The Principle of Exemption (Bara’ah), The Proofs of Exemption, Second Proof
Session Sixty-Nine
The Principle of Exemption (Bara’ah), The Proofs of Exemption, Second Proof: Narrations, First Narration: The Hadith of Lifting, Examination of the Indicative Value of the Hadith of Lifting, First Part: Lifting, Third Topic: Apparent or Actual Lifting?, Addendum to the Statement of Shahid Sadr, Objection to the Apparent Nature of Lifting
January 11, 2023
Summary of the Previous Session
The discussion is on the evidences and proofs for the apparent nature of the “lifting” in “rufi’a ma la ya’lamun” (lifted is that which they do not know). We have mentioned seven evidences and proofs for this matter, and though many of them were objected to, among them, what Muhaqqiq Iraqi stated was stronger than the other aspects.
Since the sixth and seventh evidences were derived from the words of Shahid Sadr, we addressed his statement accordingly. However, his statement has an addendum (tatimmah) that is not without benefit to mention.
Addendum to the Statement of Shahid Sadr
Before mentioning the sixth evidence, we stated that Shahid Sadr’s statement has several parts: one part has a negative aspect (ba’d-e salbi) regarding actual lifting, one part has a positive aspect (ba’d-e ijabi) regarding apparent lifting, and there is a third part. Thus far, we have explained the negative aspect. We also mentioned the two evidences for apparent lifting (which we said, in reality, indicate that it is not actual). This was from a few sessions ago. (Please pay attention to this progression of the discussion.)
Shahid Sadr, in contrast to those who believe that the lifting is actual, stated that this lifting cannot be actual. The sixth and seventh evidences were, in reality, Shahid Sadr’s responses to the two formulations established to prove that the lifting is actual.
The conclusion is that, in the first place, Shahid Sadr stated that this lifting is not actual.
If we say this lifting is not actual, it can be concomitant with it being apparent, although he himself explicitly states that we can say this lifting is apparent for two reasons and two proofs. This is the positive dimension of Shahid Sadr’s statement, which of course was mentioned previously in the course of the lectures and is reviewed only for emphasis.
He says: We derive from the Hadith of Lifting (nastazhir) that the “lifting” in this hadith is apparent, not actual, and this is due to two points:
The First Point
That surplus load and figurative framing which we require in the case of our doubt is necessary in any case (‘ala kulli hal), regardless of whether we take the lifting to be actual or apparent. However, the lifting is interpreted as apparent lifting because those who believe in actual lifting used to say that apparent lifting requires a figurative framing and a surplus conceptual load (mu’nah za’idah). He says: We have this surplus load in any case; except that because actual lifting necessitates an impossible matter, we are forced to submit to apparent lifting. That impossible matter is that if we consider the lifting to be actual, the actual obligation must be restricted to knowledge, and this is impossible.
Therefore, in any case we must accept this figurative framing and surplus load, but because interpreting it as actual lifting necessitates an impossible matter, we are forced to interpret it as apparent lifting.
The Second Point
The apparent meaning of the Hadith of Lifting is that if the Hadith of Lifting did not exist, the lifted object (marfu’) would have been legislated. The apparent meaning of “rufi’a ma la ya’lamun” is that if this hadith did not exist—meaning if this grace did not exist and if Allah did not want to remove “that which they do not know”—this would have remained upon the nation: “lawla hadha al-hadithu kana al-marfu’u mawdu’an ‘ala al-ummah” (were it not for this hadith, what is lifted would have been imposed upon the nation). If this hadith did not exist, that which is lifted would have been legislated upon the nation and not removed, and this is “la yunasibu illa al-raf’a al-zahiri” (is compatible only with apparent lifting). Therefore, he both negates actual lifting and derives the apparent meaning (yastazhir) of apparent lifting.
What we have said so far is in fact a summary of the matters we also referred to in the course of the past discussions, otherwise there was not much new matter.
In short, Shahid Sadr both refutes the opinion of those who consider the lifting in this hadith to mean actual lifting, and also himself derives the apparent meaning of apparent lifting from this narration. These two points are his proofs. That is, deriving the apparent meaning of apparent lifting from the Hadith of Lifting is based on the two points that were explained.
Objection to the Apparent Nature of Lifting
The one who objected to the argumentation based on the Hadith of Lifting for Exemption (after stating that we cannot argue on the basis of the Hadith of Lifting because it is contrary to its apparent meaning) says: “Wa la aqalla min annahu laysa zahiran fi al-raf’i al-zahiri fa-yakunu mujmalan” (And at least, it is not apparent in apparent lifting, so it would be ambiguous).
Shahid Sadr says: even if, as this objector stated, this hadith is ambiguous—meaning hesitant between actual and apparent lifting—still, inevitably (la mahalah), apparent lifting is established.
Therefore, first we must see what the objector’s statement is, and then Shahid Sadr’s response and his claim will become clear. We are mostly concerned with Shahid Sadr’s claim. He states: even if it is said that in the Hadith of Lifting there is ambiguity as to whether the lifting is apparent or actual, still apparent lifting can be proved.
At that time, we mentioned that the Hadith of Lifting indicates legislative Exemption only if the lifting is apparent lifting. If we cannot prove the apparent nature of the lifting in the Hadith of Lifting, it is of no use for Exemption. The entire dispute revolves around this very point; otherwise, why do we strive to say this lifting is apparent and not actual? It is so that it gains the capacity of being argued for legislative Exemption.
Based on this, the objector has stated that we cannot argue on the basis of this narration and hadith, because if it is interpreted as apparent lifting, it is contrary to its apparent meaning. Shahid Sadr also responded that it is not contrary to its apparent meaning, and even if it were, it is inevitable (mimma la budda minhu), and we have no choice but this.
In the next stage, the objector says: if you do not accept that this lifting is actual, still it has no zuhur in apparent lifting either: fa-yakunu mujmalan, the hadith becomes ambiguous in this regard, and therefore is of no use for the argumentation for Exemption.
Therefore, an important objection to arguing on the basis of this hadith for Exemption is this: that this narration is ambiguous, and it is unknown whether what is meant by lifting is actual or apparent, and if it is ambiguous, it is of no use for the argumentation.
Response
Shahid Sadr states in response: even if this hadith is ambiguous—meaning hesitant between actual and apparent lifting—still the result has the competency for the argumentation and is of use for the argumentation. Because the hadith says “rufi’a ma la ya’lamun”; “la ya’lamun” means that which is doubted of the obligation, meaning cases of doubt in the obligation. That obligation which you doubt is lifted. We are certain that what we doubt, that doubted obligation, is not exclusive to the knowledgeable, but rather encompasses the ignorant as well; because it is impossible for it to become exclusive to the knowledgeable. Therefore, as if we doubt whether, in the case of someone who doubts, that obligation has been specified (takhsis) or not? Consequently, it is among the cases of doubt in specification, and in a case where we doubt the specification of a general (‘amm) or absolute (mutlaq) proof, we resort to its absolute application (itlaq), and resorting to itlaq means that the lifting here is inevitably apparent lifting.
In other words, the objector says: this lifting is ambiguous because it is hesitant between apparent and actual lifting. If it is ambiguous and it is unknown whether the lifting is apparent or actual, we cannot argue on its basis, because it must be known that what is meant by this lifting is apparent lifting. If it is ambiguous, it no longer has the possibility of being argued. If what is meant by lifting is actual lifting, this is of no use for Exemption; therefore, what is meant by lifting must be apparent lifting, in the sense that the generality (‘umum) of this proof and its absolute application (itlaq) with respect to doubt in the obligation encompasses this hypothesis as well. For example, as if a proof says “honor the scholars” (akrim al-‘ulama’); this is general, or we have an absolute proof, and then we doubt whether this general proof has been specified with respect to a group, class, or person: has this “honor the scholars” been specified with respect to poets, assuming poets are among the scholars, or has it been specified with respect to the sinners among the scholars or not? If you doubt the specification, you resort to its generality or absolute application; you say: we resort to its absolute application and consider the ruling to encompass this doubted case. In all cases of doubt in restriction (taqyid) and doubt in specification (takhsis), we either resort to the principle of generality (asalat al-‘umum) or the principle of absolute application (asalat al-itlaq).
Here, too, “rufi’a ma la ya’lamun” means: lifted from you is that which you do not know, meaning that obligation which is doubted by you, cases where you doubt the obligation. However, the question is: do those cases in which we doubt it belong exclusively to the one who is knowledgeable of this ruling, or do they also encompass the non-knowledgeable? Those obligations that are not doubted are not the subject of discussion, but are these obligations exclusive to the knowledgeable or not? We are certain that they are not exclusive to the knowledgeable; every doubted obligation, every obligation that you do not know, is lifted from you, and the assumption is that this is not exclusive to the knowledgeable. Therefore, this means that those obligations are also for the ignorant.
Now, can the lifting of an obligation that also encompasses the ignorant be an actual lifting? Shahid Sadr says this is inevitably apparent lifting. The absolute application or generality of these cases dictates that if a ruling was doubted and we are certain it is not exclusive to the knowledgeable either, if we doubt whether this has been lifted or not, we say this ruling remains in its own absolute application and generality. Therefore, in any case, even if the lifting is ambiguous and it is unknown whether apparent lifting is intended or actual lifting, its inevitable result is that it is apparent lifting.
Therefore, he states: “la mahalah yathbutu anna al-raf’a zahiriyyun” (inevitably, it is established that the lifting is apparent); if it is ambiguous, still the result is the same and the hadith is of use for the argumentation. Otherwise, he himself fundamentally does not accept the ambiguity. He says it has zuhur in apparent lifting, but in response to the objector, he states: even if this hadith is ambiguous, still yathbutu anna al-raf’a zahiriyyun.
Thus far, we were discussing the word raf’. However, for this hadith to be examined carefully, we must examine its words and parts. The first word examined was raf’. Within raf’ itself, this discussion is also raised: is this lifting apparent or actual?
Question: …
Professor: In the evidences we explained, the strongest proof and evidence was indeed what Muhaqqiq Iraqi stated. There, we even responded to the objection directed at his statement.
The conclusion was that, from this perspective, there is no problem for the argumentation. Because if it is established that this lifting is actual, it is no longer of use for the argumentation, and up to this point, it has become clear that there is no problem in this regard.
Discussion of the Next Session
In “ma la ya’lamun” as well, we must see what is meant by the relative pronoun ma, and what “la ya’lamun” refers to, and then we shall have a summary.