hadith itself; it does not encompass error and mistake, because He explicitly mentioned error subsequently: “ma akhta’u” (what they commit by error)… the source of error and forgetfulness is also heedlessness. What causes a human to make a mistake? Heedlessness. What causes a human to forget? (Of course, heedlessness differs from forgetfulness).

Therefore, the meaning of la ya’lamun must be determined, but prior to that, we must specify another matter regarding the word ma. Note: pay attention to the logical progression of the discussion.

Regarding lifting, first we said raf’ is in its literal meaning, not daf’; second, we said the lifting here is in the meaning of apparent lifting, not actual; third, we said that the relative pronoun ma here certainly cannot be these matters themselves in some of the phrases, such as “ma la yatiqun” and their likes, but rather what is meant is the objects of these matters. We also stated that, on this occasion, it is discussed whether the attribution of lifting to these objects is literal or figurative; we raised this discussion.

Second Topic: Examination of the Exclusivity or Non-Exclusivity of “ma” to Particular Doubts

Another discussion that is necessary to raise regarding ma is whether what is meant by this ma is the external action or the legislative ruling? Does “rufi’a ma la ya’lamun” mean the lifting of those external actions and subjects that are doubted, or the lifting of those rulings that are doubted? In other words, is “rufi’a ma la ya’lamun” exclusive to particular doubts, or does it also encompass ruling-directed doubts?

If we say it is exclusive to particular doubts, its meaning is that this hadith is of no use for proving Exemption. However, if we say it is broader, encompassing both particular doubts and ruling-directed doubts, we can cite this hadith to prove Exemption; because the very subject of our discussion here is whether, regarding doubted obligations and rulings about which we have doubt as to whether they are obligatory or forbidden (obligatoriness-directed doubts and prohibition-directed doubts), we can prove the lifting of the obligatoriness or the prohibition or not.

In addition, this itself is raised as an objection against the argumentation of the Hadith of Lifting. Therefore, it has become clear why we address this hadith as to whether what is meant by the relative pronoun ma is external actions or legislative rulings?

Some, in the position of objecting to the argumentation based on the Hadith of Lifting in the discussion of Exemption, stated that the relative pronoun in “ma la ya’lamun” is exclusive to particular doubts, which means that ma is in the meaning of the external action. Meaning that only where you doubt, for example, the wine-nature (khamriyyat) of something, does the Hadith of Lifting have efficiency.

In the view of the objector, what is meant by the relative pronoun ma in the Hadith of Lifting is external actions. Therefore, this hadith is of no use for the argumentation for Exemption. Whereas, our discussion in Exemption relates to the ruling itself, the doubted ruling itself. Therefore, we can no longer argue on the basis of this hadith. Sometimes we doubt whether this liquid is wine or not and whether this deed that I performed is drinking wine or not? At other times, the ruling of the liquid is doubted. Therefore, we raise this discussion.

Discussion of the Next Session

Here, those who objected to this hadith and stated that it is exclusive to particular doubts sought to prove this matter through five paths; they said by these five proofs, evidences, clues, and paths (of course, this was stated by various individuals) this hadith is exclusive to particular doubts, and what is meant by *ma is the doubted or unknown external action, and therefore we cannot argue on the basis of the hadith at all. We must examine these proofs to determine whether this hadith is exclusive to particular doubts or encompasses ruling-directed doubts as well.