Session Twenty-Nine, The Second Stage: Examining Whether Dignity Constitutes a Source of Rights
Session Twenty-Nine
The Second Stage: Examining Whether Dignity Constitutes a Source of Rights — The Proof for Natural Rights — Premises One Through Six — Conclusion — The Necessity of Observing Natural Rights in Divine Law
February 22, 2025
Summary of the Previous Session
Concerning natural rights, their definition, and their source, we offered some remarks in a very brief form. The purpose of presenting these matters was to examine, within the second stage of our discussion, whether inherent human dignity can constitute a source for certain rights (natural rights) belonging to the human being, or not. Having set out these preliminary matters, the time has now come to answer the principal question of the second stage of our discussion.
The Proof for Natural Rights
The question is this: what is the proof for natural rights? On what grounds do we say that the human being must, fundamentally, possess natural rights? As to which matters are put forward as natural rights, we have already indicated some of their instances—for example, the right to life, the right to freedom, the right to inquire, the right to benefit from natural endowments, and the right to choose. Disagreement exists, of course, regarding these instances; some have expanded the scope and range of natural rights, while others have confined themselves to a minimal core. Setting aside the disagreement that exists concerning the scope of natural rights, the question is this: on what grounds is it established that the human being possesses natural rights, broadly speaking—even if only to that minimal and most certain degree? Why does the human being possess natural rights?
As already indicated, two extreme perspectives generally exist with respect to natural rights. According to the perspective of excess, natural rights are not affirmed for the human being qua human being; rather, only certain human beings enjoy these rights. In other words, the human being qua human being does not possess inherent dignity, and natural rights are therefore likewise inconceivable for him; this is not reckoned as a principle or a governing rule. This is precisely the point at which, as I noted, a conflation has occurred, and where denial and affirmation, when undertaken without due regard for this distinction, have produced a hazy and obscured situation. In any case, one perspective holds that natural rights are not affirmed for the human being qua human being, but rather that the human being, by virtue of certain particular qualities and characteristics, comes to enjoy these rights.
Opposite this, we have a perspective of deficiency, according to which there is, fundamentally, no difference whatsoever between the human and the non-human with respect to rights; rights are identical for all. In order to arrive at the correct path between these two perspectives, we must answer this question: what is the ground and basis for the human being’s enjoyment of natural rights, broadly speaking—even if only in the form of a particular affirmative proposition (mūjibah-i juzʾīyyah)?
We wish to establish this matter by means of several premises. These premises are of great importance.
The First Premise
The first premise consists in the purposiveness of nature; that is, nature, in general, has been created purposively, in accordance with the divine will. God Almighty has not created the natural world, with all the beings that exist within it, without purpose. This is a clear matter and a premise that requires little proof.
The Second Premise
The second premise is that nature follows a designed law and order; within nature, a comprehensive set of general systems and laws governs all beings, and these are likewise realized, in particular ways, with respect to the various species and categories of beings in this world. These systems contribute to the purposiveness of nature. It is not possible for a system to be brought into being for a purpose without a law and order appropriate to that purpose existing for it.
The Third Premise
The third premise is that whoever acts contrary to this law and order has, in effect, transgressed against what has been ordained for the beings of this world. When God Almighty has designed the apparatus of creation and has established a law and order governing it, any disregard or inattention to these laws and systems constitutes, in effect, a transgression against the very beings themselves. In the end, we must give due regard to these laws.
The Fourth Premise
The fourth premise is that the human being, within the natural and material world and the apparatus of creation, is a being possessed of particular characteristics, one of the most important of which—an inseparable part of human life—is his social dimension. The human being is, in general, recognized as a social being who cannot develop except in the light of social life; the flourishing of human capacities takes shape in the light of this social life.
The Fifth Premise
The fifth premise is that it is not permissible to bar the human being from those natural laws and systems that govern all beings, nor, indeed, from those that govern the human being as the most superior of beings; in the end, the human being, too, as a being who lives in this world, is governed by certain requirements, laws, and systems with respect to his life, and no prohibition or restriction whatsoever is permissible against him in this regard.
The Sixth Premise
The sixth premise, to which we have already alluded, is that human capacities have, in general, been entrusted or placed within the human being by his Creator and Maker, so that the human being may develop. This is precisely the statement we cited from Martyr Muṭahharī, namely that every natural capacity is reckoned as the basis for a natural right; it constitutes a natural document for that capacity. This is a reality: when intellect is bestowed upon the human being, when will and choice are granted to him, when he is created with emotions and feelings, these capacities are, in fact, all evidence and documentation of human rights. That is, for instance, one who possesses intellect, and who possesses the capacity to study, to become learned, and to discover the unknown, naturally possesses, by virtue of this, the right to learn. Had this capacity not existed within him, he would likewise possess no right to learn.
Conclusion
Accordingly, if the human being is possessed of intellect, will, choice, emotions, and feelings, then he possesses the right to choose, and the right to learn; he possesses the right to live, and the right to benefit from natural endowments; the natural right of human beings is the offspring of those qualities and capacities that God has placed within his existence.
If, then, we claim that the human being possesses natural rights, these natural rights are capable of being established by proof and demonstration. The premises that I have set out in this very brief and condensed form lead to precisely this conclusion. These premises admit of no objection or defect. We accordingly hold that the human being, in light of these God-given capacities, enjoys a series of rights termed human rights, of which no being other than the human being enjoys any share. You might say that the human being possesses the right to life, that the animal too possesses the right to life, and that plants and vegetation too possess the right to life; yet how vastly different is human life from animal life, and animal life from vegetative life! True, these share in common the basic reality of life, yet the type of human life differs entirely from vegetative life. We cannot say that the human being possesses this right only to the degree of vegetative life.
An important point, to which Martyr Muṭahharī has likewise alluded, is that the very means by which human natural rights are identified is the apparatus of creation itself; that is, the human being, by referring to the apparatus of creation, by referring to nature, comes to apprehend clearly that he possesses these rights. The apparatus of creation has placed this title of entitlement (sanad-i ṭalabkārī) within the existence of the human being, but has not placed it within the existence of the sheep; the right to think and the right to choose are examples of the rights that human beings possess.
We are therefore able to establish the principle of natural rights with respect to the human being.
The Necessity of Observing Natural Rights in Divine Law
A further matter that we must address is the necessity of observing, or giving due regard to, natural rights within divine law. These are all matters of central importance. In the end, when the human being possesses inherent dignity, he certainly also enjoys a series of natural, non-divestible rights, which no one is permitted to divest from him. But why do we say that human natural rights must be observed within divine law? In other words, what is the relation between natural rights and divine law, or divine rights? I am obliged to set this matter forth in a very brief and summary fashion.
The meaning of natural rights is clear; the meaning of divine law is likewise clear. Divine law consists of those regulations that God Almighty, as the principal Lawgiver, has enacted for the legislative guidance of the human being, and which He has required the human being to observe; this encompasses a body of both obligatory and non-obligatory laws, together with certain recommendations or moral requirements. These recommendations and moral requirements likewise bear the coloring of divine law; all the moral exhortations of the Qur’an and the Sunnah are recognized as constituting a juridical moral law; this moral law shares, in its fundamental principles, a common ground with the innate apprehensions of the human being. In any case, the meaning of divine law and the meaning of natural rights are both clear. What chiefly concerns us is whether God Almighty must observe natural rights within His own laws, or not.
We hold that divine laws are the most exalted laws in existence; divine law is certainly to be preferred over human law. The reason for this is evident: when the human being sets out to enact a law, since he lacks comprehensive oversight and command over the human condition, and is unfamiliar with the inner depths and complexities of the human being, he is naturally incapable of enacting a comprehensive law that gives due regard to the real needs and limitations of the human being. God Almighty, however, as the Creator of the human being, possesses complete oversight over human nature and creation; He knows his needs, He knows his natural capacities, and, since the very purpose of human creation is the flourishing of these capacities within the fabric of society and within life in this material and natural world, it naturally follows that when God, Blessed and Exalted, sets out to enact regulations for the legislative guidance of the human being, He necessarily takes the capacities and abilities of the human being into consideration. It cannot be that God enacts a law that is incompatible with human natural rights. Do not ask, at this point, what becomes of punishments such as retribution (qiṣāṣ); I have already noted that these are questions surrounding this overall framework that we must answer at a later point. For the moment, we are speaking in terms of the governing rule and principle, namely that when God Almighty, as Legislator, sets out to enact law for humanity—possessed as it is of these abilities and capacities—He cannot disregard the natural right that is the offspring of the natural capacity that He Himself has placed within the human being. If, by referring to the apparatus of creation, we discover that the human being has been created with the faculty of intellect, has been created with will and choice, and possesses the right to choose, then it makes no sense for God to enact a law that closes the door upon reason. God Almighty has willed that the human being be a being distinct from the angels, in the sense that he is not constitutionally disposed toward the good by compulsion; the angels are not compelled toward the good but are constitutionally disposed toward it—such is the very constitution (jibillah) of the angels. Had God willed that the human being likewise be of this nature, He would not have created him possessed of will and choice, nor would He have granted him the right to choose. Having honored the human being with these faculties and capacities, He cannot set His own law against the very direction of these capacities. This, too, is a clear matter. Why, then, do some endeavor to set divine laws against human and innate capacities? We have repeatedly stated that the philosophy behind the sending of prophets, the revelation of scriptures, and the institution of religious law is that these external guides should direct the human being toward his own innate disposition and inner reality, so that the capacities God has placed within him may become his helpers. These guides, then, are merely awakeners and reminders; the harmony between the purpose of religious legislation and the purpose of [divine] creation is a matter that can greatly assist us in maintaining that divine law cannot exist without due regard for these natural rights.
I have noted that, for the moment, I am not concerned with the instances of natural rights, but rather wish to establish this matter in a general sense. Disagreement may exist regarding certain instances of natural rights; we are, broadly speaking, examining the proposition that religious and divine laws cannot exist without due regard for these natural rights. These natural rights, in fact, possess an innate root; that is, they are rights that human innate disposition (fiṭrah) itself likewise pronounces upon.
The Discussion of the Coming Session
One or two further points remain, which we must address before arriving at a summary conclusion, namely that inherent dignity entails certain particular rights for the human being. We shall point to some instances of these.