Session Thirty-Eight, The Proofs of the Inherent Dignity of the Human Being
Session Thirty-Eight
The Proofs of the Inherent Dignity of the Human Being — The Second Proof: Traditions (Riwayāt) — The First Group — The First Tradition — The Second Tradition — The Second Group — The First Tradition — The Second Tradition
May 3, 2025
Summary of the Previous Session
We noted that several proofs have been invoked to prove the inherent dignity of the human being. The first proof consisted of some of the verses, which were examined, and the objection of the conflict of certain other verses was answered.
The Second Proof: Traditions (Riwayāt)
The second proof is the traditions (riwayāt); we have numerous traditions indicating the inherent dignity of the human being. These traditions are divided into several groups. I shall quote one or two traditions from each of these groups because they are very numerous. In my view, the groups of traditions that indicate these matters by implication (bi-l-mulāzamah) or by correspondence (bi-l-muṭābaqah) are abundant. Furthermore, some of the traditions indicate not only this dimension of inherent dignity, but also certain rights arising from the inherent dignity of the human being.
The First Group
The first group consists of traditions indicating kind, compassionate, and humane treatment of others. In these traditions, the standard of treatment of others is solely the aspect of being human, and sect, belief, and religion do not play any role whatsoever.
The First Tradition
The first tradition is one that narrates the treatment of Bilāl by the Messenger of God (peace be upon him and his family) in the story of making the women of some of the slain disbelievers pass by their corpses. The event is that during the Battle of Khaybar, the Messenger of God (peace be upon him and his family) heard that some of the Muslims had made the captive women (who were Jewish) pass by the corpses of their slain, which caused severe pain and distress to these women. “He (peace be upon him and his family) said to Bilāl, when he saw from that Jewish woman what he saw: ‘Has mercy been divested from you, O Bilāl, in that you make two women pass by the slain of their men?'” (قَالَ لِبِلَالٍ لَمَّا رَأَى مِنْ تِلْكَ الْيَهُودِيَّةِ مَا رَأَى أَنُزِعَتْ مِنْكَ الرَّحْمَةُ يَا بِلَالُ حَيْثُ تَمُرُّ بِامْرَأَتَيْنِ عَلَى قَتْلَى رِجَالِهِمَا). The Prophet (peace be upon him and his family) addressed Bilāl, saying: O Bilāl! Has mercy departed from you that you behave in this manner?
This tradition indicates that, even if a person is a disbeliever, one must not step outside the framework of human and compassionate relations, and one must not act in a way that rubs salt in the wound of even a disbeliever. Does this indicate anything other than a specific and distinguished position for the human being?
I emphasize here that we do not wish to conclude from this treatment that human beings are equal in all matters; rather, we wish to state that a minimum level of rights is established for human beings, and certain actions must not be performed with the human being qua human being. We do not wish to say that all human beings are equal in everything; to argue that the disbeliever possesses no sanctity whatsoever and that any treatment may be displayed toward him because he has no sanctity is incorrect.
The Second Tradition
The next tradition is the famous letter of the Commander of the Faithful (peace be upon him) to Mālik al-Ashtar, which you have heard frequently, and which is fully expressive of this matter: “And infuse your heart with mercy for the subjects, love for them, and kindness toward them. And be not to them a ravenous beast, exploiting their consumption; for they are of two classes: either a brother of yours in religion, or a peer of yours in creation” (وَأَشْعِرْ قَلْبَكَ الرَّحْمَةَ لِلرَّعِيَّةِ وَالْمَحَبَّةَ لَهُمْ وَاللُّطْفَ بِهِمْ وَلَا تَكُونَنَّ عَلَيْهِمْ سَبُعاً ضَارِياً تَغْتَنِمُ أَكْلَهُمْ فَإِنَّهُمْ صِنْفَانِ إِمَّا أَخٌ لَكَ فِي الدِّينِ وَإِمَّا نَظِيرٌ لَكَ فِي الْخَلْقِ).
This is a command that kindness, care, and love toward the people must reign in the heart of the governor and ruler. He states: clothe your heart with mercy, love, and kindness toward the subjects; beware lest you be to them like a predatory beast that deems devouring them a spoil.
Thereafter, He mentions a rationale: “for they are of two classes: either a brother of yours in religion, or a peer of yours in creation” (فَإِنَّهُمْ صِنْفَانِ إِمَّا أَخٌ لَكَ فِي الدِّينِ وَإِمَّا نَظِيرٌ لَكَ فِي الْخَلْقِ). This clearly and explicitly orders and commands humane, loving, and kind treatment of all people. He states: the people are either your brothers in religion or your peers in creation. Love, kindness, and mercy toward peers in creation are thus emphasized and enjoined by the Commander of the Faithful (peace be upon him). Can we not derive from this command a specific privilege and specific care for the human being? Being a peer in creation and a human being requires that people be treated with love, affection, and kindness.
What is inherent dignity if not this? This is precisely inherent dignity—meaning the human being possesses an advantage through which this right is established. Ultimately, being human has a specific characteristic; this is actual, and it is also not acquired. One thing I have repeatedly reminded you of is that as soon as the discussion of inherent dignity is raised, and that the human being naturally possesses respect independent of religion, disbelief, and faith, some imagine it is claimed that the disbeliever and the Muslim are equal in everything. No, what is meant is a minimum of rights, to which we shall refer later.
Thereafter, the Imam states: “They commit slips and are beset by illnesses, and errors are committed by their hands intentionally and accidentally. So grant them of your pardon and forgiveness” (يَفْرُطُ مِنْهُمُ الزَّلَلُ وَتَعْرِضُ لَهُمُ الْعِلَلُ وَيُؤْتَى عَلَى أَيْدِيهِمْ فِي الْعَمْدِ وَالْخَطَإِ فَأَعْطِهِمْ مِنْ عَفْوِكَ وَصَفْحِكَ). In the face of their intentional and accidental errors, they must be treated with pardon and forgiveness.
The Second Group
The second group consists of traditions indicating the fulfillment of natural and primary human needs. The human being has a series of natural needs: the need for food and water, the need for clothing, and the like. On various occasions in the traditions, emphatic recommendations have been made to observe these needs of the people, without any regard in this respect for the people’s belief and faith.
The First Tradition
The late Kulaynī recorded this tradition in al-Kāfī: “From Abū Jaʿfar (peace be upon him), who said: ‘Verily, Allah, Blessed and Exalted is He, loves the cooling of a thirsty liver; and whoever quenches a thirsty liver of a beast or other than it, Allah will shade him on the Day when there is no shade except His shade'” (عَنْ أَبِي جَعْفَرٍ قَالَ إِنَّ اللَّهَ تَبَارَكَ وَتَعَالَى يُحِبُّ إِبْرَادَ الْكَبِدِ الْحَرَّى وَمَنْ سَقَى كَبِداً حَرَّى مِنْ بَهِيمَةٍ أَوْ غَيْرِهَا أَظَلَّهُ اللَّهُ يَوْمَ لَا ظِلَّ إِلَّا ظِلُّهُ). Imam al-Bāqir (peace be upon him) states: God, Blessed and Exalted is He, loves the quenching of a thirsty one. Here, he does not say “cooling of a Muslim’s liver,” but says a thirsty liver (kabd ḥarrā)—someone who needs water. Whoever quenches a thirsty liver—beast or other than it—God will place him under His shade, love, and kindness, on a Day when there is no shade except His shade. The alignment of the argument with this tradition is clear.
An objection might arise here, namely that He stated: “whoever quenches a thirsty liver of a beast or other than it” (وَمَنْ سَقَى كَبِداً حَرَّى مِنْ بَهِيمَةٍ أَوْ غَيْرِهَا)—meaning quenching the thirsty, whether animal or non-animal. It might be argued that what is meant by animal is clear, which is beasts; and non-animal refers to plants and vegetation, or a general meaning that includes all beings possessing vegetative life. If this is so, what advantage does it hold for the human being? This is not a dignity for the human being! Can this be regarded as an inherent dignity for the human being?
Here lie two issues:
First, does “other than it” (ghayrihā) mean the human being, or is it broader than the human being and plants? Both are possible. It can be justified that what is meant by liver (kabd) is not the literal liver—since water is also not directly related to the liver, as it is well-known where this water goes. What is meant is that his inner self and core are thirsty; this is also the case with plants. If they use the term liver, it can also be used metaphorically regarding plants. This aspect of whether it includes plants is not very important.
Second, if the command has been given to quench every possessor of a liver and this also includes animals, is any advantage and dignity derived from this for the human being? I wish to argue that, yes, at the very least, this can prove our claim. This is like the point raised one or two sessions ago: what inherent dignity is this for the human being if animals also share in it? Something in which both humans and animals share is no longer considered an inherent dignity.
I have stated previously that inherent dignity means the human being qua human being, independent of his belief and religion, requires specific care and attention; if quenching the human being—even if a disbeliever—is a duty, it indicates the necessity of preserving the right to life for the human being, and indeed even higher, for beasts. That is, through this command, we can derive the right to life for beasts and human beings of any belief and religion. If, for example, the right to life is established for non-humans as well as humans, can this not be an inherent dignity? The right to life is a right that living beings enjoy…
Question:
Professor: We argue that the right to life does not mean giving him water forever so that he remains alive. It says a thirsty liver… your saying that they should give water to the sheep before slaughtering it—here you are not concerned with the thirsty one; even if it is not thirsty, they say give it water. So this is different. One is the effect of instinct and is inherent to them; the nature of a wolf differs from the nature of a dog. It is said that a wolf does not show mercy even to its own kind; if it becomes hungry, it eats its own kind, whereas a dog is not so. Of course, education and training also have some effect; meaning this trainability exists especially in certain animals, and its root lies in habit-formation for the animal. It conditions certain benefits upon the performance of certain actions. At any rate, this will, right of choice, and free will are an advantage for the human being. No creature possesses this; that this is exclusive to the human being, there is no doubt.
This requires no further explanation and is clear, and there appears to be no reason to explain further. I only want you to pay attention to the reason why this is an exclusive blessing for the human being and is considered an ennoblement of him and an inherent granted dignity; this is what we are concerned with now. Thus, you have observed the exclusivity of this blessing; this cannot be denied.
The Second Tradition
The second tradition is the testament of the Commander of the Faithful (peace be upon him) concerning Ibn Muljam: “Make his food good and make his bed soft. If I live, I am the master of my blood—either pardon or retaliation; and if I die, join him to me, that I may dispute with him before the Lord of the worlds.” He states: make his food good; make the bed on which he wishes to sleep soft; do not harm him; if I remain alive, I am the guardian of my own blood and shall either pardon him or seek retaliation; and if I die, join him to me.
Although he is to be killed, he nevertheless states: “Make his food good and make his bed soft,” meaning that, as it were, the Imam took the fulfillment of his natural needs as a given, and states: give him good food; “make his food good and make his bed soft”—namely, quenching his thirst and providing his sleeping facilities until the time he is to be killed. Although he is among the worst of mankind, the Imam still gives this command. On what basis is this? Is it other than that he is a human being who has natural needs that must be fulfilled? This is truly among the rarest of events, or indeed has no parallel in the world, that someone should behave in this manner toward his own killer.