Issue 8, Examination of the Five Suppositions, A Review of the Previous Discussions

Session Forty-Two

Issue 8 – Examination of the Five Suppositions – A Review of the Previous Discussions – The Correct View in the Third Supposition – Examination of the Establishment of the Option for the Ward – The Argument for the Non-Establishment of the Option and Its Examination

January 10, 2026

A Review of the Previous Discussions

Given that approximately two weeks have passed since the last session on the discussion of marriage, it is necessary to recall the previous discussion so that we may, God willing, continue our examination. In the eighth issue, we stated that five suppositions are open to examination; these five suppositions arise from three aspects — that is, these three aspects led us to depict the suppositions of the issue and to examine them. The basic issue concerns the marrying-off, by the guardian, of the ward to someone who has a defect; the discussion was whether, if such a marrying-off occurs, the guardian and the ward have the option to dissolve this marriage or not. The aspects bearing upon the issue were as follows:

1. First aspect: whether the guardian has knowledge of the defect or not.
2. Second aspect: whether this marrying-off possesses benefit, or is contrary to benefit. We stated that, when it is said to be “contrary to benefit,” this does not mean the mere absence of corruption, but rather refers to corruption [itself].
3. Third aspect: whether that defect is among the defects permitting rescission or not; because we stated that some defects result in the establishment of the option for the spouses, but some defects are not so. In light of these three aspects, we stated that the issue comprises five suppositions: First supposition: a case in which the guardian has knowledge of the other party’s defect, and there is also no benefit in this marrying-off — whether or not that defect necessitates the option. In fact, this very supposition is, in reality, two suppositions; because, in a case where the guardian has knowledge of the defect, and this marrying-off is contrary to benefit, and there is no benefit whatsoever in it, at times the defect is among those defects permitting rescission, and at times among those defects that do not necessitate the option — for example, being a wine-drinker, or, for example, being of bad character; these are defects on account of which the option of rescission is not established. In this supposition, we stated that this contract is invalid and not effective; “it is not valid and is not effective” — because the basic guardianship of the guardian, even in a case where there is no defect, is conditioned upon the observance of benefit; if there is no benefit, even in a case where there is no defect, this contract is not valid and not effective. We have examined this supposition and stated the argument for it, and the discussion of it has passed. Second supposition: a case in which the guardian has knowledge of that person’s defect, but there exists a binding and stronger benefit on account of which he has undertaken this marrying-off. The supposition, too, is that the defects are not among the defects permitting rescission. Therefore, the second supposition is one in which the guardian has knowledge of the defect, and benefit exists, and the defect, too, is not among the defects permitting rescission. In this supposition, he has stated, “neither the guardian nor the ward has the option of rescission” — neither for the guardian nor for the ward is the option of rescission established. We have also stated the argument for this; the argument is that, according to the general rule, this contract is valid, and we have no explicit textual evidence to the contrary; because the guardian had guardianship, and benefit exists, and there is no problem here. Therefore, the underlying cause exists, and the impediment is absent. We have examined this supposition as well, and the discussion of it has passed; both suppositions were stated in the text of Taḥrīr, which we have indicated. Third supposition: a case in which the guardian has knowledge of the defect, and a binding benefit also exists, but the defect is among those defects that necessitate the option; the text of Taḥrīr is: “but if it is among them” — that is, among the defects permitting rescission; his having knowledge of the defect was a presupposition, and the existence of benefit, too, is a presupposition; only the defect is among the defects permitting rescission. He has stated: “but if it is among them, the apparent view is that the option is established for the ward after he reaches maturity” — the apparent view is that the option is established for the ward after he reaches maturity. We stated that the late Sayyid, in al-ʿUrwah, states: “but with respect to the establishment of the option for the ward, there are two views”; the late Sayyid has mentioned two views. The Imam stated that the apparent view is that the option is established for the ward; the late Sayyid stated: there are two views, “the more cogent of the two is the first” — that is, he too has held to the establishment of the option. The late Sayyid then states: “Indeed, it is sometimes possible that the option is established for the guardian as well” — he has mentioned this as a further possibility; the late Sayyid, in the text of al-ʿUrwah, has also briefly indicated the argument for this. The result was that, in the third supposition, three positions exist on the matter; the third supposition — that is, a case in which the guardian has knowledge of the defect, a binding benefit also exists, and the defect, too, is among those defects permitting rescission. These three positions are as follows:
   1. First position: the establishment of the option for the ward but not for the guardian — this is precisely the position the Imam, in the text of Taḥrīr, stated: “the apparent view of it is…” — the apparent view is that the ward has the option. He has made no reference whatsoever to the guardian and has not accepted the option for the guardian. The late Sayyid, too, has accepted this very position.
   2. Second position: the non-establishment of the option for either the guardian or the ward.
   3. Third position: which was mentioned in the statement of the late Sayyid as a possibility, with a brief indication of its argument as well — the establishment of the option for both, i.e., both the guardian and the ward have the option. This was a summary of the previous discussion. We have now arrived at the point that, in the third supposition, three positions exist; now we must determine what is correct on the matter.

Question:

Professor: At times the benefit is binding, and at times it is preferable — that is, it has preferability but is not necessary. At one time, the benefit is such that it cannot be overlooked under any circumstance; at another time, the benefit has preferability — that is, it would be better for this action to be undertaken, but, if it is not undertaken, no corruption follows from this.

The Correct View in the Third Supposition

We must conduct our discussion at two positions, so that the result may become clear as to which of these three positions is acceptable; at one position, we examine the matter of the option for the ward, to determine whether the ward has the option or not. The second position concerns the guardian — whether the guardian has the option or not. We shall examine these separately, and then it will become clear, in the end, which of these three positions corresponds to the truth.

First Position: Examination of the Establishment of the Option for the Ward

With respect to the ward — for example, a daughter or son who has been married off to a person who has a defect, and whose defect is also among the defects permitting rescission, and whose guardian was also aware of this defect — does the ward, after reaching maturity, have the option here, or not?

The Argument for the Non-Establishment of the Option

One possibility is to say that the option is not established for the ward. What is the argument for the non-establishment of the option for the ward? It is said that the guardian, with respect to the ward, is like an agent (wakīl) with respect to the principal (muwakkil), and is counted as a substitute; his act is the act of the ward; the act of the agent is counted as the act of the principal; he is, as it were, placed in the same standing as the principal. If the ward himself had had knowledge of the defect and had undertaken the marriage, would the option have been established for him? Certainly not; because, with knowledge and awareness of the defect, he himself, for whatever reason, accepted to marry. Would the option have been established for the ward in that case? No. Now, too, since the guardian has undertaken this action on his behalf and has married him off to another, because the guardian had knowledge of the defect, the option is no longer established for the ward; because the act of the guardian is like the act of the ward — he is his representative and substitute; therefore, the option is not established for him.

Examination

Is this argument acceptable? It appears that this argument is not acceptable. The objection to this argument is that the requirement of guardianship and agency is that the act of the guardian be counted as the act of the ward, or that the act of the agent be counted as the act of the principal. “Act” means that which issues from him; here, the guardian’s act is the marrying-off. But that the guardian’s knowledge should be counted as the ward’s knowledge — we have no argument whatsoever for this matter; the requirement of guardianship is not that the guardian’s knowledge of the defect be the very same as the ward’s knowledge, such that you might say that, just as the option would not have been established for him had he himself had knowledge, the option is likewise not established for him now. The requirement of guardianship is never that the guardian’s knowledge be the very same as the ward’s knowledge; the same applies with respect to agency as well. With respect to agency, too, the agent’s knowledge is not counted as the principal’s knowledge. Therefore, your statement that, because the guardian had knowledge of the defect, the option is therefore not established for the ward — yes, the agent or guardian had knowledge, but the ward did not have knowledge; certainly, had he himself not had knowledge and such an event had occurred, he would have had grounds for rescission, and the option would have been established for him. In any case, the argument for the non-establishment of the option is precisely what has been stated, and the objection to it has likewise been set forth.

Question:

Professor: He had knowledge, but is his knowledge alone sufficient? … The other party has a defect on account of which, according to the Lawgiver’s authorization, the right of rescission is established for this person. … We are faced with two categories of evidence; one category of evidence is precisely what you state — the requirement of the evidences of guardianship is that this contract be valid. This person was, first, his guardian, and second, benefit required it, and the benefit was binding; we, with this argument alone, would say this contract is valid. But this is not the whole story; in opposition, we have evidences to the effect that, if these defects exist in the other party, the husband or wife can dissolve the contract; therefore, in opposition to this, we also have the evidences for the option. I have not yet stated the evidences for the option; because the very question of why the option is established here has two or three arguments, which we shall state later. For now, I shall say, in response to your question: as you state, those evidences require the validity of the contract; on the other side, we have these evidences, which require the option of rescission. We must determine whether these evidences are restricted away from that supposition or not — that is, whether the evidences for the option are restricted to a case in which the guardian and agent did not have knowledge. Interestingly, those who hold to the non-establishment of the option make precisely this argument, stating that, because the guardian has knowledge of the defect, and the guardian’s knowledge is equivalent to the ward’s knowledge, the evidences for the option therefore do not encompass this supposition; therefore he has no option. The question is: on what grounds do you say that the guardian’s knowledge is equivalent to the ward’s knowledge? You must restrict the evidences for the option away from our present case; we must determine whether this supposition has the power to restrict those evidences to a different supposition and to exclude this supposition. The entirety of their argument is that the guardian knew, and his knowledge is equivalent to the ward’s knowledge. The objection is that the act of the guardian is equivalent to the act of the ward, but what about his knowledge? … At most, what this statement of yours establishes is the validity of the contract. … This has unqualified scope, and that too has unqualified scope; the unqualified scope of the evidences for the option states that, wherever there is a defect among this category of defects, you have the option of rescission. … Where there is no defect, there is no discussion at all… because there we held to multiplicity of object sought (taʿaddud al-maṭlūb), we stated that it does not have [the option]… We have stated the argument for the non-establishment of the option and have also set forth its objection; we have not yet stated the evidences for the option. Allow us to state these evidences; if the matter is not resolved afterward, you may raise your objection then.