The Principle of Exemption (Bara’ah), The Proofs of Exemption, Second Proof
Session Seventy-Eight
The Principle of Exemption (Bara’ah), The Proofs of Exemption, Second Proof: Narrations, First Narration: The Hadith of Lifting, Examination of the Indicative Value of the Hadith of Lifting, 2. The Relative Pronoun “ma”, Second Topic: Examination of the Exclusivity or Non-Exclusivity of “ma” to Particular Doubts, The Five Paths, The Third Path, The Responses to the Third Path, The First Response and Its Examination, The Second Response
January 25, 2026
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Summary of the Previous Session
The discussion was regarding the third of the paths for proving the exclusivity of the Hadith of Lifting to particular doubts (shubhat mawdu’iyyah). The summary of this path is that if we want the Hadith of Lifting to encompass both particular and ruling-directed doubts (shubhat hukmiyyah), it necessitates that in a single attribution, both literal attribution (isnad haqiqi) and figurative attribution (isnad majazi) exist. However, the consequent (tali) is void; so the antecedent (muqaddam) is likewise void. In reality, this is a hypothetical syllogism (qiyas istithna’i) to prove exclusivity. Responses have been presented to this path.
The Responses to the Third Path
The late Mr. Khoei mentioned two responses in Misbah al-Usul, and we have one response, based on what was stated in response to the previous path and derived from the late Mr. Ha’iri. In total, we shall mention three responses here.
The First Response
The late Mr. Khoei states: This objection is valid only if what is meant by lifting here is ontological (takwini) lifting. If the lifting in “rufi’a ma la ya’lamun” is in the meaning of ontological lifting, the objection is valid; because the attribution of lifting to, for example, necessity or coercion (which are external actions), is a figurative attribution and an implication of an omitted word (taqdir) must be considered, and for example, it should be said: what is meant by “rufi’a ma-dturru ilayh” is the lifting of the ruling of the action to which they are constrained (rufi’a hukmu al-fi’li al-ladhi udturru ilayh), or the lifting of the ruling which they are coerced into. Because the action itself is in fact realized. The constrained action cannot be ontologically lifted; many perform actions out of necessity. Therefore, if we say the lifting is ontological, we are forced to commit a figurative usage.
Therefore, since the ontological lifting of these matters is impossible (these matters cannot be ontologically removed exactly), we must commit a figurative usage. Then the objection arises that we must commit both literal attribution and figurative attribution in “ma la ya’lamun”.
However, we have no proof that we must interpret “lifting” in this hadith as the ontological lifting of these actions themselves so that a figurative usage arises. Rather, what is meant by lifting is the lifting of these actions from the vessel of legislation (wi’a’ al-tashri’). For example, what does the lifting of necessity in the vessel of legislation mean? What does the lifting of coercion in the vessel of legislation mean? It means: the constrained action (al-fi’l al-mudtarr ‘alayh) is not the subject of a religious ruling. What is meant by the lifting of these actions from the vessel of legislation is the lifting of these actions as the subject of a religious ruling. That is, if a constrained action occurs, it is not the subject of any religious ruling. If a coerced action occurs, it is not the subject of any religious ruling. Therefore, the attribution of lifting to these is a literal attribution. Likewise, if the lifting is attributed to the ruling, it is a literal attribution.
In “rufi’a ma la ya’lamun”, if the lifting is attributed to the ruling, this is a literal attribution. The lifting of a ruling we do not know poses no figurative problem. If the attribution is also to the action, the lifting of that action which you do not know, this means that the action which you do not know is lifted from the vessel of legislation; the lifting of the unknown action in the vessel of legislation means that the unknown action is not the subject of any religious ruling.
Therefore, in any case, the attribution is a literal attribution. And likewise in the other phrases; in “rufi’a ma-dturru ilayh” as well, the attribution is literal. In “rufi’a ma-stukrihu ‘alayh” as well, the attribution is literal. Because the lifting of ma-dturru ilayh means the lifting of that action which is constrained as the subject of a religious ruling; since the assumption is that the lifting is not ontological, but rather in the vessel of legislation, this action is removed. The removal of an action in the world of legislation and lawmaking means that this action is not placed as the subject of any religious ruling. Therefore, this attribution becomes a literal attribution.
Examination of the First Response
What the late Mr. Khoei stated—to the effect that if the lifting were ontological this problem would arise, but if it is according to the status of legislation no problem arises—is not something we want to deny. This could also be the case.
However, in light of the meaning we previously stated for the relative pronoun ma in response to the second path—and that the relative pronoun ma is in the meaning of “the ambiguous thing” (al-shay’ al-mubham) and its conjunct clause (silah) explains and clarifies it—consequently, in all cases, ma is used in its very own literal meaning; there is no longer any need for this path and method. There is no doubt that we must consider the attribution here to be figurative. We also stated previously: although some, like Muhaqqiq Na’ini, strived to consider this attribution to be a literal attribution, this attribution is a figurative attribution. Therefore, we said we require a legitimizing factor (musahhih) and must imply a word as omitted (taqdir) in order for this attribution to be correct. Therefore, regardless of the possibility of what he stated, it appears that the problem is that the attribution of lifting to ma is not literal. We previously rejected the proof of Muhaqqiq Na’ini. Therefore, his saying that in all of these the attribution is literal is not accepted.
The Second Response
The second response of the late Mr. Khoei is: let us assume (sallamna) that what is meant by lifting is ontological lifting. However, the lifting of these actions in the hadith is a figurative attribution. Perhaps it was in view of this very aspect that he gave this second response; because many do not accept that this attribution is a literal attribution. We also said that the lifting is not ontological, it is legislative; despite it being legislative, we said the attribution is a figurative attribution. Now, the second response of the late Mr. Khoei is: let us assume that what is meant by lifting in the hadith is ontological lifting, and the attribution of lifting to the constrained action and its likes is of the figurative type (figurative in attribution and requiring taqdir); meaning we say that something must be implied as omitted, such as saying “the lifting of their rulings” or “the lifting of their effects.” In this case, the attribution of lifting to all of these nine cases is a figurative attribution (not a mixture of literal and figurative).
The consequent (tali) (or the second premise of the hypothetical syllogism) was that if we do not restrict the Hadith of Lifting to particular doubts, it necessitates combining both attributions in a single attribution (literal and figurative attribution being combined in one attribution), which is impossible. Mr. Khoei says: here, all the attributions are figurative (it is not that some are literal and some are figurative); because it is true that in reality, when we analyze the attributions, some of them are literal and some are figurative; he does not deny this (for instance, that the attribution of lifting in some of these nine cases is literal, and in some cases is figurative, especially where an action is involved. If it is a ruling-directed doubt, there is no problem, but if an action is involved and the lifting is also to be ontological, we must certainly commit to a figurative usage). However, there is a point here: we must separate the stage of analysis of the speech from the speech itself.
He says: According to the analytical attribution (al-isnad al-tahlili), some are literal and some are figurative; but in terms of the textual attribution (al-isnad al-kalami), the attribution is figurative. Like “the water and the waterspout are running” (al-ma’u wa al-mizabu jariyan), where one is figurative and the other is literal. Water is actually running, but the waterspout is not actually running; rather, in view of the water, we establish running for it. Here, despite this issue, regarding this speech, they say it is figurative. Why? Because they evaluate the entirety together. If in a speech there is both figurative and literal usage, both literal and figurative attributions, sometimes from the gate of predominance they refer to it as figurative; they say a figurative attribution exists in it. Here, too, it is the same. The attribution of lifting to some of these phrases is a literal attribution, but its attribution to some other phrases is figurative. However, when we look at the entirety of the speech, the attribution to the sum of the nine phrases becomes a figurative attribution; because a single attribution to the sum composed of the figurative and the literal is considered a single attribution, and that too is a figurative attribution. Because the attribution is made to a comprehensive title (‘unwan jami’). Sometimes we want to analyze each of these phrases and parts. Looking at it this way, some are literal, some are figurative; but at other times we want to have a macro view of the entirety of this sentence, and it is there that perhaps we consider a comprehensive title (such as the title “nine,” “lifted from my nation are nine”). Ultimately, this title of “nine” is a comprehensive title that applies to all these phrases. In the beginning of the speech as well, this “lifting” is attributed to this comprehensive title. How do you analyze this “lifted from my nation are nine”? Do you say it is literal or figurative? A single type of attribution must be intended. Now, we look at each one one by one, some are literal, some are figurative. But ultimately, these also have a comprehensive title. “Lifting” introduces this as a single sentence.
Therefore, his second response is: even if we assume (law sullima) that what is meant by lifting is ontological lifting, all the attributions are figurative. We do not have two types of attributions such that one category of attributions is literal and another is figurative.
Question: …
Professor: We give the response to the third path… Ultimately, he considered a comprehensive title between them… Currently here, “lifting” is attributed to this “nine.” What is its attribution?… No, currently “lifting” is attributed to “nine”…. But what is this “lifting” itself, ultimately: is its attribution literal or figurative? See: the comprehensive title is the very one you say… State precisely whether you want to object to Mr. Khoei or you want to support his statement. The late Mr. Khoei wants to say: it is true, according to the reality and analysis, some attributions in these phrases are literal, some are figurative; when we look at these one by one, some are literal, some are figurative. However, according to the textual attribution (not according to the reality and analysis), it is as if there is a single attribution, and its support and witness is also “lifted from my nation are nine.” Therefore, it is a single attribution after all, if the lifting is ontological. The attribution of lifting to this “nine,” in terms of it being a single speech, is it figurative or literal? He says it is figurative. We say why? He says because here, lifting is as if attributed to a comprehensive title between these nine cases, ultimately it is a single attribution…
Therefore, the conclusion of all we have mentioned is that the problem and the corrupt consequent on which the third path relied was that if we do not consider the Hadith of Lifting to be exclusive to particular doubts, it necessitates combining figurative attribution and literal attribution in a single attribution, which is void. Therefore, the Hadith of Lifting is exclusive to particular doubts.
The late Mr. Khoei, in these two responses, strived to explain that here there is no more than a single attribution.
In the first response, they stated: this attribution is a literal attribution, on the basis that we do not consider “lifting” to be ontological lifting. The objection fundamentally arises from considering “lifting” to be ontological lifting. In this case, here there is no more than a single attribution, and that is a literal attribution.
In the second response, they say: let us assume that “lifting” is ontological lifting, its utmost is that the attributions are figurative. Therefore, again there is no more than a single attribution.