Session Thirty-Two, The Proofs of Inherent Human Dignity

Session Thirty-Two

The Proofs of Inherent Human Dignity — The First Proof: The Qur’anic Verses — The Fourth Through the Fourteenth Verse

April 11, 2025

Summary of the Previous Session

Our discussion concerned the proofs of inherent human dignity; we noted that everything cited as evidence for the first category of human distinctions can, broadly speaking, indicate inherent human dignity. The indication of all this evidence with respect to inherent dignity is not, admittedly, of a uniform character; rather, the indications are, in some instances, by direct correspondence (bi-al-muṭābaqah) and, in others, by implication (bi-al-iltizām); in some instances explicit (bi-al-ṣarāḥah), and in others by allusion (bi-al-ishārah) or by intimation (bi-al-kināyah). Accordingly, since this evidence has already been cited, we must both pass through it quickly and remain mindful of the particular angle from which each piece of evidence is invoked. In the previous session, we cited three verses.

The Fourth Verse

The fourth verse comprises verses 1 through 4 of Sūrat al-Raḥmān: “The Most Merciful taught the Qur’an; He created man; He taught him eloquence” (الرَّحْمَٰنُ * عَلَّمَ الْقُرْآنَ * خَلَقَ الْإِنْسَانَ * عَلَّمَهُ الْبَيَانَ). As to the meaning of “eloquence” (bayān) in this verse, five perspectives exist; we have already indicated these five perspectives, but the view we have accepted is that “eloquence” here refers precisely to the human faculty of reflection and rational thought; were it not for the rational faculty, speech, articulation, and the other matters mentioned would have no meaning and could not be realized.

In the first and second verses, the discourse concerned honoring (takrīm) and beneficence (iḥsān)—”And We have certainly honored the children of Adam” (وَلَقَدْ كَرَّمْنَا بَنِي آدَمَ), or “We have certainly created man in the best of stature” (لَقَدْ خَلَقْنَا الْإِنْسَانَ فِي أَحْسَنِ تَقْوِيمٍ), the most excellent of creations being precisely the intellect. In the previous verse—that is, “and We made him hearing and seeing” (فَجَعَلْنَاهُ سَمِيعًا بَصِيرًا)—and in this present verse, the matter of honoring or beneficence is not explicitly stated; yet it is evident that, when God states that He created the human being and taught him eloquence, this is, in fact, a particular favor and an honoring of the human being. Where honoring and beneficence pertain specifically to the human being, independent of belief and religion, this constitutes precisely that same inherent dignity; for what else, indeed, could inherent dignity mean? Bear this in mind throughout every instance we discuss: inherent dignity means the honoring of the human being qua human being—that is, the human being’s enjoyment of a distinction that has not been granted to any being other than the human being. The human being, by virtue of being human, has come to possess such a characteristic; this cannot be denied.

The Fifth Verse

The next verse comprises verses 1 through 5 of Sūrat al-ʿAlaq: “Read in the name of your Lord who created—created man from a clinging substance. Read, and your Lord is the most generous—who taught by the pen—taught man that which he knew not” (اقْرَأْ بِاسْمِ رَبِّكَ الَّذِي خَلَقَ * خَلَقَ الْإِنْسَانَ مِنْ عَلَقٍ * اقْرَأْ وَرَبُّكَ الْأَكْرَمُ * الَّذِي عَلَّمَ بِالْقَلَمِ * عَلَّمَ الْإِنْسَانَ مَا لَمْ يَعْلَمْ); God taught the human being by means of the pen, and taught him that which he did not know. As to precisely what God taught the human being that he did not previously know, and as to whether all human beings benefited from this or only certain human beings, considerable discussion exists, into which we shall not enter. What may be derived from this verse, however, on the strength of certain contextual indications and evidences, is that the human species in general is certainly intended here, and not the prophets or certain particular human beings alone. The fact that God taught him the pen, and taught him that which he did not know, is, in fact, among the branches and offshoots of human intellect and the faculty of consciousness; here too, it is true, the term “honoring” or “beneficence” is not employed, yet, without doubt, this favor that God has bestowed upon the human being is bestowed upon him by virtue of his being human, and through it God has honored him and accorded him greatness.

The Sixth Verse

The sixth verse comprises verses 7 and 8 of Sūrat al-Shams: “By the soul and He who perfected it, and inspired it [with discernment of] its wickedness and its righteousness” (وَنَفْسٍ وَمَا سَوَّاهَا * فَأَلْهَمَهَا فُجُورَهَا وَتَقْوَاهَا). God swears by the soul, and states that We have shown it the path of transgression and wickedness and evil, and the path of righteousness (taqwā). The statement that both paths were inspired in the human being—both the path of transgression and the path of righteousness—indicates, in fact, that the human being himself must choose which of these two paths he will tread: either the path of transgression or the path of righteousness; and this is itself a distinction belonging to the human being, namely that he possesses the right to choose one of these two paths. The granting to the human being of the power to choose between these two paths constitutes an honoring and a dignifying of him. This, too, is affirmed for the human being qua human being, and is actual; it is not something he must acquire. That these two paths were inspired in him is a distinction of which even the angels do not partake.

The Seventh Verse

“And We guided him to the two distinct paths” (وَهَدَيْنَاهُ النَّجْدَيْنِ); We guided him to one of these two paths. The substance of this verse, too, resembles the previous verse. It may well be that the substance of many of these verses resembles one another, yet, for purposes of argumentation, all of them remain citable. That the human being should choose between these paths, and that, once he has chosen, God then advances him along that very path, constitutes a distinction indicating this power and this right belonging to the human being—namely, his capacity to choose.

The Eighth Verse

“To each of these and those We extend [the consequences of their deeds]” (كُلًّا نُمِدُّ هَؤُلَاءِ وَهَؤُلَاءِ); the extending and prolonging granted to this group or that group, to this path or that path, likewise constitutes a form of dignifying and honoring of the human being—although God Almighty has no inclination whatsoever toward the human being’s setting foot upon the path of transgression, wickedness, and evil.

Question:

Response: This refers to the individual’s own choice; … whatever a person chooses, We support him in it; this conveys precisely this very power of choice.

The Ninth Verse

“And if your Lord had willed, those on earth would have believed, all of them entirely” (وَلَوْ شَاءَ رَبُّكَ لَآمَنَ مَنْ فِي الْأَرْضِ كُلُّهُمْ جَمِيعًا); had God Almighty willed, He would have created all those upon the earth as believers. This means that God has not willed that people should come to believe in Him by way of compulsion and constitutive necessity; rather, both paths have been left open to humanity, so that they might choose for themselves. The fact that God has not compelled His servants and human beings toward faith, but has instead left the path open for humanity and the human being to choose for himself the path of felicity or wretchedness (albeit with all the support that exists for choosing the path of felicity), demonstrates that the human being has been honored and dignified by his Creator, who has left him free in his choice of path.

The Tenth Verse

A further verse, citable on account of a substance closely related to this one, is verse 99 of Sūrat Yūnus: “Then would you compel the people in order that they become believers?” (أَفَأَنْتَ تُكْرِهُ النَّاسَ حَتَّى يَكُونُوا مُؤْمِنِينَ); although this clause continues on from the remainder of verse 99, it is independently citable in its own right. God addresses the Prophet (peace be upon him), saying: do you wish to compel the people to become believers? That is, He states that no such right exists, and that people must not be compelled toward faith. That the human being has been left free even in the choice of the path of faith, and has been granted the right to choose, is nothing other than an honoring, a dignifying, and a glorifying of him.

The Eleventh Verse

“Indeed, We guided him to the way, be he grateful or ungrateful” (إِنَّا هَدَيْنَاهُ السَّبِيلَ إِمَّا شَاكِرًا وَإِمَّا كَفُورًا); the substance of this verse, too, is clear; this, likewise, is nothing other than an honoring and a dignifying. The statement that We show him the way, yet it is he himself who is grateful or ungrateful, is nothing other than a dignifying and an honoring.

I would emphasize this point: when we say that the human being has been honored by God—that is, that certain forms of dignity have been bestowed upon him that have not been bestowed upon any other being, such that the human being qua human being has come to enjoy these matters—these constitute the foundation of natural rights. When we say that the human being possesses inherent dignity, we mean that God has granted the human being, by virtue of his being human, these distinctions, and that, in consequence of these distinctions, a series of natural rights is affirmed for him. We do not say that all human beings enjoy all rights; we do not say, for instance, that, since the human being possesses these forms of inherent dignity, punishment with respect to him is therefore meaningless, or that restriction is meaningless. Not at all; these are entirely compatible with one another, as we have already indicated and as we shall further explain later.

The Twelfth Verse

“[He] who created death and life to test you [as to] which of you is best in deed” (الَّذِي خَلَقَ الْمَوْتَ وَالْحَيَاةَ لِيَبْلُوَكُمْ أَيُّكُمْ أَحْسَنُ عَمَلًا); God, who created death and life in order to test you as to which of you is better and more excellent in deed. That human beings should be placed within the scope of a test, such that it might become evident which of them attains a higher standing in life, constitutes a dignifying and an honoring. It is comparable to gathering a number of students together in a single class and providing them with the means of advancement, so that it might subsequently become clear which of them attains better results. The very fact of seating the child in the classroom is itself an honoring.

Question:

Response: We are not concerned, here, with the matter of testing as such; rather, the fact that the human being has been placed within an abode in which his life can lead him to the most excellent of deeds—that is, the possibility exists for him, through his own choice, to undertake the best and most excellent of deeds—is, in itself, an honoring and a dignifying. …

The Thirteenth Verse

“Indeed, We have made that which is on the earth as adornment for it, that We may test them [as to] which of them is best in deed” (إِنَّا جَعَلْنَا مَا عَلَى الْأَرْضِ زِينَةً لَهَا لِنَبْلُوَهُمْ أَيُّهُمْ أَحْسَنُ عَمَلًا); that which We have placed upon the earth as adornment is so that We may test them as to which of them is reckoned more excellent in deed. God’s testing and trial, as to which of them performs the more excellent deed, indicates the very possibility of choosing the most excellent course; were the very notion of excellence in deed without practical meaning, and were the possibility of selection and choice absent, it would make no sense for God to state, “that We may test them [as to] which of them is best in deed” (لِنَبْلُوَهُمْ أَيُّهُمْ أَحْسَنُ عَمَلًا). That the human being is capable of choosing the best and most excellent of things is itself an honoring, a dignifying, and a glorifying of the human being; he may, of course, fail to perform the most excellent of deeds—should he fail to succeed in these trials, he is naturally not one who performs the most excellent of deeds.

The Fourteenth Verse

“So direct your face toward the religion, inclining to truth. [Adhere to] the fitrah of God upon which He has created [all] people. No change should there be in the creation of God” (فَأَقِمْ وَجْهَكَ لِلدِّينِ حَنِيفًا فِطْرَتَ اللَّهِ الَّتِي فَطَرَ النَّاسَ عَلَيْهَا لَا تَبْدِيلَ لِخَلْقِ اللَّهِ); God Almighty created the human being upon an innate disposition (fiṭrah) that admits of no substitution or alteration—”no change should there be” (لَا تَبْدِيلَ). As to the precise meaning of fiṭrah here, we have already noted that we possess innate matters both in the sphere of cognition and apprehension and in the sphere of inclinations. What matters is that the human being possesses particular inclinations upon which he has been created; the discussion here is not one of believer versus unbeliever, nor of the pious versus the impious; all human beings have been created with these inclinations and apprehensions. The human being likewise possesses a general, summary apprehension of God Almighty—an inclination toward divine unity (tawḥīd), an inclination to know God. The category of apprehension and the category of inclination in the human being each possess their own branches and ramifications, which we shall not set forth here; but, in the end, the human being is, by his innate disposition, one who seeks God, who seeks the truth, and who is given to love and worship. Could any being be more excellently honored and dignified than this? The very foundation of human creation rests upon these matters, and all human beings partake of them. The only complication that exists is that this innate disposition may, owing to certain factors and accidents, become afflicted with heedlessness and forgetfulness; naturally, however, means likewise exist for drawing him out of this heedlessness. This verse alone, in itself, is capable of sustaining our claim. I have offered a single instance for each of these verses; otherwise, we might perhaps be able to cite several instances for each of them.

I would also note that, if we are multiplying these proofs—particularly the verses indicating inherent dignity—this is on account of the denials and objections that exist with respect to inherent dignity. That is, by explaining the nature of dignity and by clarifying its inherent character and the fruit of inherent dignity, it becomes clear that inherent dignity is not something to be feared. In establishing inherent dignity, we do not seek to establish a complete equivalence between the believing human being and the unbelieving human being. The purpose, broadly speaking, of establishing inherent dignity is, rather, the matter of human beings’ enjoyment, by virtue of their being human, of a series of primary natural rights; otherwise, we do not, by means of these forms of dignity termed “inherent dignity,” seek to establish special rights for non-Muslims, nor do we seek, for instance, to remove certain punishments and penalties from them. The most certain core of the rights affirmed for the human being by virtue of inherent dignity is natural rights—and, indeed, only the most certain core of natural rights at that.

Question:

Response: He possesses the right to choose, he possesses freedom … these primary natural rights are capable of being grounded in these forms of dignity. Are these reckoned as inherent dignity or not? … If he possessed no inviolability whatsoever (lā ḥurmata lah), then why should he not be insulted? …