The Principle of Exemption (Bara’ah), The Proofs of Exemption, Second Proof
Session Eighty-Three
The Principle of Exemption (Bara’ah), The Proofs of Exemption, Second Proof: Narrations, First Narration: The Hadith of Lifting, Examination of the Indicative Value of the Hadith of Lifting, 2. The Relative Pronoun “ma”, Third Topic: Examination of the Exclusivity of the Hadith of Lifting to Positive Matters and Its Inclusion of Negative Matters, Continuation of the Statement of Muhaqqiq Na’ini, Examination of the Statement of Muhaqqiq Na’ini, The First Objection (Muhaqqiq Iraqi)
February 1, 2026
Summary of the Previous Session
The discussion was on whether what is meant by the relative pronoun ma—which has attached to the nine matters—also encompasses negative matters (umur ‘adamiyyah) and omissions (taruk) or not?
We mentioned that Muhaqqiq Na’ini argued against the inclusion of the Hadith of Lifting with respect to negative matters and omissions. He also presented a proof for this, the summary of which is that “lifting” (raf’), in contrast to “enactment” (wad’), is in the meaning of placing the existing in the position of the non-existent (tanzil al-wujud manzilat al-ma’dum); because “enactment” is in the meaning of placing the non-existent in the position of the existing (tanzil al-ma’dum manzilat al-wujud), and this cannot be the object of lifting. He also presented two evidences and proofs, particularly regarding the forgotten part (al-juz’ al-mansi) of the prayer, stating that if someone performs the prayer without the surah—for example, omitting it out of forgetfulness—the Hadith of Lifting does not apply here and cannot remove its effects. He explained this matter both with respect to the part itself and with respect to the entire composite: whether it wants to lift the effects of the forgotten part itself, or the effects of the entire collection and composite, in both cases this hadith does not apply. Therefore, lifting does not encompass omissions and negative matters.
Continuation of the Statement of Muhaqqiq Na’ini
He pursued a discussion regarding prayer in greater detail, which we shall, God willing, mention. I will only point out that the late Na’ini states: some have said that if a part such as the surah in prayer is forgotten, the Hadith of Lifting removes the status of being a part (juz’iyyah) of the surah; “lifted from my nation are nine” removes the obligatoriness of the surah. Because the late Na’ini objects to this, saying that this is not so; because juz’iyyah is fundamentally not a legislative matter (amr shar’i).
He believes that since juz’iyyah is not capable of being enacted, it is also not capable of being lifted; because juz’iyyah is fundamentally not a legislative matter. Juz’iyyah is something that the duty-bound himself, when he observes that the prayer is the commanded object (al-ma’mur bih) and is composed of parts and conditions—for example, the prayer has a surah, takbir, standing (qiyam), bowing (ruku’), prostration (sujud), and salutation (salam). For the prayer, one must stand facing the qiblah with specific conditions and perform the prayer; here, the external existence of prayer is realized. However, once it is realized, it makes no sense to say that it possesses a right. This indicates that each of these acts of worship possesses a reality in the celestial realm (‘alam-e malakut). The reality of prayer and fasting, which according to some traditions becomes personified and manifested for the human in the purgatorial world (‘alam-e barzakh), is an entity. It might be said that the fact that prayer appears as light in the purgatorial world for individuals is the very embodiment of the action they performed; for someone who prays, since his actions are embodied in purgatory and on the Day of Resurrection, that light is in fact the embodiment of his external action in this world. This might be said. However, the discussion is on how the act of worship like fasting is conceptualized as possessing a right. Is it like other entities—human beings and nature—for which we assume a right; meaning a realized entity, whether material or immaterial, whose rights we must observe? Humans have a right over one another. Trees and water possess rights, and these rights are upon our shoulders. When we say the right of fasting is this, must we conceptualize this as an entity beyond the material world, a luminous reality, a reality in the celestial realm which has this right? Because the discussion here is on rights, and not in the sense of “and it is fitting and proper” that it should be like this. How can this right be conceptualized?
Sometimes when we say the “right” of prayer and fasting is this, it means it is fitting, proper, and necessary for prayer to have these effects. However, sometimes what is meant by the right of fasting, prayer, and pilgrimage is higher than this; meaning it does not [merely] want to say “and it is fitting and proper” (wa haqiqun wa yaliqu), it is fitting and proper that prayer, fasting, and hajj should have these results. The apparent meaning of mentioning these acts of worship alongside the organs, limbs, and also the classes of people mentioned here is that this is an entity and possesses a reality that has rights; otherwise, if we want to take the right in the second sense, it would be of a completely different nature and realm than the rights of the organs, limbs, and the rights of the teacher, neighbor, ruler, and so forth.
On this basis, it is as though fasting has a reality which, if it is to be personified, becomes personified in the form of light, brightness, and beauty. This is an important discussion: what is the existential reality of acts of worship? At any rate, fasting has a very important right.
In contrast, some believe that the Hadith of Lifting removes the juz’iyyah or shartiyyah of some parts, such as the forgotten part, the constrained part, or the coerced part, but he does not accept this opinion and says that if a person performs the prayer without the surah out of forgetfulness, and it is subsequently revealed that he did not perform the surah, this prayer cannot be corrected by relying on the Hadith of Lifting; rather, we must correct it by means of the rule of “Do not repeat” (La Tu’ad).
At any rate, they say: instead of wanting to fix this prayer without the surah by means of the Hadith of Lifting, we correct it with the rule of La Tu’ad; because La Tu’ad rules on the non-necessity of repeating the prayer, except in those five specific cases. The surah is also not among these cases; therefore, the prayer becomes valid and there is no longer any need to repeat it…
Now it must be made clear how it wants to have influence. If an action is forgotten (as we said, similar to the case where one vowed to drink water and they forced him to omit it), the discussion is on negative matters. If coercion or necessity regarding omission arises, we want to see whether the Hadith of Lifting applies here or not. The discussion here is also regarding a part. So far, the discussion was regarding the action itself; positive and negative actions. On the occasion of Muhaqqiq Na’ini’s statement, the discussion was drawn to the subject of the part and condition: if a part is omitted, can we, by means of the Hadith of Lifting, accept this deed and worship without that part and consider it valid or not?
He says that a group has resorted to the Hadith of Lifting, arguing that since the Hadith of Lifting removes the juz’iyyah of the surah, therefore the prayer without the surah poses no problem. Mr. Na’ini’s statement is: No, the Hadith of Lifting cannot perform any function in this case; it cannot negate the juz’iyyah of the surah. If we want to correct this prayer, we must correct it by means of La Tu’ad.
He states: Our witness is also that no one, in the case of someone who forgets the surah in prayer, has resorted to the Hadith of Lifting. Because this forgotten part is not outside of two states: it is either an essential part (juz’ rukni) or a non-essential part (ghayr rukni). If the forgotten part is essential, it must be performed before entering another essential part; however, if one moved from this forgotten essential part to another essential part, the prayer is void (if an essential part is omitted for any reason, even out of forgetfulness, the prayer is void). If it is a non-essential part, we cannot solve it by means of the Hadith of Lifting for the very reason we explained. At any rate, this is a general point and an overview of the discussion that we shall gradually address more.
Then he says: Yes, we can make a distinction between a part, a condition, and an obstacle (mani’). In the case of a part and a condition, the Hadith of Lifting has no efficiency. For example, if a part is forgotten or a condition is forgotten, the Hadith of Lifting cannot enter with respect to this forgotten part or condition and negate the juz’iyyah and shartiyyah. However, with respect to the obstacle, it applies. Because the obstacle is a positive matter.
In truth, he terminates the core of the issue to this: if the part and condition are forgotten, the Hadith of Lifting cannot be cited; because these are negative matters and the Hadith of Lifting does not encompass negative matters. However, when an obstacle is spoken of, the obstacle is always a positive matter (meaning an action). Suppose, for example, that with respect to the obstacle, forgetfulness occurred; in the sense that, for example, he knew that in prayer one must not use silk, but he used it; meaning he forgot the obstacle and introduced it into the prayer. Here, he says the Hadith of Lifting can apply, because it is a positive matter. Then, if it is a positive matter, its lifting can be in the meaning of placing the existing in the position of the non-existent.
Examination of the Statement of Muhaqqiq Na’ini
Regarding the statement of Muhaqqiq Na’ini, objections have been raised, including by Muhaqqiq Iraqi. He raised an objection against the late Na’ini:
The First Objection (Muhaqqiq Iraqi)
This statement of Muhaqqiq Na’ini, in which he said that lifting consists of “placing the existing in the position of the non-existent,” is not a correct statement. Why did he take lifting in this meaning? Muhaqqiq Na’ini said that since “enactment” (wad’) is in the meaning of “placing the non-existent in the position of the existing,” therefore “lifting” (raf’), by virtue of the clue of the meaning of enactment, is in the meaning of “placing the existing in the position of the non-existent.” However, this is not a correct statement. If we consider the reality of lifting with respect to the world in which lifting occurs, it has an entirely different meaning.
“Lifting” in the ontological world is clear; lifting means making the existing non-existent. In contrast, “enactment” and “legislation,” in the ontological world mean establishing something that was not; making it exist, making that very non-existent exist. It is no longer a matter of placement. In reality, in the ontological world, it is no longer a matter of placement. When you create and legislate something, it means you bring the thing from non-existence to existence. Lifting, correspondingly, has this very meaning in the ontological world: making the existing non-existent. If you make something that is existing non-existent—whether you take it from there to somewhere else—this is lifting. However, in the legislative world, lifting is not actual; it is claimed (iddi’a’i). Claimed lifting means that that which is removed is not realized in the legislative world. The non-realization of a thing in the legislative world means that that thing is not the subject for religious rulings. It has no more meaning than this. If something is negated in the legislative world, it means that thing is not placed as the subject of a religious ruling. This is the meaning of lifting.
If we say that lifting is in this meaning, it encompasses both negative matters and positive matters. Its inclusion with respect to positive matters is clear: if something considered among positive matters is lifted in the legislative world, it means that positive matter is no longer the subject of a religious ruling. Up to this point, there is no discussion. Now, if that which is lifted is a negative matter, if this negative matter is to be lifted in the legislative world through a claimed lifting, it means this negative matter is no longer the subject for a religious ruling. What constraint does this have? What problem is there if we do not place a negative matter as the subject of a religious ruling? The negative matter was previously the subject of a religious ruling; currently, it is no longer so. The legislative world is the conventional world. It poses no problem.
Therefore, in the same example of the coerced omission of drinking the water of the Euphrates (while drinking the water of the Euphrates was the object of a vow, if someone is coerced into this action (meaning this omission)—meaning they told him you have no right, or forced him in a way not to drink the water of the Euphrates), the meaning of lifting such an omission is that this (omission) is no longer placed as the subject of a religious ruling. The religious ruling that could result from this omission was, on the one hand, prohibition (the prohibition of omitting the drinking of the water of the Euphrates due to opposing the vow); on the other hand, the establishment of expiation, in that if someone does not act upon his vow, he must pay expiation. When he is coerced into omitting this water, this (omission) is also excluded from being the subject matter for the ruling of the necessity of expiation.